PhD 19016

THE ROLE OF SAVAK IN THE 1978-1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE

Submitted by
Abbas William Samii, M.Phil.
(Darwin College)
in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Ph.D.
at the
University of Cambridge
February 1994

'The Role of SAVAK in the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution,' *Dissertation Summary*
by Abbas William Samii, Darwin College

I. The major point of this work is to explore the role of SAVAK (*Sazeman-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar*, National Security and Intelligence Organization) in the Iranian government's failure to foresee and prevent the events of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution. Yet it would be impossible to do this without studying the organization itself, nor would it be possible to do so without placing SAVAK in the proper context of time or place.

II. For these reasons, three secondary themes are discussed herein.

A. Chapter 1 discusses the Shah's consolidation of power after his return to the throne in August 1953 through the early 1960s. To this end, he moved to eliminate or isolate his enemies, such as the National Front, the Tudeh, and the *Fada'iyan-i Islam*. He also acted to neutralise potential competitors who might normally be expected to support him, such as the Islamic religious community (*ulama*), the aristocracy, the military. and the tribes. The Shah also had to solve Iran's economic problems. It was during this period that SAVAK was created. A centralised intelligence and security organization was essential if so many threats to the regime were to be identified and eliminated. Chapter 2 discusses the Iranian intelligence community, such as it was, before the creation of SAVAK in 1957. In the years between 1953 and 1957, the Iranian intelligence community consisted of a hodgepodge of both official and unofficial (but government-sanctioned) organizations.

Chapter 3 is a brief discussion of SAVAK's overall organization. This touches on the changes the organization underwent between 1957 and 1979. Chapter 4 discusses several of the bodies which were created to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the Iranian organizations concerned with intelligence and security matters. Among these oversight and coordination bodies were the *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau), the *Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi* (Imperial Inspectorate Organization), and the *Shora-yi Amniyat-i Kishvar* (National Security Council).

Chapter 5 discusses SAVAK's service-oriented departments. Among these were the Training Department and Department I, the headquarters section which consisted of the director's staff, the personnel section, the ceremonies section, consultants and inspectors, and a secret operations fund. There was Department IV, which dealt with security for SAVAK personnel and facilities and provided personnel for paramilitary units. Department V had technical duties, such as mounting surveillance and planting wiretaps, while Department VI dealt with finance (accounts and purchases), motor transport, and the health of SAVAK employees. Department IX was SAVAK's records and filing section.

Chapter 6 is about the portions of SAVAK which were concerned with foreign affairs. This covers Department II (Intelligence Collection and Operations), Department VII (Intelligence Analysis), and the Liaison Sub-Department. The portions of SAVAK which dealt with domestic issues are addressed in Chapter 7. This covers Department III (Domestic Security), the SAVAK offices in the provinces, and Department VIII (Counter-espionage/Counter-intelligence). The domestic security apparatus is the portion of SAVAK which earned it a reputation for brutality, torture, and lack of adherence to legal process.

B. Chapter 8, 'Sayyid Musa Sadr, SAVAK, and Iranian-Lebanese Relations,' accomplishes a number of things. The role of SAVAK in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy is illustrated with a discussion of, among other things, clandestine aid to Lebanese President Camille Chamoun. The overwhelming influence of SAVAK's domestic security section, which had the power to undo long-running intelligence-gathering operations and political actions, is also demonstrated. Finally, the chapter shows a major reason why SAVAK did not provide timely or sufficient intelligence on the armed opposition facing the Iranian government.

C. Chapter 9 covers the years from, approximately, 1970 to 1979. During these years, the opposition's campaign of terrorism commenced and escalated, as did the regime's campaign of counter-terrorism and counter-opposition activities. This chapter provides a discussion of the armed opposition and the tactics used against it, arguing that intelligence methods were not applied sufficiently in the counter-terrorist campaign. This chapter also discusses SAVAK's efforts to hold back the impending revolution.

CONTENTS

Preface iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms v
Introduction 1

Chapter 1. August 1953-1960 consolidation of power 10
I. Domestic groups 10
A. National Front 10
B. Tudeh 12
C. *Fada'iyan-i Islam* 17
D. Military 19
E. Aristocracy 25
F. Clergy 26
G. Tribes 30
II. Other issues 34
A. Oil 34
B. US Economic Aid 38
C. Military Aid 41
III. International Events 42

Chapter 2. SAVAK's establishment 44
I. Before SAVAK 44
A. Official organizations 44
B. Unofficial organizations 46
II. The US Position 50
A. Military 50
B. Police 51
C. Gendarmerie 52
III. The British Position 53
A. Official intelligence ties 53
B. Unofficial intelligence ties 56
IV. Legislative Action 63
V. Foundations of SAVAK 66
A. Personnel 67
B. Training 67

Chapter 3. SAVAK's overall organization 69
I. Structure and Budget 69
II. Personnel 73

Chapter 4. Oversight and coordination bodies 77
I. Special Intelligence Bureau 78
II. Imperial Inspectorate Organization 81
III. National Security Council 82
IV. Coordinating Committees 1 and 2 83
V. Others 84
VI. Summary 85

Chapter 5. Service and support departments 94
I. Training Department 94
A. Early Intelligence Training 94
B. SAVAK's Training Program 99
C. Recruitment 105
II. Department I. Headquarters 112
A. GEN Teimour Bakhtiar 113
B. GEN Hassan Pakravan 118

C. GEN Nematollah Nassiri 120
D. GEN Nasser Moghaddam 123
III. Department IV. Internal Security 126
IV. Department V. Technical Duties 127
V. Department VI. Finance 128
VI. Department IX. Records 128

Chapter 6. Foreign SAVAK 129
I. Department II. Foreign intelligence collection and operations 129
A. Organization, Budget, Personnel 129
B. Operations 130
C. Miscellaneous 144
II. Department VII. Foreign intelligence analysis 145
A. Organization, Budget, Personnel 145
B. Operations 145
III. Liaison Sub-Department 146
A. Israel 147
B. CENTO Counter-Subversion Desk 149
C. France and the Safari Club 150

Chapter 7. Domestic SAVAK 154
I. Department III. Domestic Security 154
A. Organization, Budget, and Personnel 155
B. Operations 157
C. Prisons 169
D. Provincial SAVAK Offices 169
II. Department VIII. Counter-espionage / counter-intelligence 170
A. Establishment and training 170
B. Organization, Budget, and Personnel 172
C. Operations 174
D. Miscellaneous 179

Chapter 8. Sayyid Musa Sadr, SAVAK, and Iranian-Lebanese Relations 181
I. A Brief Biography 182
II. The Political Environment, 1957-1967 183
III. The Palestinians' Influence 196
IV. The Iranian Opposition 200
V. Sadr's Break with the Shah's Government 203
VI. Conclusion 210

Chapter 9. SAVAK, The Opposition, and the Revolution: 1970-1979 212
I. Armed opposition 212
A. LMI 212
B. PMOI 214
C. Marxist Fedai 215
D. Islamic Opposition 216
II. The War on Terrorism 218
A. Events 218
B. Non-violent tactics 222
C. Theory vs. Reality 224
D. Use of *ad hoc* groups 229
III. The Final Years, 1977-1979 232
A. Islamic Resurgence and Government Activities 233
B. Rise of secular groups 241
C. SAVAK versus the Revolution 242
D. SAVAK after the return of Khomeini 249

Conclusion 252
I. Domestic issues 252
A. Secular groups 252
B. Religious opposition 252
C. Shah's management style 253
D. Corruption 253
II. International issues 254
A. Economic issues 254
B. Intelligence reporting and analysis 254
C. Human Rights 255
III. Summary 255

Appendix 257
Glossary 258
Bibliography 259

PREFACE

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor A. Reza Sheikholeslami of Wadham College, Oxford, for his valuable advice, his encouragement, and his recognition of when to push me and when to give me some leeway. I would also like to thank my M.Phil. supervisor, Mister Peter Avery of King's College, Cambridge, for his advice and encouragement. I am particularly grateful to Professor Mark Gasiorowski of Louisiana State University. When I was starting to think that I had embarked upon an impossible project, he shared his experiences in conducting interviews and in finding elusive individuals, and he warned me about the pitfalls I might encounter. He has continued to help me by critiquing my work and encouraging me to strive for high standards by setting those standards.

I would also like to thank the following individuals for their advice, encouragement, and recollections: General Hassan Alavi-Kia, Doctor Ali Banuazizi, Dr Reza Baraheni, Prof. James Bill, Prof. Houchang Chehabi, The Honourable William Colby, Prof. Richard Cottam, Mr Michael Gaouette, Gen. Manucher Hashemi, Mr Avi Hecht, The Honourable Richard Helms, Dr Nasser Kalawoun, Prof. Homayoun Katouzian, Prof. Douglas Little, Colonel Stephen Meade, Prof. Farhang Mehr, Gen. Mohsen Mobasser, Gen. Javad Moinzadeh, Gen. Ali Motazed, Mr Morteza Moussavi, Dr Fida Nasrallah, Prof. Augustus Norton, Mr Mehdi Nourbakhsh, Dr Ali Reza Nourizadeh, Dr Earnest Oney, Dr Mujtaba Pashai, Col Isa Pejman, Dr Alfred Prados, The Honourable Jafar Raed, Mr Nowzar Razmara, Prof. Yann Richard, Mr William Royce, Dr Ahmad Salamatian, Dr Victoria Schiffmann, Dr Kemal Shehadi, Dr Nadim Shehadi, Prof. Gary Sick, and Dr Ebrahim Yazdi. I would also like to extend my gratitude to those individuals who have asked to remain anonymous, but without whose help I could not have completed this project. I am also grateful to the University of Cambridge Centre of International Studies, the Oxford University Centre for Lebanese Studies, the Foundation for Iranian Studies, and Darwin College for two travel grants.

I owe a great deal of gratitude to my grandparents and all of my parents for their support and encouragement. I am also very grateful to them for teaching me the values of industry and sacrifice. I will not forget the days at Fort Benning.

Finally, I would like to thank the individuals who refused to talk to me. They made me push just a little bit harder.

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development
AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
Amal	*Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya,* Lebanese Resistance Detachments
Aya.	Ayatollah
Brig. Gen.	Brigadier General
Capt.	Captain
CDO	Civil Defense Organization; *Sazeman-i Defa-yi Melli*
CECI	Counter-espionage/Counter-intelligence
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CC-1 & CC-2	Coordinating Committees 1 & 2, *Shora-yi Hamahangi*
Col.	Colonel
COS	Chief of Station
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
G-2	Army Intelligence
Gen.	General
GENMISH	US Army Mission to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
GRU	*Glavnoe Razvedyvatel 'noe Upravleni;* Soviet military intelligence
Ho.	Hojjat ol-eslam
ICDFHR	Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights
IIO	Imperial Inspectorate Organization, *Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi*
J-2	Military Intelligence
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KGB	*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti;* Soviet state security agency
KOOK	*Sazeman-i Kianouri va Kojour*
Lieut. Col.	Lieutenant Colonel
Lieut. Gen.	Lieutenant General
LMI	Liberation Movement of Iran, *Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran*
LMI(a)	LMI(abroad)
Maj.	Major
Maj. Gen.	Major General
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI-6	British foreign intelligence organization
MOIS	Ministry of Intelligence and Security
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NSC	National Security Council
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMOI	People's Mojahedin of Iran
PNL	*Parti National Liberal*
PPS	*Parti Populaire Syrien*
SAS	Special Air Service
SAVAK	*Sazeman-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar;* National Intelligence and Security Organisation
Sgt.	Sergeant
SIB	Special Intelligence Bureau, *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at*
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence

SOE	Special Operations Executive
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNOG	United Nations Observer Group
US	United States
VC	Viet Cong

ON TRANSLITERATION

The occasional use of Persian words and the frequent use of Iranian names in this work calls for some explanatory remarks. Any words from Persian-language sources have been transliterated according to a modified September 1970 Library of Congress system which avoids diacritical marks. All proper names and titles have been written in the same way that they were written in the English-language sources to which the author referred. For example, the name of the last pre-Islamic regime Minister of the Interior is written as Qarabaqi, rather than Qarabaghi. This is also the case in which the individual has a preferred spelling of his or her name. The standard English form of toponyms has been used, rather than the author's transliteration.

INTRODUCTION

I. The major point of this work is to explore the role of SAVAK (*Sazeman-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar*, National Security and Intelligence Organization) in the Iranian government's failure to foresee and prevent the events of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution. Yet it would be impossible to do this without studying the organization itself, nor would it be possible to do so without placing SAVAK in the proper context of time or place.

II. For these reasons, three secondary themes are discussed herein.

A. After the Shah was restored to the throne in August 1953, he initiated actions to consolidate his power. Not only did he act against proven enemies, such as the National Front, the Tudeh, and the *Fada'iyan-i Islam*, he also acted against potential competitors. These competitors had their own bases of power and some people saw them as possible alternatives to the Shah. For this reason, moves were made to isolate some of them, remove others from the political scene completely, and remove or eliminate others' bases of power. Among these potential competitors were the Islamic religious community (*ulama*), the aristocracy, the military. and the tribes. A concurrent approach during those years, and one which continued until the Revolution, was that of cooptation through financial inducements and the offering of sinecures.

Equally important in the Shah's consolidation process was the successful resolution of Iran's economic problems. The most important step to achieve this end, both economically and politically, was the conclusion of an agreement which would put Iranian oil back on the market. Until this was done, and even afterwards, US economic aid was essential for Iranian government operations, to which end both the Shah and his representatives lobbied hard.

Finally, the Shah was genuinely concerned by the external threats he faced. The greatest threat was that posed by the Soviet Union. Of similar concern was the danger posed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Pan-Arab ideology. As a result, the Shah entered into military agreements, such as the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) and the US-Iran Bilateral Pact.

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE

It was during this period that SAVAK was created. A centralised intelligence and security organization was essential if so many threats to the regime were to be identified and eliminated. Chapter 2 discusses the Iranian intelligence community, such as it was, before the creation of SAVAK in 1957. In the years between 1953 and 1957, the Iranian intelligence community consisted of a hodgepodge of both official and unofficial (but government-sanctioned) organizations. During those years both the United States and England played a major role in assisting the Shah in his efforts to improve his security. To this end, they provided advice and support for the military, the National Police, and the Gendarmerie. They were also closely connected with the creation of SAVAK, providing advice and training its personnel. These two countries also created their own intelligence networks as fail-safes.

Chapter 3 is a brief discussion of SAVAK's overall organization. This touches on the changes the organization underwent between 1957 and 1979, progressing in complexity over the years. This trend continued until its last director, Gen. Nasser Moghaddam, initiated moves to shed SAVAK of its domestic security apparatus. He intended to transfer responsibilities for domestic security and counter-espionage to the National Police (*Shahrbani*), but events overtook him before this could be done.

Even after SAVAK was created, it was not assumed that all of Iran's intelligence-related problems had been eliminated. Among these problems were corruption, excessive competition between top-ranking individuals, excessive personal ambition, and duplication of efforts resulting in wasted resources. Chapter 4 discusses several of the bodies which were created to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the Iranian organizations concerned with intelligence and security matters. Among these oversight and coordination bodies were the *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau, SIB), the *Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi* (Imperial Inspectorate Organization, IIO), and the *Shora-yi Amniyat-i Kishvar* (National Security Council, NSC).

Chapter 5 discusses SAVAK's service-oriented departments. Among these were the Training Department and Department I, the headquarters section which consisted of the director's staff, the personnel section, the ceremonies section, consultants and inspectors, and

a secret operations fund. There was Department IV, which dealt with security for SAVAK personnel and facilities and provided personnel for paramilitary units. Department V had technical duties, such as mounting surveillance and planting wiretaps, while Department VI dealt with finance (accounts and purchases), motor transport, and the health of SAVAK employees. Department IX was SAVAK's records and filing section.

Chapter 6 is about the portions of SAVAK which were concerned with foreign affairs. This covers Department II (Intelligence Collection and Operations), Department VII (Intelligence Analysis), and the Liaison Sub-Department. It was the Liaison Sub-Department which dealt with relations between SAVAK and other countries' intelligence services. The Liaison Sub-Department also dealt with intelligence exchanges, such as Trident (Iran, Turkey, and Israel), the CENTO Counter-Subversion Desk (Iran, England, Turkey, Pakistan, and the US as an observer), and the Safari Club (which was also referred to as the Pentagonal Group because it had five members: Iran, France, Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia).

The portions of SAVAK which dealt with domestic issues are addressed in Chapter 7. This covers Department III (Domestic Security), the SAVAK offices in the provinces, and Department VIII (Counter-espionage/Counter-intelligence). The domestic security apparatus is the portion of SAVAK which earned it a reputation for brutality, torture, and lack of adherence to legal process. The use of torture was allegedly commonplace even before SAVAK was formed, during the post-Musaddiq era of the Military-Governorship of Tehran. This pattern continued during Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar's leadership of SAVAK (1957-1961), but under his successor, Gen. Hassan Pakravan (1961-1965), greater emphasis was placed on the use of intelligence over coercion. The use of repression reached a new high during the leadership of Gen. Nematollah Nassiri in the late-1960s and the 1970s, as the Iranian security apparatus tried to deal with the rise of urban terrorism.

SAVAK also had a reputation for interference in the operations of other government agencies, placing its personnel and agents in jobs where they could report on other employees. These SAVAK agents used their positions to intimidate the non-SAVAK personnel while enriching themselves. SAVAK also placed its agents in academic and cultural insti-

tutions, playing on a naturally cynical and suspicious public to further deter Iranians from acting against the regime or even voicing discontent.

B. Chapter 8, an abridged version of which has been submitted to the *Middle East Journal* for publication under the title 'Sayyid Musa Sadr, SAVAK, and Iranian-Lebanese Relations,' accomplishes a number of different things. The role of SAVAK in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy is illustrated with a discussion of, among other things, clandestine aid to Lebanese President Camille Chamoun. The overwhelming influence of SAVAK's domestic security section, which had the power to undo long-running intelligence-gathering operations and political actions, is also demonstrated. Finally, the chapter shows a major reason why SAVAK did not provide timely or sufficient intelligence on the armed opposition facing the Iranian government.

C. Chapter 9 covers the years from, approximately, 1970 to 1979. During these years, the opposition's campaign of terrorism commenced and escalated, as did the regime's campaign of counter-terrorism and counter-opposition activities. This chapter provides a discussion of the armed opposition and the tactics used against it, arguing that intelligence methods were not applied sufficiently in the counter-terrorist campaign. This chapter also discusses SAVAK's efforts to hold back the impending revolution.

Why study SAVAK?

In the years since the Shah's departure from Iran and the disintegration of SAVAK, several books have been written about SAVAK.[1] Some SAVAK employees have written articles about aspects of their jobs or other SAVAK personnel.[2] There has been, furthermore, at least one autobiography by a former SAVAK officer.[3] While interesting, all of these works suffer from several drawbacks. Often, the author has a specific agenda, either

---

1. C. Delannoy, *SAVAK*, (France, 1990). S. Bashiri, *Qisih-yi SAVAK*, (Paris, 1987).

2. Letter from Gen. M. Qadar, reprinted in M. Alamuti, *Iran Dar Asr-i Pahlavi*, v. 10, *Aryamehr Daraj-i Iqtidar*, (London, 1991); Col. I. Pejman, *Asrar Qatl Va Zindegani-yi Shigiftangiz-e Sepahbod Teimour Bakhtiar*, (Paris, 1991); Col. I Pejman, *Arteshbod Hossein Fardust, Rais-i Sabeq-i Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at va Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi, "Khidmat ya Khianat?"* (Paris, 1991).

3. M. Rafizadeh, *Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal, An Insider's Account of US Involvement in Iran*, (New York, 1987).

pro- or anti-SAVAK, and this is apparent only to the reader who is familiar with the subject.[4] Others are trying to hide their own mistakes and/or they are pursuing personal grudges. Perhaps the greatest problem is that many such works are written in Persian, making them inaccessible to most researchers.

Perhaps the book which is mentioned most often when people discuss SAVAK is the memoirs of Gen. Hossein Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust.* Fardust was a high-ranking military officer who had a number of important positions in intelligence-related organizations (he was, among other things, a deputy-director of SAVAK), he was a confidant of the Shah's, and he was allegedly the highest-ranking defector to the Islamic regime. Indeed, some reviewers have termed this work as being very useful to the researcher.[5] His memoirs are unreliable as a source of factual information, however, and recommendation of them to students of Iranian affairs is a mistake. It is unfair, furthermore, to call them Fardust's 'memoirs', since they were compiled by the Iranian government's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after Fardust's death. Much of the book is dedicated to furthering almost every conspiracy theory which is part of Iranian folklore. Also, the book is full of historical errors which could have been easily checked, and which have been refuted in recent articles.[6]

Many of the English-language works about Iran, while excellent in their own respect, only make passing references to SAVAK.[7] Other works focus solely on the repressive aspects of SAVAK, and, in fact, this seems to be a tendency which will continue.[8] Two

---

4. See, for example, E.R. Oney, review of Rafizadeh, *Witness*, in *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 3, n. 4; and A.A. Farazian, review of Rafizadeh, *Witness*, in 'Aya Jameh-yi Irani In Hameh Ahanat-ha va Narava Goftan-ha Ra Bayad Bipasokh Bigzarad?,' *Rah-e-Zendegi*, (n.d.), pp. 32, 33, 62, 63, 70.

5. Fardust is reviewed in M.F. Saidi, 'All the Shah's Men,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 47, n. 1 (Winter 1993).

6. See F. Jam, 'Asharaty bih Adaha-yi Arteshbod-i Sabeq-i Artesh-i Iran Hossein Fardust va Merury bar Kitab-i Khatirat-i U zir 'nvan "Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi",' *Rahavard*, v. VIII, n. 29 (Spring 1992).

7. See, for example, P.W. Avery, *Modern Iran*, (London, 1965); J. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, (New Haven, 1988); R.W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold-War Case Study*, (Pittsburgh, 1988).

8. R. Baraheni, *God's Shadow*, (Bloomington, 1976); R. Savin, *Vakil Abad, Iran: a survivor's story*, (Edinburgh, 1979); W. Butler and G. Levasseur, 'Human Rights and the

works pay greater attention and are therefore more thorough when discussing SAVAK and the other intelligence and security organizations, but they suffer from the lack of information available at the time of their publication.[9] Two others stand out for their thoroughness and accuracy regarding SAVAK, but one, because of its length, and the other, because it was about a different subject, do not pay SAVAK the attention it deserves as an individual subject.[10]

This work, therefore, tries to overcome the problems in the works mentioned above. To this end, the author has relied on two primary sources. The first is US government documents available in Record Group 59 of the Diplomatic Records Branch of the National Archives in Washington, DC. These are indicated in the footnotes by 'RG-59', then the number of the box in which they are stored (ex: Box 3808). These documents were supplemented by those which were declassified under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and those which are available under the Declassified Documents Reference System at the US Library of Congress (LOC).[11] There are several problems with the government documents. First, the documents are declassified in chronological increments. Those which were available at the National Archives in Spring 1992 only covered up to 1960. Secondly, the US government has been selective in the documents it has chosen to declassify under FOIA. This being the case, the documentary evidence available to the researcher is somewhat limited.

I have also used the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents seized from the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and which have since been reproduced in a series of volumes titled *Asnad-i Laneh-yi Jasusi* (Documents from the Nest of Spies). It must be noted, however, that problems also exist

---

Legal System in Iran,' *A Report for the International Commission of Jurists,* (Geneva, MAR76); R. Cooper, *Death Plus Ten Years,* (London, 1993).

9. R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power,* (London, 1978, 1979); F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development,* (London, 1979).

10. E.R. Oney, '"The Eyes and Ears of the Shah",' *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 1, n. 4. Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran,* (London, 1991).

11. I am grateful to Dr. M.J. Gasiorowski for making the FOIA documents available to me.

with these documents. These volumes were produced by the *Danishjuyan-i Piru-yi Khatt-i Imam* (Students Following the Imam's Line), and have been used to justify elimination of political rivals, so it is difficult to know what has *not* been reproduced because it might implicate members of the Islamic Republic's government. These documents, furthermore, also contain errors which can be ascribed to language difficulties experienced by the reporters themselves.

The second primary source, and the most important one, has been the author's interviews with a number of retired intelligence officers who now reside in California, North Carolina, Washington, DC, England, France, and Denmark. A great deal of the information, which was secured in over seventy conversations with former SAVAK, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), British Intelligence (MI-6), and Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) personnel, is not available elsewhere, and it is not clear when, if ever, it will be made available. Information secured in interviews was supplemented with information from thirteen interviews conducted for the Oral History of Iran Collection of the Foundation for Iranian Studies (FIS) in Bethesda, MD, and the Harvard University Iranian Oral History Project (IOHP). Wherever possible, information from interviews is cited with the name of the source.

I have attempted to weigh the value of the information of these sources in several ways. First of all, what was the individual's rank and position? Was he or she in a position to have specific information about an incident, is the individual speculating, or is the individual repeating that which he or she has been told by others? Secondly, how reliable and accurate has the source been on other matters which I have been able to check with other individuals? Is he or she always right, usually right, occasionally right, or rarely right? Finally, how does the information correspond with open-source information?

Due to the sensitive nature of all intelligence-related matters, many of the interviewees have asked to remain anonymous. Three names in the text itself have been changed to protect the identity of sources or of individuals who still live in Iran. Most of the individuals approached were willing to assist the author in his research. There are multiple reasons for this willingness. The most frequently heard reason is a desire to 'set the record

straight', the 'record' being that which has been written by the previously mentioned books and articles. Another reason is that the interviewees realize that if their memories are not recorded, an important aspect of history will be lost. Many of them, furthermore, are proud of their service to their country, and they believe they have not done anything wrong.

For several reasons, none of the interviews were electronically recorded. The first reason is that intelligence personnel, by their very nature, tend to be very uncomfortable around recording devices. Even if they do give permission for the devices' employment, the interviewees will not be as open as they might have been. Secondly, individuals are often self-conscious around recording devices or are distracted by them. Finally, it was often impractical to employ such devices. Using a tape recorder in a Parisian café is not very discreet, and finding a power source for one in a Los Angeles parking lot or a Copenhagen hotel lobby is not very easy. Whenever possible, the author took notes during the interview, and when the interviewee forbade this, notes were taken as soon as the interview ended. This is why there are no direct quotes from the interviewees.

Seven potential interviewees declined to comment. Most of the former MI-6 personnel stated that they were forbidden to do so. All of these gentlemen, with one exception, were very straightforward and honest about this. One gentlemen feigned ignorance until presented with a description of his involvement in Iranian affairs, at which point he stated that he was not at liberty to comment on the subject. The reason most frequently cited when an individual did not want to be interviewed, and the one that makes the most sense, is the passage of time. Events that occurred decades ago, and which did not seem so important at the time, are eventually forgotten. Some of those who declined stated that they were trying to get on with new lives, and they preferred to forget about Iran. Most disappointing was the case of a retired CIA officer who stated that he had removed himself from the 'interview circuit' because his experiences with previous interviewers had not been very pleasant. It is a shame that a potentially valuable source of information has been lost because of mishandling by a clumsy individual.

Some of the interviewees were economical with the truth. This was usually because the individual was trying to hide his or her own role in certain events. Other times this

was because the individual was trying to use this work to pursue a personal vendetta. In order to avoid these potential pitfalls and those which are also seen in open sources, all evidence, whether written or oral, was confirmed by at least two other sources whenever possible. If it was not possible to confirm the veracity of a statement, this has been indicated in the text or in a footnote.

For these reasons, I believe that this is, to date, the most complete work on SAVAK. At the same time, as an analyst I believe that one can never have enough evidence. I believe that, as US, Iranian, and English government documents become more readily available, more work can be done on this subject. This will lead to a better understanding of Iranian domestic politics, Iran's role in regional politics, counter-terrorism theory, and the functions of intelligence organizations.

CH. 1. THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER AFTER AUGUST 1953

After Mohammad Reza Shah's restoration to power after the 19 August 1953 ouster of Premier Mohammad Musaddiq, he recognised the need to consolidate his power by improving his security, his political position, and his public standing. Obviously, he was concerned by the political groups ranged against him, such as the National Front, the Tudeh, and (eventually) the *Fada'iyan-i Islam*, and his Western allies assisted him in dealing with these threats. Like Reza Shah before him, the Shah sought to control the nomadic tribes of Iran, such as the Bakhtiari, the Kurds, and the Qashqai. The Shah also acted against individuals and groups which one would normally expect to support him. One such individual was Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who had been appointed as Musaddiq's successor, and one such group was the Iranian armed forces. The Shah also acted to reduce the power of the landowner-aristocracy and the Moslem clergy (*ulama*), since they served as potentially rival poles of power.

The Shah also had to act to improve Iran's economic situation. To this end he, with encouragement and assistance from his Western allies, sought an oil agreement that would give Iran a fair return on its natural resources. Until achievement of an oil agreement, the Iranian government depended on US economic aid, and the armed forces on US military aid and military pacts. Finally, the Shah had to act within the context of international events and regional threats, such as Egyptian Pres. Gamal Abdel Nasser and Communism.

I. Domestic groups

A. National Front

The first step in this process of consolidation was the neutralisation of the National Front. After the coup, Musaddiq's supporters went into hiding, while trying to rally support for their new alliance, the *Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli* (National Resistance Movement, NRM). Only ten days after the coup, 2,000 copies of the NRM statement, '*"nehzat edameh darad"* (the movement goes on)', were distributed in Tehran.[1] The NRM

---

1. H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini*, (London, 1990), p. 128.

then sent mimeographed notes to journalists warning them against criticising Musaddiq in print.[2]

The bazaar had been another source of National Front support, although it failed to act during the events of 16-19 August. Some bazaar merchants provided a 40 million rial fund to help Musaddiq.[3] This money probably came from the clandestine Bazaar Committee, which was made up of wealthier merchants whose economic interests were best served by Musaddiq.[4] Such bazaar support was discouraged by government measures, such as a threat to tear off the bazaar's roof and the actual re-routing of buses away from the bazaar.

In October 1953, the indictments of Musaddiq and Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi, Chief of the General Staff, were made public.[5] Musaddiq was accused of dissolving the Majlis, weakening the armed forces, attempting to weaken people's faith in Islam, and generally trying to overthrow the monarchy. Riahi was accused of complicity in Musaddiq's actions, although he tried to absolve himself by saying he was only following orders.

In November the two were tried, found guilty, and briefly imprisoned. While this went along with the shah's theme of intimidating and silencing his opponents, it would seem that this plan backfired, to a degree. Musaddiq, a seasoned speaker with a dramatic flair, used the trial as a platform to lash out against the Shah, foreigners, etc. His oratory combined well with his fainting spells, and his crying or laughing fits to, in the end, earn him, if not the outright support, then at least the respect of the majority of Iranians. The majority of Westerners saw his behaviour as a sign of his mental instability, not realising that, for Iranians, such histrionics are the qualities of a convincing speaker. Sympathy strikes were held, and the government reacted harshly, arresting thousands and destroying part of the bazaar.

---

2. State Department telegram 767, 788.00/28SEP53, RG-59, Box 4111. According to an April 1992 interview with a CIA officer who dealt with Nationalist elements, it was actions such as this which earned the NRM a reputation for toughness.

3. E. Sablier, 'L'extravagant en pyjama,' *Le Monde*, (18SEP53).

4. 'Political Significance of Tehran Bazaar Organizations,' Foreign Service Despatch 348, 788.00/19DEC53.

5. 'Transmittal of MOSADEQ-RIAHI Indictments,' Foreign Service Despatch 215, 788.00/9OCT53.

In general, however, the trial had the effect of intimidating the public and helped eliminate the National Front's popular appeal. Musaddiq was imprisoned until 4 August 1956, when he went into internal exile in his village of Ahmadabad.[6] To make Musaddiq's isolation complete, journalists who tried to see him were promptly arrested.[7]

The rigging of the 1954 elections prompted more NRM protests. NRM sympathisers were actually prevented from voting by Shaban Jafari's *chaqu keshan*, who cruised Tehran's polling places, beat up, then handed over to the authorities, anyone with a 'communist' ballot.[8] In November 1954, Hossein Fatemi, Musaddiq's foreign minister and closest adviser, was executed. The NRM then targeted non-governmental Americans in Iran with an appeal which would make them question US government support of Zahedi's government.[9] By 1958, NRM activities had come to a standstill, in the face of government repression and the combined handicaps of internal divisions and a lack of actual activists.[10]

B. Tudeh

Iran's Communist party, *Hizb-i Tudeh*, failed to act in support of Musaddiq during the events of August 1953. What Tudeh activities which did occur were mainly CIA provocations and reactions to these provocations. Why, then, did not the Tudeh support Musaddiq in his time of need? This was later revealed to have been caused by a split within the party itself.[11] One faction favoured helping Musaddiq and the National Front because of their opposition to the Shah and AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). The other faction was opposed to any form of cooperation with the National Front, seeing Musaddiq as a Western puppet who would eventually betray the Left. While the Tudeh later criticized itself for failing to support Musaddiq, it is not entirely clear whether the National Front would have allied itself with the Tudeh. The more pragmatic and left-leaning politicians may have been willing to do so, but would the Fada'iyan Islam and

---

6. State Department telegram 189, 788.00/6AUG56, RG-59, Box 3810.
7. US Army WEEKA (weekly update), 788.00 (W)/23JUL59, RG-59, Box 3814.
8. State Department telegram 1906, 788.21/10MAR54, RG-59, Box 4117.
9. 'National Resistance Movement Letter in English,' Foreign Service Despatch 363, 788.00/4FEB55.
10. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 130.
11. E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton, 1982), pp. 321-23.

other religious groups have been so eager? Another hindrance may have been the fact that both the CIA and MI-6 had managed to thoroughly infiltrate the Tudeh Party,[12] and were thus in a position to sow discord.

Despite the Tudeh's failure to present a united front, the Shah and the US government were still quite concerned by the potential Communist threat, particularly in the armed forces. As early as 1944, informal leftist groups had been organized among military officers. For the most part, these were little more than discussion groups, although one such group initiated a mutiny and Turkoman uprising in August 1945. This attempted uprising failed, and the Tudeh Party denied any association with the mutineers.[13]

This incident led to a government crack-down on suspected communists within the armed forces, and in 1949, the government formally outlawed the Tudeh Party. At this point Abdol Samad Kambakhsh initiated a network of Tudeh officers in the military, and its leaders (Executive Committee) included former Capt. Khosrow Rouzbeh, Gendarmerie Col. Ezatollah Siamak, Artillery Lieut. Col. Mohammad Ali Mobasheri, Air Force First Lieut. Manuchehr Mokhtari Golpaygani, Artillery Capt. Ismail Mohaqeq Davani, former Capt. Abol Hassan Abassi, and Infantry Maj. Jafar Vakili.[14] Some of these individuals were arrested, but they escaped from prison in December 1950.[15]

In June 1952, Iranian Military Intelligence (J-2) reported the existence of a 250-member Communist network in the armed forces, but stated that it was only effective for espionage.[16] Fears persisted, however, that the purpose of this network was to initiate a coup against the Shah on Moscow's orders. It was later discovered that the officers were to use their positions to gather intelligence that would improve the security of Tudeh Party operations. To this end, specific instructions were issued on what to look for, such as

---

12. The Reminiscences of Col. Gratian Yatsevich, (5NOV88, Camden, ME & 12JAN89, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

13. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 336-37.

14. Military Governor of Tehran, *Kitab-i Siyah Dar Bareh-yi Sazeman-i Afsaran-i Tudeh*, (Tehran, 1955). An English-language discussion of this book is O. Miyata, 'The Tudeh Military Network during the Oil Nationalization Period,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 23, n. 3 (JUL87).

15. 'Escape of Ten Tudeh Party Leaders from Qasr Prison, Tehran, on December 15, 1950,' Foreign Service Despatch, 788.00/22DEC50; RG-59, Box 4107.

16. State Department telegram 4672, 788.00/3JUN52; RG-59, Box 4108.

troop movements and morale, and the activities of the Americans, the British, and the Soviets.[17]

As if to show that its power was unaffected by the events of August 1953 and the subsequent Military Governorship, the Tudeh Party continued its subversive activities.[18] Tudeh propaganda was disseminated via *Mardom*, despite government attempts at suppressing it, and sabotage of government facilities took place. Many civilian ministries were infiltrated, and there was an on-going campaign to arrest known or suspected party members. The Lankarani brothers, who were believed to be British agents in the Tudeh Party, allegedly identified many of their former associates for the government.[19] The confessions and renunciations of arrested Tudeh members were given extensive publicity, in an attempt to show sympathisers the error of their ways.[20]

By the end of 1953, the Government's anti-Tudeh activities began to take effect. Distribution of Tudeh propaganda leaflets dried up and Party members began to quit. The Tudeh leaders realized that the harsher political climate might necessitate violent opposition. For this reason the Tudeh Military Network was ordered to instruct some 2,000 Tudeh civilians in military tactics. The training focused on individual infantry skills, such as marksmanship and grenades. This training, however, only continued for three or four months.[21] The network also engaged in extensive propaganda activities aimed at recruitment and dissemination of the Tudeh political message. Members whose military activities took them to rural villages were especially important in this regard. Other members were to question soldiers on their concepts of patriotism and nationalism, and to show the Shah and the military leaders as foreign puppets.[22]

---

17. *Kitab-i Siyah*, pp. 187-96.

18. 'Recent Tudeh Activities and Government Countermeasures,' Foreign Service Despatch 214, 788.00/9OCT53.

19. On the British connection of the Lankaranis, see M.J. Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (London, 1991), pp. 69-70, fn 23 and 24. On their role in identifying Tudeh members, see 'Recent Tudeh Activities and Government Countermeasures'.

20 'Roundup of Tudeh Activities, Late November 1953,' Foreign Service Despatch 316, 788.00/4DEC53.

21. *Kitab-i Siyah*, pp. 234-38.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-53.

Extreme secrecy, thorough vetting of potential members, and the substitution of pseudonyms and/or numbers for real names, were important factors in the network's operations. These elements, combined with the Network's strict discipline, made it very difficult to discover the Network. How was the Tudeh Military Network finally discovered? In August 1954 Abol Hassan Abassi was observed travelling from one safe-house to another with a suitcase in tow. He was behaving very suspiciously, leading a policeman to think that the suitcase contained stolen property. Abassi was arrested, and it was seen that the suitcase was full of encoded documents.[23]

Abassi was put in protective custody, because the authorities believed that if the Tudeh discovered his location he would be killed, since he was one of the few who knew almost everything about the military network. Abassi was very well-treated, but the only information he gave up was the location of two Tudeh safehouses, one in northern Tehran, and one in southern Tehran.[24] Maj. Pooladezh, a secret Tudeh member in J-2, was in the party that raided the northern house, so he diverted the raiding party to the wrong house.[25] The Tudeh members in the correct house heard the ensuing commotion (the raided house belonged to a Majlis member) and they fled to the southern house. The authorities had already surrounded the house, so all the Tudeh members were arrested, except Khosrow Rouzbeh.

Rouzbeh himself was not captured until 6 July 1957. His capture took place after a fierce gun-battle in southern Tehran with a SAVAK *shikar* (hunter) team led by Capt. Asghar Zamani. These teams owed their success to the use of Tudeh members who had

---

23 Based on interviews with M. Mobasser (London, 11MAR92), and with a CIA adviser to Bakhtiar (8MAY92). See also State Department telegram 515, 788.00/30AUG54, RG-59, Box 4112.

24. It has been suggested that torture was used to extract information from Abassi. [See C. Delannoy, *SAVAK*, (France, 1990), p. 57]. Abassi was not tortured, because it is generally recognized that information secured by physical means is unreliable, since the victim will say anything to relieve himself of the pain he is suffering. Overall, however, the era of the Military Governorship is viewed as one in which torture was relatively commonplace.

25. Pooladezh had been arrested by Riahi loyalists during the events of 16-19 August 1953. As the round-up of the military network began, Pooladezh fled the country, and he was next seen in Iraq, where many Tudeh members had established themselves. See State Department telegram 35, 788.00/17AUG53, RG-59, Box 4111; and Mobasser interview, (London, 11MAR92).

rallied to the government side. Not only was Rouzbeh's capture a blow to Tudeh morale and appeal, it hurt actual operations also, since he was seen as the mastermind.[26]

The Tudeh Military Network utilized a very ingenious trigonometric code. A CIA adviser was on his way to Washington to present the Military Network's codebook to a team of cryptologists, but during a stop-over in Paris he was contacted by Tehran's Military Governor, Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar, and informed that the code had been cracked. Despite his disbelief, he returned to Tehran and saw that Col. Mohsen Mobasser and Lieut. Col. Mostofa Amjadi had decrypted the network's code.[27]

Initially, the Shah did not announce the discovery of the network. CIA headquarters ordered two members of the Tehran station (the Chief of Station was unavailable) to draft a statement and encourage the Shah to read it. The Shah was initially hesitant, telling the CIA adviser that there would be no Tudeh if the US provided more modern equipment for the military. Eventually, he was persuaded to make an announcement.[28]

Approximately 500 officers and non-commissioned officers were arrested as a result of this cryptological breakthrough. Twenty-seven were executed, 134 were given life imprisonment, and many others were given shorter sentences.[29] Some of those who were imprisoned switched over to the government side in exchange for a reduction in their sentences. Others returned to military service, while others worked for SAVAK.[30] The motivations to switch sides were numerous. While some were executed, others were imprisoned on Persian Gulf islands, where the temperatures could reach 126 degrees and the humidity was extreme. The discipline was very strict, there was no mail, no reading,

---

26. 'Capture of Tudeh Leader,' Foreign Service Despatch 62, 788.00/15JUL57, RG-59, Box 3811; and interview with Mobasser (London, 11MAR92). On 11 May 1958, Rouzbeh was executed after a secret trial; see *New York Times*, (12MAY58), p. 2.

27. This information is based on interviews with the CIA adviser (8MAY92) and Mobasser (London, 22JAN92).

28. This information is based on an interview with the CIA adviser (8MAY92).

29. *Kitab-i Siyah*, pp. 345-73. See also, 'Government Anti-Tudeh Campaign,' Foreign Service Despatch 207, 788.00/26NOV54, in the Declassified Documents, 1979 (309D), LOC.

30. A former Tudeh member who SAVAK tried to coerce into cooperation was Dr Ehsan Naraghi, director of the Institute of Social Studies of the Faculty of Letters at Tehran University; see Department of State Airgram, (21DEC63), in *Asnad*, v. 20, pp. 2-26; Department of State Contact List, (9SEP67), in *Asnad*, v. 17, p. 10; E. Naraghi, *Des Palais Du Chah Aux Prisons De La Revolution*, (Paris, 1991).

rallied to the government side. Not only was Rouzbeh's capture a blow to Tudeh morale and appeal, it hurt actual operations also, since he was seen as the mastermind.[26]

The Tudeh Military Network utilized a very ingenious trigonometric code. A CIA adviser was on his way to Washington to present the Military Network's codebook to a team of cryptologists, but during a stop-over in Paris he was contacted by Tehran's Military Governor, Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar, and informed that the code had been cracked. Despite his disbelief, he returned to Tehran and saw that Col. Mohsen Mobasser and Lieut. Col. Mostofa Amjadi had decrypted the network's code.[27]

Initially, the Shah did not announce the discovery of the network. CIA headquarters ordered two members of the Tehran station (the Chief of Station was unavailable) to draft a statement and encourage the Shah to read it. The Shah was initially hesitant, telling the CIA adviser that there would be no Tudeh if the US provided more modern equipment for the military. Eventually, he was persuaded to make an announcement.[28]

Approximately 500 officers and non-commissioned officers were arrested as a result of this cryptological breakthrough. Twenty-seven were executed, 134 were given life imprisonment, and many others were given shorter sentences.[29] Some of those who were imprisoned switched over to the government side in exchange for a reduction in their sentences. Others returned to military service, while others worked for SAVAK.[30] The motivations to switch sides were numerous. While some were executed, others were imprisoned on Persian Gulf islands, where the temperatures could reach 126 degrees and the humidity was extreme. The discipline was very strict, there was no mail, no reading,

---

26. 'Capture of Tudeh Leader,' Foreign Service Despatch 62, 788.00/15JUL57, RG-59, Box 3811; and interview with Mobasser (London, 11MAR92). On 11 May 1958, Rouzbeh was executed after a secret trial; see *New York Times*, (12MAY58), p. 2.

27. This information is based on interviews with the CIA adviser (8MAY92) and Mobasser (London, 22JAN92).

28. This information is based on an interview with the CIA adviser (8MAY92).

29. *Kitab-i Siyah*, pp. 345-73. See also, 'Government Anti-Tudeh Campaign,' Foreign Service Despatch 207, 788.00/26NOV54, in the Declassified Documents, 1979 (309D), LOC.

30. A former Tudeh member who SAVAK tried to coerce into cooperation was Dr Ehsan Naraghi, director of the Institute of Social Studies of the Faculty of Letters at Tehran University; see Department of State Airgram, (21DEC63), in *Asnad*, v. 20, pp. 2-26; Department of State Contact List, (9SEP67), in *Asnad*, v. 17, p. 10; E. Naraghi, *Des Palais Du Chah Aux Prisons De La Revolution*, (Paris, 1991).

and the food was very limited. There were only two ways off the islands: the easy way was to recant and sign a confession, while the hard way was to die.[31]

At least two Tudeh demonstrations were broken up with CIA help.[32] Once, a CIA officer helped Tehran's Military-Governor stop an uprising in the bazaar. Another time, two CIA officers bugged a Tudeh safehouse and overheard plans for a demonstration. The demonstration was broken up after the information was given to Prime Minister Zahedi. The presses of the Tudeh newspaper were also kept in this safehouse, but the Chief of Station refused to continue the operation.

Between August 1953 and April 1955, estimated Tudeh membership of 50,000 was halved, and between four and five thousand members were arrested.[33] A new law, the Subversive Activities Control Act, was adopted on 2 November 1954 to accommodate the anti-Tudeh crackdown.[34] Another measure was a loyalty oath for government employees.[35] Yet this was only the tip of the iceberg. Iranian Military Intelligence had knowledge of even more Tudeh officers in the armed forces. The Shah forbade further arrests, however, since he believed that this would undermine military morale, public confidence in the military, and Western confidence in the Shah.[36]

C. *Fada'iyan-i Islam*

The Fada'iyan should not be considered a true part of the National Front, although the group did act in support of Musaddiq during the early stages of the Oil Crisis. The group's support for and then opposition to Musaddiq stemmed from its xenophobia. Their violent attacks on any politicians believed to be connected to foreign elements and their resort to assassination were justified by their fanaticism.

---

31. 'Status of Tudeh Party Members Imprisoned on Khark Island,' Foreign Service Despatch 37, 788.001/28NOV55, RG-59, Box 3814.

32. See K. Love, 'The American Role in the Pahlavi Restoration,' (manuscript, The Allen Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, 1960), p. 37; cited in Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 91, fn 13. See also M. de M. Ruehsen, 'Operation "Ajax" Revisited: Iran, 1953,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 29, n. 3 (JUL93).

33. 'Anti-Tudeh Campaign of the Iranian Government from November 20, 1954,' Foreign Service Despatch 484, 788.00/30APR55.

34. Interparliamentary Union, *Constitutional and Parliamentary Information*, III, no. 21, 8-9, cited in S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, (Berkeley, 1966), p. 209.

35. 'Proposed Anti-Communist Legislation,' Foreign Service Despatch 230, 788.001/6NOV54, RG-59, Box 4114.

36. Interview with J. Moinzadeh (London, 6FEB92).

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE

Sayyid Mujtaba Mirlohi (also known as Navab Safavi), the group's founder, claimed 5000 members and 100,000 sympathizers. At their public meetings, however, attendance rarely exceeded a few hundred. They had no formal organization and met irregularly. Although they claimed to recruit members from the *madrasahs* in Qum and Mashad, their activities were Tehran-based.[37] Most of the group's members came from the lower classes, and it got most of its funding 'from various individuals as part of Sh'ite religious "tax" payments and, through threats, from wealthy bazaar merchants.'[38]

In retrospect, it seems that the importance of the Fada'iyan was exaggerated, due to its connection with Aya. Abul Qassem Kashani, an influential *mujtahid* who spoke for the bazaari Moslems and who had served in the Majlis. At one point, Kashani made claims of founding and leading the Fada'iyan. This connection only lasted until May 1951. After the break Kashani was made the primary propaganda target of the Fada'iyan, and charges were exchanged over abandonment of religious principles and working for the British.[39] Cynics said this break occurred when Kashani stopped paying a subsidy for Fada'iyan support, while others said the political absolutism of the Fada'iyan made Kashani a natural target.[40] The Fada'iyan also gave up on Musaddiq, due to his failure to enforce Islamic law, his 'alleged reliance on the Americans and the Government's indifference to corruption,' shifting allegiance to Sayyid Zia Tabatabai.[41] In February 1952, 16 year-old Mohammad Mehdi Rafii (also known as Abd-i Khodai), made an attempt on the life of Deputy Prime Minister Hossein Fatemi.[42]

The group's last act took place in November 1955, when an attempt was made on the life of Prime Minister Hossein Ala for his interest in having Iran join the Baghdad Pact (CENTO's predecessor). The government reacted swiftly, rounding up the Fada'iyan leadership, its sympathisers, and even former associates like Kashani. Although most of

---

37. 'Fedayan Islam,' Foreign Service Despatch 20, 788.00/7JUL51.

38. F. Kazemi, 'The Fada'iyan-i Islam: Fanaticism, Politics, and Terror,' in S.A. Arjomand, ed., *From Rationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, (Albany, 1984), p. 168-69.

39. State Department telegram 2741, 788.00/10MAY51, and State Department telegram 2815, 788.00/16MAY51, RG-59, Box 4107.

40. R.W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, (Pittsburgh, 1964, 1979), pp. 151-52.

41. 'The Fida'iyan-i-Islam,' 1MAR52, FO/248/1540, (PRO).

42. State Department telegram 3116, 788.00/16FEB52, RG-59, Box 4108; *New York Times*, 17FEB52, p. 3.

these people were released, four of its leaders, including Safavi, were executed. The Fada'iyan were thus muted, but this was not to be the last of them.

It is believed that a September 1963 letter from Aya. Ruhollah Khomeini to religious leaders led to their support of the revival of the Fada'iyan. At this point the group's revival amounted to little, because SAVAK had secured information regarding its smuggling of weapons and its plot to assassinate the Shah.[43] In January 1965 Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur was assassinated by a member of a religious group called *Maktab*.[44] Maktab was traced to the Islamic Nation's Party (*Hizb-i Millal-i Islami*); at the trial it was learned that several of the party's members had been members of the Fada'iyan-i Islam, and indeed, the members had similar social backgrounds.[45]

D. Military

The Shah also saw the military as a threat to his power. During the early years of his reign (1942-51), he had begun to build on his ties with the military.[46] In this respect, the Shah was following in his father's footsteps. Thus, his moves to keep control of the military were not entirely unexpected; but he repeatedly said that the people were not yet ready for democracy.[47] The US government did not share the Shah's enthusiasm for such measures, nor did it want an overtly pro-Western Iran, but it did want an Iran that was at least stable and orderly on the Soviet Union's border. Hence it was decided that the rule of a strong individual, rather than of fledgling democratic institutions, was the means to this end. This decision overlooked the advice of several of the government's Iran-experts, such as John D. Jernegan, acting chief of the Division of Greek-Turkish-Iranian affairs, and George V. Allen, ambassador to Iran.[48]

Nor was the Iranian military a unified body, riven as it was with factions and cliques. These various groups tended to be centred around certain high-ranking individuals whose

---

43. Confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer (11APR92).
44. *New York Times*, (24JAN65), p. 3.
45. *The Times*, (21JAN66), p. 11; (7FEB66), p. 8; (7MAR66), p. 10.
46. OSS, 5JUL43, RG-226, ID-30178, National Archives (NA); in H. Ladjevardi, 'The Origins of US Support for an Autocratic Iran.' *IJMES* 15 (1983), p. 227.
47. OSS, 5JUL43, RG-226, ID 30178, NA; Morris to Hull, RG-59, Numerical File 891.00/6DEC44, NA; in Ladjevardi, 'Autocratic Iran,' p. 227.
48. J.D. Jernegan, RG-59, Numerical File 891.001/4DEC47, NA; G.V. Allen, RG-59, Numerical File 891.00/26DEC47, NA; in Ladjevardi, 'Autocratic Iran,' *IJMES*, p. 239.

motives varied. The majority of these officers were sincerely patriotic, believing that the goals they pursued were in Iran's best interests. So, when an officer was described as working for the English or the Americans, it did not necessarily indicate a straight agent-controller relationship, it usually indicated the officer's means of strengthening Iran.

Some officers, particularly the higher-ranking ones who had been in the military since Reza Shah's time, had certain business interests which influenced their political actions. These officers tended to be Royalists in nature. There was also a class of officers which could be classified as 'the professional soldiers,' in that they were relatively apolitical and identified purely with the military The Shah needed to replace such factionalism with loyalty to him, if he was to achieve complete control of the armed forces, but if anything, he actually encouraged it, hoping that by competing with each other, the officers would be too busy to conspire against the Shah. The following examples serve as illustrations of the problems the Shah faced.

1. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi[49]

The planners of Operation Ajax, particularly the British, had had doubts about the choice of Zahedi as Musaddiq's successor, because they had arrested Zahedi for pro-German and anti-British activities during World War II. They believed, however, that they had little choice, since he was the Shah's choice.[50]

The coup planners' mystification stemmed from a lack of understanding of behind-the-scene Iranian political dynamics, which effectively forced Zahedi on the Shah. As early as October 1952, Zahedi was gathering support for a possible bid as Prime Minister, and he went on to select a cabinet.[51] Soon after Zahedi was charged with plotting against the

---

49. See 'Biographic Data on Assadullah Mamaghani and General Zahedi,' Foreign Service Despatch 86, 788.521/27FEB50; RG-59, Box 4119.

50. F. Maclean, *Eastern Approaches*, (London, 1949, 1974), p. 266; K. Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*, (New York, 1979), p. 13, 123. A CIA officer who had protected Zahedi in the days leading up to the coup remembers that he had to help Zahedi get dressed because he was so nervous. At a post-coup victory party, Zahedi and his son Ardeshir asked their protector, 'We're in .... We're in .... What do we do now?' The US officer became 'a legend in the CIA's clandestine services' for his role in Operation Ajax. See D. Ignatius, 'In From the Cold,' *Wall Street Journal*, (19OCT79), p. 1; W.C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, (New York, 1980), p. 253.

51. State Department telegram 1341, 788.00/2OCT52, RG-59, Box 4109; State Department telegram 3343, 788.00/23FEB53, *ibid.*

government with the Rashidian brothers (British agents!), reports surfaced that Zahedi was in contact with the Bakhtiari *khans* in order to gain their support.[52] Zahedi's connection with the Retired Officers' Association, a conservative group of generals allegedly connected with the murder of Police Chief Gen. Afshar-Tus, resulted in his eventual arrest.[53] The Shah needed the support of the tribes and the Retired Officers' Organization, so he was obliged to select Zahedi as his Prime Minister.

Soon after the coup, tension between Zahedi and the Shah and Zahedi and pro-British officers became apparent. When the Shah returned from his exile he saw that Nematollah Nassiri, one of his most trusted officers, had been promoted to General by Zahedi, although such high-level promotions were normally in the Shah's domain.[54] The Shah told Zahedi that control of the military was imperative if he was to stay in power, so Zahedi should not interfere in military affairs.[55] Zahedi then began complaining about Gen. Nader Batmanghelidj, the Chief of Staff, who was associated with Ernest Perron, the Shah's private secretary.[56]

The Shah and Zahedi then began arguing about the allegedly corrupt candidates for the 1954 elections. Col. Hassan Pakravan encouraged Batmanghelidj to complain about Zahedi because of the enmity between Pakravan and Zahedi.[57] By April 1955, the anti-Zahedi elements, Zahedi's corruption-ridden clique, and the Shah's growing self-confidence, all combined to allow the Shah to oust Zahedi and replace him with his trusted ally Hossein Ala. Zahedi was exiled to Europe as an Ambassador-at-Large.[58]

---

52. 'Intrigues Among the Bakhtiari Tribes,' Foreign Service Despatch 414, 788.521/28NOV52.

53. State Department telegram 3427, 788.00/27FEB53, RG-59, Box 4109.

54. H. Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust*, (Tehran, 1989-1990), p. 171.

55. State Department telegram 636, 788.5/10SEP53, RG-59, Box 4109.

56. State Department telegram 861, 788.00/9OCT53, RG-59, Box 4111. According to confidential interviews with an MI-6 officer (7FEB92) and a CIA officer (16APR92), Perron was a long-time UK asset who was in close contact with MI-6 officer Robin Zaehner.

57. State Department telegram 1481, 788.21/7JAN54, RG-59, Box 4117. In a confidential interview with an MI-6 officer (7FEB92), Pakravan was a identified as a British agent. Although he could not confirm this definitely, a CIA officer stated that it seemed very likely to him (16APR92).

58. E.R. Oney, *CIA Research Study: Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76); in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 49.

2. Gen. Valiollah Qarani

Qarani, head of Army Intelligence (G-2), inspired by Egyptian Pres. Nasser's republicanism, set about organising a coup attempt against the Shah. Qarani, through intermediaries, established a variety of political contacts, from allies of Gen. Zahedi to NRM elements. It was believed that Qarani hoped to force the Shah's retirement to a figurehead position, while Qarani himself took over as Prime Minister.[59] By trying to enlist such varied elements, operational security suffered, and after the arrest of Qarani's ally Esfandiar Bozorgmehr, the entire plot was exposed. One report, however, speculates that the Qarani affair may have succeeded had a little more time passed before the arrests were made.[60]

This coup was headed off and several of the military officers were tried, with Qarani receiving the minimum jail sentence of three years. According to a US diplomat, his Embassy knew of Qarani's plot, but the Embassy did not tell the Shah about it.[61] Qarani later confirmed that he had been in contact with opposition politicians but shortly before his death he denied rumours that he had been in league with the US.[62] There were rumours that the Shah had been informed of the plot by Soviet intelligence, which produced a witness, based on a theory that the Soviet Union (which was having good relations with Iran at the time) would have preferred the Shah to a reformist government bought to power by the US.[63]

Another account has it that Qarani and his allies had approached the British with a plan for a coup. When the British were found to be unresponsive, the group turned to the Americans, and soon thereafter the plotters were arrested.[64] A man who had shared a cell with Qarani stated that Qarani had prepared a report showing that Generals Bakhtiar, Haj-Ali Kia, and Mehdi-Qoli Alavi-Moghaddam were all engaged in corrupt

---

59. 'The Qarani Affair: A Recapitulation,' Foreign Service Despatch 850, 788.00/25MAR58, (FOIA).

60. M.J. Gasiorowski, 'The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,' *IJMES*, v. 25 (1993).

61. H. Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, (London, 1990), p. 215.

62. H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*, (London, 1981), p. 209-10, fn5.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 200; and *idem.*, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 215.

64. P.W. Avery, *Modern Iran*, (London, 1965), p. 475.

practices, so this group told the Shah that Qarani was planning an American-sponsored coup.[65] Indeed, Qarani was on record for his views on Bakhtiar and Alavi-Moghaddam's corruption, although these officers reciprocated the sentiments.[66] The arrest of Qarani did have the effect of removing a counterweight to Bakhtiar's power.[67]

3. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar

Bakhtiar, the son of a Bakhtiari khan, was a very capable officer who eventually became SAVAK's first chief. The main action which brought him to the Shah's attention was the fact that, during the events of 16-19 August 1953, he managed to drive an armoured column from Kermanshah, where he was a garrison commander, to Tehran. The importance of armour, in terms of the strength it represents, is undeniable, and the poor roads and forbidding terrain made such a feat remarkable. Bakhtiar was rewarded for his loyalty by being made Governor-General of Kermanshah on 20 August.[68]

By 22 December 1953, Bakhtiar had become Tehran's Military-Governor, having replaced Col. Farzad Dadsetan, who had also run into problems with Gen. Batmanghelidj and his allies.[69] The fact that Bakhtiar was related to Queen Soraya had undoubtedly helped in his promotion. His position was further strengthened by his success in breaking up the Tudeh Military Network and civilian Tudeh and National Front organizations. In connection with these successes, Bakhtiar used the press in a campaign of self-promotion, leading to speculation that he would become Prime Minister.[70]

By 1956 Bakhtiar was in frequent contact with the US Embassy, in addition to being in constant contact with the CIA. In these contacts he tried to portray himself as a progressive and effective officer, who, despite his loyalty to the Shah, was a powerful

---

65. Interview with Sayyid Mohammad Baqer Hijazi, Tehran, (3OCT66), in J. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, (New Haven, 1988), p. 127-28.

66. 'Recent Conversations with Iranian Politicians,' Foreign Service Despatch 579, 788.00/17JAN57, RG-59, Box 3810.

67. 'Summary of Internal Political Developments in Iran in 1336,' Foreign Service Despatch 869, 788.00/31MAR58, RG-59, Box 3811.

68. 'Events in Various Provincial Cities, August 16-23, 1953,' Foreign Service Despatch 134, 788.00/1SEP53, RG-59, Box 4111.

69. State Department telegram 1004, 788.00/30OCT53, RG-59, Box 4111.

70. 'Anti-Tudeh Campaign of the Iranian Government from November 20, 1954,' Foreign Service Despatch 484, 788.00/30APR55.

political personality in his own right.[71] CIA personnel who worked closely with Bakhtiar saw him as a valuable ally in the battle against Communists, so they promoted him in conversations with the Shah.[72] Although the Shah was not very happy with what he saw as US interference, he felt obliged to appoint Bakhtiar as chief of the new intelligence organization, SAVAK.[73] Bakhtiar began to accumulate a personal fortune, displaying it, his numerous female companions, and his ambition ostentatiously.[74]

The Shah became both alarmed and irritated by Bakhtiar's behaviour, so he began moves to reduce Bakhtiar's power, according to Brig. Gen. Pakravan.[75] In 1961 Bakhtiar was relieved of his post under the pretext of not having foreseen the civil unrest of 1961. Bakhtiar's ouster coincided with those of Gen. Abdollah Hedayat, chief of the supreme commander's staff and number two after the Shah in the armed forces; Gen. Kia, chief of Military Intelligence (J-2); and many lower-ranking military personnel.[76]

4. Others

The above three officers were not the only potential sources of intrigue. There were groups organised around the following officers. Gen. Kia, who in addition to being chief of J-2, ran a private intelligence-gathering organization called *Sazeman-i KOOK*. Gen. Hassan Arfa, a former Chief of Staff who was a member of the Retired Officers' Association. Gen. Batmanghelidj, who had served as Chief of Staff before being made Ambassador to Iraq. Gen. Alavi-Moghaddam, chief of police and a rival of both Kia and Bakhtiar. Gen. Hedayat, Batmanghelidj's replacement as Chief of Staff, who was being

---

71. 'General Bakhtiar's Political Beliefs,' Foreign Service Despatch 1082, 788.00/25JUN56.

72. Confidential interview with a CIA adviser to the Military-Governor of Tehran's intelligence unit (8MAY92).

73. Interview with M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

74. 'A Political Analysis of the Iranian Army,' Foreign Service Despatch 709, 788.5/12FEB57.

75. 'Recent Conversations with Political Leaders,' Foreign Service Despatch, 788.00/10FEB59.

76. M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, (Princeton, 1971), p. 49.

used by Alavi-Moghaddam as a counter-weight to Bakhtiar.[77] And finally, Generals Aryana (Army Chief of Staff) and Golpira (Gendarmerie chief).

Nor were these the only potential sources of trouble in the military. The Shah recognized that the military was a pillar of 'stability and security' for his rule. The generally apolitical enlisted men were not very well treated, but the food, shelter, and clothing they received in the military were superior to those they got in their villages. To boost morale, the Shah sought to improve salaries, provide housing, and build military cooperatives. Even lower-ranking officers were unreliable, because many saw themselves as civilians who were fulfilling an unpleasant obligation. Others saw the military as a political entity (a praetorian, rather than professional, force). Some of the officers saw the military as a source of self-enrichment.[78]

E. Aristocracy

Although Iran's aristocratic class is referred to as the 'Thousand Families', in reality it never exceeded one to two hundred.[79] The exaggeration, however, is an indication of the power these families wielded. Their power was furthered by inter-marriage and shared interests. This group consisted of the royal families, tribal nobility, military elite, upper clerics, and native landlords. They not only had economic significance, they had political significance, too. When Majlis elections took place the landowners could encourage the peasants occupying their land to vote for specific candidates, thus guaranteeing the election of the landowners' preferred candidates. Reza Shah had revoked some of their power by confiscating some of their lands, but they still constituted a powerful group. Mohammad Reza Shah, immediately after the August 1953 coup, did nothing to threaten their interests. The landowners seemed more concerned with their own economic interests, so they basically cooperated with him.

---

77. 'Analysis of Power Groupings Within the Iranian Government: The Struggle for the Prime Ministership,' Foreign Service Despatch 5, 788.00/3JUL56, RG-59, Box 3810.

78. State Department telegram 705,788.00/19SEP53, RG-59, Box 4111; 'A Political Analysis of the Iranian Army.'

79. A. Qasimi, *Tarikh-i Siyah ya Hukumat-i Khanivadah-ha dar Iran* (The Black History or the Rule of Families in Iran), pp. 45-46; in Bill, *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization*, (Columbus, 1972) p. 9.

After some time, however, the Shah began moves to reduce the power of the Thousand Families. There was public demand for legitimate elections, and, when the results of the 1954 elections did not live up to public expectations, there were demonstrations and unrest. Newspapers demanded changes in national politics and government, and editorials claimed that the Thousand Families, who dominated the Majlis, were hindering the Shah's efforts to initiate reforms.[80] The landowners, becoming irritated with what they saw as the incompetence of the Shah's rule, which in turn was harmful to their interests, started to agitate for a return to the old system in which they exerted greater power.[81]

The Shah's next attempt to curtail their power came with the 1960 introduction of a Land Reform bill, but this was eventually so diluted as to be meaningless. The 1960 elections were so obviously rigged and public discontent so vocal that the Shah cancelled them. The 1961 elections were not as obviously manipulated. After claiming that free elections would merely return the landlords to the Parliament, the Shah initiated the Land Reform program, partly to reduce the landowners' power base.[82] During the first stage of this program (1962-1964), landholdings in excess of one village were turned over to the government for resale to the peasants who farmed the land, and in the remaining villages, the landlord's share of the crop was reduced to 5-10%. During the second stage of the program, landlords were forced to dispose of or sell the remainder of their land in a number of ways prescribed by the government. Mindful of the power this class still wielded, and recognizing the need for its continued support, there were a number of provisions in the second stage which allowed the landlords to avoid selling their land. Religious endowment lands were to be leased to the peasants. The Shah thus hoped to gain the loyalty of the peasant class, while simultaneously eliminating the power-base of the landowner class. The Shah, furthermore, was willing to let the landed interests believe that land reform was a policy forced on him by the US. In a sense, this plan

---

80. 'Newspaper Demands for Reform,' Foreign Service Despatch 565, 788.00/26FEB54, RG-59, Box 4112.

81. 'Internal Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Memorandum, 788.00/11FEB61, (FOIA).

82. On the land reform program, see H. Mahdavy, 'The Crisis in Iran,' *Foreign Affairs*, v. 44, n. 1 (OCT65), pp. 137-139.

backfired, because it succeeded in eliminating the landlords as a buffer between the peasants and the government. With the removal of this buffer, the peasants felt at liberty to blame their problems on the government.[83]

After the August 1953 coup, the power of the Thousand Families was also diminished by the arrival into the upper-classes of new-comers whose power was based on their financial status. They were the foreign capitalists, the landless rentier elite of landowners whose land had been confiscated, and the economic elite of bankers, contractors, major merchants, and industrialists.[84]

F. Clergy

The clergy had played a significant role in the Oil Crisis and the Shah's subsequent return to power. Aya. Kashani's role has been noted above, but it bears elaboration. Kashani was a vocal proponent of nationalisation and the elimination of foreign influence in Iranian affairs. While he advocated a return to Islamic government for Iran, it is generally agreed that this stemmed more from his political motives than any real religious motivation.[85] During the *30 Tir* (18 July 1952) incident Kashani helped organise crowds in Musaddiq's favour, prompting the Shah to ask Musaddiq to resume the role of Prime Minister, which he had symbolically resigned.

Later, however, both Kashani and Aya. Sayyid Mohammad Behbehani were approached by CIA contract officers to encourage them to split with the National Front.[86] It was later stated that they did take the money, leading to stories of 'Behbehani dollars' in the bazaar, and a report of a post-coup meeting between the Shah, Zahedi, and

---

83. Mahdavy, p. 142.

84. Bill, *Politics of Iran*, , p. 8, 10.

85. See M. Yazdi, 'Patterns of Clerical Political Behaviour in Postwar Iran, 1941-53,' *Middle Eastern Studies* v. 26, n. 3 (July 1990). On Kashani's early career, see 'Transmitting Biographic Data on Ayatollah Kashani,' Foreign Service Despatch, 788.521/9JUN50.

86. Based on interviews with seven former CIA officials in Iran at the time, in M.J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran,' *IJMES* 19 (1987) pp. 268-69. This financial approach was part of an operation, codenamed BEDAMN, intended to thwart Tudeh and Soviet influence. Funded at $1 million a year, BEDAMN utilised propaganda, 'black operations' (such as infiltration of the Tudeh, 'paying religious figures to denounce the Tudeh as anti-Islamic, and organising attacks on mosques and public figures in the name of the Tudeh'), and 'direct attacks on Soviet allies.'

Kashani, in which Kashani was thanked for his efforts.[87] Musaddiq's extra-legal efforts to concentrate power in his own hands had a greater effect in losing him his early supporters, despite what some apologists may say, than did foreign money.[88]

After the coup Kashani gradually slipped from public life, because many came to believe that he was a British agent, and Tehran's press and radio ignored his efforts to attract attention.[89] This did not signify a diminution in the importance of the clergy in Iranian affairs, and it has been suggested that the clergy's importance increased after August 1953.[90] The government's position towards the religious community did not involve the use of repression and coercion, in contrast to its dealings with Communists and Nationalists. In fact, the *ulama* were generally quiet after the coup, following the example of the *Marja al-Taqlid* (source of imitation) Aya. Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi in Qum.

There was one major exception to this general quiet. During the Ramadan period in 1955 the popular preacher Falsafi spoke out against the rising power of the Bahais in Iran and accused them of being traitors and foreign agents.[91] The military government called on the Bahais to stop spreading propaganda that would provoke the public, and the government radio station replayed Falsafi's sermons. Borujerdi then praised Falsafi publicly, and the Majlis voted to outlaw the Bahai faith.[92]

---

87. 1983 and 1984 interviews with the CIA officials who delivered $10,000 to a Kashani representative, Ahmad Aramesh; in Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 *Coup D'Etat* in Iran,' p. 274; and 'Account of Conversation,' 1SEP53, FO/371/104571, in *ibid*, p. 285.

88. This apologetic tendency has been noted in a review of J.A. Bill and W.R. Louis, ed.'s, *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil*, by C. Arjani, *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin*, v. 16, n. 2 (1989), pp. 207-12.

89. 'National Front Leaders: Whereabouts and Potentialities,' Foreign Service Despatch, 788.521/17APR54, RG-59, Box 4119; and 'The Government and Kashani's Publicity Campaign,' Foreign Service Despatch 788.00/26FEB54, RG-59, Box 4112.

90. A. Tabari, 'The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics,' in N.R. Keddie, ed., *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, (New Haven, 1983).

91. Falsafi had a history of rabble-rousing. In June 1951 he was identified as 'one of Iran's most influential younger mullahs' whose lectures against the UK, US, and USSR led to riots. In May 1952, he was involved in disorders in the Tehran bazaar. Also, he was sponsored by a CIA operation called BEDAMN as an alternative to Kashani during the oil crisis. (State Department telegram 3453, 788.00/27JUN51, RG-59, Box 4107; Mashad Consulate telegrams 2 & 4, 788.00/2AUG51, *ibid.*; S. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*, [Albany, 1980], p. 64; Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 70).

92. State Department telegram 2225, 788.00/8MAY55. Falsafi was a member of an anti-Bahai group which eventually became the Hojjatieh Society, and the leading ulama

On 9 May 1955 the press carried reports of the destruction of the dome of the Bahai centre in Tehran (*Hazhir'e al-Qods*) and its occupation by troops, and on 17 May it was announced that the Bahai centre in Shiraz had been closed and occupied by the military.[93] The Chief of Staff (Batmanghelidj) and the Military Governor of Tehran (Bakhtiar) led the attackers.[94] Behbehani congratulated the Shah for these acts. At the same time, the Shah's personal physician, Abdol Karim Ayadi, a Bahai, was told to leave the country for a while. For this reason he went to Italy for about nine months. The Bahais fought back by withdrawing their cash from the bazaar, a move which led to the collapse of several businesses.[95]

In purely religious terms, Bahai refusal to accept Mohammad as the final prophet was the ulama's major concern. More practical reasons, such as an attempt to counter the Bahais' increasing political and economic influence and reform-orientation, and an effort by the ulama to regain its influence, probably carried more weight. More conservative elements resented the Bahai pressure for reforms, too.[96] Also, the ulama felt threatened by the number of conversions of Moslems to the Bahai faith.[97]

In 1955, 70 military officers were retired on the grounds of being Bahais, yet among this group were some of the very officers who were most helpful in terms of remodelling the armed forces. So, while the Shah had to permit these moves to appease the religious establishment, to which he undoubtedly felt an obligation for its support and a need for its continued support, he also recognized that he could not allow the campaign to go too far.[98] Minister of the Interior Assadollah Alam had Falsafi muzzled until order was restored.[99]

---

approved of the group's work; see 'The Hojjatieh Society — Its History, Advocates, and Opponents,' *Iran Press Digest*, (28SEP82), p. 20, and *ibid.*, (5OCT82), p. 15.

93. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, p. 77, 80.

94. Oney, *CIA Research Study*; in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 33.

95. State Department Office of Intelligence Research, 'Political Significance of the Campaign Against the Bahai Sect in Iran,' Intelligence Report 6964, (16JUN55), p. 5.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2, 6.

97. 'Murderers of Bahais Convicted - Analysis of Present Position of Bahai Community,' Foreign Service Despatch 27, 788.00/12JUL56, RG-59, Box 3810.

98. 'Political Significance of the Campaign Against the Bahai Sect in Iran,' p. 7. Tragically, Islamic aggression against the Bahais was revived during the Revolution.

99. In 1963, Falsafi spoke out against the Shah's Reforms, so Alam, who had become Prime Minister, had him imprisoned; see A. Alam, (A. Alikhani, ed.), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, [London, 1991], p. 48)

Over time, Bahais regained their influence, and although the ones mentioned below exceeded the limits of mutual help, it is important to cite them as examples of people's irritants. Ayadi, whose medical abilities were not commensurate with his position, was given exclusive rights for Persian Gulf shrimp fishing, was a shareholder in numerous companies, and used his position to help other Bahais.[100] Another example is that of Hojabr Yazdani, who had started out as little more than a shepherd in Sangsar. Allegedly through the use of coercion and protection from high in the government, he achieved immense wealth and power. Allegedly, when he was investigated by the Imperial Inspectorate Organization (IIO) (on the IIO, see Ch. 4), its head, Gen. Hossein Fardust, was told by Ayadi that he had intervened with the Shah and Fardust should drop the issue.[101]

Resenting the end of the anti-Bahai campaign, the ulama rose up when efforts to enforce women's Constitutional rights arose. By mid-1959, however, the clergy fully supported the Shah, even making anti-Soviet speeches during the Muharram processions, and in general, the *ulama* was supportive of the Shah during the post-coup period. The Fada'iyan-i Islam is an exception to this view, but as stated earlier, the group's importance was exaggerated. Clergy-government relations became strained with the introduction of the Shah's Land Reforms in the 1960s.[102]

G. Tribes

By trying to establish dominance over Iran's tribes, Mohammad Reza Shah was continuing a policy of his father's. Although the tribes were a small part of Iran's population (only 20% by 1957), their military potential ensured that they were always included in any political calculations.[103] This was why there was debate within the Iranian government over who should have authority over the tribes. Originally, Army

---

100. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 386; *Asnad*, v. 17, p. 66.

101. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 375. Yazdani was jailed by the Shah in August 1978 for fraud and illegal use of government land; see Department of State telegram, (28NOV78); in *Asnad*, v. 37, pp. 4-5.

102. 'Women's Rights Become Current Political Issue,' Foreign Service Despatch 479, 788.00/15JAN59, RG-59, Box 3812; US Army WEEKA (weekly update), 788.00 (W)/23JUL59, RG-59, Box 3814.

103. 'The Tribes and the Political Stability of Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 662, 788.00/4FEB57, p. 1.

Intelligence (G-2) sent tribal affairs officers to live and move with each tribe. Musaddiq wanted this responsibility transferred to the Gendarmerie and the Ministry of the Interior.[104] The Army officers were keen to retain this responsibility for several reasons. First of all, tribal duties allowed them to extort money from the tribe. Secondly, in purely bureaucratic terms, an organization is hardly ever willing to lose any of it prerogatives, since such a loss is seen as a diminution of its importance.

There were other government-based plans involving the tribes. The CIA hid arms caches which were to be used by tribally-based guerrilla warfare units if Iran was invaded by the Soviets. Kia of Military Intelligence (J-2) had a 'pet scheme' which involved the training of the tribes for guerrilla operations, but it is not clear how much of this plan was anything more than an attempt to detract from the power of Qarani at Army Intelligence.[105]

Many outside observers romanticized the tribal lifestyle, which did have a surface appeal, so they tended to condemn the government's attempts to settle and control the tribes. This also led to over-estimations of the tribes' potential. While the potential dangers of Kurdish and Arab nationalism continued to exist, by June 1959, government activities had reduced tribal power to only a 'tertiary' level.[106]

---

104. 'Difficulties Presented By Transfer of Authority over the Tribes by the Iranian Government,' Foreign Service Despatch 875, 788.00/24APR53, RG-59, Box 4110.

105. 'The Southern Tribes - A Pawn in Iranian Armed Forces Politics,' Foreign Service Despatch 838, 788.00/19MAR57, RG-59, Box 3810.

106. 'Political Potential of the Tribes of Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 890, 788.00/2JUN59, p. 1.

1. The Bakhtiari

It was believed that the Bakhtiari khans, particularly Abul Qassem Khan Bakhtiari and Bahman Samsam Khan Bakhtiari, were in contact with Gen. Zahedi during the Oil Nationalization period, and that these contacts were leading to hopes of an independent or autonomous Bakhtiari southern Iran. It was rumoured, furthermore, that funding for such efforts was coming from the British, while arms were flooding into the region, despite the Army's efforts to weaken the flow.[107] A few months later a Bakhtiari rebellion commenced, rising to such a pitch that military aircraft had to be engaged against the tribe.[108]

This anti-Musaddiq rebellion was suppressed, and by 1957 the Bakhtiari had fitted themselves into the Iranian mainstream. While many Bakhtiari continued a semi-nomadic existence, leading members of the tribe had gone to the cities, and their tribal contacts were minimized to annual trips to ensure that their crops were collected. Many younger khans entered government service, either in the military or the civilian bureaucracies, although a few of the older ones continued to live in their villages.[109]

2. The Kurds

The Kurdish Javanrudis had been practicing virtual autonomy in the remote mountains of Western Iran, and a three-week military campaign against them commenced on 5 February 1956. The Javanrudi had allowed no government agents in their area, operated across the Iran-Iraq border illegally, and were in contact with the Barzani Kurds who had rebelled against the government in 1946.[110] This campaign succeeded in eliminating a large number of the tribesmen, while, for a change, the Army suffered few casualties.

The fact that other Kurdish groups joined the government forces against the Javanrudi was as much an indication of the Kurds' warlike tendencies as it was an indication of a

---

107. 'Intrigues Among the Bakhtiari Tribes,' Foreign Service Despatch 414, 788.521/28NOV52.

108. Foreign Service Despatch 738, 788.00/10MAR53, RG-59, Box 4109.

109. 'The Tribes and the Political Stability of Iran,' p. 5; 'Political Potential of the Tribes of Iran,' p. 5.

110. For discussions of this movement, see A. Roosevelt, 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,' *Middle East Journal* 1 (JUL47); A. Roosevelt, *For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer*, (Boston, 1988); and W.L. Westermann, 'Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion,' *Foreign Affairs* 24 (JUL46).

weakened sense of tribal identity.[111] In fact, the number of Kurdish officers in the Iranian military was on the increase. Kurdish nationalism was seen as a threat which could be exploited by the Soviets and, after 1958, by Iraq. Cultural programs and the central government's divisive tactics were successful in reducing Kurdish unity and increasing identification with the state. After the 1958 Iraqi coup, furthermore, the Barzani Kurds cooperated with SAVAK in military operations and in intelligence gathering against Iraq's government.

3. The Qashqai

The Qashqai had established relations with Musaddiq in 1920, when he was governor of Fars, and they believed that a Musaddiq government would treat them more gently than the Pahlavis had. In September 1953, the Qashqai tribes marched on Shiraz, despite the CIA's offer of $5 million and cabinet posts if they would support the Shah and refrain from attacking the city.[112] Hushang Shahbazi, a relative of the Qashqai chiefly family, said that the Qashqais favoured the National Front because the Shah was the greatest threat to their interests as landowners.[113] It also seems that their actions were motivated by concern over tax obligations.[114]

After the arrest and forced exile of several Qashqai khans, the tribal confederation withdrew its forces. A year later Khosrow Qashqai, who had served as Musaddiq's

---

111. For a discussion of Kurdish aggression, see 'The Illegal Arms Traffic in Western Azerbaijan with Special Reference to Kurdistan,' Foreign Service Despatch 49, 788.00/9APR53, RG-59, Box 4110.

112. Based on interviews with the Shahilu family and corroborated by Miles Copeland in a JUL79 interview, in L. Beck, *The Qashqa'i of Iran*, (London, 1986), pp. 153-54. This offer was made by Commander Eric Pollard, a CIA officer with diplomatic cover as a naval attaché; see interview with Felix Aghayan by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP, (5MAR86, Paris).

113. Department of State cable, (DEC79); in *Asnad*, v. 26.2, pp. 80-81. That the Qashqais' major motivation was their land and their tribal interests can be seen in their activities during World War II. In the late 1930s the Abwehr (Nazi military intelligence) recruited one of the khans to provide support for German covert operations in Iran. At least three German teams parachuted into southern Iran and distributed a great deal of money, hoping to encourage the Qashqais to rebel against the Tehran government. The tribesmen confiscated the Germans' money and weapons and then turned the Germans over to the British, who eventually repatriated them. In February 1968 two of the Germans confessed to being long-time KGB agents. E.R. Oney, 'Drang Nach Islam Revisited,' *Intelligence Quarterly*, v. 3, n. 2.

114. 'Qashqai Developments During October 1953,' Foreign Service Despatch 246, 788.00/30OCT53, RG-59, Box 4111.

adviser on tribal affairs, was warned by Gen. Sadegh Amirazizi that if he did not leave Iran the Army would be forced to pursue him, too. Khosrow Khan wanted money to leave the country, so approximately 300,000 tomans were deposited in the *Bank Markazi* (Central Bank). Amirazizi escorted Khosrow to Tehran, where he collected the money, then took him to the airport.[115] The majority of Qashqai were not unhappy to see the Khans' ouster, since the Khans had been more extortionate than the Army or Gendarmerie. This did not prevent the Shah from strengthening his hold on the tribe by seizing some of the Khans' property, on the pretext that this was to compensate for sugar stolen from government warehouses in 1946.[116] The Qashqai were also disarmed, unlike the Boir-Ahmadi, Iran's fiercest tribe and the one the Qashqai used for the toughest fighting.[117]

4. Others

After 1954 the regime implemented several programs to control the tribes.[118] A Superior Council of Tribes was formed by the central government. The government confiscated Qashqai land, passed legislation forbidding Qashqai land-purchases, and taxed the products of the remaining land. Other programs included putting tribesmen in the military, settlement schemes with housing, and health and education schemes.[119]

By 1959, few of the tribes were politically dangerous. Younger Lurs tended to settle in the cities, and since they were based on loose groups of up to a dozen families, they were incapable of major actions. The Sang-e-Sars were very conservative and could be counted on to help any conservative central government. Settlement and farming had claimed the Turkomans, although their proximity to the Soviet Union made them a potential source of subversion.[120]

---

115. Department of State memorandum of conversation, (28OCT54), and CIA Memorandum, (29DEC67), in *Asnad*, v. 56, pp. 68-102; and interview with Gen. Sadegh Amirazizi,(25OCT85, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP. Khosrow Qashqai was executed by the Islamic Republic's government on 8 October 1982.

116. 'The Tribes and the Political Stability of Iran,' p. 4.

117. 'Tribal Disarmament in Southern Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 9, 788.00/12AUG56, RG-59, Box 3810; and 'General Bakhtiar's Political Beliefs'.

118. Beck, *The Qashqa'i of Iran*, pp. 155-56.

119. See L. Beck, 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy,' in Richard Tapper, ed., *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, (London, 1983).

120. 'Political Potential of the Tribes of Iran,' p. 7.

adviser on tribal affairs, was warned by Gen. Sadegh Amirazizi that if he did not leave Iran the Army would be forced to pursue him, too. Khosrow Khan wanted money to leave the country, so approximately 300,000 tomans were deposited in the *Bank Markazi* (Central Bank). Amirazizi escorted Khosrow to Tehran, where he collected the money, then took him to the airport.[115] The majority of Qashqai were not unhappy to see the Khans' ouster, since the Khans had been more extortionate than the Army or Gendarmerie. This did not prevent the Shah from strengthening his hold on the tribe by seizing some of the Khans' property, on the pretext that this was to compensate for sugar stolen from government warehouses in 1946.[116] The Qashqai were also disarmed, unlike the Boir-Ahmadi, Iran's fiercest tribe and the one the Qashqai used for the toughest fighting.[117]

4. Others

After 1954 the regime implemented several programs to control the tribes.[118] A Superior Council of Tribes was formed by the central government. The government confiscated Qashqai land, passed legislation forbidding Qashqai land-purchases, and taxed the products of the remaining land. Other programs included putting tribesmen in the military, settlement schemes with housing, and health and education schemes.[119]

By 1959, few of the tribes were politically dangerous. Younger Lurs tended to settle in the cities, and since they were based on loose groups of up to a dozen families, they were incapable of major actions. The Sang-e-Sars were very conservative and could be counted on to help any conservative central government. Settlement and farming had claimed the Turkomans, although their proximity to the Soviet Union made them a potential source of subversion.[120]

---

115. Department of State memorandum of conversation, (28OCT54), and CIA Memorandum, (29DEC67), in *Asnad*, v. 56, pp. 68-102; and interview with Gen. Sadegh Amirazizi,(25OCT85, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP. Khosrow Qashqai was executed by the Islamic Republic's government on 8 October 1982.

116. 'The Tribes and the Political Stability of Iran,' p. 4.

117. 'Tribal Disarmament in Southern Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 9, 788.00/12AUG56, RG-59, Box 3810; and 'General Bakhtiar's Political Beliefs'.

118. Beck, *The Qashqa'i of Iran*, pp. 155-56.

119. See L. Beck, 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy,' in Richard Tapper, ed., *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, (London, 1983).

120. 'Political Potential of the Tribes of Iran,' p. 7.

II. Other Issues

A number of other matters had to be addressed if the Shah was to show that he had restored order and stability to Iran. The most important matter was that of oil, since this was the issue which brought about the rise and fall of Musaddiq. Oil, furthermore, was extremely important in determining Iran's economic health, and until that issue was settled, US economic aid was to be essential in bolstering the Iranian government. It was through US grants and loans that Iranian civil servants were paid.

US aid to the military was essential for the payment of its personnel and the establishment of facilities, such as housing, that would meet their needs. New equipment and techniques would keep personnel mentally challenged and occupied, while simultaneously encouraging a feeling of value and *esprits des corps*. Military aid would, furthermore, allow a degree of modernization which would enable Iran's armed forces to provide some resistance against outside aggressors. Such an ability was important to the Shah, if the military's disgraceful performance in 1941 was not to be repeated. The US also encouraged Iran's participation in regional military alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact (which later became CENTO), as a more reliable safeguard against Soviet aggression. While discussing these events, one must be mindful of the greater international framework against which these events took place.

A. The Oil Question

Just as the nationalization of Iran's oil industry and the Oil Crisis were the issues which marked the rise and fall of Mohammad Musaddiq, the settlement of the oil issue was one of the major issues which would determine the Shah's right to power. It was essential for an agreement to be reached which would get Iranian oil back on the market. At the same time, successful conclusion of an agreement by the Pahlavi government would show that other countries were willing to deal with the Shah, while they would not or could not deal with Musaddiq. In more practical terms, oil revenues would pay for government expenditures. An oil settlement would also improve the Iranian business climate. Another motivation for a settlement was the realization that the Majlis was relatively acquiescent and would concur with an early agreement. The passage of time would see the

evaporation of this mood. It would also see the public's confidence in the government evaporate, and opposition elements could also become vocally critical.[121]

When the Iranian government nationalized the AIOC's Iranian assets, the Iranian people welcomed a move against what they perceived as the exploitative hand of British Petroleum (BP) and the British Government itself. The major international oil companies (Esso, Gulf, Mobil, Chevron, BP, Texaco, and Shell: the 'Seven Sisters')[122], however, rallied together to prevent the sale of Iranian oil, showing that potential nationalizers could not overcome the power of the majors.

After the Shah's return to power, the US and UK realized that it was time for a concerted policy with regard to an Iranian settlement so that their Middle Eastern assets would be safe from further threats of nationalization. Since BP was not on the list of Iranian favourites, it was decided to let the US take the lead in negotiating with Iran. The man chosen to lead the negotiations was Herbert Hoover, Jr., the US president's son. Hoover wanted to be sure that all the US majors would be in on the deal made with Iran, but several factors made them reluctant. Firstly, the oil companies were not very eager due to a world oil glut.[123] Secondly, the Iranians were not the easiest people to deal with and Iran was not very politically stable yet. Finally, there was the Soviet menace to Iran's north.[124] The US government believed, however, that if the oil issue was not settled quickly, the Iranian economy would collapse. This, in turn, would force Iran into the Soviet bloc. Hoover pressured BP to the negotiating table, and in late-1953, the Seven Sisters and the French Compagnie Française des Petroles (CFP) met in London and agreed to form a consortium to buy Iranian oil.[125]

The oil companies' chief negotiator was the American Howard Page, who was assisted by British Foreign Office chargé Denis Wright. Iran was represented by Finance

---

121. CIA, 'Probable Consequences in Iran of Failure to Achieve An Early Oil Settlement,' (29MAR54), in the Declassified Documents, 1984, (002267), LOC.

122. A. Sampson, *The Seven Sisters:: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made*, (London, 1975).

123. L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics*, (London, 1955) p. 305.

124. D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, (London, 1991, 1992), p. 471.

125. Sampson, *Seven Sisters*, pp. 142-44.

Minister Ali Amini, a French-educated economist, and a number of other technocrats. The CIA, through Operation BEDAMN, mounted a major propaganda effort to generate Iranian public support for the oil negotiations.[126] After some long and difficult negotiations, on 17 September 1954, Page and Amini initialled an agreement, and in October, the Shah signed the agreement, and the Majlis approved it. On the surface, this was a fair deal for all concerned. Each American company got 8%, CFP got 6%, Shell got 14%, and BP got 40%. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) owned the refinery and the oilfields. BP was even compensated for its nationalized assets. (A few months later each US company in the Consortium gave up 1% of its share so that nine US independent oil companies could be included, thus avoiding charges of monopoly formation).

In reality, however, the situation had not changed. The major oil companies still controlled the markets, so they effectively controlled the production side of the equation. The eight oil companies also entered into a 'participants' agreement', without informing the Iranians, which laid out conditions for the purchase of oil and terms under which production could be reduced to avoid an oil glut. They achieved this by defining how much oil was to be lifted from Iran and alloting a percentage of that amount to each company. If the company wanted more oil than it was allowed under the participants' agreement, it would have to pay extra for it. In other words, the Consortium members restricted the level of production.[127]

The Iranians were not overly pleased with the terms of the agreement with the Consortium, but it was believed that Iran had little choice under the circumstances. When Enrico Mattei, the chief of Italy's state-run oil company (AGIP), came to Iran, he negotiated a deal that was much more beneficial to the Iranians. The Italians were so eager to work with the Iranians that they even suggested that the Shah marry an Italian princess, although the Roman Catholic Church objected.[128] Under this arrangement the venture would have a joint board led by an Iranian chairman, Italy would pay the costs of

---

126. Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 91.

127. On the Iranian attitude to the agreement, see F. Fesharaki, *Development of the Iranian Oil Industry: International and Domestic Aspects*, (New York, 1976), pp. 59-60. On the participants' agreement, see Sampson, *Seven Sisters*, pp. 145-46.

128. *New York Times*, (14FEB59), p. 3; (24FEB59), p. 1.

exploration, and Iran would get 75% of the proceeds should oil be discovered. This agreement was signed in August 1957, and although little oil was discovered, this was an important step in showing Iran how unfair a deal it was getting from the Consortium. It also showed the vulnerability of the Seven Sisters. AGIP was followed by Amoco, which made an even better deal with Iran. These agreements brought about a sharp increase in Iranian government revenues. In 1957, Iran passed a Petroleum Law which gave the government even greater control over its natural assets. The Law gave NIOC the power to enter into agreements on petroleum exploration in areas outside the Consortium's control, such as the Persian Gulf.[129]

OPEC

A side-effect of the Oil Crisis was that the other oil-producing countries had wittingly participated in the oil companies' bringing to heel of Iran. They were, after all, the beneficiaries of the initial boycott of Iranian oil, and they also benefitted from the production levels that the companies later determined for Iran. Although the oil-producers enjoyed the money they had made at Iran's expense, they also felt concerned at the evident power of the major oil companies.

For this reason, when in August 1960 the major oil companies announced a 10 ¢ per barrel decrease in oil prices, the oil-producing countries acted in defence of their economic well-being. At a September meeting in Baghdad, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia met to discuss the issue. The outcome of the meeting was the formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the participants seeing it as a cartel to confront a cartel. Its initial accomplishment was the prevention of any further price reductions.[130]

B. US Economic Aid

The Iranian economy was particularly weak as a result of the Oil Crisis, and the successful conclusion of an agreement with the Consortium was essential in restoring the economy's health. As has been shown, however, the terms of the agreement were not as

---

129. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion*, p. 112.
130. Sampson, *Seven Sisters*, pp. 173-77.

favourable as Iran might have wished, so the Iranians turned to the US for help. The US government, in turn, was willing to help Iran, but it did not want to give too much aid until an oil agreement had been reached.

Only a week after becoming Prime Minister, Zahedi wrote to Pres. Eisenhower:

> The assistance which the United States is already rendering Iran, helpful as it is, is unfortunately not sufficient in amount and character to tide Iran over the financial and economic crisis which I find it to be facing. The treasury is empty; foreign exchange resources are exhausted; the national economy is deteriorated. Iran needs immediate financial aid to enable it to emerge from a state of economic and financial chaos.[131]

Soon thereafter Pres. Eisenhower made available an emergency grant of $45 million, in addition to existing aid programs. A further $1 million in cash which was not used in Operation Ajax was donated to Zahedi by the Tehran CIA station.[132]

It was recognised that this aid would only last until about May or June 1954, and that it would have to be continued until oil revenues became substantial. Lack of aid would lead to deficit spending, which could, in turn, lead to Zahedi's downfall. US aid, however, was to be channelled through international or private agencies, so the appearance of undue US influence would be minimized. The US Foreign Operations Administration then arranged several loans designed to meet short-term budgetary needs and finance development projects.[133]

As the size and scope of US aid to Iran increased, a number of problems surfaced. The problems became so bad that, in early 1956, a US House of Representatives subcommittee (the Hardy Committee) issued a report on them. The report said that aid was administered in a 'loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner'; the assistance provided did not conform to its stated intentions and its real purpose was to '[keep] the Iranian

---

131. Y. Alexander and A. Nanes, eds., *US and Iran: A Documentary History*, (Fredrick, MD, 1980), pp. 252-53. See also, State Department telegram 447, 788.5 MSP/22AUG53, RG-59, Box 4119.

132. Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, pp. 253-54. Interview with Kermit Roosevelt (5JUN85, Washington, DC) in Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 90.

133. CIA, 'Probable Consequences in Iran of Failure to Achieve An Early Oil Settlement,' in *ibid.* 'United States Policy toward Iran: A Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board,' (21DEC53); in Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, pp. 265-70. State Department Press Releases, (NOV54 and 25APR55); in *ibid.*, pp. 276-78.

economy afloat'; and poor administration prevented any proper accounting. Finally, it claimed that funds went to families and individuals who did not really need them.[134]

The State Department realised that the report would receive a negative reception in Iran, so Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ordered Ambassador Seldon Chapin to inform Iranian officials that the report was not very important and was only designed for US consumers (taxpayers). At the same time, Dulles told Congressman Hardy that he should tone down the report because of national security needs. Refutations of the report were also prepared by the International Cooperation Administration and by a member of the Subcomittee itself. In Iran the report got a mixed reception. Nationalists hoped it would show the corruption of the ruling class and the disillusionment of the US with the Shah's regime, but it seemed that the major concern was that aid would be cut off.[135]

Only a few months later, the Shah renewed his requests for increased budgetary aid. Ambassador Chapin suggested that some of the bigger civilian projects like hospitals, schools, and agricultural projects be deferred, but the Shah cited domestic political needs. The Shah then suggested that the Soviet Union would help if the US would not. The threat to turn to the Soviets was one which would be used effectively many times in the future. In June 1958, Abol Hassan Ebtehaj and several other Plan Organization personnel made a trip to the US to lobby for a $40 million loan. Their request was granted, and the Development Loan Fund authorized a $40 million loan to the Plan Organization for 'financing economic development projects'.[136]

Between 1954 and 1961, an annual average of $64.5 million in economic aid and $60 million in military aid was given by the US to Iran. Although this money was originally intended for the Plan Organisation, a great deal of it was siphoned off to pay military

---

134. International Operations Subcommittee, 'US Aid Operations in Iran,' House Report #10, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, (28JAN57).

135. State Department telegram, Dulles to Chapin, 788.5 MSP/1JAN57, RG-59, Box 3820. ICA letter, 788.5 MSP/6FEB57, RG-59, Box 3820; Congressional Record, v. 103, pp. 1205-6, in Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, pp. 298-300. 'Iranian Reactions to Hardy Committee Report and Department Statement on US Aid Program to Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 692, 788.5-MSP/9FEB57, RG-59, Box 3820.

136. State Department telegram 1066, 788.5 MSP/30NOV57, RG-59, Box 3820. Memorandum of Conversation, 788.5 MSP/17JUN58, RG-59, Box 3820; Dulles to Tehran, 788.5 MSP/3JUL58, *ibid.*

personnel and civil servants and to fund military purchases. The budget deficits that occurred were corrected by further US loans.[137]

In June 1961, the US General Accounting Office published another review of the aid relationship with Iran.[138] This report criticized the way US aid was being handled by US and Iranian agencies which lacked coordination and duplicated each other's functions. Another problem was that there was no overall designation on how much aid Iran was to receive, it was decided on a year-to-year basis. Finally, there was little actual control over the funds.

C. Military Aid

The shah had to exert control over the military, if he was to successfully centralise governmental power. As was seen earlier, the choice of Zahedi as Prime Minister was effectively forced on him by Zahedi's relationship with the Retired Officers Association. Coalitions of officers, such as those of Generals Bakhtiar, Alavi-Moghaddam, and Kia, vied for power and access to the Shah. Other officers saw military service as a route to personal wealth. Transfers and retirements were one way to address these problems. To make the military strong enough to protect Iran from outside attack, however, direct military aid was needed. It was the US government which provided most of this aid.

Such aid was in the form of equipment and advisers, and it was enthusiastically received, although not always effectively implemented. The Iranian military's ability to absorb the materiel, due to its limited size, however, was a concern.[139] The US government encouraged Iran to maintain armed forces strong enough to somewhat delay any invaders. The main emphasis, however, was on Iran to maintain its external defences by entering into alliances with its neighbours.

---

137. US Agency for International Development, *US Overseas Loans and Grants: Series of Yearly Data*, vols. 1-5; in Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 94. 'Evaluation of Aid Program, FY-1960,' Foreign Service Despatch 75, 788.5 MSP/24JUL58, p. 3.

138. 'GAO Examination of US Aid to Iran,' Printed General Accounting Office Report, June 1961; in Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, pp. 300-03.

139. 'Justification for US Budgetary Support to the Iranian Ministry for War for FY 1960 (Iranian Year 1338),' State Department Airgram G-220, 788.5 - MSP/16APR59.

1. Baghdad Pact --- CENTO

In 1955, the US pressed for the formation of an alliance between the Northern Tier states bordering the Soviet Union. The first signatories were Turkey and Iraq, followed by the UK, Pakistan, and Iran (3 November 1955). Although the US was not an official member of this agreement, it was to maintain observer status, and it joined the Pact's Military Committee. It was largely on his own initiative that the Shah expressed Iran's interest in joining the Baghdad Pact, although he did so in the belief that he would be one of its guiding voices. The Shah's enthusiasm for the Pact was short-lived, however, and he later complained that the other Baghdad Pact countries were getting more US aid than Iran was.[140]

In July 1958 the Iraqi royal family was killed and a republic was declared. While the effects of the Iraqi coup were far-reaching, only their influence on the Baghdad Pact will be discussed here. Only a month after the coup, Iraq entered into a defence agreement with the United Arab Republic. In October the Pact's offices were moved to Turkey from Iraq, and in March 1959 Iraq formally left the Pact. On 28 July 1958, an agreement between the US, UK, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran was signed which allowed for the formation of a new organization, which would start as the Middle East Treaty Organization and would eventually become the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).[141]

2. US-Iran Bilateral Pact

On 5 March 1959, the US and Iran signed a bilateral pact in Ankara. '[A]ccording to this bilateral pact, ..., whenever an act of aggression is made against Iran, and Iran asks for help in its defense [*sic*], the United States government will give the necessary aid.' While this agreement was favourably received by pro-Western Iranians, the average Iranian was indifferent. The pact effectively strengthened the Shah's position. Some

---

140. 'Communiqué on the Richards Mission,' (27MAR57), Foreign Policy, 1957, pp. 838-39; in Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, p. 304. Operations Coordinating Board, 'Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action,' (14DEC55); in the Declassified Documents, 1989, (n. 455), LOC. 'OCB Report on Iran (NSC5703/1),' (8MAY58); in *ibid.*, 1985 (n. 229), LOC.

141. 'Multilateral Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact,' (28JUL58), 9 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 1077; in Alexander and Nanes, *The US and Iran*, p. 305.

political groups saw this agreement as an indication that the US was to play the dominant role in Iran, thus opening the US to blame for the Iranian government's problems.[142]

III. International Events

The issue which determined Iran's role in the world was the Cold War. This phenomenon allowed the Shah to play the US, UK, and USSR off against each other, to Iran's advantage. A number of other events had an influential role, and they will be briefly mentioned below. It was the Cold War, however, which provided the framework into which all other issues had to fit.

Nasser had come to power in Egypt in 1952, after masterminding an officers' coup against King Farouk. Nasser proceeded to threaten Israel, blockade the Suez Canal, and promote the ideology of Pan-Arabism. To this end, Egypt entered into treaties with Arab states, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia. Egypt also entered into arms and trade agreements with the Soviet Union, and other regional states were persuaded to do the same.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 was to have a profound regional effect. In July 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, an act which earned the hostility of France and the UK. In October, Israel opened a 70-mile front on the Canal Zone, and England and France used this as a pretext to invade the area to restore order. They were forced to withdraw by US and UN pressure, and UN peace-keepers entered the area.

In February 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), to the alarm of many regional states. The UAR commenced activities in Lebanon which would lead its President, Camille Chamoun, to ask for UN help. In July, US Marines landed in Beirut to help maintain peace and subdue unrest brought about by the Iraqi coup, while British military personnel were despatched to Jordan. Iran provided military aid to Pres Chamoun, and it also mounted a covert action, the Green Plan (*Tarh-i Sabz*), to counter Nasserism with religious ties. Covert actions and paramilitary operations were also mounted in the Yemen and in the Persian Gulf states. Iran was an active participant in

142. 'Text of Approved Bilateral Bill in Parliament,' Foreign Service Despatch 651, 788.5/11MAR59, RG-59, Box 3819. State Department telegram 1763, 788.5/11MAR59, *ibid.*

several intelligence exchanges with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and other regional actors, in an attempt to prevent the expansion of Nasserism and Communism.

CH. 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAVAK

I. Before SAVAK

The previous chapter has shown the efforts to which the Shah went to consolidate his position in Iranian politics. An important part of this consolidation process was the creation of a centralized intelligence organization which would, it was hoped, alleviate many of the problems caused by the existence of many intelligence and security organizations with overlapping functions. It was also hoped that the creation of a centralised intelligence organization would alleviate the problems caused by competition between various officials. It is important to note that, although the US and UK governments did play a part in this process, it was the Shah himself who wanted a centralized intelligence organization and the greater control it would afford him.

A. Official organizations

Prior to the August 1953 coup, Iran lacked a coordinated intelligence community. There was a mixture of organizations, such as Military Intelligence (J-2), Army Intelligence (G-2), the National Police, and the Gendarmerie, which were charged with tracking internal developments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with keeping track of external developments, as well as transmitting this information back to the Shah. Not only were they hampered by a lack of coordination, they also suffered from insufficient money and personnel.[1]

After the Shah's return to power, the situation did not immediately improve. Rural security was the province of the Gendarmerie. Urban security was dealt with by the *Shahrbani* (National Police). The Shahrbani also had a political division known as the Secret Police. This unit received information through secret agents and other sources, disseminated analyses, and maintained dossiers on enemies of the state. These elements were not very effective, due to under-staffing, under-training, under-equipment, corruption, and the illiteracy of many police officers. There was the Frontier Guard, which had been created to stop Soviet cross-border infiltrations, via application of counter-espionage/counter-

---

1. State Department telegram 53, 788.00/26DEC50, RG-59, Box 4107.

intelligence and positive intelligence techniques. Finally, there was a Railway Regiment Guard, whose function is indicated in its name.[2]

In August 1953, the Prime Minister, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, informed the US Embassy that a number of Communists were being arrested, and, in conjunction with this, a counter-espionage service was being organized.[3] Zahedi's promise took a more concrete form in September 1953, when a US Army officer who had been working with the CIA in the Middle East was sent to Iran as an assistant Army Attaché.[4] He was tasked with organising a counter-intelligence effort centred around the Shah. The new unit's primary target was the Tudeh, but the National Front and even military officers were also seen as suspect.

This new unit, organised around the military governorship of Tehran, was under Brig. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar and three Colonels (Mostafa Amjadi, Houshang Naderi, and Mohsen Mobasser).[5] It operated informally, clandestinely, and independently of any other security organization. The unit's members were chosen by the Shah, and although there were a few civilian members of this group, they did not stick with it, and generally, there were few people to work with. It reported directly to the US officer, who in turn reported to the Shah. While the unit was built around the military governorship of Tehran, it had the power to draw from many civilian and military resources. Bakhtiar and the three Colonels also received some rudimentary intelligence training from the US Army officer. This covered subjects like interrogation, surveillance, use of agents and networks, and organizational security.

---

2. Operations Coordinating Board, 'Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action,' (14DEC55), pp. 4-5; in the Declassified Documents, 1989 (455) LOC.

3. State Department telegram 487, 788.5-MSP/26AUG53, RG-59, Box 4119.

4. Based on an interview with the US officer (8MAY92) and later confirmed in interviews with two retired CIA officers and one Iranian Military Intelligence officer. See also, M.J. Gasiorowski, 'Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978,' in N.R. Keddie & M.J. Gasiorowski, ed.'s., *Neither East Nor West: Iran, The Soviet Union, and the United States,* (New Haven and London, 1990), p. 150.

5. It has been suggested that Colonel Zibai was a member of this unit; see C. Delannoy, *SAVAK,* (France, 1990), p. 57. This is not true. Zibai, whose nickname was The Butcher, had such a reputation for brutality that other officers did not care to work with him. Interviews with M. Mobasser (8DEC91, London); M. Pashai (11DEC92, Denmark); and a retired CIA officer with CIA-SAVAK liaison responsibilities (18JAN93).

The unit's greatest accomplishment was the discovery and apprehension of the Tudeh Military Network. It was after this discovery that Iran's need for a professional intelligence organization was recognised by both the Shah and the US. If Military Intelligence couldn't keep itself free of Communists, how could it control the country?[6] This is not to say that there had not been earlier calls for the formation of a centralised intelligence organization,[7] but the discovery of the Tudeh Military Network underlined this need.

The Shah travelled to the US in 1956, and when he met with John Foster Dulles, he again expressed an interest in intelligence coordination. The Shah's main complaint was that there were too many sources who were competing to get their own information to him first, and the Shah was wise enough to recognise the selfish motives behind these actions. 'I know that advisers, no matter how technically competent they may be, sometimes make the national interest subservient to their own. Furthermore they are prone to funnel all information through themselves and to seal off independent intelligence channels.'[8]

B. Unofficial organizations

1. *Sazeman-i KOOK*

There were also unofficial organizations which dealt with intelligence matters. The most prominent of these organizations had been organised in 1951 by Gen. Haj-Ali Kia, chief of Military Intelligence, as a pro-regime, anti-Musaddiq party.[9] Kia was from Iran's Mazandaran province, and he named his organization *Sazeman-i KOOK* (the *Kianouri, Kojour* Organization) after some of the province's major families. Kia's deputy in KOOK was Brig. Gen. Charkhosht, who went on to serve in Military Intelligence. Due to this close relationship with Military Intelligence, extensive use of Army assets was made by KOOK members, even after Kia was forced into retirement by Musaddiq.

KOOK became stronger after Musaddiq's removal from power and Kia's return to the military. It was KOOK that was behind the June 1954 detection and elimination of a net-

---

6. Interview with M. Hashemi (14FEB92, London).
7. Letter from Loy Henderson to Arthur Richards, Office of Greece/Turkey/Iran Affairs, 21OCT53, 788.00/21OCT53, RG-59, Box 4114.
8. M.R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, (London, 1961), p. 322.
9. Interview with Gen. H.-A. Kia (21OCT85, Paris) by H.Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

work of Soviet agents run by a cavalry officer named Col. Mahmoud Niv.[10] KOOK was also used by Kia as a private source of intelligence which he would then turn over to the Shah in an attempt to improve his own standing at the expense of his political competitors, such as Generals Bakhtiar, Mehdi-Qoli Alavi-Moghaddam, and Valiollah Qarani. Kia himself was removed from office in early-1961, in one of the Shah's periodic shake-ups of the Iranian political elite. After Kia's ouster, KOOK was taken over by Maj. Gen. Homayouni, a member of the Senate, but it continued to function in the same way. KOOK took all types of people, whether they were journalists or government bureaucrats, and it had initiations and ceremonies.[11] Some KOOK members had been members of the violently nationalistic Pan-Iran party, and it was believed that there was a connection between the Pan-Iranists and Military Intelligence.[12]

2. *Baradaran*

A similar group was the approximately 2000-member *Baradaran* (Brothers). This group had been organized by Sayyid Hassan Emami, Tehran's *Imam Jomeh* (Friday prayer leader) in the early-1950s. Generally Royalist and anti-Communist in nature, this group was less politically-oriented than KOOK, and it operated along the lines of a discussion- and mutual-aid group. Regarded as pro-British, Baradaran membership included many Iranians with security-related jobs. Among these individuals were Qarani, Brig. Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia, Maj. Gen. Fereidoun Kusheshi, Col. Hamidi, and Abol-Hassan Etebar. The Rashidians and many other civilian members of the Iranian elite were also members. This group also used initiation ceremonies, including oaths on the Koran.[13]

---

10. Niv had been a member of the group which instigated an uprising in Khorasan in August 1945, as a result of which he was briefly imprisoned, and after his release, he was given assignments in very isolated places. In about June 1954, Military Intelligence decided to arrest Niv for being a Soviet agent. When the authorities came to arrest him at his rented flat, Niv fled to his friend Charkhosht's house. Charkhosht turned Niv over to the arresting authorities. Niv was never heard from again, and it is believed that he was tortured to death. Interview with M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

11. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92; San Diego, CA), and M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London), both of whom were members of KOOK.

12. 'PAN-IRANISM: The Ultimate in Iranian Nationalism, Foreign Service Despatch 893, 788.00/6FEB52. See also, 'Recent Developments in Pan-Iranism,' Foreign Service Despatch 6, 788.00/1JUL52.

13. Telephone interview with M. Pashai (9APR93); telephone interview with H. Alavi-Kia (9APR93); M.J. Gasiorowski, 'The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,' *IJMES*, v.

3. Pan-Iran Party

The Pan-Iran Party, which consisted of some upper-class intellectuals and many lower-class toughs, and which advocated restoration of portions of the Persian Empire which had since become part of the USSR, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Gulf sheikhdoms, had been part of Musaddiq's National Front, but the party then split into a number of factions due to ideological, personality, and policy differences. The CIA allegedly sponsored the more extreme elements of the Pan-Iranists, as well as the Somka Party (a party with Nazi-like trappings), to engage in street brawls with the Tudeh.[14] Since the Pan-Iranists had been practicing jiu-jitsu, they put their martial arts training to the test in these frequent clashes.[15] The faction led by Dariush Foruhar, the *Hizb-i Millat-i Iran* (Party of the Iranian Nation), was believed to be receiving financial support from Musaddiq,[16] and it joined the National Resistance Movement after the August 1953 coup. As a result of his activism, Foruhar was arrested and jailed frequently.[17]

Qarani encouraged the Shah to revive the Pan-Iranists as a Nationalist Club, and even after Qarani's arrest in February 1958, the Shah was sufficiently taken with the idea to push for its promotion. Although it was to be operated by Pan-Iran leaders of different factions, the Club was to be overseen by Brig. Gen. Nematollah Nassiri of the Imperial Guards and funded with money from the SAVAK budget.[18] It seems possible that the Organization of Iranian Nationalists was the name given to this club, since the Organization was a government-sponsored body which borrowed heavily from Pan-Iranist ideology.[19] The existence of such a club, it was hoped, would serve as an outlet for those

---

25 (1993). Emami was the target of a (possibly Fada'iyan-organized) assassination attempt in 1951. Although one of the Shah's supporters, Emami had opposed Land Reform.

14. M.J. Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (London, 1991), p. 69.

15. 'Recent Developments in Pan-Iranism.'

16. *Ibid.*

17. US Army Weekly update, 788.00 (W)/6JUN59, RG-59, Box 3814; 'Iranian Government Critics and Opposition Leaders and the Status of the Latter,' Foreign Service Despatch 486, 788.00/8FEB60, p. 9, (FOIA).

18. 'Government-Sponsored Extreme Nationalist Political Grouping,' Foreign Service Despatch 849, 788.00/2MAR58 HBS, (FOIA).

19. 'Manifesto of the Organization of Iranian Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 1153, 788.00/30JUN58, RG-59, Box 3811.

with nationalist demands, and it would also support the Shah's brand of nationalism (such as promotion of Iran's pre-Islamic glories).

By 1963, the Pan-Iranist faction led by Mohsen Pezeshkpour, who had split with Foruhar over Pezeshkpour's support for the Shah, was back in action. Its platform was now directed against Iraq, which was making claims on Khuzestan, and against Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabism. In a reaction to Arab claims on Iran and the Persian Gulf, the Pan-Iranists continued their earlier claims on portions of the Persian Empire. It was believed that Pezeshkpour and other Pan-Iranists were operating with direct government approval, allegedly having met with the Shah at an audience arranged by SAVAK director Gen. Hassan Pakravan, and it was believed to be functioning as a SAVAK-connected instrument.[20] When five Pan-Iranist candidates were elected to the 22nd Majlis in August 1967 to serve as a vehicle for anti-Arab propaganda, a high-ranking member of the Ministry of the Interior admitted that they had been allowed to win by facing no real opposition.[21] The Pan-Iranist leadership, which never diverted from its stated platform,[22] took itself too seriously, however, and when they criticized Iran's recognition of Bahrein's independence in 1971, they were imprisoned.

4. Others

It has been alleged that a cabal of three officers formed another unofficial intelligence organization called the Black Snakes.[23] Other unofficial pro-regime assets existed, such as the National Defense Society, the main function of which was expression of 'indignation at Soviet propaganda'.[24] Finally, gangs of *luti*s (neighbourhood peddlers) and of toughs from the *zurkhanehs* (houses of strength) of southern Tehran, such as the ones directed by

---

20. 'The Pan-Iran Party and its Anti-Nasser Activities,' State Department Airgram A-354, 6JAN65, (FOIA); 'The Noisy Pan-Iranists in Parliament,' State Department Airgram A-393, 27JAN68, (FOIA).

21. 'Pan-Iranist Party 1967,' State Department Airgram A-124, 30AUG67, (FOIA).

22. 'Pan-Iran Party Leader Tours Khuzistan,' State Department Airgram A-777, 19AUG68, (FOIA); 'The Pan-Iranist Party, Bahrein, and the Kurds,' State Department Airgram A-6, 26APR70, (FOIA).

23. Confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (11APR92).

24. 'Establishment of Mashad Branch of National Defense Society,' Foreign Service Despatch 11, 788.5/19SEP59, RG-59, Box 3819.

Shaban *Bimokh* (Brainless) Jafari, were occasionally employed against the Shah's opponents as examples of individuals who were acting out of spontaneous patriotism.[25]

II. The US Position

The US position regarding the creation of a centralized Iranian intelligence organization is mentioned above and is discussed in later chapters. US concern with the Iranian security situation also led to dealings with the military, the Police, and the Gendarmerie.

A. Military

While the Shah was interested in centralization of Iran's intelligence and internal security organizations, he was also concerned with the Iranian military's role in this context. The ouster of Musaddiq had emphasised the importance of the military to the Shah. If the military had acted more decisively, favouring either the Shah or Musaddiq more categorically, the issue may have been decided more promptly. Units loyal to the Shah, in the end, were on the winning side. To reward loyal units and individuals, and to encourage the loyalty of any fence-straddlers, the Shah pressed the US for more equipment, both in terms of quantity and sophistication. The US government was unsure of the wisdom of giving in to these demands, concerned as it was by the Iranian military's ability to absorb the materiel.

The US military's confidence regarding Iran's ability to defend itself had been dented by the Iranian displays of technical incompetence, such as driving unoiled armoured cars in parades.[26] In an attempt to improve the calibre of the Iranian military, several training schools, such as a Medical Services Field School, a Parachute School, and a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) School, were opened. There was also an initiative to give enlisted personnel a chance to enter the officer ranks by establishing an Officer Candidate School (OCS), but this initiative met strong resistance from the Iranian officer corps.[27]

The US government believed that military aid should achieve several objectives, including maintenance of internal security, enhancement of the monarchy's prestige, and im-

---

25. State Department Telegram 1906, 788.21/10MAR54, RG-59, Box 4117. On the *luti* culture, on the *zurkhaneh* culture, and their use by the government, see A. Arasteh, *Man and Society in Iran*, (Leiden, 1964), pp. 26-33.

26. Letter from J.D. Jernegan to Loy Henderson, 788.5-MSP/15APR54, RG-59, Box 4119.

27. Foreign Service Despatch (un-numbered), 788.5-MSP/12JUL54, RG-59, Box 4119.

provement of the Iranian government and military's morale.[28] As far as security from foreign invaders was concerned, it was believed that Iran was best off if it entered alliances with its neighbours.[29] At the same time, however, US Army advisers in Iran advised against the use of the Iranian Army for internal security functions.[30]

Not only were US advisers in Iran differing with Washington, but there was also a bureaucratic debate between the Department of State and the Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD/JCS).[31] State recommended increases in the shipment of heavy military equipment, such as tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery pieces, while DOD/JCS believed that internal security should be the first priority. The US position on the military's role was the cause of some confusion, leading the Shah to ask the US ambassador for clarification.[32]

B. Police

In terms of internal security, the US faced a dilemma. Urban security was dealt with by the National Police, which was under the Ministry of the Interior. External and rural security were dealt with by the Army and Gendarmerie, respectively, which were under the Ministry of War. The provision of advisers and riot force equipment would go far in maintaining internal security. It would have also made economic sense, because it would allow the removal of more expensive military garrisons from the cities.[33] Chief of Police Alavi-Moghaddam had also argued for more aid to the Shahrbani, saying that the urban populace was more subject to Communist ideas, while the rural populace was less susceptible due to the influence of the clergy.[34]

---

28. State Department telegram, re: US aid to Iranian military and its purpose, 788.5-MSP/19FEB54, RG-59, Box 4119.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Foreign Service Despatch (un-numbered), 788.5-MSP/12JUL54, RG-59, Box 4119.
31. W.C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, (New York, 1980), pp. 87-89.
32. State Department telegram 1102, 788.55/14NOV53, RG-59, Box 4119.
33. Letter from Rountree (NEA) to Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, re: Project no. 67-71-033 (Improvement of Law Enforcement Services) and Project no. 65-71-136 (Equipment for the National Police), 788.5-MSP/31OCT58, RG-59, Box 3819.
34. 'Iranian National Police Aid Program,' US Government Office Memorandum, 788.5-MSP/5NOV58.

In 1958, the US State Department's International Cooperation Administration recommended denying the National Police's requests for aid, because of the desire to avoid US association with the repressive apparatus of internal security.[35] Yet as early as 1954, American technical advisers had been sent to Iran to train the Shahrbani. At that time, furthermore, US funds were provided to purchase supplies and equipment for a Police training school. It was also recommended that the efficiency of the intelligence and security units be improved, not by removing certain functions from certain agencies, but by improving overall coordination. 'To this end, the US should:'

> Urge and assist the Iranian Government to establish a coordinating unit, agency or mechanism based on the existing G-2, responsible to the Shah and designed to coordinate the countersubversive activities of the security services. ...
>
> Assist in the establishment of a school, associated with this agency, to train carefully selected representatives of all security services in (1) latest techniques in countersubversive operations, and (2) standardization of administration, procedures, records, and filing systems. In this school, efforts should be made to overcome present organizational characteristics and traditions which militate against cooperation.[36]

A year and a half later, the US National Security Council (NSC) was recommending a further strengthening of security and intelligence units. Training and equipment was to be provided to the National Police. There were also recommendations that stricter legislation be enacted. Assistance to the intelligence school was to be continued, and counter-subversion training in the US was to be made available to the Iranians. Finally, it was recommended that the Baghdad Pact be used as a source of information on 'subversive personalities, techniques, and activities.'[37] At its peak, the US advisory mission to the Police had 900 members, although at its termination in March 1976 it was down to sixteen members.[38]

C. Gendarmerie

The US government had been providing training to the Gendarmerie since 1942, when Col. H. Norman Schwartzkopf was sent to Iran to form the US Army Mission to the

---

35. ICA Airgram, 788.5-MSP/1NOV58, RG-59, Box 3820.

36. OCB, 'Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action,' 14DEC55; in the Declassified Documents, 1989 (455) LOC.

37. OCB, 'Internal Security Program in Iran,' Memorandum for the Board Assistants, 18JUN57; in the Declassified Documents, 1989 (1710) LOC.

38. *New York Times*, (6MAR76), p. 4.

Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH).[39] GENMISH, which consisted of a cadre of about eight US Army officers, stayed in Iran until its deactivation in 1976. In the 1950s, GENMISH was also the source of vehicles, such as trucks, armoured cars, bicycles, and fixed-wing aircraft, and in later years, rotary-wing aircraft and patrol boats. GENMISH was also behind the improvement of the Gendarmerie's arms supply and communication capabilities. Finally, GENMISH encouraged the Gendarmerie's reorganization, and its adoption of new responsibilities, such as narcotics interdiction and counterinsurgency, and of new units, such as an intelligence branch.[40]

III. The British Position

A. Official intelligence ties

The British position on security and intelligence differed slightly from that of the US, although the UK also supported the establishment of forces that could maintain internal security. As a reflection of its success with Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Special Air Service (SAS) and similar units during and after the Second World War, the UK also called for the formation of 'small highly mobile commando-type units for delaying harassing operations in [the] northwest'.[41] The British later helped in the formation of an Underwater Demolitions (UDT) school on the Persian Gulf, to the irritation of the US.

The British adopted a more subtle approach towards security matters than the US did. The UK encouraged the creation of deep-cover operations in northern Iran, such as a bakery in Rasht or a cobbler's in Ardebil. These could be activated during time of war, but they were mainly for intelligence-gathering. The UK also promoted SAVAK's organization of

---

39. M.H. Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance: 1941-1953*, (New York, 1987); *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1945, VIII, The Near East and Africa, (Washington, DC, 1969); H. Ladjevardi 'The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran,' *IJMES* 15 (1983); T. Ricks, 'US Military Missions To Iran, 1943-1978: The Political Economy of Military Assistance,' *Iranian Studies* v. XIII, n. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1979), pp. 168-73. Schwartzkopf has been described as a member of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and the organizer of the Iranian CIA operation, but this has been hotly denied by Kermit Roosevelt; see Lytle, *Origins*, p. 34n.

40. See V. Croziat, 'Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie,' *Marine Corps Gazette* (OCT75); *Asnad*, v. 7, pp. 219-220; Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 115.

41 State Department telegram, re: US aid to Iranian military and its purpose, 788.5-MSP/19FEB54, RG-59, Box 4119. An earlier but identical UK policy is noted in State Department telegram 2276, 788.55/22JAN53, *ibid.*

border operations, all of which were undercover. The operations were fairly covert, in the sense that the US government was unaware of their existence, as were most SAVAK personnel.[42]

By late-1955, the Iranians were becoming very concerned by the ease with which Soviet agents were effecting cross-border infiltrations. When a Soviet intelligence officer was caught in Jolfa by an alert Railway Regiment guard, a number of Army Intelligence officers were sufficiently alarmed that they decided it was time for action. Qarani, chief of Army Intelligence, approached a representative of MI-6 and asked for help in halting the Soviet incursions.[43]

As a result of Qarani's request for assistance, in January-February 1956 three officers from Iranian Army Intelligence were sent to England to attend an intelligence course, the primary thrust of which was intelligence collection in the Soviet Union. One of these officers, Col. Abdol-Ali Mahoutian, who was to become chief of Department III (Domestic Security) at SAVAK, was regarded as an Anglophile, if not a British asset. Based on this line of training, and on his alleged British connection, in 1956-1957 Mahoutian created networks in Mazandaran and Gilan which were to infiltrate the Soviet Union and observe people who came over from the Soviet Union. For example, an employee of a caviar company was recruited to observe Soviet ships in Bandar Pahlavi. Mahoutian also created similar networks in the Persian Gulf region.[44]

When these networks were created, they operated under Mahoutian's supervision in Army Intelligence. When he was transferred to SAVAK, he continued operation of these networks with money from the (then) limited SAVAK budget. In the early-1960s, Generals Qadar and Motazed, who were in charge of Middle East operations and Foreign

---

42. Interview with an Iranian officer who was in Army Intelligence and who went on to be one of SAVAK's first department heads. Many other interviewees believe that this officer, who received intelligence training in England, had close ties to the British. Information in this paragraph was corroborated in interviews with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark), and in another with a SAVAK officer who asked not to be identified (27OCT92).

43. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark), who was on the same course, and corroborated in interviews with two other SAVAK officers (2MAY92 and 27OCT92).

44. This is from the same officers cited in the previous fn.

Intelligence, respectively, and were Mahoutian's superiors, considered termination of the networks in the South because their operation was difficult to justify in the budget. They favoured, however, continuation of the northern networks. Eventually, the northern networks were turned over to Col. Ali-Akbar, as was control of a 100-man special warfare airborne unit.[45]

The British were very discreet when conducting relations with SAVAK. One important UK representative was Alexander Stuart, but he never visited SAVAK's first headquarters on Iranshahr Avenue, only meeting at the highest levels. Donald Mackenson was another MI-6 representative with diplomatic cover as a Press Attaché. Mackenson worked closely with an Iranian officer named Mehdi Hedayati who was the SAVAK intermediary appointed by Pakravan, who had issued orders that all personnel were to cooperate with Hedayati. Hedayati was allegedly close to Ali-Akbar, so one could infer that Hedayati had something to do with the northern networks, although Hedayati never told anybody what he did specifically. Eventually, Qadar got tired of signing checks for Hedayati's mysterious projects, and he said he would not cooperate unless he was given a better idea of what Hedayati was up to. After this, Hedayati was reassigned to SAVAK's Private Office.[46]

---

45. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark). Information on Ali-Akbar and on the 100-man irregular warfare unit in the north is from this source and the same officers cited in footnote 43. See also H. Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust*, (Tehran, 1989-1990), p. 454. Ricks, 'US Military Missions To Iran,' p. 186, writes that the US was behind the creation an 'Airborne antiguerrilla force (Rangers)'. In his 'memoirs', Fardust states that he and Pakravan ordered termination of the northern networks. I believe that Fardust's statement regarding his own involvement in this issue (pp. 348-49, 351) is a fabrication, and he merely substituted his and Pakravan's names for those of Qadar and Motazed. Qadar has refused to be interviewed, Motazed has had a stroke, and Ali-Akbar is in Iran, so I have not been able to form a conclusive opinion on this.

46. The Reminiscences of Gen. M. Qadar, (30APR & 4MAY86, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS; interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); and S. Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988*, (New York, 1989), p. 22. There were two such Private Offices, one in Department I which answered to SAVAK's director only, and one in Department II, which was dealt with by that Department's chief. In this case, it was probably the Department I Private Office, since Qadar was in charge of Department II for a time and Pakravan was trying to move Hedayati to a more friendly working environment.

It has also been alleged that Pakravan himself had entered into a special relationship with the UK. Pakravan had been chief of G-2 during the Musaddiq-era, until he was assigned to Paris between May and August 1953 as a military attaché. During his time in Iran, Pakravan allegedly provided documents to John Briance, his MI-6 case-officer, who would spend all night photographing them so they could be returned by the next morning. Shahpour Reporter, who had been recruited by Robin Zaehner, translated the documents from Persian into English. Although Musaddiq knew that Pakravan was loyal to the Shah, he had kept Pakravan as G-2 chief because Musaddiq believed that Pakravan would not be involved in plots against the Prime Minister. Allegedly, Pakravan was involved later in an intelligence network run by Ernest Perron, the Shah's Private Secretary and a British asset. It has not been possible to determine how long this special relationship continued, although it seems reasonable to speculate that the British would have tried to maintain it for as long as possible.[47]

In 1958, the UK recommended the establishment of the *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau, SIB).[48] To this end, Gen. Hossein Fardust was sent to London to attend a course to familiarize him with the UK intelligence community. Upon his return he organised the SIB, as well as a National Security Council (*Shora-yi Amniyat-i Kishvar*) based on England's Joint Intelligence Committee.[49] He also instituted organizational changes in SAVAK (see Ch. 3).

B. Unofficial intelligence ties

Despite the existence of the SIB and a few UK-aligned officers, after the 18 August 1953 coup the UK really settled into the background. This is not to say that British intelligence did not perform its normal duties in trying to gather intelligence in Iran, but there seemed to be a conscious decision by the British intelligence community to let the US take

---

47. Information on Pakravan and the British intelligence personnel is from a confidential interview with a retired MI-6 officer (7FEB92). A retired CIA officer, who in a confidential interview provided information on the Perron network, believed that this was a very likely scenario (16APR92). Information in this paragraph is supplemented by an interview with Mrs. F. Pakravan (3MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

48. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 293; and confirmed in an interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

49. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 389.

the lead, or at least the overt lead, in the relationship with Iranian intelligence and military elements. Some English observers who lived in Iran at the time and went on to have Iran-related government jobs claimed that the British government was trying to distance itself from its traditional allies in the ruling-classes in an attempt to shed a conservative image. At this time, England was trying to repair its image in Iran, since it had received such adverse publicity during the Oil Crisis. England's main interest at this time, and in the years until the 1978-1979 Revolution, was the expansion of its business interests in Iran.

Many Iranians believed, however, that England continued to be the behind-the-scene power in Iranian affairs. It was believed that the British controlled SAVAK by advising the Shah on personnel policies, and the book which is allegedly Fardust's memoirs is an example of this trend. Alleged British influence was not just confined to SAVAK, however, and it was believed that they had other ways of gathering information on Iran and exercising influence over Iranian affairs. The Freemasons and the Progressives were supposedly vehicles of British influence, so they bear some study to understand the type of thinking which went into forming such beliefs. Also, it was this type of belief in grand conspiracies which created such a rich operating environment for SAVAK.

1. Freemasons

'The Freemasons in Iran were considered in particular the locus of the MI-6's (British Intelligence's) primary recruitment.'[50] A series of books (*Faramush-Khaneh va Feremasoneri*, or *The House of Forgetfulness and Freemasonry*) written by Pan-Iranist and KOOK member Esmail Rai'in in the late-1960s published Lodge membership lists.[51] Yet another book by Rai'in, titled *Huquq Begiran-i Ingilis dar Iran* (*England's Agents in Iran*), named some of the early Iranian Anglophiles. It was true that among Grand Orient Lodge members were some of the more aristocratic names of Iranian society, such as Khozeimeh-

---

50. R.W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold-War Case Study*, (Pittsburgh, 1988), p. 59. There are parallels between views on Iranian Freemasonry at the time and more recent views on the Italian P-2 Lodge.

51. On Rai'in's Pan-Iranist membership, see 'Recent Developments in Pan-Iranism'. On his KOOK membership, see interview with Gen. H.-A. Kia (21OCT85, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

Alam and Arab-Sheibani, and that they therefore had considerable political potential.[52] A number of these individuals, furthermore, were involved in an early-1959 plan to promote the Shah's brother, Prince Gholam Reza, as Crown Prince in case the Shah fell from power.[53] It is also true that Jafar Sharif-Emami and Manucher Eqbal, who were Grand Masters of Masonic bodies, had also served as Prime Ministers, and that Premier Amir Abbas Hoveida was also a Mason.

There were also three or four 12-member *dowrehs*, all of which met on Sunday evenings, with Freemasonic associations.[54] Among the members of these dowrehs were former-Prime Minister Hussein Ala, Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh, Dr Loghman Adham, Manucher Eqbal, and Abdullah Entezam. Eleven members of Eqbal's cabinet were in a Freemason-oriented *dowreh* known as the Hafez Club.[55] In fact, a British visitor to Iran who had been made a guest of the Hafez Club for a few days was strongly urged by the British Embassy to leave the Club's facilities at once and to travel to Isfahan, so necessary was it considered to disassociate Britain from the Club's Freemasonic nature.[56]

Accusations of political meddling overlook the apolitical nature of Freemasonry. The political climate of the post-coup period discouraged people from active political participation in the form of joining parties. Lodge membership afforded them the togetherness, fraternity, and mutual aid of a political party without calling for actual participation in political activities. They were, furthermore, protected by Freemasonry's secrecy.[57] The

---

52. 'Grand Orient Lodge Membership in the Majlis,' Foreign Service Despatch 26, 788.00/7-1654. The Grand Orient Lodge was never recognized as an official Masonic organization, (confidential interview). Earlier (*circa* 1808) Iranian Freemasons are discussed in H. Algar, 'An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran,' *Middle East Studies* v. 6, n. 1 (OCT70).

53. E.R. Oney, *CIA Research Study: Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76); in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 67.

54. A *dowreh* (literally 'circle') is nothing more than a social gathering of people with similar interests, whether they be professional or social. For a discussion of this subject, see W.G. Miller, 'Political Organization in Iran: From Dowreh to Political Party,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 23, n. 2 and 3 (Spring and Summer 1969); M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, (Princeton, 1971), pp. 40-41, 238-41.

55. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community: Structure, Patterns, Problems, and Recommendations for US Actions,' State Department Airgram, (21DEC63); in *Asnad*, v. 20, p. 17.

56. Interview with P.W. Avery (4JUN92, Cambridge).

57. P.W. Avery, *Modern Iran*, (London, 1965), p. 364.

Alam and Arab-Sheibani, and that they therefore had considerable political potential.[52] A number of these individuals, furthermore, were involved in an early-1959 plan to promote the Shah's brother, Prince Gholam Reza, as Crown Prince in case the Shah fell from power.[53] It is also true that Jafar Sharif-Emami and Manucher Eqbal, who were Grand Masters of Masonic bodies, had also served as Prime Ministers, and that Premier Amir Abbas Hoveida was also a Mason.

There were also three or four 12-member *dowrehs*, all of which met on Sunday evenings, with Freemasonic associations.[54] Among the members of these dowrehs were former-Prime Minister Hussein Ala, Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh, Dr Loghman Adham, Manucher Eqbal, and Abdullah Entezam. Eleven members of Eqbal's cabinet were in a Freemason-oriented *dowreh* known as the Hafez Club.[55] In fact, a British visitor to Iran who had been made a guest of the Hafez Club for a few days was strongly urged by the British Embassy to leave the Club's facilities at once and to travel to Isfahan, so necessary was it considered to disassociate Britain from the Club's Freemasonic nature.[56]

Accusations of political meddling overlook the apolitical nature of Freemasonry. The political climate of the post-coup period discouraged people from active political participation in the form of joining parties. Lodge membership afforded them the togetherness, fraternity, and mutual aid of a political party without calling for actual participation in political activities. They were, furthermore, protected by Freemasonry's secrecy.[57] The

---

52. 'Grand Orient Lodge Membership in the Majlis,' Foreign Service Despatch 26, 788.00/7-1654. The Grand Orient Lodge was never recognized as an official Masonic organization, (confidential interview). Earlier (*circa* 1808) Iranian Freemasons are discussed in H. Algar, 'An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran,' *Middle East Studies* v. 6, n. 1 (OCT70).

53. E.R. Oney, *CIA Research Study: Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76); in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 67.

54. A *dowreh* (literally 'circle') is nothing more than a social gathering of people with similar interests, whether they be professional or social. For a discussion of this subject, see W.G. Miller, 'Political Organization in Iran: From Dowreh to Political Party,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 23, n. 2 and 3 (Spring and Summer 1969); M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, (Princeton, 1971), pp. 40-41, 238-41.

55. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community: Structure, Patterns, Problems, and Recommendations for US Actions,' State Department Airgram, (21DEC63); in *Asnad*, v. 20, p. 17.

56. Interview with P.W. Avery (4JUN92, Cambridge).

57. P.W. Avery, *Modern Iran*, (London, 1965), p. 364.

view of a British hand directing the Freemasons also overlooked the practicalities behind controlling agent networks: it would have been impossible to control so many people.[58]

Rumours surfaced that the US and UK had crossed swords over Freemasonry in Iran.[59] According to these rumours, SAVAK's US advisers encouraged observation and infiltration of the Masons as a way of countering British influence. In interviews with CIA officers these stories have been dismissed.[60] One retired CIA officer said that he recommended having some agents join the Freemasons as a way of gathering information on them, 'just in case the rumours were true.' His suggestion, however, 'went over like a lead balloon,' so unlikely did his superiors consider rumours of Masonic influence.

2. The Progressives

The Progressive Group (*Jamiyat-e Tarraqikhahan*) did not wish to be associated with the Freemasons. It was created in 1956 and led by Ahmad Aramesh. In 1957, this 300-member organization held meetings with a diverse range of political groups, such as the Iran Party, National Resistance Movement units, and allies of Gen. Hassan Arfa. At the same time, Aramesh was operating on Qarani's behalf in an attempt to gather support for Qarani's planned coup.[61] *Tehran Mosavar* published articles by Aramesh that were critical of US Middle East policies,[62] and the group advocated neutrality, withdrawal from CENTO, and abrogation of the US-Iran bilateral treaty.[63] The Progressive Group sought British patronage, but failed to find it. Some members (such as the Rashidians) successfully milked their perceived British connection for many years, yet the British desire not to be associated with any one group was so great that the British Embassy actively avoided the Progressive Group.

Aramesh was associated with the Rashidian brothers, who were British agents, and had played a part in the August 1953 coup when he had supposedly served as a financial in-

---

58. Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, p. 97.
59. See, for example, Fardust, *Khatirat*, pp. 372-373.
60. Confidential interviews (16 APR92 and 19MAY92).
61. 'The Qarani Affair: A Recapitulation,' Foreign Service Despatch 850, 788.00/26MAR58, (FOIA).
62. US Army weekly update, 788.00 (W)/8FEB58, RG-59, Box 3814.
63. 'Reflections on the Azmudeh and Aramesh Affairs,' Foreign Service Despatch 24, 788.00/12JUL61, (FOIA).

termediary between the CIA and Ayatollah Kashani.[64] Aramesh and the Rashidians were part of another group -- a dowreh called *Iran Javan* (Young Iran) with facilities on Takhte Jamshid Avenue -- which was 'known for its pro-British tendency.'[65] Probably as a result of his marriage to Prime Minister Sharif-Emami's sister, Aramesh served as Plan Organization's director for about three months, but his main activity there was politics, not economics, and he even accused the World Bank, in a closed Majlis session, of trying to control Iran. He also used this position to attack Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, his predecessor at Plan Organization, by accusing him of corrupt dealings with David E. Lilienthal and Gordon R. Clapp, directors of the Development Resources Corporation, a US firm connected with the Khuzestan Water Project.[66]

Aramesh and Mohsen Pezeshkpour's faction of the Pan-Iranists, with whom he had been associated, were later in the pay of SAVAK, and in May 1964 the government encouraged him to call for a holy war against Egyptian leader Nasser.[67] Aramesh was a big gambler who threw around money, and when his lenders started pressing him for repayment, he tried to kill himself with a gunshot to the stomach. This failed, and after he had recuperated, Aramesh sent letters to his friends declaring his candidacy as leader of an Iranian republic. He even gave out fliers to pedestrians. He was imprisoned for this offence in 1966 (he later wrote a book called *Haft Sal dar Zendan-i Aryamehr* or *Seven Years in*

---

64. Two CIA officers gave Aramesh $10,000 to deliver to Kashani, so that he would call for anti-Musaddiq crowds, and although they were not certain, they believed Aramesh had delivered the money to Kashani; see Gasiorowski, *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 79. According to a confidential interview with a former MI-6 officer (7FEB92), the Rashidians were recruited by Robin Zaehner, the officer in the British Embassy who had originally conceived the plan which led to the ouster of Musaddiq.

65. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community,' p. 17.

66. On Aramesh's long rivalry with Ebtehaj, see 'Majlis Proceedings 26MAR-8APR56,' Foreign Service Despatch 859, 788.21/10APR56, RG-59, Box 3818; and 'Further Developments with Regard to the Iran Party Declaration,' Foreign Service Despatch 743, 788.00/20FEB57, RG-59, Box 3810. On the actual case, see 'Alamuti Comments on the Ebtehaj Case,' State Department Airgram A-210, 25JAN62, (FOIA). On the Khuzestan Water Project, see D.E. Lillienthal, 'Enterprise in Iran: An Experiment in Economic Development,' *Foreign Affairs* v. 38, n. 1 (OCT59).

67. 'The Pan-Iran Party and its Anti-Nasser Activities,' State Department Airgram A-354, 6JUN65, (FOIA).

Aryamehr's Prison). He was eventually released from prison, but in 1973 he was killed in a shoot-out with the police in Farah Park.[68]

This brief biographical sketch of Aramesh shows that it is difficult to label him or the Progressive Society as purely British agents.[69] If Aramesh could be called anything, it was, at best, an ambitious pragmatist, and at worst, mentally unbalanced. He had been a British agent who was turned over to the Americans in 1953, and he had been associated with the Rashidians. He was also against CENTO, which included England, against the US-Iran bilateral treaty, and an extreme nationalist. Many of his fellow Progressives were out-of-office officials and political hacks who sought reinstatement and were bitter over having lost their posts. As for the Rashidians, they sought political power only when it served as a key to wealth, and they boasted of their ties with the British, showing their possession of the agencies of several British firms as proof. The truth did not matter, people believed it, and the Rashidians played on the perception of a British connection as a way of encouraging other Iranians to come to them for assistance in business affairs.[70]

Founded in 1959, the Progressive Centre (*Kanun Moterreqi*) started as a nine-person *dowreh* whose members were Hassan Ali Mansur, Amir Abbas Hoveida, Mohammad Taqi Sarlak, Manucher Shahgholi, Mohsen Khajenouri, Dr Hossein Hedayati, Fathollah Sotudeh, Dr Zia Shadman, and Dr Gholam Reza Nikpay. After receiving some publicity from a February 1963 journal article describing their work, they were given a royal charter as the Economic Research Bureau to the Imperial Court.

> The body called the 'Progressive Center [*sic*]' and composed of educated men, experts, intellectuals, and persons interested in deep and accurate studies in economic and social affairs for the welfare, comfort, progress, and prosperity of the Iranian people and homeland, enjoys our pleasure and satisfaction. In order to express our special favour and attention by This Charter, we hereby proclaim that the said Center [*sic*]' has been appointed our Economic Research Bureau and that its members enjoy our special favour and attention.[71]

---

68. Interviews with Khodadad Farmanfarmaian (5JAN83; Cambridge, MA), and Mozaffar Baghai (25JUN86) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

69. For information on Aramesh's earlier political life, see G.R.M. Saleh, ed., *Khatirat-i Siyasi-i Ahmad Aramesh,* (Isfahan, 1990).

70. R.W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran,* (Pittsburgh, 1964, 1979), CH. 13.

71. *Peiqam-e Emruz* [Tehran], (5JUN63), in Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran,* p. 87.

The above nine individuals served as the executive committee of the 100-member Progressives, the stated purpose of which was to conduct research on Iran's economic and social problems [72] It was suspected that this group had a European orientation, because a number of prominent American-trained Iranians had not joined, and Mansur himself had been critical of former Prime Minister Ali Amini, who was regarded as an American favourite.[73]

On 15 December 1963, this group became the *Hizb-i Iran Novin* (New Iran Party).[74] Its leader, Hassan Ali Mansur, became Prime Minister in March 1964, serving in this position until January 1965, when he was assassinated by a member of the Islamic Nations Party (*Hizb-i Millal-i Islami*). Mansur was succeeded by Amir Abbas Hoveida, who had been his deputy until two or three months before the assassination and who through a later marriage was related to Mansur. Hoveida had served in the Iranian foreign service and the NIOC, and he had been a member of the Iran Novin, so he seemed to be well-qualified for the job.[75]

At first glance, there was an interesting coincidence between the membership of the Progressives and Freemasonry. By cross-referencing a partial listing of the group's members with a list of Iranian Freemasons, one sees that Hassan Ali Mansur, Mohsen Khajenouri, Fatollah Sotudeh, and Amir Abbas Hoveida, were also Freemasons [76] Yet such lists could be misleading. For example, Hassan Ali Mansur was never a regular Iranian Freemason, because his application to join had been blackballed. He was part of the irregular Freemasonry organised by a Syrian-born intriguer named Mohammad Khalil Javaheri.[77]

---

72. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community,' p. 17. 'Ali Mansur's Progressive Society,' Foreign Service Despatch 375, 14FEB62, (FOIA). Dr Farhang Mehr, a member of the Progressive Centre and then the Iran Novin Party, provided details on this group; interview with the author, (2NOV92, Boston).

73. 'Progressive Society Election Activities,' State Department Airgram A-10, 8JUL63, (FOIA).

74. 'The New Iran Party,' State Department Airgram A-366, 4JAN64, (FOIA).

75. Interview with F. Mehr, (2NOV92, Boston).

76. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community,' and Rai'in, *Faramush-Khaneh va Framasuneri*, v. III, (Great Britain, 1978), pp. 640-680.

77. Information on Javaheri, who was supposedly the chief of the aforementionned Hafez Club, was repeated in numerous interviews. It can also be seen in Fardust, *Khatirat*, pp. 192-193. Masonic lodges practicing in Iran, which were considered to be 'regular', were those which were affiliated with the Grand Lodges of Germany, France, or Scotland. In

Rumours about Javaheri, who claimed to be the chief of Freemasonry in the Middle East, made him out to be part of the grand British conspiracy in Iran. He had supposedly encouraged Police chief Alavi-Moghaddam to join the Freemasons and was actively recruiting other high-ranking security, military, and intelligence officials.

In later years this list grew as Progressives who were not Freemasons rushed to join, in the mistaken belief that membership in the fraternity would somehow earn them political influence. Often, individuals would seek Masonic membership even after becoming cabinet members, fearing that to do otherwise would somehow leave them out of touch and without influence. This tendency only furthered the belief in a British hand behind the scenes. When Hoveida took over for the murdered Mansur, he inherited about seven or eight cabinet members who were Masons. By the time he left office 13 1/2 years later, however, there was only one Freemason in his cabinet.

IV. Legislative Action

One could say that laws which had been enacted by Musaddiq served as the basis for the establishment of SAVAK. On 20 August 1952, Musaddiq imposed martial law in Tehran, and as has been shown above, it was under the Military-Governorship of Tehran that SAVAK's predecessor unit was formed. Musaddiq also imposed, on 23 October 1952, a Public Security law under which one could be arrested and sentenced to internal exile for inciting strikes, disorders, or insurrection. In July 1953, another law — the Formation and the Powers of the Commission for Social Security — was passed. This law stated a security commission would pass judgement on those accused of sabotage or disruptive activities. Those found guilty could be imprisoned or sent into internal exile.[78]

1968, these three Grand Lodges gave leave for the formation of a Grand Lodge of Iran, under the aegis of which all regular Iran-based lodges would operate. Any groups which did not comply with these standards were considered 'irregular' and were not recognised as real Masonic bodies. See H. Carr, 'The Foundation of the Grand Lodge of Iran,' *Ars Quatuor Coronatorum*, v. 81 (1968).

78. F. Azimi, 'The Political Career of Muhammad Musaddiq,' in J.A. Bill and W.R. Louis, eds., *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, (London, 1988), p. 59; H. Ladjevardi, 'Constitutional Government and Reform Under Musaddiq,' in *ibid.*, pp. 78-80; and H. Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, (London, 1990), p. 169.

Imposition of these laws was necessitated by the need to contain the violent activities of extremist political groups, such as the Somka, say those who seek to shield Musaddiq from criticism. Others fault the Majlis for enabling such legislation.[79] In fact, Musaddiq had cancelled Majlis elections so those who opposed his policies would not gain their seats. He also dissolved the Senate.[80] Musaddiq then demanded the power to bypass the constitution ('limited legislative powers').[81] Thus, Musaddiq succeeded in earning accusations from his political opponents and the press for acting in an unconstitutional manner. The Public Security law, although temporary, was extended several times, and a permanent version of it was introduced by Fazlollah Zahedi when he became Prime Minister.[82]

The discovery of the Tudeh Military Network served as an impetus for several new security-related laws to be enacted. Among these was the Subversive Activities Control Act, which was adopted on 2 November 1954, and another measure was a loyalty oath for government employees.[83] In October 1956, a new press law was created which gave the Ministry of Justice the power to stifle any opposition.[84] An Internal Security Bill was also proposed in late-1956, but it met with considerable opposition in both the Senate and the Majlis, as well as from the Military Governor of Tehran, Gen. Bakhtiar, because it was seen as giving too much power to individual provincial security offices.[85]

The Shah, on his birthday in October 1956, made a speech to the Majlis in which he decried the dangers of corruption and espionage and announced 'pending draft Security Agency legislation'.[86] Later in the month the government introduced a bill for a new

---

79. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 449.
80. Ladjevardi, 'Constitutional Government and Reform Under Musaddiq,' p. 72.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
83. 'Proposed Anti-Communist Legislation,' Foreign Service Despatch 230, 788.001/6NOV54, RG-59, Box 4114; and Interparliamentary Union, *Constitutional and Parliamentary Information*, III, no. 21, 8-9; in S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, (Berkeley, 1966), p. 209.
84. 'Political Summary for Month of September 1956,' Foreign Service Despatch 274, 788.00/8OCT56, RG-59, Box 3810.
85. 'New Security Legislation - Recent Developments,' Foreign Service Despatch 506, 788.21/19DEC56; and 'Proceedings of Iranian Parliament, 12DEC-20DEC56,' Foreign Service Despatch 510, 788.21/26DEC56, RG-59, Box 3818.
86. 'Shah's Remarks to Speaker of Majlis,' Foreign Service Despatch 353, 788.00/1NOV56, RG-59, Box 3810.

Security and Intelligence Agency to replace martial law.[87] This agency was to have wide powers of investigation, search, and arrest, and it would make use of the military courts to prosecute the accused. Bakhtiar claimed to oppose the agency's formation because he thought its creation would cause the same problems, corruption and petty tyranny, as the Internal Security Bill mentioned above.[88] It seems more likely that Bakhtiar's opposition stemmed from the fact that the Shah was considering making the new organization a completely non-military one and appointing Nasser Zolfaqari as its chief.[89]

On 15 December 1956, a bill for a new intelligence and security agency was proposed. This bill also met with some Senate opposition. This was because some elements, such as Interior Minister Alam and Chief of Police Alavi-Moghaddam, were political rivals of Bakhtiar, who was now Chief-designate of the proposed security agency. This rivalry, in turn, dragged in Court Minister Eqbal, who was allied with Bakhtiar.[90]

The establishment of SAVAK (*Sazeman-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar*, National Intelligence and Security Organization) was authorised by the Majlis in April 1957.[91] SAVAK was formed to obtain information required for the maintenance of national security and to prevent conspiracies which were harmful to the national interest. Also, it was to uncover espionage and pursue those suspected of acting in the interests of foreign powers. In general, SAVAK was to provide the Shah and the government with the facilities for the collection and analysis of intelligence and counter-intelligence information and to monitor and exercise control over illegal groups. SAVAK's chief was to be appointed by an Imperial Decree from the Shah and would hold the rank of Assistant to the Prime Minister.[92]

---

87. 'Political Summary for the Month of October 1956,' Foreign Service Despatch 380, 788.00/1NOV056, RG-59, Box 3810.

88. 'Recent Conversations with Iranian Politicians,' Foreign Service Despatch 517, 788.00/27DEC56, RG-59, Box 3810.

89. Zolfaqari, who had served in Military Intelligence and in the Majlis, was considered in October-November 1956 because the Shah was concerned by Bakhtiar's apparent ambition and the fact that he was being promoted by the US government's representatives in Iran; interview with M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

90. 'New Security Legislation - Recent Developments.'

91. For the text of this law, see the Appendix.

92. Butler, 'Report on Human Rights in Iran,' in W.J. Butler, and G. Levasseur, 'Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran,' *A Report for the International Commission of Jurists*, (Geneva, MAR76), pp. 32-33. See also, F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*,

SAVAK's legal operations were outside the civil realm. SAVAK officials were considered military magistrates, and those they arrested were tried by military courts. Any SAVAK personnel charged with abuse of power or any other act which affected execution of their duties were to be prosecuted by a military court under the Court-Martial Act of 1318 (1939). The *22 Khordad 1310* (1931) Treason Act, which made the promotion of socialist or communist ideas illegal, was used frequently to prosecute those arrested by SAVAK.[93] On 16 October 1957, a Law on Penalties Applicable to Saboteurs in the Petroleum Industry was adopted. This law set out harsh penalties for those who set out to harm Iran's vital oil industry. SAVAK was given responsibility for enforcement of this law, and people accused of breaking this law were to be tried by military courts.[94]

V. Foundations of SAVAK

In 1956, as the Shah was consolidating his position, he ordered the formation of a commission to discuss the concept of an Iranian intelligence organization. The officers in this commission included Alavi-Kia, Mobasser, Mostafa Amjadi, Zibai, Asghar Zamani, Siahatgar, and Pakravan (who was put in charge). Mobasser was put in charge of organizing the domestic security functions of the projected unit, while Pakravan dealt with matters of foreign intelligence.[95]

The commission copied, to some extent, the Turkish intelligence service [MIT (*Milli Istikbarat Teskilati*), or TNIO (Turkish National Intelligence Organization)], which combined internal and external functions. In this sense, SAVAK and MIT were different from Western intelligence organizations. The aim of SAVAK, as its founders saw it, was to prevent problems, not to make arrests. It was decided to ban uniforms so SAVAK would be more civilian- and public-oriented. It was also decided to put in full-time hours, like foreigners,

---

(London, 1979), p. 79; and E.R. Oney, '"The Eyes and Ears of the Shah",' *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 1, n. 4, fn 2.

93. Butler, 'Report on Human Rights in Iran,' p. 33.

94. 'A Law on Penalties Applicable to Saboteurs in the Petroleum Industry,' Foreign Service Despatch 445, 788.21/13NOV57.

95. Interviews with M. Mobasser, (11MAR92, London) and H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego); and interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83; Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

not the usual Iranian schedule which started in the late-morning, ended in the late-afternoon, and included a very long lunch. Bakhtiar agreed with all these ideas.[96]

A. Personnel

Most of SAVAK's first trainees were officers who had served in Army Intelligence, Military Intelligence, or the National Police. Some civilians were also recruited, but because of the disparity between pay scales in the civilian and government sectors, few civilians initially joined the organization. Among those who did were Iranians from the country's wealthier families. As a result of their economic advantage, some of them had been educated at foreign universities, several even earning advanced degrees. (On SAVAK's recruitment of personnel, see Ch. 5).

B. Training

SAVAK's first trainers were Americans from the CIA. One American officer provided advice and training from September 1953 until March 1955. He was replaced by a more permanent group of officers who provided intelligence instruction from Summer 1955 until about 1961-1962. Feeling that the training was not entirely adequate to its needs, SAVAK communicated with European countries for specialised training. SAVAK personnel underwent training in England, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and many other countries. Such courses were usually of a technical nature, with officers getting language training at Harvard, London, Israel, and even the People's Republic of China. The Japanese trained SAVAK in the acquisition and use of electronic surveillance equipment.[97]

It was prohibitively expensive to do this, so it was realized that Iran needed its own training program. Iran finally turned to Israel for help in this, because Israel was seen as being the most compatible with Iranian needs and character. This training relationship was solidified in 1961, but specialised training in other countries still took place. In addition, some of the US trainers were held in much higher esteem than others, and these officers were invited back to conduct further training. By 1965 or 1966, the SAVAK training de-

---

96. Interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83; Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; and author's interviews with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego) and M. Mobasser (11MAR92, London).

97. Interview with M. Hashemi (14FEB92, London).

partment had become self-sufficient, so the Israelis left the scene. (On the Training Department, see Ch. 5).

CH. 3. OVERALL ORGANIZATION

As was discussed in Chapter 2, before 1953 Iran had at least six organizations concerned with security and intelligence-related matters. After the August 1953 ouster of Musaddiq, there had been an attempt at forming a centralized intelligence facility, and this was embodied in the intelligence unit based on the Military-Governorship of Tehran. Throughout this period, however, there was intense competition between the chiefs of these units, the end result being that the Shah was compelled to request foreign assistance in an attempt to alleviate the problems. The US and UK gave advice where they could, but the Iranians were unwilling to leave their destiny in the hands of foreigners.

I. Structure and Budget

For this reason, by the time SAVAK was launched in 1957, a number of commissions had met to discuss, among other issues, its organizational structure. Yet the outcome of these meetings, in purely organizational terms, was not very impressive. Iran's new centralized intelligence and security body was organized along very simple and straight-forward lines.



There were several reasons for keeping SAVAK's structure so simple. One reason was the decision to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, so that changes could be initiated after more specific needs were recognized. As new responsibilities were acquired, changes could be made. The new organization, furthermore, was small, with only about 120-150 personnel. For this reason, a complex structure would stretch its personnel. The new organization's employees were mostly

personnel seconded from Military Intelligence, Army Intelligence, the Military Academy, and a few from the National Police.

An example of this is an officer who was stationed in Shiraz while assigned to Army Counter-intelligence. He was recalled to Tehran and informed that he was now the local SAVAK chief for Fars Province. The only real change in his status was the assignment of a driver. Otherwise, he had to build his own local intelligence organization. Since there was no central cadre from which to get intelligence officers, he had to get some officers from the Army and some from the Police. The local military commanders did not like to lose their best men, so they did not always cooperate.[1]

SAVAK then started trying to recruit civilians. An example of this is an individual who was attending English classes at an institution run by the US Embassy. This civilian was approached by a classmate, an Army officer he had met while doing his national service. The civilian liked the idea of intelligence work, so he filled out the application forms. After waiting about two months, he was accepted for SAVAK.[2]

At this point, furthermore, SAVAK did not have a very big budget. In the first year, SAVAK had a budget of only $3.75 million, which was expanded to $5.6 million in the next year. Its director had a secret operations budget, but this only amounted to approximately $1.5 million in the first few years.[3]

SAVAK's organizational structure stayed this way until 1959-1960. At this point, Gen. Hossein Fardust, the Shah's trusted friend, was made a deputy director of SAVAK and was given responsibility for administrative matters. Fardust had spent most of his military career, until that time, undergoing training in a number of subjects in different countries. Upon his return to Iran he was given two jobs, one as chief of a new oversight organization, the *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau, SIB), and the other was the SAVAK position. It seems reasonable to speculate that Fardust was given these jobs because the Shah wanted to use his extended military education and to keep a check on ambitious or disloyal personnel.

---

1. Interview with Gen. Manucher Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.
2. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).
3. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (6OCT93, Paris).

Fardust initiated a meeting of Iran's intelligence bodies and this committee recommended a re-organization, because 'lack of centralized control and delimitation agreement has long plagued and obstructed operations of the many security type agencies.'[4]

Fardust's implementation of these organizational changes means much of the credit must go to him for modernizing and streamlining SAVAK, while at the same time enabling it to widen its scope and improve its efficiency. The new structure (below) stayed essentially intact until 1978, when Gen. Nasser Moghaddam became SAVAK's director, having replaced Gen. Nematollah Nassiri.



Several organizational changes did take place in the years between 1960 and 1978, however, and they bear some expansion here, although they will be discussed more fully in later chapters. In June 1963, the first such change took place, with the creation of an eighth Department. Department VIII was concerned with Counter-espionage / Counter-intelligence, and the officer given responsibility for this department was Gen. Manucher Hashemi. Soon

4. US Army Weekly update, 788.00 (W)/3SEP59, RG-59, Box 3814.

thereafter the second change took place, with the creation of SAVAK's Training Department. The creation of these two Departments served to greatly reduce US involvement with SAVAK.

In 1971-1972, the Joint Committee of the National Police and SAVAK was formed to deal with Iran's terrorism problems. The reason for the creation of a joint structure was the recognition of the armed opposition's foreign connection. Neither SAVAK nor the Police were properly equipped or prepared to address this problem individually. Presided over by Parviz Sabeti, chief of SAVAK Department III, this Committee had access to resources from SAVAK, the Police, and the Armed Forces. Personnel from SAVAK, the SIB, the Police, and the military were assigned to this unit. In 1978, a number of *ad hoc* groups were formed with the express purpose of acting in support of the government. Among these groups were Civil Defense Organization (*Sazeman-i Defa-yi Melli*) 'Action Squads' (also known as 'Resistance Corps Units'), who could take action against the opposition while the government denied responsibility, and later *agents provacateur* actions which led to clashes in major cities. Although the precise SAVAK connection in these cases is unknown, the former head of the Joint Committee took credit for the clashes.[5]

In June 1978, Nassiri was replaced by Moghaddam, who immediately moved to institute drastic and sweeping organizational and personnel changes. The SAVAK Departments concerned with foreign intelligence (Departments II and VII) were placed under a newly appointed Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence. The Private Office was separated from Department I, renamed the Liaison Sub-Department, and placed under the new foreign intelligence director . This section was organized along the following lines (see below).

---

5. 'Disturbances in Isfahan,' State Department Airgram, (6MAY78), in *Asnad*, v. 61, p. 107; 'Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-measures,' State Department Telegram, (5NOV78); in *Asnad*, v. 63, p. 13.



Moghaddam also intended to make changes in SAVAK's domestic security apparatus. He projected placing the domestic security functions covered by Departments III, VIII, and the Joint SAVAK-Police committee solely in the hands of the National Police. The Iranian Revolution was progressing at too rapid a pace, however, and these changes were not initiated. By this time, SAVAK had 3,000-3,500 full-time employees and an unlimited budget.[6]

II. Personnel

SAVAK's first director, who was given the governmental rank of Deputy Prime Minister, was Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar. His deputy for Internal Affairs was Col. Hassan Alavi-Kia. Alavi-Kia's deputy for Internal Security was Col. Abdol-Ali Mahoutian. Bakhtiar's deputy for External Affairs was Col. Hassan Pakravan. His deputy for Foreign Intelligence was initially Abdol Hossein Rahimi who, after being assigned to Tel Aviv as Chief of Station, was replaced by Ahmad Azima, a Naval officer. Initially, there was only a foreign intelligence section, but this was then split into Department II (Foreign Intelligence Collection and Operations) and Department VII (Foreign Intelligence Analysis). Azima was left in charge of Department II, while Rasai, another naval officer, was made chief of Department VII.

In March 1961, Bakhtiar was dismissed because the Shah suspected him of having ambitions on the Premiership. The dismissal of Bakhtiar had a major effect on the first generation

---

6. Information on personnel numbers and the budget are from a confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92) and were confirmed in several other interviews. Other numbers given have been 5,300, in Revolutionary Prosecutor-General, 'The Role of SAVAK,' *Iran Times*, (31AUG79). The State Department put that figure at 6,000; see *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 100. An earlier estimate, based on conversations with members of the opposition, was that SAVAK had between 30,000 and 60,000 employees; see *Newsweek*, (14OCT74), pp. 27-31, and R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (London, 1978, 1979), p. 146.

of SAVAK personnel. Some were dismissed immediately, while others were viewed with great suspicion and their personnel files were marked accordingly. Those who were not dismissed immediately were transferred away from Tehran. Others were transferred back to the military or to non-intelligence related government jobs. When Bakhtiar was dismissed, he was succeeded by Pakravan. Alavi-Kia remained as Pakravan's deputy until 1962. Pakravan served as SAVAK's director until 1965, when he was succeeded by Gen. Nematollah Nassiri.

Then, in 1978, Nassiri was reassigned as Ambassador to Pakistan and replaced by Moghaddam. Nassiri's reassignment was a result of the Shah's attempts to appease the mounting opposition he faced. It was also the result of the Shah's desire to deflect some of the criticism he was getting from the Carter Administration for human rights violations committed by SAVAK.

Along with these organizational changes, Moghaddam initiated a number of personnel changes at all levels. In July, a number of personnel transfers took place, and most of the officers in charge of regional SAVAK's were replaced. In October 1978, thirty-three officials with domestic security functions were fired. So too were many Department chiefs, such as Parviz Sabeti.[7] This was accompanied by the fact that many SAVAK officers were retiring in 1978. The reasons for the retirements were multifold. One reason was that many of the retirees saw the proverbial writing on the wall and believed it was time to leave the country.[8] Some of them had managed to accumulate personal fortunes which they had transferred abroad and felt it was time to enjoy these fortunes. Others resented the fact that Nassiri, a man known for his loyalty to the Shah, was being used as a scapegoat (particularly after his arrest in November 1978), and they believed that others would face the same fate. This belief was reinforced by the actions of Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, who promised to eliminate SAVAK when he presented his government to the Majlis in January 1979. He may have done this as a way of clearing the Shah's name of blame, saying that SAVAK had not kept the monarch informed.[9] Of the officers who did stay in Iran, many sent their families abroad.

---

7. *The Times*, (30OCT78), p. 5.
8. J.D. Stempel, *Inside The Iranian Revolution*, (Bloomington, 1981), p. 125.
9. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington); Stempel, *Inside The Iranian Revolution*, p. 162.

Many of the remaining officers were arrested and executed.[10] Others had to go underground and effect overland escapes, going through Turkey, Pakistan, or the Persian Gulf.

In purely organizational terms, Moghaddam's ideas were good ones. Proposals for the creation of new organizations are often made when the stage of bureaucratic routinization is reached, and an organization's adaptability is an indicator of its institutionalization. Particularly important in this respect is the belief that the more the organization's leaders change, while the organization continues to operate normally, the more adaptable the organization is.[11] Thus, some turnover is desirable. Turnover also gives lower-ranking individuals a hope of fairly regular advancement.

In the case of the regional SAVAK's, furthermore, was the hope that the turnover in personnel would eliminate some of the corruption for which they were infamous. Some of the regional SAVAK officers had turned their areas of responsibility into personal fiefdoms. Far from the centre and operating without sufficient oversight, they abused their power and used their positions to extort money. They sent reports to their superiors claiming that all was well and there were no local problems, thus lulling the leadership into a false sense of security.

In theory, then, Moghaddam's moves were desirable. In practical terms, however, they were a mistake because they were ill-timed. It is a mistake to bring about such sweeping changes during a time of crisis. Some regional SAVAK officers may have been dishonest, but in theory they had local knowledge and were familiar with their areas of responsibility and the personalities in those areas. The new personnel were, for the most part, military officers with little, if any, intelligence training. They were not given, furthermore, any familiarisation, but were suddenly placed in their new jobs.[12] The case of Javad Mobini is an example of these problems.[13] He had served with distinction in those portions of SAVAK which dealt with the

---

10. On the executions, see G.F. Rose, 'The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment,' *Iranian Studies* XVII, n. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1984); W.F. Hickman, 'Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982,' Brookings Institution Staff Paper, (Washington, DC, 1982), pp. 8-18; N.B. Schahgaldian, 'The Iranian Military Under The Islamic Republic,' RAND National Defense Research Institute Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, (Santa Monica, CA: MAR87), pp. 17-27.

11. S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London, 1968), pp. 13-22.

12. Interview with J. Moinzadeh, (6FEB92, London).

13. Interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93, London).

Kurds. When Moghaddam took over, he transferred Mobini to the SAVAK office in Qasr-e Shirin. This was done despite the fact that the Qasr-e Shirin position was normally for a Brigadier General, who would have had the requisite management and command training.

The problems caused by these personnel shifts did not apply only to regional SAVAK offices. As was shown above, there were major organizational shifts in all the Departments of SAVAK. To take another example, one need only look at SAVAK's foreign intelligence section. The chief of Department VII was made the Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence, and he was replaced at Department VII by his deputy. The deputy, however, was relatively new to the job and did not have sufficient background to fulfil his responsibilities.[14]

---

14. Confidential interview (21FEB92).

CH. 4. OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION BODIES

It had been recognized by the Shah and the US and UK intelligence organizations which were working in Iran with the Iranian government that there was a need for greater coordination and cooperation between local security organizations. One of the reasons for SAVAK's creation was the elimination of the fierce competition between the security chiefs, such as Generals Valiollah Qarani, Haj-Ali Kia, Teimour Bakhtiar, and Mehdi-Qoli Alavi-Moghaddam, by creating a more centralised intelligence organization. The formation of SAVAK, however, did not eliminate the competition. In a project handled by Dr Mohammad Hossein Masoud, Bakhtiar had powerful German radios in SAVAK headquarters collect open-source information from TASS, Agence France Press, etc., and he would rush to be the first to present this data to the Shah. Bakhtiar would also intercept military and police communications and beat the commanders to the Shah with the collected information. Kia, at Military Intelligence, operated similarly. He maintained a filing system from which he would present different bits of information to different individuals, based on who they were and who they represented.[1] This competition was not confined to officers with intelligence-related duties, and officers with straight military functions were also busy fighting each other.

To alleviate these problems, the Shah promoted the creation of oversight and coordinating bodies. As well as helping coordination within the intelligence and security apparatus, the Shah hoped that the various oversight bodies would help prevent any coup-attempts by disloyal officers.

Despite the creation of various oversight and coordinating bodies, the Shah never fully trusted any of them or any of their chiefs. Some of them may have had a great deal of influence, such as Gen. Nematollah Nassiri or Gen. Hossein Fardust, but even they had their good days and their bad days. Different individuals had different amounts of access to the Shah, mainly based on their abilities in bureaucratic infighting. Yet another variable was the closeness of the officer to civilians in the Court, particularly Minister of Court

---

1. Information on Bakhtiar and Kia is from a confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (11APR92), and was confirmed in interviews with two other retired CIA officers (16APR92 and 11SEP92).

Assadollah Alam and the Queen herself. Occasionally, albeit rarely, the Shah would by-pass all these individuals, as well as the organizations they represented, and consult with lower-ranking personnel.

I. *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau, SIB)[2]

The SIB was created in 1958-1959 by Gen. Hossein Fardust after having received intelligence-training in several other countries.[3] He selected a number of military officers, gave them a rushed training course, and after three months, announced the existence of the SIB.

Its organization was fairly straight-forward, a fact which belied its extensive powers. The headquarters section consisted of a chief (during the twenty years of the SIB's existence, Fardust was always its chief) and his deputy. Samad Samadianpour was the first deputy, followed by Eshqipour, and finally Nejati. There were also five branches. Branch 1 dealt with administrative matters and finance, and its personnel consisted of one officer and twenty non-commissioned officers (NCO's). Branch 2 was concerned with the functioning of Iran's ministries, and it consisted of four officers.[4]

Branch 3 was responsible for political affairs. This branch, which checked on information from Military Intelligence and SAVAK's Department III (domestic security), had four officers assigned to it.[5] Branch 4 dealt with military and security affairs, and it collected information from and about the Armed Forces, the National Police and the Gendarmerie. There were four officers assigned to Branch 4. Branch 5 was created after the other branches. Its function was to determine whether or not the Shah's orders were being carried out according to his instructions. Its six officers had the power to pursue investigations in any ministry or organization, be it military or civilian, located in Iran or abroad.[6]

Initially, the SIB had a budget of 750,000 tomans a year, but because its money came from the military, it increased over the years. The personnel assigned to it, other than

---

2. Despite the similarity in names, this body should not be confused with the Special Bureau (*Daftar-i Makhsus*).

3. Interview with Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP. See also Gen. H. Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust*, (Tehran, 1980), p. 397.

4. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 397.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 397-98.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

clerks and jerks, were military officers, so their pay came from their respective branches. The military nature of the organization's personnel was a hindrance, in a way, in that the SIB did not have any slots for Brigadier Generals. In other words, an individual could remain in the SIB up to the rank of Colonel, but if he hoped for a promotion above that rank he had to return to his armed service branch.[7]

Since there can be an adverse effect when officials see their jobs as a source of a safe, easy living,[8] the fact that many officers had to go to other assignments and could not make a career of the SIB was also a strengthening factor. Turnover, furthermore, ensures that the institution itself can continue functioning effectively without becoming attached to any one individual. Another advantage of this turnover in personnel was that SIB officers, who were now theoretically loyal to Fardust and were indoctrinated in the principles of intelligence, were present throughout Iran's security institutions.[9] This effectively created an SIB network that reached every aspect of the Iranian security apparatus.

Fardust had simultaneous duties as a Deputy Director of SAVAK while serving as the SIB's chief. In 1971-72 he was transferred from SAVAK to head the revived Imperial Inspectorate Organization (IIO), while still staying in his SIB slot. To get some idea of the reach of Fardust's SIB network, one need only examine the jobs held by some other officers after having left the SIB. Gen. Nasser Moghaddam served as head of SAVAK's Department III, chief of Military Intelligence, and chief of SAVAK.[10] Gen. Azizollah Palizban would later serve as chief of Military Intelligence.[11] Gen. Samadianpour served

---

7. *Ibid.*

8. M. Weber, (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.), *Economy and Society* v. II, (Berkeley and London, 1968, 1978), p 990.

9. A number of interviewees have stated that Fardust had the ability to engender great loyalty from those who served under him, not because of any great personal talents, but because of his honesty, sense of fairness, and sense of duty. His actions immediately during and after the 1978-79 revolution have mystified many of those who thought they were close to him.

10. Both times that Moghaddam worked in SAVAK it was on Fardust's recommendation, according to an interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; and 'Decision-making in Iran,' State Department Report, (22JUL76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 126.

11. CIA cable, (2NOV79); in *Asnad-i Laneh-yi Jasusi* , v. 32, p. 152. Palizban allegedly linked up with some Jaf Kurds to form a guerrilla band; see National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,' (AUG79), in *Asnad*, v. 31, p. 20.

in SAVAK's Department III and eventually became chief of the National Police. Gen. Khatami became counter-intelligence chief of the Imperial Guard. Gen. Firouzmand became head of the military inspectorate. Gen. Boroumandjazy succeeded Moghaddam at Military Intelligence. Gen. Jaafari became the deputy chief of the National Police.[12] Gen. Issa Afshai became head of Gendarmerie counter-intelligence.[13] Gen. Zandipour became chief of the Joint Committee of the National Police and SAVAK. Gen. Ghassem Parnianfar became Deputy Director of Department III in 1973 and in April 1975 he was a member of the Tehran SAVAK office.[14]

The SIB received information from a number of sources. Military Intelligence provided a daily bulletin with news about the Iranian armed forces, the borders, neighbouring militaries, and anything else of interest. Military Intelligence would also prepare occasional reports of greater length on one of Iran's neighbour's militaries. SAVAK's Department III would provide a daily bulletin plus occasional longer ones, about the clergy, tribes, religious and secular opposition, and governmental organizations. Both Tehran SAVAK and the National Police would also provide daily bulletins.[15]

SAVAK's Department VII (Foreign Intelligence Analysis) provided a daily bulletin on neighbouring states, and the SIB would supplement this with information it had secured from open sources and Department II (Foreign Intelligence Collection). Department VII would also provide the occasional country reports. Department VIII provided daily reports on foreign embassies in Tehran and occasional reports on itself.[16]

The Gendarmerie provided a daily report, as did the Ministry of Information, which also provided occasional reports, all of which were based on foreign radio news, particularly as it pertained to Iran. Information from *Sazeman-i KOOK* also made its way to the SIB. Finally, the SIB drew on its own clandestine sources for information. With the forma-

---

12. CIA cable, (12SEP79); in *Asnad*, v. 32, p. 15.

13. His brother, Gen. Reza Afshai, had served with SAVAK in both Kermanshah and East Azerbaijan; see CIA cable, (1NOV79), in *Asnad*, v. 32, p. 157-58.

14. CIA cable, (27SEP79); in *Asnad*, v. 38, p. 37. Information on the officers whose names appear in this section was secured in confidential interviews with officers who served with them in other assignments.

15. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 400.

16. *Ibid.*

tion of the SIB, all of this information, which came to about 200 pages (per day), could be reduced to about five-ten pages which were delivered to the Shah.[17]

The SIB's other main area of responsibility was to staff the meetings of the various coordinating committees, which will be discussed below. Fardust would provide the minutes of these meetings to the Shah.[18]

II. *Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi* (Imperial Inspectorate Organization, IIO)

The Imperial Inspectorate was created on 21 October 1958 in the wake of numerous corruption-related scandals.[19] This action was initiated after the Shah realized how much controversy would arise if his proposal to forbid the participation of government officials in government transactions actually went forward.[20] Originally formed as a complaints bureau in the Imperial Court, it was to investigate public complaints against military personnel, civilian government officials, and judges. The first officer to run the Inspectorate was Gen. Morteza Yazdanpanah.[21] The Inspectorate claimed that by August 1959 it had received over 39,000 complaints about various Iranian bureaucrats, although the Iranian public, cynical by nature, believed that only minor officials would actually be affected.[22] In August 1962, the Inspectorate was closed, and in 1963, Yazdanpanah, a heretofore loyal servant of the Shah, was summarily dismissed, after he and several other officials ap-

---

17. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 402.

19. On these scandals, see State Department Office of Intelligence Research, 'Iran: The Shah's Anti-Corruption Campaign,' Intelligence Report 6948, (29JUL55). R. Graham seems to have confused the functions of the IIO with those of the SIB, when he states that the IIO was responsible for watching over SAVAK; see Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (London, 1978, 1979), p. 74. J.D. Stempel makes the same mistake, perhaps because his work on this organization uses Graham as a source; see Stempel, *Inside The Iranian Revolution*, (Bloomington, 1981), p. 26. One work which does not confuse the two organizations is H. Irnberger, *SAVAK oder Der Folterfreund des Westens: Aus den Akten des iranischen Geheimdienstes*, (Hamburg, 1977), p. 28.

20. 'Proposed Law Forbidding GOI Employees and Officials to Participate in Government Transactions,' Foreign Service Despatch 246, 788.34/2OCT58, RG-59, Box 3818.

21. 'Establishment of a Complaints Bureau in the Imperial Court,' Foreign Service Despatch 294, 788.00/27OCT58, RG-59, Box 3811; and 'Government to Combat Nepotism and Influence-Peddling,' Foreign Service Despatch 304, 788.00/29OCT58, *ibid.*

22. US Army weekly update, 788.00 (W)/8AUG59, RG-59, Box 3814; M. Zonis, 'Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran,' *Comparative Political Studies*, v 1, n. 3 (OCT68).

proached the Shah and registered their doubts about the wisdom of suppressing the June riots with violent military action.[23]

The Inspectorate was resurrected in 1968, and Yazdanpanah was again put in charge. In 1972-73 Hossein Fardust took over its leadership, having been relieved of his duties at SAVAK earlier. The Inspectorate adjudicated citizens' complaints against the government, conducted investigations of personnel, programs, and policies, prepared reports, formulated solutions and recommendations, and forwarded them directly to the Shah, who, in theory, ordered the necessary corrective measures. In this role it had the authority to make unannounced spot-checks on government offices around the country, in an effort to make the bureaucracy more accountable to the public it was supposed to serve. The IIO's actual efficacy, however, was questionable, witness the fact that in March 1976 - March 1977 less than 12% of the cases it investigated actually resulted in recommendations for correction.[24]

III. *Shora-yi Amniyat-i Kishvar* (National Security Council, NSC)

During Fardust's training trip to England in the late-1950s, he was familiarized with the British intelligence community. Upon his return to Iran, he told the Shah what he had learned, and the Shah was particularly impressed by the idea of the Joint Intelligence Committee. He recognised that this would be a good way of avoiding giving too much weight to any one adviser, and this is the very reason why leaders often opt for committee structures, rather than a closed circle of advisers, as a means of getting alternative suggestions.[25] In the Shah's case, however, he opted to exclude civilian officials and limited membership to the chiefs of intelligence, military, and security organizations. This concept was put into practice in 1959-60. Named the National Security Council, it would meet once a week in a building near the Marble Palace. The individuals at these meetings were the

---

23. *New York Times*, (13AUG62), p. 10; M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, ((Princeton, 1971), pp. 63-65.

24. 'New "Critical" Role for Three Official Groups,' State Department Airgram A-157, 19SEP77, (FOIA); 'Straws in the Wind,' State Department Airgram A-124, 25JUL77, (FOIA).

25. Fardust, *Khatirat*, pp. 318-19. F.E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 3rd ed., (Boston, 1984), p. 24.

chiefs of Military Intelligence (Gen. Kia), SAVAK (Gen. Bakhtiar), National Police (Gen. Alavi-Moghaddam), the Gendarmerie, and the SIB.[26]

While this was an excellent idea conceptually, in reality it amounted to little. Kia, Bakhtiar, and Alavi-Moghaddam were bitter rivals, and they spent more time arguing than discussing matters of substance. They were often late for meetings, or they would leave in a sulk. Once these officers were retired by the Shah, Generals Kamal (Military Intelligence), Amir-Ansari (Police), and Pakravan (SAVAK) took their places.[27] Pakravan rarely attended the meetings himself, and he usually sent his deputy, Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia. Despite these changes, the NSC never achieved much, because the attending officers were busy trying to protect what information they had at their disposal. Since each of them met privately with the Shah, the officer would relay the information in these individual audiences, in an attempt to improve his own and his organization's standing. This set-up lasted until about 1970.

In January 1979, a new NSC was formed at Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar's urging. The members of this body included Ground Forces and Imperial Guard commander Gen. Abdol Ali Badrei, Chief of Staff Gen. Abbas Qarabaqi, Navy commander Adm. Kamal Habibollahi, Air Force commander Gen. Amir Hossein Rabii, Acting Minister of Defence Gen. Hassan Toufanian, Defence Minister Gen. J. Shafeqat, and SAVAK chief Gen. Nasser Moghaddam.[28]

IV. *Shora-yi Hamahangi* (Coordinating Committees 1 & 2)

Having recognised that this first attempt at an intelligence-coordinating body had not been an overwhelming success, orders were issued for the formation of a new body. The

---

26. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 390.

27. Fardust writes that Gen. Amir-Ansari replaced Alavi-Moghaddam at the NSC meetings, but Amir-Ansari was chief of the Tehran Police, while Alavi-Moghaddam had been chief of the National Police. It would make more sense if Nassiri, who was chief of the National Police at the time, had been at the NSC meetings. On Amir-Ansari, see 'Eqbal vs. Alavi-Moqadam,' Foreign Service despatch 33, 788.00/10JUL57, (FOIA). The choice of Kamal was questionable, because he had been accused of wrong-doing in Mashad, but SAVAK Deputy-Director Alavi-Kia told the Shah that it was a false accusation; see interview with H. Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

28. R.E. Huyser, *Mission to Tehran*, (London, 1986), p. 70, 96; S. Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, (London, 1988), p. 41; *Misl-i Barf Ab Khahim Shod: Mozakerat-i 'Shora-yi Farmandahan-i Artesh,' (Dey-Bahman 1357)*, (Tehran, 1986).

chiefs of Military Intelligence (Gen. Kia), SAVAK (Gen. Bakhtiar), National Police (Gen. Alavi-Moghaddam), the Gendarmerie, and the SIB.[26]

While this was an excellent idea conceptually, in reality it amounted to little. Kia, Bakhtiar, and Alavi-Moghaddam were bitter rivals, and they spent more time arguing than discussing matters of substance. They were often late for meetings, or they would leave in a sulk. Once these officers were retired by the Shah, Generals Kamal (Military Intelligence), Amir-Ansari (Police), and Pakravan (SAVAK) took their places.[27] Pakravan rarely attended the meetings himself, and he usually sent his deputy, Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia. Despite these changes, the NSC never achieved much, because the attending officers were busy trying to protect what information they had at their disposal. Since each of them met privately with the Shah, the officer would relay the information in these individual audiences, in an attempt to improve his own and his organization's standing. This set-up lasted until about 1970.

In January 1979, a new NSC was formed at Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar's urging. The members of this body included Ground Forces and Imperial Guard commander Gen. Abdol Ali Badrei, Chief of Staff Gen. Abbas Qarabaqi, Navy commander Adm. Kamal Habibollahi, Air Force commander Gen. Amir Hossein Rabii, Acting Minister of Defence Gen. Hassan Toufanian, Defence Minister Gen. J. Shafeqat, and SAVAK chief Gen. Nasser Moghaddam.[28]

IV. *Shora-yi Hamahangi* (Coordinating Committees 1 & 2)

Having recognised that this first attempt at an intelligence-coordinating body had not been an overwhelming success, orders were issued for the formation of a new body. The

---

26. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 390.

27. Fardust writes that Gen. Amir-Ansari replaced Alavi-Moghaddam at the NSC meetings, but Amir-Ansari was chief of the Tehran Police, while Alavi-Moghaddam had been chief of the National Police. It would make more sense if Nassiri, who was chief of the National Police at the time, had been at the NSC meetings. On Amir-Ansari, see 'Eqbal vs. Alavi-Moqadam,' Foreign Service despatch 33, 788.00/10JUL57, (FOIA). The choice of Kamal was questionable, because he had been accused of wrong-doing in Mashad, but SAVAK Deputy-Director Alavi-Kia told the Shah that it was a false accusation; see interview with H. Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

28. R.E. Huyser, *Mission to Tehran*, (London, 1986), p. 70, 96; S. Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, (London, 1988), p. 41; *Misl-i Barf Ab Khahim Shod: Mozakerat-i 'Shora-yi Farmandahan-i Artesh,' (Dey-Bahman 1357)*, (Tehran, 1986).

Shah emphasised the necessity of cooperation, if the plan was to succeed, and urged the officers concerned to try to make a go of it.[29] The new coordinating body was, in reality, two separate committees, referred to here as CC-1 and CC-2.

The membership of CC-1 was almost identical to that of the NSC. Thus, its members included the chiefs of the National Police, SAVAK, Gendarmerie, Military Intelligence, and the SIB. A change was the inclusion of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.[30]

CC-2's membership included the second level of leadership in the organizations concerned with intelligence, the military, and security. Specifically, the members of CC-2 were: SAVAK's Department III chief, SAVAK's Department VIII chief, the Army's Intelligence chief, the Army's Counter-intelligence chief, the National Police Intelligence chief, the National Police Counter-intelligence chief, the Gendarmerie Intelligence chief, the Gendarmerie Counter-intelligence chief, an SIB officer and a secretary.

The Coordinating Committees met on alternating Saturdays. Initially, the CC-1 meetings were productive, but the officers soon returned to their old ways of by-passing the committee and individually delivering information to the Shah. CC-2, however, performed as hoped.

V. Others

There were other oversight and coordination bodies. One such organization was the *Daftar-i Makhsus* (Special Bureau). The Daftar-i Makhsus was the executive arm of the Imperial Court and was in charge of the private affairs of the Shah and the Royal family. It was run by Nosratollah Moinian, who had been a member of both Premiers Assadollah Alam and Hassan Ali Mansur's cabinets. Moinian was also a member of the Iran Novin Party's Central Council. Moinian was also the coordinator of the Imperial Commission, created in November 1975, which assessed government performance in several areas. The Commission was, in fact, several committees and inspection teams which oversaw government spending and tried to eliminate waste and corruption.[31]

---

29. Fardust, *Khatirat*, p. 391.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 392.
31. See 'New "Critical" Role for Three Official Groups'; Graham, *Iran*, p. 140.

Yet another such body was the *Komiteh-yi Alli-i Ettela'ati* (Supreme Intelligence Committee), for which Gen. Kia claimed credit.[32] This body had members from SAVAK, the Prime Minister's office, and the Judiciary. It was intended to inform SAVAK of public attitudes and provide advice which would curtail SAVAK's interference in government ministries. It was intended, furthermore, to reduce corruption within government organs.

A Security Commission was formed in the late-1950s or early-1960s, and its members were the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Interior Minister, SAVAK chief, Army Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie chief, and Police chief. This body occasionally met in the Shah's presence. Little else is known about this Commission.[33]

VI. Summary

The obvious failure of the various oversight and coordinating bodies to function as they should was due to several factors. The main contributing factor was the Shah's own leadership style, which has been termed 'leadership by distrust'.[34] The Shah was not willing to rely on any one source of information, and he would meet with a large number of different people each week. These could be commanders of branches in the armed forces, commanders of special units like the Imperial Guards, the Special Forces, or the chiefs of intelligence organizations. There were also civilian Ministers (of Interior or of Foreign Affairs, for example) and chiefs of bodies like the National Iranian Oil Company or the Plan Organization. The Shah would also consult with Iran's provincial governors.

He often would turn to a number of individuals with whom he had established a long-standing personal relationship. Notable among these private figures were the Minister of Court Assadollah Alam, the Shah's sister, Princess Ashraf, and his private secretary, Ernest Perron (who died in 1961).[35] Others with whom he consulted on a private as well as on an official basis were the Queen, Fardust, and Ardeshir Zahedi, his former son-in-law and ambassador to Washington.

---

32. Interview with Gen. H.-A. Kia, (25OCT85, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

33. L. Binder, 'The Cabinet of Iran: A Case Study in Institutional Adaptation,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 16, n. 1 (Winter 1962), p. 45.

34. K. Fatemi, 'Leadership By Distrust: The Shah's *Modus Operandi*,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 36, n. 1 (Winter 1982).

35. M. Zonis, *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah*, (Chicago, 1991), p. 115-37.

> I am a great believer in a plurality of administrative channels and in having alternative channels always available. If through ignorance, laziness or self-interest one official refuses to bestir himself to vigorous action, then I turn to somebody else ... I do not employ advisers in the usual sense of the term. To do this is, I think, dangerous for any head of state. One of the few mistakes my father made was to rely on a narrowing circle of advisers. Fearing Reza Shah, they flattered him rather than telling him the truth; and I am sorry to say that they were by no means incorruptible. My system is entirely different. I know that advisers, no matter how technically competent they may be, sometimes make the national interest subservient to their own. Furthermore they are prone to funnel all information through themselves and to seal off independent intelligence channels. So in lieu of advisers I obtain information from many quarters and then try to strike a balance sincerely and solely in light of the public interest.[36]

Due to the fact that the Shah trusted nobody, however, the system operated in such a way that no-one would have too much power. To achieve this end there were overlapping areas of responsibility, which in turn encouraged competition among the various actors. The lines of communication in the Iranian administrative system all led to the Shah, and it was almost impossible for any communications to take place without the Shah's knowledge.

These very factors had an effect which was the reverse of the desired one, and in fact there seemed to be a desire to keep the Shah insulated and away from any bad news. If an official brought bad news to the Shah, one of three things could occur. One, the official's political competitors would try to convince the Shah that in reality there was nothing wrong and the official was actually disloyal.[37] Two, the Shah would personally berate the official for bringing news which was obviously false because it contradicted that which had been provided by others.[38] And three, the official who had been the subject of the Shah's anger would in turn berate his underlings who had provided him with the negative report.[39] These factors led to an unwillingness to give the Shah bad news in an attempt to avoid his wrath, effectively discouraging any but the most courageous officials from presenting anything but good news. In SAVAK this led to self-censorship.[40] The best intelli-

---

36. M.R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, (London, 1961), pp. 321-22.

37. 'Current Political Situation in Iran and Assessment of Future,' Foreign Service Despatch 176, 788.00/4SEP58 HBS, (FOIA).

38. Interview with I. Pejman (15OCT92, Paris); confidential interview with a Department head (3MAY92).

39. Interview with J. Moinzadeh (6FEB92, London).

40. Confidential interview with a Department head (24JUL92); interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).

gence, furthermore, is of little value if it is not accepted by the decision-maker.[41] There was also a form of self-censorship in other parts of the government. An example of this tendency occurred at a meeting of Prime Minister Manucher Eqbal's cabinet when the Shah asked if the people were discontented, and if so, why, but none of the Ministers had the courage to respond.[42]

After the attempts on the Shah's life in the late-1960s, those responsible for his safety (and who, coincidentally, had the greatest interest in the continuation of his rule) increasingly isolated him.[43] While this may have been for his own safety, it succeeded in giving his most trusted confidants a greater degree of influence over him. The reports that did reach him were increasingly 'doctored' while others were just withheld. These factors had the effect of 'warp(ing) his perspective, isolat(ing) him, and imperil(ing) his regime.'[44]

Individuals within the system had to display absolute loyalty to the Shah, and his system of micro-management encouraged this. He controlled civilian appointments which seemed completely unimportant. He also exercised complete control within the armed forces. Anybody above the rank of second lieutenant could not be transferred without the Shah's permission (this was usually done *en masse*), and promotions above the rank of colonel received his personal attention, because they required his signature on an official decree (*firman*).[45]

It was not, furthermore, in the interests of any individuals to stand out as being too good at their jobs. The chief US Military Adviser in Iran, Gen. Seitz, had described Gen. Fereidoun Jam, Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff (1969-71), as the best General in the Iranian Army at an audience with the Shah. Jam claimed that he was suddenly informed by Assadollah Alam that he was not being asked to resign, but Jam's resignation

---

41. M.I. Handel, 'The Study of Intelligence,' *Orbis*, v. 26, n. 4 (Winter 1983), p. 20.
42. 'Views of Majlis Deputy Fatollah Forud,' Foreign Service Despatch 182, 788.00/8SEP58, (FOIA).
43. Confidential interview (31MAY92).
44. FOCUS Iran. 'An Intelligence Community Review of Reporting by Human Resources from the United States Mission in Iran,' (DEC76-JAN77); in *Asnad*, v. 8, p. 139.
45. US Army weekly update, 788.00 (W)/11SEP59, RG-59, Box 3814; 'Impressions of the Iranian Military Officer Corps,' (6MAY76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, pp. 205-218.

would be accepted. Due to his loyalty, however, he would be granted whichever Ambassadorship he wanted.[46]

While it is easy to criticize this type of administration, one must be mindful of the circumstances. The Shah had barely headed off the coup planned by Qarani. There is little doubt that Teimour Bakhtiar had had political ambitions of his own. The Shah would not have returned to power in 1953 without the military's support. The officers he promoted were, therefore, the least ambitious ones, and the ones who were the least threatening intellectually and politically.

Gen. Hossein Fardust

One of the officers the Shah trusted most was Hossein Fardust. Fardust had been one of the boys Reza Shah had selected to accompany his son during his studies in Switzerland. He was at the Le Rosey school the whole time the Crown Prince attended. Fardust returned to Iran with the Crown Prince and continued his studies at the military academy. Fardust furthered his military education in a number of different countries, and his first non-training assignment was the command of the SIB.[47]

The son of a lower-ranking member of the Iranian armed forces, Fardust was a retiring individual who lived modestly. He always wrote with pencils, and while some say this was because of his very secretive nature, others say it was due to his lower-class background. He was one of the Shah's few social friends, a keen bridge player who often played with the monarch.[48] His recreational interest, other than bridge, was the cultivation of flowers, which he did at his garden on Mehmandust Avenue. Without trying to read too much into such a minor activity, it is interesting that he pursued a hobby like flower culti-

---

46. P.C. Radji, *In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah's Last Ambassador to London*, (London, 1983), p. 114. There is no mention of this incident in Alam's memoirs, although he did quote the Shah's reference to Jam as a 'blabbermouth'; see A. Alam, (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), p. 259. Jam himself wrote about his retirement and subsequent Ambassadorship in Spain, but he did not refer to the circumstances surrounding his retirement; see F. Jam, 'Asharaty bih Adaha-yi Arteshbod-i Sabeq-i Artesh-i Iran Hossein Fardust va Merury bar Kitab-i Khatirat-i U zir 'nvan "Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi",' *Rahavard*, v. VIII, n. 29 (Spring 1992), pp. 93-94.

47. Interview with Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

48. 'Who's Really Who in Iran,' *Newsweek*, (14OCT74), pp. 32-33.

vation, which requires a great deal of patience, a very delicate touch, and does not offer much in the way of public acclaim.[49] His success was due to these two factors: his friendship with the Shah and his seeming lack of personal ambition.

One of the most interesting facts about Fardust was his reputation for fairness. He was one of the few Iranians of such a rank and with such extensive power who did not use his position to gain great personal wealth. He also had a reputation as a sort of last appeal who could help the underdog. One government bureaucrat stated that he had managed to run afoul of a SAVAK official, so this SAVAK'i arranged to have the bureaucrat harassed by bringing him in and informing him that he was suspected of certain misdeeds, without actually naming the misdeeds. The bureaucrat promptly went to Fardust's office where he was politely greeted by the General's personal assistant, who then took down the bureaucrat's complaint of harassment. Several days later, the bureaucrat was contacted by Fardust's assistant, who stated that the SAVAK officer had been officially reprimanded, and there was no evidence of the bureaucrat's involvement in any actual misdeeds.[50] Fardust also made sure SAVAK's internal appeals system worked. He fired a number of officers for abusing their power, and he even fired an entire section for a similar abuse.[51]

Even Fardust, however, did not have the Shah's complete confidence. There are several examples of this. In 1962, Teimour Bakhtiar had been ordered to leave Iran because of his efforts to gain support for a plot to have him installed as Prime Minister. He arrived in Beirut and met with the SAVAK Chief of Station, Col. Mujtaba Pashai. Bakhtiar also spent his time there in contact with other Iranian exiles. After Bakhtiar left Beirut and Pashai reported on his meeting with his former boss, he was recalled back to Tehran. Pashai was accused of attending a meeting at the Coral Beach Hotel with Bakhtiar,

---

49. Col. I. Pejman, *Arteshbod Hossein Fardust, Rais-i Sabeq-i Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at va Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi, "Khidmat ya Khianat?"* (Paris, JAN91), p. 8. Another intelligence officer who pursued the solitary pleasures of flower cultivation was the CIA's famous counter-intelligence officer James J. Angleton; see T. Mangold, *Cold Warrior, James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter*, (New York, 1991); and R. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961*, (New York, 1987).

50. Confidential interview (17JAN93). Fardust dealt with this matter in his role as chief of the IIO.

51. Confidential interview (17APR92).

Khomeini representative Bahr al-Olum, Iranian Embassy representative Parviz Atabaki, and Sayyid Musa Sadr. At this purported meeting it was decided to send a $1 million contribution by Egypt's Pres. Nasser to Iran to sponsor anti-Shah demonstrations. Pashai denied this story emphatically, saying he had never been to the Coral Beach Hotel. Atabaki was also recalled to Tehran and confronted with this story by SAVAK. Atabaki denied the story, too.[52] Before being questioned, Pashai met with Fardust, who informed him that he was to be questioned by SAVAK, and who went on to tell Pashai what questions to expect. As the interrogation took place it became evident that Pashai had been briefed. The very next day, Fardust was called in for questioning by SAVAK.[53]

The Shah admitted that he had created some distance between himself and Fardust, but he ascribed this to the realization, occasioned by the events of 1953, that as a king he had to create some distance between himself and others.

> I came to realize I could not have the same relations with my friends. Friendship involves the exchange of confidence between two people, but a king can take no one into his confidence. I have even had to put some distance between myself and my old friend, Hossein Fardust, whom I trust implicitly.[54]

After the revolution, rumours eventually surfaced that in the last two to three years of the Shah's rule, he and Fardust had become estranged, so much so that Fardust was no longer received at the Royal Palace. Yet these rumours seem hard to believe, in light of the documentary evidence. In the early- to mid-1970s, Fardust was given 2 million square metres of land in the Karaj district.[55] In 1975, the Shah had entrusted Fardust with the task of clearing candidates for the Majlis elections.[56]

In 1978, when revolutionary violence was increasing, the Shah still had confidence in Fardust. On 13 May 1978 a meeting of all of Iran's top security and intelligence officials

---

52. 'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?' *Elm va Jameh*, Sixth year, n. 40 (July-August 1985), p. 44. In a letter in the author's possession, Atabaki described the questioning he underwent.

53. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); interview with I. Pejman, (15OCT92, Paris); confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer (11APR92).

54. E.A. Bayne, *Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversations with a Monarch Whose Office is Traditional and Whose Goal is Modernization*, (New York, 1968), p. 54.

55. Title deed document #10,650 of the Karaj Land Registry # 3, as cited in 'Hayadah va Giti as Mushtariyan-e Awqaf,' *Iran Times*, (11APR79).

56. 'The Iranian One-Party State,' State Department Airgram A-151, 10JUL75, (FOIA).

took place.[57] At this meeting, Gen. Nassiri advocated closing the bazaars and using lethal force against the demonstrators. Fardust opposed this approach, worrying that if a religious leader got killed, the conscripts might change sides. This being the case, Fardust advocated opening a dialogue with the opposition, a proposal which was adopted by the meeting and by the Shah, to whom Fardust's proposal was submitted. At a 22 July 1978 meeting between the Shah, Fardust, and SAVAK's new chief, Gen. Nasser Moghaddam, the Shah heavily criticized *Moghaddam* for the failure to restrain, if not prevent, the demonstrations of the previous day, and directed him to allow the Army to fire on the demonstrators.[58] Fardust also headed a committee concerned with 'building pro-Shah demonstrations.'[59]

Others allege that Fardust had been the reason for the failure to foresee the revolution, let alone to stop the revolutionaries. One such reason was that he was alleged to have been in contact with followers of Ayatollah Khomeini and the religious opposition for at least two years before the revolution.[60] It has also been written that the SIB was the final source of intelligence, and as its chief Fardust had the greatest influence in determining what the Shah did or did not hear.[61] While these explanations have a surface appeal as easy solutions to a very complex problem, and they furthermore serve as convenient alibis for people who are afraid to critically examine their own roles, they overlook the reality of the Shah's style of ruling. As has been discussed above, and as has been repeated in *all* interviews that were conducted for this work, the Shah trusted nobody completely, and he had numerous sources of information.

A final word on Fardust. It was alleged that Fardust travelled to Washington, DC, in July 1980 to negotiate an arms-for-hostages deal with the Carter Administration.[62] Also,

---

57. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, (15MAY78), in *Asnad*, v. 23, pp. 23-25.

58. State Department Airgram, (1AUG78), in *Asnad*, v. 23, pp. 50-53.

59. 'Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-measures,' State Department Telegram, (5NOV78), in *Asnad*, v. 63, pp. 12-14.

60. Pejman, *Arteshbod Hossein Fardust*, p. 12; A. Pahlavi, *Faces in A Mirror: Memoirs from Exile*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980), p. 195.

61. Zonis, *Majestic Failure*, p. 140.

62. 'Israel's Iran Connection,' *Israel & Palestine*, (JAN87), p. 24.

it was rumoured that he became the chief of the Islamic Republic's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). In his autobiography, he denies this and claims that he simply withdrew from public life.[63] While it is not clear whether or not Fardust did become chief of the MOIS, it is almost impossible to believe that the Islamic authorities would not have debriefed him thoroughly about the Iranian intelligence community, the Iranian armed forces, and various high-ranking personalities who were active in counter-revolutionary organizations.

Fardust goes on to say that the decision to stay in Iran was due to two factors. First of all, his old friend the Shah had ordered him to stay and try to hold back the revolution, or at least the Communists' climb to power. Secondly, he was an Iranian, had no ill-gotten gains outside the country, and what little assets he had were still in Iran. What better way to comply with the alleged order to prevent the ascendancy of the Communists than by becoming chief of the security apparatus? An American businessman who had been in contact with Fardust in February 1979 stated that the General was trying to ensure a working relationship between Khomeini, the US government, and pro-Western elements, because Fardust saw the success of the Khomeini government as essential if the Communists were to be thwarted.[64] Ironically, in December 1985, Fardust was arrested for working as a Soviet agent, allegedly on the basis of information provided by KGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin or by British agents working for the Islamic Republic.[65] In April 1987, Fardust's taped confessions were broadcast on Iranian television, and he discussed his hostility to the Pahlavis and British interference in Iranian affairs.[66] Fardust's death, which was

---

63. For obvious reasons, it has been impossible to verify what Fardust's memoirs contain about Fardust's final days in Iran. Fardust's wife, Tala, has spoken with the Harvard Iranian Oral History Project, but her statement has not been made available to the public. On Fardust's reasons for staying, see Fardust, *Khatirat*, pp. 669-73; and on his post-revolution life, see *ibid.*, pp. 674-80.

64. State Department cable, (7FEB79), in *Asnad*, v. 27, p. 130. The US Ambassador saw this as a provocation and did not allow his subordinates to act on the opening.

65. 'Mohakimih-yi Arteshbod Hossein Fardust dar Zendan-i Evin Payan Yaft,' *Keyhan*, (2JAN86), p. 1. See also 'Trial of Fardoost [*sic*] Concluded,' *Iran Press Digest*, (7JAN86), p. 6, and 'Banisadr on Fardoost [*sic*],' *Iran Press Digest*, (17SEP86), p. 4.

66. 'Fardoost [*sic*] Appears on TV,' *Iran Press Digest*, (7APR87), p. 3. See also, Gen. Huyser, *Mission to Tehran*, p. 64; and Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, p. 112, fn 9.

brought on by old age and apoplexy according to a hospital physician, was announced on 19 May 1987.[67]

67. 'Fardoost [*sic*] Dies,' *Iran Press Digest*, (26MAY87), p. 3.

CH. 5. SERVICE AND SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS

I. Training Department

A. Early Intelligence Training

1. *US*

In the years after the ouster of Musaddiq, a great deal, but not all, of the intelligence training for Iranians was provided by the US. The personnel who performed this function were either CIA officers or military personnel on temporary assignment to the CIA. The CIA-SAVAK training relationship can be broken down into two fairly distinct phases, or missions. These were, roughly, from September 1953 to March 1955, and from Summer 1955 to about 1961-1962.

The first phase took place shortly after the formation of Brig. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar's intelligence unit, which was centred on the Military-Governorship of Tehran. It was at the Shah's invitation that the CIA sent an adviser to this unit. The officers assigned to this unit, other than Bakhtiar himself, had previously held positions in military intelligence, so they already had a background in the subject. The US officer assigned to this unit, in addition to acting as an adviser to both the Shah and Bakhtiar, also provided some elementary intelligence training, covering subjects like cryptology and organizational security. The value of this training showed when the unit succeeded in cracking the Tudeh's codes and rounding up most of the Communist organization's membership.[1]

Returning to the US in March 1955, the US Army officer was replaced by a more permanent CIA team of five officers. This five-man team was distinct from the regular CIA station in Tehran. The job of this team covered both instruction and advice. A chief of base, his deputy, and instructors in counter-intelligence, operations, and analysis made up this team. The CIA officer who was in charge of this unit was René (Duke) Guiraud, a Frenchman who had lost an arm and part of a leg in the Korean War.[2] Guiraud and

---

1. Interview with the US officer (8MAY92); and interview with M. Mobasser, who was a member of the Military-Governor's intelligence unit (8DEC91). See also, Military Governor of Tehran, *Kitab-i Siyah Dar Bareh-yi Afsaran-i Tudeh*, (Tehran, 1955).

2. Interview with Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; and confirmed in confidential interviews, one with a SAVAK officer (17APR92), one with a CIA officer who served as one of the team's instructor's (11APR92), one with a CIA

Bakhtiar were close because they shared several interests and hobbies, particularly women and alcohol.

The training was conducted in English, French, and Persian. Initially, none of the trainers spoke Persian, but some of them came to speak the language. An Iranian translator was provided, and this individual was deemed invaluable not only because he was a master of the intricacies of Iranian bureaucratic politics, but because he was from a good family and took advantage of the respect he was due.[3]

The early trainees were primarily, but not exclusively, military officers. Between the years 1957 and 1960 there were five to six groups of trainees, with twelve to fifteen trainees per class. One such class was made up entirely of officers destined for the provinces. The quality of the trainees was deemed to be high, in that they were generally well-educated and were highly motivated. There were, of course, the occasional 'duds', but that was inevitable.

Among the main subject areas were counter-intelligence, operations, and analysis. SAVAK's future counter-intelligence officers were taught about Eastern-bloc operating procedures which they might face, as well as subjects like organizational security. Covert operators were given training in various aspects of tradecraft, so they could recruit agents, engage in clandestine communications, conduct surveillance, and protect themselves. Analytical officers were taught how to establish biographies, write intelligence reports using information from different sources, how to value sources based on their reliability, and how to write reports so that they would attract the attention of intelligence consumers.

There have been numerous allegations that the CIA trained SAVAK in the use of hostile interrogation procedures (torture). A former CIA Iran analyst claimed that a CIA officer taught SAVAK how to use torture techniques from World War II Germany, and he also claimed that the CIA gave seminars in 'extensive interrogation techniques'.[4] There is no

---

officer who had training duties in Iran from 1959-64 (23MAY92), and one with a CIA officer who had intelligence duties in Iran from 1954-59 (11SEP92).

3. Confidential interviews (11APR92 and 28APR93).

4. J.J. Leaf interview with S. Hersh, 'Ex-Analyst Says CIA Rejected Warning on Shah,' *New York Times*, (7JAN79), p. 3:1; J.J. Leaf, as quoted in C. Kaplan and F. Halliday, 'The SAVAK-CIA Connection,' *The Nation*, (4MAR80), p. 229. Hassan Sana, who claimed that

evidence of this, and the charge has been denied by all my interviewees, whether American or Iranian. The CIA was banned from using torture, and its teaching was also banned. There was the admission that the Iranians did not need any extra training in a subject in which they were already well-versed.

While all my Iranian interviewees denied that torture was as extensive as it was rumoured to be, there was the admission that less subtle means were turned to because SAVAK, being a relatively young organization, did not have enough experience in the use of psychological techniques, nor did it have access to sophisticated 'truth serums'. The security forces (not just SAVAK) did rely, to a great extent, on physical methods during the height of Iranian terrorist activities in the 1970s. The reason for this, although by no means excusable, was the need to secure information as quickly as possible.

Some, but not many, of the trainees had received earlier training in the US or UK, although such training was not necessarily intelligence-related. Some had attended Personnel Management courses, while others had attended the Basic or Advanced Courses in their military specialities. Others had attended American universities, such as Syracuse.

Some officers went to the US for extra intelligence training. Such training was highly specialised in nature, and there were usually one to five students per class. At least one SAVAK officer attended a course in 'Clandestine Activities', which covered basic tradecraft and emphasised the creation of stay-behind networks.[5] In Winter-Spring 1959, ten SAVAK officers attended a one-week course in the US which was intended to familiarise them with Soviet operations and how to counter them.[6] In February-March 1959, thirteen

---

he had been 'key adviser to its [SAVAK's] director for security, economics, and political affairs,' claimed, in an interview arranged by his revolutionary captors, that the CIA gave training in both physical and psychological torture, although no CIA personnel actually participated in these activities; see J.C. Randal, 'SAVAK Jails Stark Reminder of Shah's Rule,' *Washington Post*, (13DEC79), p. A27. None of my interviewees had ever heard of Sana, and based on his statements to other publications (see, for example, *Weekly Hibernia*, [20MAR80], p. 2), it seems likely that both Sana and his statements were fabrications.

5. Confidential interview (21FEB92).
6. Interview with M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

SAVAK officers went to the US for a one month counter-espionage course.[7] They were taught how to train others in counter-espionage and how to form a cadre of instructors. They were also encouraged to collect photos and biographic information on any people who left a Communist country for an Arab one, so they could build a data-base that would assist in tracking Communists' movements.

It would seem that these were excellent opportunities for the CIA to engage in 'incompatible operations' (the recruitment of agents in friendly foreign governments), since the Iranians were coming from an undeveloped country to what was then the richest country in the world. The relationship with Iran was so highly valued, however, that such recruiting activities were expressly forbidden so that the relationship would not be endangered. Even walk-ins were to be dissuaded. Recruiting of SAVAK trainees in Iran was also forbidden.[8]

This may be hard to believe, but as another US intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East put it: US training personnel 'were enjoined to avoid any semblance of collecting intelligence or passing on what they learned to military attachés or to the CIA.'[9] Another reason for dissuading US military and training personnel from providing information was that, since they were not trained in intelligence-gathering, a great deal of the information they provided was imprecise and not very useful. Finally, SAVAK was considered to be a friendly intelligence service, so it was assumed that whatever information was needed by the US would be duly provided. The Shah encouraged SAVAK to provide the

---

7. Interview with Gen. Manucher Hashemi (20FEB85, London) by S. Meskoob for the IOHP.

8. This policy was reiterated in all my interviews with CIA officers. Although this rule applied to training personnel, operational officers did recruit SAVAK members. One retired CIA officer has written that the CIA had a 'penchant' for incompatible operations; see O. DeForrest and D. Chanoff, *Slow Burn*, (New York, 1990), p. 160. One such case might be that of Mansour Rafizadeh, a SAVAK official stationed in the US. By his own account, he was a CIA agent from about 1959-1960. It is not clear whether he was a walk-in or he was recruited. See Rafizadeh, *Witness: From The Shah to the Secret Arms Deal An Insider's Account of US Involvement in Iran*, (New York, 1987), and E.R. Oney, review of *Witness*, in *Intelligence Quarterly*, v. 3, n. 4. Another case was that of a military officer who became a US agent in November 1961. This officer's job was political reporting and spreading black propaganda through a third party. See CIA cable, (22MAY79); in *Asnad*, v. 55, p. 42.

9. He continues: 'Such standards of "fair play" were a joke to the British, ...' W.C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, (New York, 1980), p. 291.

US with any information on Soviet and Communist activities in Iran so the CIA would not feel the need to dig too deeply in Iranian domestic politics.[10]

Many US allies, including Iran, sent personnel for security training at the International Police Academy in Washington, DC, which had been established and was run by the US Agency for International Development (AID). Allied students underwent the Technical Investigation Course, which had two four-week cycles. The first was in Washington and the second, which involved fieldwork, took place at the Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos, TX. There were classes on 'Police Intelligence', 'Basic Electricity', 'Surveillance', and 'Bombs and Explosives'. Training also took place at the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg.[11]

The CIA operated a proprietary called International Police Services (IPS) which offered a course which would augment the AID training According to a US Congressional committee (the House Select Committee on Intelligence, or the Pike Committee), this school provided training which would improve allies' internal security, while permitting evaluation of foreign students as possible intelligence recruits. To this end, IPS, in conjunction with AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS), collected biographical information on the students and provided it to the CIA. The AID training program was terminated in 1975, pursuant to an outbreak of bad publicity.[12]

While these courses were purportedly for police and gendarmerie personnel, SAVAK officers also attended them. This was as much for the benefits provided by the training as it was for the opportunity to keep an eye on the other Iranian trainees.

2. *UK*

In January and February 1956, three Iranian military officers were sent to England for an intelligence course which emphasised intelligence collection in the Soviet Union. The officers were taught how to organize networks, how to execute infiltrations into and exfiltra-

---

10. Interview with Gen. Manucher Hashemi (20FEB85, London) by S. Meskoob for the IOHP.

11. T. Plate and A. Darvi, *Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror*, (London, 1981), pp. 53-54.

12. US Congress, *CIA: The Pike Report*, (Nottingham, 1977), pp. 228-29, 236.

tions from the Soviet Union, and how to discreetly observe people who came to Iran from the Soviet Union. An important part of this was the extensive training the officers received in land navigation. The three officers were also trained in black propagandising, which is the creation of propaganda by one source which is then attributed to another source completely.[13] Later that year, three more officers went to England to attend a course which covered both intelligence collection and counter-intelligence.[14]

In 1957-1958, SAVAK sent an officer to England with the request that he be familiarized with the British intelligence community. This officer also requested and received information on how MI-6 hired and recruited personnel. About a year later, he got more operational training in intelligence collection. He was also lectured on the Soviet Union, Communism, and the Soviet intelligence community.[15] In 1958, two SAVAK officials were sent to England to attend a counter-espionage / counter-intelligence course. This course lasted two months and was very intensive.[16]

Between 1958 and 1960, Col. Hossein Fardust was sent to England to undergo intelligence training. The training he received was not entirely operational in nature. He received lectures on political and economic matters, such as Communism, Iranian history, and import-industrialization substitution. Also, he was familiarized with the British intelligence community and possibly received indirect encouragement to initiate some organizational changes in Iran's when he returned.[17]

B. SAVAK's Training Program

Some of SAVAK's first generation of officers also received specialised training, in such topics as languages and electronics, in countries other than the US. With time, however, it was realised that it was prohibitively expensive to keep sending the SAVAK officers overseas. The US government, meanwhile, had been encouraging the Iranians to form their

---

13. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).
14. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (6OCT93, Paris).
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington, DC).
17. Gen. H. Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust,* (Tehran, 1989-1990), p. 299-308.

tions from the Soviet Union, and how to discreetly observe people who came to Iran from the Soviet Union. An important part of this was the extensive training the officers received in land navigation. The three officers were also trained in black propagandising, which is the creation of propaganda by one source which is then attributed to another source completely.[13] Later that year, three more officers went to England to attend a course which covered both intelligence collection and counter-intelligence.[14]

In 1957-1958, SAVAK sent an officer to England with the request that he be familiarized with the British intelligence community. This officer also requested and received information on how MI-6 hired and recruited personnel. About a year later, he got more operational training in intelligence collection. He was also lectured on the Soviet Union, Communism, and the Soviet intelligence community.[15] In 1958, two SAVAK officials were sent to England to attend a counter-espionage / counter-intelligence course. This course lasted two months and was very intensive.[16]

Between 1958 and 1960, Col. Hossein Fardust was sent to England to undergo intelligence training. The training he received was not entirely operational in nature. He received lectures on political and economic matters, such as Communism, Iranian history, and import-industrialization substitution. Also, he was familiarized with the British intelligence community and possibly received indirect encouragement to initiate some organizational changes in Iran's when he returned.[17]

B. SAVAK's Training Program

Some of SAVAK's first generation of officers also received specialised training, in such topics as languages and electronics, in countries other than the US. With time, however, it was realised that it was prohibitively expensive to keep sending the SAVAK officers overseas. The US government, meanwhile, had been encouraging the Iranians to form their

---

13. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).
14. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (6OCT93, Paris).
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington, DC).
17. Gen. H. Fardust, *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust,* (Tehran, 1989-1990), p. 299-308.

own intelligence school.[18] The Iranians were also somewhat dissatisfied with the training provided by the CIA.

The cause of this dissatisfaction was two-fold. Firstly, there was a feeling that American attitudes and techniques were not entirely appropriate for Iran. An example of this is an incident which occurred when students were told that when writing a report, they should try to be as concise and clear as possible, focussing on 'Who, What, When, Where, and Why'. A trainee raised his hand and told the trainer that if a SAVAK officer did this, the reader of the report would believe that the author was stupid and ill-educated.[19] This was because of an Iranian belief that the length of a report indicated the amount of work that had gone into it. If a report was short, the reader would think that the author was lazy, rather than concise.[20]

And secondly, the Iranians were quite disappointed by the quality of the trainers who were coming to Iran. Iranians who had been educated in the US recognised that they were not getting America's best and brightest, and there was some resentment at this. There were, of course, the occasional exceptions to this rule. Some of the CIA personnel were not only good trainers, but they had a grasp of the Persian language and a genuine affection for Iran and its people. Such personnel were popular with the Iranians and were invited back to serve as advisers, even after the training relationship had been terminated in 1962-63.[21]

The Shah had more overtly political reasons for wanting to create some distance between SAVAK and the CIA. The US government had been pressuring the Shah to open up the Iranian political system, an activity which did not appeal to him. The Shah feared that the US actually wanted his ouster because, in 1958, the Tehran CIA station had maintained contacts with Gen. Qarani, *via* Esfandiar Bozorgmehr, a Qarani ally and CIA

---

18. Operations Coordinating Board, 'Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action,' (14DEC55), RG-59, Box 3820.

19. Confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer who had training duties in Iran (11APR92) and with a SAVAK officer (28APR93).

20. Interview with M. Pashai (25JUN93, Denmark).

21. Similar problems took place with State Department personnel, but because they had a more overt role, they made a worse example; see J. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, (New Haven, 1988), ch. 10.

agent.[22] Also in 1958, a CIA officer in Iran, as part of his official duties, encouraged the *New York Times'* Sam Pope Brewer to write articles critical of the Shah, leading the Shah to complain about Iranians who met with foreigners in the night.[23] In April 1959, a CIA contract officer was sent to Tehran in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Shah to reign, not rule.[24]

Several high-ranking military officers approached the US government for support in plots to overthrow the Shah.[25] The Shah believed that Bakhtiar had been in contact with the US government in the hope of gaining its support for his bid as Prime Minister, if not President.[26] The Shah was concerned by and resented the Kennedy Administration's pressure on him to open up the political system, and he believed that Bakhtiar's supposed contacts were part of this US pressure. The Shah also believed that the US was behind the political unrest which occurred in Iran in 1961 and 1962. By 1963, furthermore, Iran was less reliant on the US because of its rising oil income and its ability to secure non-US assistance, accompanied by the fact that US economic assistance was on the decrease.[27]

For these reasons, the Iranians began a search for a new training partner. In fact, this search had begun in 1961-62, before the actual termination of the CIA training program occurred. After some time, and allegedly some advice from Maurice Oldfield of MI-6,[28] a decision was reached that Israel was the most appropriate choice, the Iranians believing that Israel's combination of East and West was what would meet their needs best. As a re-

---

22. Confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (11SEP92).

23. Confidential interview with the now-retired CIA officer (16APR92); S.P. Brewer, 'Unrest is viewed as threat in Iran,' *New York Times,* (25FEB58), p. 2. By the late-1950s, Brewer was regarded as a CIA mouthpiece; see S. Aburish, *Beirut Spy: The St George Hotel Bar,* (London, 1989), p. 17.

24. D.N. Wilber, *Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions,* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 190-91.

25. 'Internal Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Memorandum, 788.00/11FEB61, p. 5, (FOIA).

26. Information on the meetings between Bakhtiar and Pres. John F. Kennedy is from an interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark) and one of the SAVAK officers who had accompanied Bakhtiar on the trip to the US (1MAR93).

27. 'Politico-Economic Assessment: Iran: March-September, 1963,' State Department Airgram A-231, 8OCT63, (FOIA).

28. Oldfield, who would go on to become chief of MI-6, supposedly had great respect for the Israeli intelligence community, and it is also alleged that he had established a close personal relationship with the Shah; see R. Deacon, *'C': A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield,* (London, 1985), p. 113.

sult of this decision, a number of officers from SAVAK's three operational departments (those concerned with foreign intelligence collection and operations, domestic security, and counter-espionage/counter-intelligence) were sent to Israel. Once again, however, cost became a concern.

The Americans were not surprised at this turn of events, since they both expected and wanted SAVAK to become self-sufficient. Initially, however, the CIA station did not know about SAVAK's Israeli friends and only learned about the Israeli presence through rumours and a chance encounter in SAVAK headquarters. And even then, when the CIA officers ran into someone at SAVAK headquarters who obviously was not an Iranian they would just nod politely at each other, mutter greetings, and say nothing else. In the intelligence business, it just is not done to ask questions or be too talkative.

Among the Israeli trainers was Maj. Levy, who had been commander of the Direct Secret Collection Agency on the Jordan-Israel border. This was only natural, since the Israelis had established, with the Shah's permission, several bases along the Iran-Iraq border.[29] Another Israeli training officer was Lieut. Col. Yaakov Nimrodi.

In 1963-64 the Iranians launched a scheme to establish their own intelligence school. At the same time, a civilian SAVAK official and Fardust, who had replaced Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia as SAVAK's administrative chief, were put in charge of SAVAK's training program. This was when SAVAK's Training Department was formed to direct training activities. Retired Col. Masoud Pirshafii was the first chief of the training department. In 1965, Pirshafii was succeeded by an officer named Manucherifar, who was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Keyvani. Keyvani was not an intelligence officer, and his duties were primarily administrative. The school itself was located in the basement of SAVAK

---

29. Memorandum on Israeli Trade Mission, Tehran, (21JUN77); in *Asnad*, v. 11, p. 60-61. It is possible that this was the same officer who was later identified as Lieut. Col. Moshe Moussa Levi, deputy to Israeli Military Attaché Abraham Lunz (also known as Rami Luncz, or Luntz). Assigned to Tehran in 1974, Levi had been Foreign Liaison Officer at Israeli Defense Forces Headquarters, was multi-lingual, hard-working, and cultivated Iranian officers.

headquarters in the Saltanatabad area. The basement was chosen because it allowed the classes to be conducted in a fairly isolated and centralized location.[30]

The Department's training manuals were written by a committee headed by Brig. Gen. Mohammad Ayromlou, after going through books and pamphlets that had been borrowed or stolen from other countries' services. US military personnel were a good source of such manuals. The Iranians would occasionally consult with their US or Israeli advisers on some of the materials, but they generally strove for self-sufficiency. Over forty books from foreign intelligence agencies were collected. Gen. Pakravan had a library built and urged the higher-ranking personnel to donate books. The library also had an excellent collection of newspapers, journals, and news magazines.[31]

There were always classes operating. There were 20-25 instructors, with some turnover, although there was a permanent cadre. At one stage there was a plan to supplement the training by having field officers called back from their foreign assignments to attend and conduct classes.[32] This happened only once, before it was decided that such a plan was too costly. Fardust made sure the school had an ample budget, and some officers who were there on temporary duty were paid extra for teaching, although they were already receiving a regular salary. Among the courses that were taught were politics and geo-politics, tradecraft, sabotage, communications, codes and ciphers, lockpicking, photography, reporting, internal (organizational) security, positive and negative intelligence, and counter-espionage/counter-intelligence (CECI).[33]

Iranians in the know were justifiably proud of this school and the quality of the officers it produced. The school's applicants were both foreign - and Iran - educated. They were first given competitive exams. The examinee was faced with questions which covered do-

---

30. Information in this paragraph is from confidential interviews with the civilian SAVAK official (27OCT92), with a former Department head (28APR93), and M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

31. Information on the training manuals and the library is from confidential interviews with the civilian SAVAK official (27OCT92) and with a former Department head (28APR93). Information on the library is supplemented by an interview with Mrs. F. Pakravan (3MAR83, Paris) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

32. Confidential interview with a former Department head (28APR93).

33. Confidential interview with a civilian SAVAK official (27OCT92).

mestic and international politics and history. These tests were not only a test of the applicant's general knowledge, but of his or her loyalty to the regime and sense of nationalism. If the applicant was accepted, he or she was trained in SAVAK standard operating procedure (SOP). After 3 or 4 months they would get specialised training for their specific branches.

Some officers, because of their jobs prior to joining SAVAK (diplomats, for example), had received similar training so they were sent to a shorter intelligence course. The security department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for example, had an extensive course which covered 'the dangers of espionage, disloyalty to the Shah and to Iran, the art of discretion, and the safe methods of storing documents.' Diplomats were also warned about the company they kept. Officers whose skills were deemed to be necessary immediately were also eligible for this shorter course, although they were eventually sent back for further training.[34]

SAVAK's training school advanced to such a level that a few other Middle Eastern states sent their intelligence personnel there. And although SAVAK's Training Department was so successful, SAVAK officers were still sent to other countries for instruction in special topics. Officers, for example, went to the US, Italy, Israel, France, England, West Germany, and Pakistan. Arrangements were made to send three groups of SAVAK personnel to West Germany to study anti-terrorism, counter-espionage, and crypto-analysis.[35] Another SAVAK official, Bahman Naderipour, attended courses in the US and in Israel, where Mossad gave a five-day course addressing intelligence-gathering and Palestinian groups.[36] Two officers were even sent to mainland China to learn Mandarin. In this case, however, the cooperation of the Chinese government was not secured and the

---

34. Information in this paragraph is from a former MFA official who joined SAVAK (4MAY92), and the MFA security training is discussed in M. Reeves, *Behind the Peacock Throne*, (London, 1986), p. 65.

35. 11DEC76 message from the SAVAK representative in Bonn to Tehran, as quoted in Organization of Democratic Youth and Students of Iran, eds., *Aus Dem SAVAK-Dossier: Die Westdeutsche Beziehung*, v. 2, n. 3 (JUL78), p. 40.

36. *Iran Voice* v. I, n. 11 (13AUG79). Naderipour, who occasionally used the pseudonym Tehrani, was executed in 1979.

SAVAK officials were sent there under diplomatic cover. (They failed to learn the language and were recalled).[37]

Allied training for intelligence personnel was also provided in Iran. A US Army Special Forces team trained the Iranian military in gathering and using military intelligence.[38] The US gave a four-month counter-intelligence course, and Israel also taught a similar course. West German intelligence personnel gave a course on Communism and the Soviet Union, and the high-light of this course was a number of lectures by individuals who had escaped from East Germany. When international terrorism became more common, Israeli military personnel taught a course on hostage-rescue operations.[39]

C. Recruitment

In 1956 a commission was formed and met a number of times to consider organizational and personnel issues. The commission's members were Alavi-Kia, Mohsen Mobasser, Mostafa Amjadi, Zibai, Asghar Zamani, Siahatgar, and Pakravan (all of whom were military officers), and they decided to select the top intelligence and security officers from Iran's military and police. For this reason, recruitment was to be selective and nobody would be forced to work for SAVAK, it was to be an honour.[40] In fact, this tactic was so successful that a number of military personnel faked their academic records (an example of this is claims to speak foreign languages) in attempts to join SAVAK.[41] The recruiters usually relied on appeals to patriotism ('This is how you can best serve your country.') or prestige ('It's an elite in terms of qualifications.'). As well as the conditions set out above, it was decided to keep out officers with reputations for harshness and corruption. This was so people would not be afraid of the organization.[42]

---

37. Interview with M. Hashemi (14FEB92, London) and confidential interview (28APR93).

38. *New York Times*, (16NOV70), p. 2.

39. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington, DC).

40. This point was emphatically reiterated by every SAVAK officer I interviewed. One officer (2APR92), who admits to some apprehension upon joining SAVAK in 1957, and who went on to be a Department head, said that the number of volunteers always exceeded SAVAK's actual needs.

41. Interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London); and confidential interview (1MAR93).

42. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego).

One of the more hotly debated points the commission considered was over the military versus civilian status of SAVAK. The general consensus, although by no means a unanimous one, was that SAVAK should try to be civilian in nature. Its personnel, therefore, were to forsake military uniforms and wear suits for work. It was believed that the public would feel more comfortable with a civilian intelligence/security organization than it would with yet another military organization

This was an excellent idea in principle. In reality it created recruiting problems. Many military personnel took great pride in their perceived status as defenders of the realm. The uniform was an indication of the individual's service to his country. An individual may look pretty average in civilian dress, but when that person dons a uniform, he is suddenly different from everybody else. The uniform can, furthermore, symbolise the country, thus earning its wearer an added degree of respect. Some of the military officers in the commission refused to join SAVAK because they objected to the 'counter-military' provisos.

Often, SAVAK personnel would be stationed overseas with diplomatic cover as Military Attachés. Also, a number of military personnel would serve on temporary duty as SAVAK officers. A number of regulations existed, however, to ensure that SAVAK remained, overall, a civilian organization. Military personnel could only transfer to and remain on SAVAK duty for three years. If they chose to stay in SAVAK, they would forsake their rights to any further advancement in the military. For this reason, a number of individuals who had received most of their intelligence training in SAVAK eventually left the organization to return to their military duties, albeit in an intelligence-related assignment (J-2, Army/Navy/Air Force Intelligence or Counter-intelligence). A number of others stayed with SAVAK for many years after retiring from the military. While these individuals were often referred to as 'General' or 'Colonel', this was done more out of respect than out of the individual's current military status.[43]

Some civilians were also recruited to work in SAVAK. Recruitment was not easy in those early days, because there was much more money to be made in private enterprise. In

---

43. Confidential interview (10FEB93).

circumstances in which the recruit would show some reluctance, Bakhtiar was not above veiled hints at possible problems should the recruit not change his or her mind.[44] It should be noted, however, that such cases were an exception to the rule. Bakhtiar was an aggressive individual who was not known for his subtlety. At the time, furthermore, the organization was badly in need of suitable personnel. Obviously, an organization like SAVAK was something completely new for Iran, and it was natural for people to be reluctant to leave the security of their jobs to try something which was not guarantied to succeed.

Others joined SAVAK but later asked to be returned to their military assignments. Nasser Moghaddam was such a case, because he was unhappy with the organization's overall reputation during the Bakhtiar-period and he preferred a military environment.[45] Another interviewee admitted to a great deal of trepidation when he accepted the offer to leave his job as an instructor at the military academy and come to SAVAK. He did not know what he was in for, and the recruiters were not very descriptive. From the day he started his training, however, he knew he had found a home.[46]

Despite the fact that SAVAK was a civilian organization, the prevalence of current and former military personnel in the higher ranks of the organization did create problems. There was always a division between the military and civilian employees, because many of the military personnel questioned the dedication of the civilians. Military education indoctrinated one and confirmed one's loyalty, while an Iranian educated at a civilian institution just thought differently and had different loyalties.[47] While discussing the concept of loyalty, it should be noted that nearly all SAVAK officers interviewed, whether military or civilian, exhibited greater loyalty to their country and to their organization than they did to the monarchy, because they saw themselves as intelligence professionals.

The civilians thought the military people were too stiff and inflexible, while the soldiers thought there was not enough discipline and that the civilians might be good ana-

---

44. 17APR92 interview with a SAVAK officer who was one of the first employees and who rose to be chief of station in several countries.

45. 3MAY92 interview with an officer who eventually rose to the position of Department head. For more on Moghaddam, see below.

46. Confidential interview (2APR92).

47. Interview with M. Hashemi (14FEB92, London).

lysts, but they could not manage personnel or an office. Military officers had undergone management training and were used to giving orders. Those officers who worked around civilians for a long time, however, would start to act like them. Some of the military SAVAK personnel, furthermore, resented the educational accomplishments and obvious intellectual abilities of the civilian personnel.[48]

The civilians also lacked discipline and would take advantage of friendships with their superiors, in the soldiers' opinions. They would spend all night partying with the boss, but the next day they would come to work late, thinking that since they were friends with their bosses, tardiness would be excused. Soldiers would party with the boss, but the next morning they would come in early to show that they were not taking advantage.[49]

All the factors in the preceding three paragraphs, loyalty, discipline, and leadership, can be traced back to one thing: training. Military training forces one, in a gradual way, to assume leadership responsibilities. At the same time, one is instilled with a spirit of endurance, an ability to operate under pressure while seeing a task through until its successful conclusion. While the nature of an intelligence organization differs from that of a military one, since intelligence work calls for greater flexibility and individuality, it also differs from that of a purely civilian organization. This is because the combination of time-constraints and the realisation that one's work affects national security can impose a great deal of pressure on an intelligence organization, and only when its individual components can operate together in a smooth and disciplined fashion will its goals be attained.

In the mid- to late-1970s, the civilian-military issue took on greater significance. Staff relations in the foreign intelligence departments, for example, had been fairly harmonious, and the soldiers and the civilians got on well because they were mission-oriented, the department was set up on fairly hierarchical lines, and they were well-disciplined. In the last few years, however, there was disgruntlement among some of the younger analysts, because, with the prevalence of older military personnel, they believed that there was not

---

48. Interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London).
49. Confidential interview (24JUL92).

enough room for promotion.[50] At the same time, some of the military personnel were also voicing irritation. Some of them were older officers who were just biding their time until they could retire, and they did not have the required expertise, nor had they shown the appropriate enthusiasm and willingness to assume responsibility, to warrant their advancement to higher positions in SAVAK. So, when civilians like Parviz Sabeti were made the heads of departments, there was tremendous resentment at the advancement of a man who was perceived as an upstart, whether or not he had worked hard and earned the right to be a department chief. There was a similar outcry when the relatively youthful Dr Dibaj was chosen to head a branch, thus promoting him over the heads of several people with longer 'tenure' in SAVAK. They ignored the fact that Dibaj had distinguished himself as Chief of Station in Islamabad.[51]

SAVAK's founders were advised to recruit from Iran's best families, based on advice from MI-6.[52] An MI-6 officer had claimed that his organization preferred to recruit from Cambridge or Oxford, not only because of the excellent education offered by these institutions, but because Oxbridge students (at that time) came from the upper classes. Since they were from the top classes of society, their family histories were known and their loyalty was easy to evaluate. To this end, university lecturers were encouraged to act as talent-spotters for the intelligence services.

Such an approach was appealing on the surface, but it overlooked the realities of Iranian class structure. Upper-class Iranians were generally loath to join the military. It was believed that such activities should be left to tribal types and the military-oriented classes. Children of good families generally lived off the proceeds of family lands, entered business, or worked as civil servants. Such occupations were acceptable and were respected. Every family had the child who was an adventurer, who sought danger or at least something different, and allowances were made for these types.

There is also the fact that the spy is generally not held in high esteem.

---

50. Confidential interview (21FEB92).
51. Confidential interview (28APR93).
52. Confidential interview (22MAY92); interview with H. Alavi-Kia (6OCT93, Paris).

> Those who inform in secret, those who are not what they appear to be, those who accept hospitality in order to probe the weaknesses by which the host can be brought to his knees, those whose true purposes are masked behind a tissue of lies and stealth — all such people generally inspire what we take to be a certain repugnance.[53]

One could at least spot a soldier by his uniform, but since a spy was theoretically undetectable and unknown, he inspired greater fear. Also, people resented the power that information imparted to its holder. People therefore considered it more honourable to be a soldier than a spy. All these factors also conspired to make recruitment of members of the social elite difficult.

Recruiting of civilians became more difficult as the years progressed, for two overlapping reasons. First of all, SAVAK's reputation became worse and worse as time progressed. Secondly, it was generally not acceptable for upper-class people to do such work.[54] The combination of SAVAK's bad reputation and these pre-existing social norms made recruitment of the ideal civilian candidates difficult.

Many of these early recruits had received university educations, either in Iran, Europe, or the US, or they were graduates of the Iranian Military Academy. In this early batch of SAVAK officers were a number of individuals who had earned doctorates. Some of these individuals, after leaving SAVAK, held high positions in academia, the Cabinet, or in international organizations. They all had professional experience, and many had already served in Military Intelligence. Previous educational and professional accomplishments played a role in individual job placement and pay.

Interestingly, a relatively high proportion of SAVAK's top officers were women, and it has been estimated that there were more women in SAVAK than in other government ministries. 5-10% of the personnel in each department were women, and this excludes those who had purely secretarial functions. When one thinks of a Middle Eastern country this may come as a surprise, but the Iranian attitude towards women has always been fairly advanced, relative to attitudes in its Moslem neighbours. There is, of course, a more practical explanation to this, and that is that the daughters of military SAVAK men wanted jobs.

---

53. C. Felix, *The Spy and His Masters: A Short Course in the Secret War*, ((London, 1963), p. 34.

54. Confidential interview (1MAR93).

There was, furthermore, an opening to women's employment in government ministries from the 1960s onward.[55] This seems as appropriate a place as any to mention the problem of nepotism, which was and is common to many countries. Not only did SAVAK employees seek jobs for their friends and families, but other government employees also sought jobs for their relatives. Two department chiefs described the difficulty of attending to their jobs when they had to spend an inordinate amount of time fielding phone calls from ministers, parliamentarians, and bureaucrats who were asking them to just meet a son (or nephew, or niece, or daughter).[56]

As SAVAK grew, the nature of the personnel it employed changed. The well-educated individuals tended to go to the foreign intelligence branch of SAVAK, serving as Chiefs of Station, emissaries for the Shah, and department heads. Also, as Iran grew wealthier, greater numbers of youth could afford university educations, either at home or abroad, via state scholarships. Those who were educated abroad tended to have a sense of cynicism about the Iranian political system, and they preferred to take jobs in the private sector or government ministries where they could perform their technocratic functions without having to impose a system in which they did not believe, and often believed to be unjust, on others.[57] The expansion of the domestic security branch (Department III), particularly, necessitated an increase in employees. As one would expect, not all employees fulfilled the above high standards. Not only was this not necessary, it was not even desirable. A large number of Department III and Department IV (internal/organizational security) personnel had straight security and enforcement functions, and it would not do to have them thinking too much. Of course, this led to abuses of power.

---

55. N.R. Keddie, 'The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: An Overview,' *IJMES* 2 (1971), p. 17.

56. Interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London); confidential interview (28APR93).

57. M. Zonis, 'Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran,' *Comparative Political Studies*, v. 1, n. 3 (OCT68), p. 360, 365.

II. Department I

SAVAK's Department I was the organization's headquarters unit. This Department consisted of the SAVAK director and his staff. There was a Secret Operations Fund which, in a reorganization which took place in 1973-1974, was dealt with by the Director's Private Office. The Department's Ceremonies section handled SAVAK's guest house and helped with trips to Iran by visiting heads of state. Department I also had a Personnel section and dealt with consultants and inspectors.[58]

The role of an organization's leadership in the sphere of institutional power is important. The relationship between the country's and the organization's leader can lead to the success or downfall of the agency. The political climate is important, too: do events let the agency function, and does it appear at its best? Luck and chance, then, have a part to play.

The organization's leader is important in two ways: (1) he must try to guarantee support from other groups and organizations that control its necessary resources, and (2) he must maintain agency morale and goal-orientation. In terms of external support, outside interests must have confidence in the leader's competence. He must also appear to be honest, clear, precise, and when dealing with others, affable.[59] The leader can provide assistance to the other groups, either materially or in the form of information. He must be able to communicate clearly, so he can defend or promote his organization. Public relations and image-projection are also important, if the leader is to be successful.[60]

In the internal context, the leader's tasks are just as demanding. A leader must deal with the organization's day-to-day functions, but maintenance of employee morale, control of intra-organizational relations, and appraisal of old programs and initiation of new ones are also important.[61] An organization's leadership is important in defining what the or-

---

58. Information in this paragraph is from: National Front of Iran, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation (SAVAK),' (unpublished manuscript, MAY71), p. 5; confidential interview with a high-ranking officer in Department I (4MAY92). On the guest house, see W. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, (New York, 1981), p. 98.

59. F.E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 3rd ed., (Boston, 1984), p. 111.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

61. *Ibid.*

ganization's mission is. A leader's personality can also affect the way personnel perceive their roles in the organization, and subsequently, how they approach their mission.

It must be recognised that these internal and external factors are inter-connected. If an organization's leader appears to be a strong advocate of the organization's interests, the employees will hold that leader in high esteem, despite his personal short-comings. If, on the other hand, the leader is seen as a political weakling, his status within the organization will drop, in spite of his personal popularity. The following paragraphs will discuss SAVAK's four directors. These four individuals had a profound effect on how SAVAK defined its responsibilities and how it operated. They subsequently had a profound effect on outsiders' perception of the organization.

A. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar

Bakhtiar, the son of a Bakhtiari khan, was educated at French schools and then at St. Cyr, the French military academy. Bakhtiar's career prospects improved when he played a role in the 1947 re-conquest of Iranian Azerbaijan and participated in the suppression of a 1953 rebellion led by Abol Qassem Bakhtiari. The Shah's marriage to a Bakhtiari, Soraya Esfandiari, also helped in bringing Bakhtiar to the Shah's attention. Bakhtiar displayed both loyalty and practical assistance during the events of August 1953, earning himself a promotion to the rank of Brigadier General and the Governor-Generalship of Kerman. By December 1953 he had been made Military Governor of Tehran. (For more details and references on these matters, see Ch. 1).[62]

Bakhtiar's job as Military Governor and leader of the intelligence unit which had uncovered the Tudeh Military Network brought him into frequent contact with CIA personnel. The US adviser to the intelligence unit became impressed with Bakhtiar, seeing him as an aggressive anti-Communist who was completely loyal to the Shah. These beliefs in Bakhtiar's loyalty and abilities were reinforced by other CIA personnel, particularly the Chief of Station in the late-1950s to early-1960s. The US personnel, therefore, promoted Bakhtiar's assignment as chief of the new centralized intelligence agency, SAVAK.

---

62. Gen. H. Arfa, *Under Five Shahs*, (New York, 1965), p. 410; Foreign Service despatch 704, 788.00/4MAR53, RG-59, Box 4109.

Bakhtiar's involvement with the Military Governor's intelligence unit, furthermore, made it seem natural to make him the first head of SAVAK.[63]

Although Bakhtiar was SAVAK's first chief, the Shah did not make this choice without misgivings. He was alarmed by Bakhtiar's self-promotion and apparent attempts to build an independent power base, and he did not appreciate what seemed to be US interference in Iranian affairs. The Shah even considered making Nasser Zolfaqari, a conservative Majlis member, SAVAK's chief. The Shah eventually appointed Bakhtiar, who was sent to the US to study American security organizations. To Bakhtiar's credit, SAVAK went about the business of identifying the Shah's enemies, particularly the Communists, and removing them from the political scene. On the other hand, this tireless pursuit of real and imagined threats drove any remaining opposition underground and played a powerful part in the elimination of any hope for real democracy in Iran. It has been alleged that the doors of the interrogation buildings were left open so that passers-by would hear the screams. There were also tales of prisoners being fed to trained bears. The reputation for brutality (torture, extortion, and rape) earned by the Military-Governorship of Tehran travelled with Bakhtiar to SAVAK.[64]

At the same time, Bakhtiar was earning a reputation as a man with a fondness for strong drink, fast cars, fast women, and the power that could earn these things. His subordinates in SAVAK saw nothing wrong with his actions. What they saw was a boss who was interested in them as individuals and who cared about their families. They respected him for defending SAVAK's interests versus the other intelligence chiefs, and they respected his access to the Shah. They appreciated his interest in Iran's national security

---

63. Confidential interview with a US adviser to the Military-Governor's intelligence unit (8MAY92); confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer stationed in Tehran in the late-1950s (11SEP92). A fictionalized version of the relationship between Bakhtiar and the CIA Chief of Station is by G. de Villiers, *SAS Contre CIA*, (France, 1965, 1990).

64. On Bakhtiar's self-promotion, see, for example, 'Anti-Tudeh Campaign of the Iranian Government from November 20, 1954,' Foreign Service Despatch 484, 788.00/30APR55. Information on the Shah's choosing Bakhtiar is from an interview with M. Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark). While hard to believe, the bear story was cited and then denied, without any prompting from the interviewer, by one of Bakhtiar's associates in security work. The bear story was also cited by someone who was a teenager in Rasht and Tehran in the mid- to late-1950s. It was also related to the author by a British visitor to Iran.

and his willingness to listen to his junior officers. Bakhtiar's subordinates, according to his deputy, Gen. Hassan Pakravan, 'adored him'. Some even noted Bakhtiar's alleged xenophobia with pride, saying that he had managed to fool the Americans, such as Duke Guiraud (see above), into believing he liked them.[65]

The Shah faced somewhat of a dilemma with Bakhtiar. He trusted Bakhtiar enough to carry out highly sensitive foreign policy missions, such as hand-carrying correspondence to and from Israeli representatives and visiting foreign heads of state, such as King Hussein. He also trusted Bakhtiar enough to have him act as an escort for visiting heads of state.[66] This confidence was never complete, however, and this was why Bakhtiar was eventually dismissed.

Although there are various accounts still circulating about the reasons for Bakhtiar's dismissal, the one related here is based on discussions with one of the SAVAK officers closest to him and confirmed by another SAVAK officer who was in contact with Bakhtiar even after his ouster. In March 1961, the Shah sent Bakhtiar to Washington so he could deliver a letter to Pres. Kennedy requesting more military assistance. Bakhtiar was accompanied by two civilian SAVAK officials, Ph.D.'s with expertise in economics and Persian Gulf affairs who served as Bakhtiar's advisers before and after his meetings with Kennedy. Bakhtiar's companion at the meetings was Khosrow Khosravani, because Bakhtiar wanted a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative as a witness. Bakhtiar and the President discussed two subjects: (1) Iran's need for financial aid if the Communists were to be deterred, and (2) the Nasserist threat. From Washington, the Iranian officials went to Canada, back to Washington, Paris, and then Tel Aviv. On their return to Washington, according to an individual who was in contact with Bakhtiar after his retirement, the General had a private meeting with Kennedy. At this meeting, Kennedy

---

65. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; confidential interviews with two SAVAK officers who worked closely with Bakhtiar (17APR92 and 1 MAR93); 'Complaints of Two High-Ranking Iranian Army Officers,' Foreign Service Despatch 407, 788.00/15NOV56, (FOIA).

66. US Army Weekly Updates, 788.00 (W)/6JUN58 and 788.00 (W)/21NOV59, RG-59, Box 3814.

complained about the level of corruption in Iran and rigging of the 1960 Majlis elections. He then asked whether Bakhtiar would like to become Prime Minister, an offer which Bakhtiar declined, responding that he was loyal to the Shah and would be Premier only if the monarch ordered it.[67]

While Bakhtiar's companions went to Tel Aviv to participate in Trident meetings (see Ch. 6), he returned to Tehran to report to the Shah. When he went back to Tel Aviv, he told the SAVAK officials that he had resigned, but would not say why.[68] Since the Shah often moved about and dismissed officials, it is still not clear if Bakhtiar was dismissed as a routine move, because the Shah believed him to be involved in disloyal plots, perhaps at US instigation, or if his resignation should be seen in the context of SAVAK's failure to prevent the January-February 1961 election riots and thus a sop to the opposition. After these riots, the US government promised to provide Iran with $35 million in financial aid if the Shah replaced Premier Jafar Sharif-Emami with Ali Amini.[69] It also has been speculated that Amini was behind the rumours of Bakhtiar's disloyalty and connection with public disturbances. After Bakhtiar's dismissal he returned to Tehran and began meeting with other dismissed officials and with conservative figures like the Rashidians in an alleged attempt to seize power. Amini complained to the Shah about this, so the Shah had Gen. Nassiri tell Bakhtiar to leave the country in early-1962.[70]

---

67. State Department Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk, (1961), in the Declassified Documents, 1988, (002668), LOC; confidential interview with one of Bakhtiar's advisers (1MAR93); interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark). It has also been alleged that in 1958 Bakhtiar asked for US support in his bid for the Premiership. He was informed that the US government would not support him, and the CIA then informed the Shah. (Interview with Kermit Roosevelt, in B. Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran*, [Oxford, 1980], pp. 108-109). If this is the case, it is not clear why the Shah kept Bakhtiar around for three years, during which he was entrusted with very sensitive issues.

68. Confidential interview with one of Bakhtiar's advisers (1MAR93).

69. Information on the riots is from 'Opposition Activities and Resulting Disturbances in Tehran,' Foreign Service Despatch 433, 788.00/11FEB61, (FOIA). On US government encouragement for the Amini appointment, see the reminiscences of Col. Gratian Yatsevich, (5NOV88,Camden, ME, and 12JAN89, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

70. On Amini's complaints to the Shah and his belief that Bakhtiar was behind political unrest, see interview with Gen H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; and 'Political Disturbances in Tehran January 21-January 25,' Foreign Service Despatch 358, 788.00/3FEB62, (FOIA). On Bakhtiar and the Rashidians, see

complained about the level of corruption in Iran and rigging of the 1960 Majlis elections. He then asked whether Bakhtiar would like to become Prime Minister, an offer which Bakhtiar declined, responding that he was loyal to the Shah and would be Premier only if the monarch ordered it.[67]

While Bakhtiar's companions went to Tel Aviv to participate in Trident meetings (see Ch. 6), he returned to Tehran to report to the Shah. When he went back to Tel Aviv, he told the SAVAK officials that he had resigned, but would not say why.[68] Since the Shah often moved about and dismissed officials, it is still not clear if Bakhtiar was dismissed as a routine move, because the Shah believed him to be involved in disloyal plots, perhaps at US instigation, or if his resignation should be seen in the context of SAVAK's failure to prevent the January-February 1961 election riots and thus a sop to the opposition. After these riots, the US government promised to provide Iran with $35 million in financial aid if the Shah replaced Premier Jafar Sharif-Emami with Ali Amini.[69] It also has been speculated that Amini was behind the rumours of Bakhtiar's disloyalty and connection with public disturbances. After Bakhtiar's dismissal he returned to Tehran and began meeting with other dismissed officials and with conservative figures like the Rashidians in an alleged attempt to seize power. Amini complained to the Shah about this, so the Shah had Gen. Nassiri tell Bakhtiar to leave the country in early-1962.[70]

---

67. State Department Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk, (1961), in the Declassified Documents, 1988, (002668), LOC; confidential interview with one of Bakhtiar's advisers (1MAR93); interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark). It has also been alleged that in 1958 Bakhtiar asked for US support in his bid for the Premiership. He was informed that the US government would not support him, and the CIA then informed the Shah. (Interview with Kermit Roosevelt, in B. Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran*, [Oxford, 1980], pp. 108-109). If this is the case, it is not clear why the Shah kept Bakhtiar around for three years, during which he was entrusted with very sensitive issues.

68. Confidential interview with one of Bakhtiar's advisers (1MAR93).

69. Information on the riots is from 'Opposition Activities and Resulting Disturbances in Tehran,' Foreign Service Despatch 433, 788.00/11FEB61, (FOIA). On US government encouragement for the Amini appointment, see the reminiscences of Col. Gratian Yatsevich, (5NOV88,Camden, ME, and 12JAN89, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

70. On Amini's complaints to the Shah and his belief that Bakhtiar was behind political unrest, see interview with Gen H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; and 'Political Disturbances in Tehran January 21-January 25,' Foreign Service Despatch 358, 788.00/3FEB62, (FOIA). On Bakhtiar and the Rashidians, see

After leaving Iran in early-1962, Bakhtiar met with a number of his old colleagues, such as Farid Shihab, chief of Lebanese intelligence, and SAVAK personnel in Beirut and Iraq. When he met with these individuals he complained about the treatment he had received and tried to recruit their support for anti-Shah activities.[71] Bakhtiar also met with the Shah's enemies, such as Khosrow Qashqai, who had money, weapons, and a number of followers, and who hoped to return to Iran to conduct clandestine operations against the Shah's forces.[72] After the riots of 1963, any contact with Bakhtiar made one suspect in the Shah's eyes. The Chiefs of Station in both Baghdad and Beirut were recalled to Tehran for questioning, and one of them was dismissed for meeting with Bakhtiar. The Shah's half-brother, Hamid Reza, was stripped of the title 'Prince', supposedly because of his contacts with Bakhtiar.[73] When the Shah visited West Germany in 1967, Iranian students staged violent protests. The Shah believed that Bakhtiar was behind these events and that the local SAVAK COS, who had once served as Bakhtiar's deputy, was in league with him, so he had the COS dismissed.[74] After his father's death, Sadiq Behdad, a wealthy Iranian lawyer, received a letter of condolence from Bakhtiar. When SAVAK asked Behdad if he had heard from the former SAVAK chief, Behdad denied it, a mistake for which he was held by SAVAK for almost two months.[75]

On 15 August 1967 the Office of Military Prosecution charged Bakhtiar with making an illegal fortune while heading SAVAK. Bakhtiar was arrested in Lebanon in May 1968 on gun-running charges, at which point the Iranian government sought his extradition. The Iranians' request fell on deaf ears, and Bakhtiar was allowed to go to Iraq in April 1969,

---

'Conservative Groups Opposing the Amini Government,' Foreign Service Despatch 368, 788.00/8FEB62, (FOIA), p. 4.

71. Interview with Gen H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92); the reminiscences of Col. Isa Pejman, (MAY83, Paris), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

72. Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, (19JUN63), in *Asnad*, v. 56, pp. 68-102.

73. E.R. Oney, *CIA Research Study: Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 70. Hamid Reza was imprisoned after the revolution.

74. Interview with Gen H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with H. Alavi-Kia, (2MAY92, San Diego); confidential interview with a high-ranking SAVAK foreign intelligence officer (17APR92).

75. '(censored) Argues that Unchecked SAVAK Power Constitutes Long Term Danger to Iranian Regime,' State Department Airgram A-151, 9SEP72, (FOIA).

where he was granted citizenship. In June 1969 all his property in Iran was confiscated by the government; and in September 1969 he was tried *in abstentia* and sentenced to death for treason.[76] The Shah moved quickly to carry out this sentence, ordering both the National Police and SAVAK to formulate plans to eliminate Bakhtiar. One plan called for a group of Naqshbandi Kurds to take refuge in Iraq, gain Bakhtiar's trust, and then kill him.[77]

While in Iraq, Bakhtiar entered discussions with a number of Iranian opposition members, ranging from Tudeh members such as Iraj Eskandari and Reza Radmanesh to, allegedly, religious figures connected with Aya. Ruhollah Khomeini. By May 1970, SAVAK agents had infiltrated Bakhtiar's household, but the opportunity to take action did not present itself until August, when Bakhtiar was shot by the SAVAK agents who had persuaded him to go on a hunting trip. Even then, he hung on and refused to die, much to the consternation of the Shah, until 24 August. In December 1970 SAVAK made hundreds of arrests after uncovering a Bakhtiar plot to overthrow the government.[78]

B. Gen. Hassan Pakravan

The son of a diplomat father and a French-Iranian mother, Pakravan was born in 1911 and attended a *lycee* in Cairo and a high school in Liege, Belgium. He received military training at the artillery school in Poitiers and the advanced artillery school at Fontainebleu. In the mid-1930s, he returned to Iran where he served as a cadet trainer. In the early-1940s, he served in Bushehr and other southern cities. In the late-1940s, he served in Army Intelligence (G-2) and in Pakistan as a Military Attaché. In the early-1950s, Pakravan served as chief of G-2, possibly having a special relationship with MI-6 at the same time. In May-August 1953, Pakravan served as a Military Attaché in Paris. In

---

76. M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, (Princeton, 1971), p. 52. 80% of the Kish Island project was owned by SAVAK because Bakhtiar, when he was SAVAK's chief, had bought the island with SAVAK funds for $2 million. When he lost his post SAVAK reclaimed the property. (R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, [London, 1978, 1979], pp. 161-62.) It was hoped that Kish Island could be developed into a major resort which would attract Gulf Arabs, but since the actual construction dragged on for so long, access to it was severely limited.

77. CIA Cable, (SEP79), in *Asnad*, v. 32, p. 16; A. Alam, (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), pp. 151-52.

78. On the Bakhtiar-Tudeh connection, see 'Recantation of Two Tudeh Party Members,' State Department Airgram A-185, 13JUN70, (FOIA), and 'Shake-Up in Iranian Tudeh Party,' State Department Airgram A-62, 25FEB71, (FOIA).

1954, Pakravan attempted to resign from the Army, but the Shah forbade this and had him assigned as a Military Attaché to India until October 1956. He was then recalled to Tehran, where he headed several of the commissions which had met to discuss organizing a centralized intelligence agency.[79]

When SAVAK started operations in 1957, Pakravan was put in charge of the foreign intelligence section. Other than playing a major role in SAVAK's foreign intelligence operations and political actions (see Ch.'s 6 and 8), he was also interested in making sure SAVAK had high-quality personnel. To this end, he was closely involved in recruiting a number of individuals who had received advanced degrees in France. These individuals were, in turn, encouraged to recruit similarly qualified friends. He continued this pattern after he became SAVAK's chief, pushing for frequent improvements to SAVAK's Training Department and frequently consulting with foreign advisers.[80]

Pakravan was a 'scholar and a gentleman in the French style', a well-read and well-spoken individual who brought credit to Iran when he participated in international conferences.[81] Pakravan's approach towards security matters, especially after that of Bakhtiar, seemed very gentle. Opposed to any physical violence, especially torture, Pakravan favoured the use of intelligence over the use of coercion in security matters. He also thought that economic matters were very important, believing that people who were satisfied were unlikely to cause political unrest. After Bakhtiar, such an approach made SAVAK almost 'popular'.[82] When religiously-inspired riots took place in June 1963, Pakravan advocated a gentle approach, rather than the 'iron fist' which was eventually used. Pakravan's at-

---

79. Interview with F. Pakravan, (3MAR83 and 7MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with M. Mobasser, (11MAR92, London). On the special relationship, see Ch 2, fn 47. An abbreviated version of Pakravan's biography is presented in *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, v. II, *Jostarha-i as Tarikh-i Moaser-i Iran*, (Tehran, 1990), pp. 448-449.

80. Confidential interview with a French-educated SAVAK officer (1MAR92); confidential interview with a US adviser (11APR92); confidential interview with an officer in the Training Department (27OCT92).

81. Oney, *Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 50; interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with M. Hashemi (14FEB92, London.).

82. Interview with K. Farmanfarmaian (5JAN83, Cambridge, MA), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

tempts to negotiate with the opposition failed to yield results. He later went on the radio and publicly apologised for what had happened, saying that he had been deceived by the clergy with whom he had been meeting and who had agreed to be calm. His line of argument at these meetings reflected his overall character, however, because he had discussed philosophy while the ulama discussed religion, the end result being that nobody understood each other.[83]

The Shah eventually decided to replace Pakravan, who had been under a cloud for his apparent leniency towards the regime's opponents, after the assassination of Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur in 1965. Pakravan then served as Minister of Information, then Ambassador to Pakistan, and then as Iran's Ambassador to France. He was eventually given a sinecure as a counsellor to the Royal Court. He was also involved in a number of business projects, such as an iron foundry near Mashad. Pakravan went out of his way to help the individuals who had worked for him in the past, and when he was working at the Court, he would make sure that these individuals had jobs with him. In November 1978, Pakravan sent his family out of Iran, while opting to stay in the country. He was arrested and executed in February 1979, at the same time as his successor at SAVAK.[84]

C. Gen. Nematollah Nassiri

Nassiri came from a family which originated in Semnan. A classmate of the Crown Prince at the Military Academy, they were commissioned at the same time. Nassiri was transferred to the Imperial Guard in 1950. The action that secured Nassiri's position in Iranian affairs took place on 15-16 August 1953, when he delivered the *firman* dismissing Musaddiq. He was arrested by Musaddiq's supporters, but was then released by the Shah's supporters. In about 1961, Nassiri was made chief of the National Police (*Shahrbani*). He

---

83. Interview with F. Pakravan, (3MAR83 and 7MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; confidential interview (11APR92).

84. Interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with I. Pejman, (15OCT92, Paris); State Department memorandum of conversation, (19APR78), in *Asnad*, v. 61, p. 101.

served in this position until 1965, when Gen. Mohsen Mobasser replaced him at the Police and Nassiri, in turn, replaced Pakravan at SAVAK.[85]

Nassiri's success as an organizational leader, in terms of the standards indicated above, was mixed. He had unlimited access to the Shah and often played cards at the royal palace.[86] While this may seem unimportant, in Iran it was almost imperative to have the Shah's ear if the organization was to have access to the necessary resources. Confidence in Nassiri's competence was weak, however, because most people believed that he had gotten the SAVAK job because of his reputation for absolute loyalty to the monarch, not because of any intellectual achievements. He was regarded as very affable when dealing with others, but he was also rumoured to be financially and socially connected with Hojabr Yazdani, an allegedly corrupt businessman.[87] He was also successful in the field of image-projection, because by the time Nassiri was made chief of SAVAK, he already had a reputation as a 'ruthless' individual, which was apparently the message the Shah wanted to send to any potential opponents.[88] In terms of intra-organizational relations, SAVAK always had the upper-hand, because almost everybody feared its wide-ranging powers, and representatives of other organizations believed that the Shah always gave more weight to the SAVAK side of an argument (for a direct example of this tendency, see Ch. 8).

Nassiri's report card in terms of maintenance of employee morale is also mixed. Those who had served with Nassiri spoke highly of his personality, referring to him as a kind and friendly individual who always cared about his subordinates' welfare. An officer who served in the Imperial Guard stated that Nassiri was the best commander that unit ever had, and his loyalty was exemplified by the motto *'Cheh farman-e yazdan, cheh farman-*

---

85. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); interview with M. Mobasser, (22JAN92, London).

86. 'Who's Really Who in Iran,' *Newsweek*, (14OCT74), p. 32.

87. On rumours of Nassiri's corruption, see '(censored) Argues that Unchecked SAVAK Power Constitutes Long Term Danger to Iranian Regime.'

88. On the 'ruthless' characterization, see 'Semi-Annual Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Airgram A-408, 4FEB65, (FOIA). Some have said that Nassiri was poor at public relations; see J.D. Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution*, (Bloomington, 1981), p. 25.

e Shah,' which equated the Shah's command with God's.[89] Personnel who served in SAVAK, and even his political competitors, spoke of him in similar terms.[90] He got high marks for bringing his subordinates' intelligence reports to the Shah. When the Shah liked the report, he would praise Nassiri, who would in turn praise the responsible individuals. When the report was not to the Shah's liking, however, he would berate Nassiri, who would treat the reporter similarly. This gradually affected SAVAK officials' self-perception, and they subsequently began a pattern of self-censorship. (For more on this tendency, see Summary, Ch. 4).

Nassiri was generally willing to sponsor new foreign intelligence operations.[91] He was also ready to appraise old programs and scrap them if their performances were not satisfactory (see Ch. 8). He was more conservative in terms of domestic security activities. A SAVAK official would be assigned to a province and left there with little or no oversight, although it was originally intended for provincial SAVAK chiefs to be changed every three years.[92] While such practices may have allowed the officers concerned the opportunity to become very familiar with their areas of responsibility and the personalities within them, it also provided opportunities for corruption. It was also organisationally harmful, because some turnover is considered an institutional strengthener. He was, furthermore, always willing to approve counter-espionage operations against Communist states, but he was reluctant to approve similar operations against countries such as the US, because of the possible political ramifications.[93] Nassiri also failed to keep up with new trends in counter-insurgency / counter-terrorism and in Iranian political developments.[94] Such complacency can be and was very harmful.

---

89. Interview with Col. A. Fartash, (1MAY85, Bournemouth), by S. Meskoob for the IOHP.

90. Interview with I. Pejman, (15OCT92, Paris); interview with Gen. H.-A. Kia, (21OCT85, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

91. Confidential interview with a high-ranking SAVAK foreign intelligence officer (3MAY92).

92. Interview with J. Moinzadeh (3FEB92, London); interview with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego).

93. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).

94. Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution*, p. 25.

The Shah's confidence in Nassiri was almost complete, witness the very sensitive tasks assigned to him. Nassiri escorted visiting dignitaries, such as Moroccan Prince Moulay Abdullah (April 1973) or Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin (December 1974 and July 1976).[95] He was also tasked with sponsoring the unsuccessful Iraqi coup attempt of January 1970 (see Ch. 6) and the elimination of Bakhtiar. Nassiri had a Private Office created in Department I to deal with these special operations because they were considered too sensitive to go through the normal bureaucracy.[96] It was later alleged that the Private Office was created to handle Nassiri's business interests.[97] Although there were rumours of his corruption, he had a 'small and modestly furnished' office in SAVAK headquarters, and he lived quietly with his second wife, never going to receptions and rarely attending embassy parties.[98]

Nassiri was relieved of his duties at SAVAK in June 1978 and reassigned as the Ambassador to Pakistan. In October 1978 he was recalled to Tehran and arrested in a purge of government officials in November. He was charged with 'torture, illegal detention of people, murder, and corruption,' and imprisoned.[99] After being tortured and forced to appear on television, Nassiri was executed by his revolutionary captors.

D. Gen. Nasser Moghaddam

When Nassiri was dismissed, the Shah considered replacing him with Gen. Ali Motazed, Nassiri's deputy for foreign intelligence who was highly respected by other SAVAK personnel. Gen. Hossein Fardust advised the Shah to choose Moghaddam instead. This may have been done because Moghaddam was from an important Azerbaijani family, his family had close ties with Aya. Kazem Shariatmadari, and he was also distantly related to Rahmatollah Moghaddam-Maraghei, an opposition figure who later rose to

---

95. S. Segev, *The Iranian Triangle*, (New York, 1988), pp. 84-85, 87; Alam, *The Shah and I*, pp. 288-89, 401, 500.

96. Confidential interview with a high-ranking officer in Department I (4MAY92).

97. Confidential interviews with two high-ranking SAVAK officials (17APR92 and 21FEB92).

98. P. Radji. *In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah's Last Ambassador to London*, (London, 1983), p. 18; 'Who's Really Who in Iran,' *Newsweek*, (14OCT74), p. 32.

99. *The Times*, (8NOV78), p. 8.

prominence. Fardust's advice may have been, and probably was, based on Moghaddam's professional record. Moghaddam had served in the military prosecutor's office and in SAVAK. He then served in the *Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at* (Special Intelligence Bureau, SIB) under Fardust. After leaving the SIB, Moghaddam served as head of SAVAK's Department III, having replaced Gen. Mostafa Amjadi in 1964. Moghaddam was recommended for this job by Fardust. Moghaddam stayed in the Department III slot until the early-1970s, when he was replaced by Parviz Sabeti and transferred to Military Intelligence. Moghaddam was chief of Military Intelligence until June 1978, when he replaced Nassiri at SAVAK.[100]

The nature of Moghaddam's relationship with the Shah is not very clear, although it was not as close as Nassiri's, witness the Shah's heavy criticism of Moghaddam for failing to foresee and prevent the demonstrations of July 1978.[101] If the Shah's support was not whole-hearted and other SAVAK personnel learned this, then Moghaddam's ability to maintain agency morale and goal-orientation would have been seriously harmed. By September 1978, when martial-law was declared in a number of major Iranian cities, the Shah had apparently decided to exhibit more confidence in Moghaddam. The declaration of martial-law occurred after Moghaddam had persuaded the Shah that force was the only way to stop further demonstrations. Moghaddam had also persuaded cabinet ministers and the National Security Council (NSC) to go along with his decision.[102]

The confidence of the other security chiefs in Moghaddam's competence was also important. While some of them, such as Fardust, Gen. Boroumandjazy (G-2 chief), and Gen. Samadianpour (National Police chief) had also served in the SIB and were linked together in this way, others were not so confident. Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami believed

---

100. Information on Motazed is from an interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; on Moghaddam's family, see E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton, 1982), p. 509, and M-J. Delvecchio-Good, 'The Changing Status of an Iranian Provincial Elite,' in M.E. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds., *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*, (Albany, 1981), p. 273; on Moghaddam's religious connections, see Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions*, p. 207, 210; information on Fardust's role in getting Moghaddam into SAVAK in 1964 is from 'Decision-making in Iran,' State Department Report, (22JUL76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 126.

101. State Department Airgram, (1AUG78), in *Asnad*, v. 25, pp. 50-53.

102. S. Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, (London, 1988), p. 22.

that SAVAK was actually behind some of the demonstrations, and he complained about the lack of intelligence that was coming in. Interior Minister Gen. Abbas Qarabaqi also believed that SAVAK's support of the government was not whole-hearted.[103]

Those interviewees who served with Moghaddam were united in their condemnation of him. (It may be the case that anybody who served as SAVAK's chief at the time would be criticised now). The major personnel shifts that he initiated in the regional SAVAK offices were judged to be poorly timed, and the replacements to be of poor quality, not having been sufficiently prepared for their new jobs. The morale of SAVAK personnel was very low for a number of other reasons, some, but not all of them Moghaddam's fault. A number of SAVAK officials had been fired in October 1978, and the next month several, including Nassiri, were arrested. Around the same time, many SAVAK officials resigned. SAVAK personnel resented being used as scapegoats, and they resented the failure of their boss to protect them. Moghaddam also proposed a major reorganization of SAVAK which would have stripped it of its domestic security and counter-espionage / counter-intelligence functions, an action which was harmful to the self-esteem of the SAVAK personnel. Finally, those who served with Moghaddam have stated that he was neither intelligent nor tough, qualities which would have been particularly helpful during his time as chief of SAVAK.[104]

Some individuals have stated that Moghaddam and Qarabaqi were in contact with the opposition, perhaps in an attempt to buy time for themselves and their families. While there is not sufficient evidence to disprove these allegations as they apply to Moghaddam, some question still remains. It has been suggested that Moghaddam sent an emissary to Paris to meet with Khomeini.[105] In fact, the official had been sent to Paris to discuss security arrangements with Count Alexandre de Marenches and other French offi-

---

103. On Sharif-Emami and Qarabaqi, see Zabih, *The Iranian Military*, pp. 23-24.

104. Information in this paragraph is from: interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; interview with H. Alavi-Kia, (2MAY92, San Diego); confidential interview with a Department head (3MAY92); interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93, London); interview with J. Moinzadeh (3FEB92, London). In contrast, Moghaddam is referred to as 'sophisticated and subtle-minded' by R.W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold-War Case Study*, (Pittsburgh, 1988), p. 171.

105. Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions*, p. 240.

cials.[106] It has also been alleged that Army Counter-intelligence learned of Qarabaqi's contacts with the religious opposition and reported them to Moghaddam, but he failed to act, supposedly because he too was in contact with the opposition in an attempt to guarantee the safety of his relatives.[107] While the extent of Qarabaqi's contact with the opposition is not clear, it has been written that Moghaddam often warned him that all levels of the military had been penetrated by the opposition.[108] The final piece of evidence which casts doubt on the allegations of Moghaddam's cooperation with the opposition can also be cited as supporting those allegations. Namely, his post-revolution execution. Was Moghaddam killed because of his long experience in the regime's repressive apparatus, or was he killed to destroy the evidence of his contacts with his eventual captors?

III. Department IV

Department IV was responsible for the physical security of SAVAK personnel. It also ensured the security of SAVAK documents and buildings. It observed the activities of SAVAK employees, in an attempt to avoid penetration of the organization by unfriendly intelligence services. Department IV's task was made difficult in two ways. Firstly, a number of SAVAK personnel were former Tudeh members, and their loyalty was always in some doubt. Secondly, as the number of SAVAK personnel stationed overseas increased, it became harder to control their movements without a major increase in the number of personnel assigned to Department IV itself. This was made even more difficult because a number of SAVAK personnel were sent to other countries for training. One case where Department IV did not function as expected was that of Mansour Rafizadeh, the SAVAK Chief of Station in the US, who became a US agent in about 1959-1960.

Department IV trained personnel in other government ministries on the basics of organizational security. If the ministry in question did not have its own security officer, Department IV could recommend one. This Department also provided security information

---

106. Confidential interview (28APR93).
107. Interview with J. Moinzadeh, (6FEB92, London).
108. Zabih, *The Iranian Military*, pp. 36-37. On their meetings with the opposition, after the Shah left Iran, see *Asnad*, v. 9 & 10, (this volume does not have page numbers).

on individuals who were seeking government employment and on government personnel who were being considered for promotion. Finally, Department IV was in charge of SAVAK's paramilitary assets, such as Rangers and frogmen, who functioned in the Keyhan units.[109]

IV. Department V

Department V was responsible for technical duties. Among these duties were the printing of organizational literature and laboratory analysis. There was a postal section which checked all mail and publications coming to Iran from Communist countries. The postal section also had a list of opposition figures and other suspect individuals whose mail was to be intercepted. The mail would then be checked for coded messages or anything of a subversive nature, copied, restored to its original condition by one of the Department's flaps-and-seals experts, and then forwarded to the intended recipient. In conjunction with these tasks, Department V's chemistry section checked the correspondence for messages in 'invisible ink', developed new types of inks, and developed chemicals for use by the flaps-and-seals experts.[110]

Department V also had personnel who were experts in photography and film-making, lock-picking, and wire-tapping. These individuals worked in conjunction with the Department's surveillance teams, which were at the disposal of Departments III and VIII. Department V would be told who the surveillance subject was by one of the operational Departments. They would also tell the surveillance teams what type of coverage to give the individual in question, varying from very discreet to very obvious. The obvious coverage could include intimidation of the subject and his or her family, in an attempt to force the individual to make a mistake, panic, or simply leave the country.[111]

---

109. Information in this paragraph is from: S. Bashiri, *Qisih-yi SAVAK*, (Paris, 1987), pp. 538-539; Graham, *Iran*, p. 147; and E.R. Oney,'The SAVAK Émigré,' *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 4, n. 1 (NOV88).

110. Bashiri, *Qisih-yi SAVAK*, p. 544-546.

111. Interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93, London).

V. Department VI

The main responsibility of this Department was finance (accounts and purchases), motor transport, and the health of SAVAK employees.[112] It is very difficult to get an accurate picture of the SAVAK budget, for a number of reasons. Many of its personnel were on temporary duty from their individual branches of the armed forces. Although they were working for SAVAK, they were being paid by the military. The budget for clandestine operations, furthermore, was secret. As Iran's income climbed in conjunction with its oil revenues, the Shah's military expenditures also climbed. Spending on intelligence operations also increased, although not in proportion to the military expenditures.[113] Effectively, however, SAVAK's budget was unlimited.[114]

A government auditor was occasionally sent to review affairs at this Department. Department VI's chief, however could have hidden any documents detailing misappropriations, if they existed, citing 'national security' as the reason that these documents were secret. Whether or not this really happened, it is known that several of the personnel from this Department seemed to develop the Midas Touch.

VI. Department IX

This Department was in charge of record-keeping and filing. It provided personnel-data to Department IV when it conducted security checks in SAVAK and in other branches of the government. It also provided information on individuals who were applying for passports or exit visas.[115]

---

112. National Front, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation,' p. 11.

113. For more on hidden government expenditures, see H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*, (London, 1981), Ch. 13.

114. Confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92); see also 'Decision-making in Iran,' State Department Report, (22JUL76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 108.

115. National Front, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation,' p. 12; Bashiri, *Qisih-yi SAVAK*, p. 571-572.

CH. 6. FOREIGN SAVAK

Establishment

When SAVAK was first created, its foreign intelligence branch was just that, a branch, and it consisted of a few officers who dealt with issues on an *ad hoc* basis. It was soon realized that this was an inefficient system, so the foreign intelligence branch was divided into two separate Departments. Department II was responsible for intelligence collection and operations, while Department VII was responsible for research and analysis. Until 1973-1974, these two Departments were referred to as the Organization of Foreign Information.[1] SAVAK shared information with its allies in both bilateral and multilateral exchanges through a Liaison Sub-Department and through Department VII's Exchange of Information Branch.

I. Department II

A. Organization, Budget, and Personnel

In terms of overall organization of Department II, see the chart below.



1. National Front of Iran (operating abroad), 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organization (SAVAK),' (unpublished manuscript, MAY71), p. 12.

Department II's budget was essentially unlimited, particularly during Gen. Nematollah Nassiri's time at SAVAK. This was because of Nassiri's good relations with the Shah and Iran's substantial income from oil revenues. The actual intelligence collection operations were usually called for by Department VII, based on current events and a standing list of information requirements. Despite this apparent budgetary *carte blanche*, Department II still managed to operate on a relatively low budget of about $150,000 a month.[2]

When Department II was first created, it had very few people assigned to it. As the organization matured and its budget grew, the number of personnel climbed, although never reaching the five hundred mark. The numbers changed frequently, however, on a need-determined basis.[3]

B. Operations

Initially, SAVAK's clandestine activities were mainly propaganda-oriented. As the organization matured and confidence in its abilities grew, SAVAK began aiding foreign individuals and groups financially and militarily. This eventually expanded into large-scale military commitments.

1. Lebanon

One of SAVAK's major foreign operations was its involvement in Lebanese affairs. This involvement commenced in May 1958, when Iran, in conjunction with Israel and Turkey, provided military aid to Lebanese President Camille Chamoun. This operation was run by SAVAK's foreign intelligence branch under Admiral Ahmad Azima. Shortly afterwards, SAVAK's Deputy-Director for Plans and chief of Middle East operations, Col. Mujtaba Pashai, created the *Tarh-i Sabz* (Green Plan) to contain Nasserist expansionism. Such involvement with Lebanon continued during the existence of SAVAK and is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 8.

---

2. Confidential interviews with two Department heads (21FEB92 and 3MAY92).
3. *Ibid.*

2. Kurds

SAVAK's Kurdish policy can be seen in four distinct yet overlapping ways. When SAVAK first became concerned with the Kurds, the main interest was Iran's internal security. There was concern that the Kurdish minority could either be agitated into acting against the Iranian government by Nasserist propaganda, by Soviet infiltration and propaganda, or by a combination thereof. After the 1958 coup in Iraq, some additional worries were added to the first two. The first was the fear of a spill-over effect from the anti-monarchist coup of Abdol Karim Qassem. The second concern was that of Pan-Arabist claims by the Iraqi government which focussed on Iran's Khuzestan province (Arabistan in Nasserist propaganda). After the February 1963 overthrow and execution of Qassem by the Pan-Arab Baathists, Israel began a relationship with the Kurds in coordination with SAVAK. This relationship had at least two objectives. The Kurds were encouraged to fight the Iraqis, thus keeping the Iraqi military concentrated in the North and precluding its commitment to the Arab wars against Israel. A second aspect of the Israel-Iran-Kurd relationship focussed on the opportunity to collect intelligence on the Iraqi military, which was supplied and trained by the Soviet Union and which used Soviet tactics. After the 1975 Algiers Accords resulted in the termination of Iranian aid to the Kurds in their fight against Iraq, SAVAK's Kurdish policy again focussed on internal security.

In 1957, Col Pashai and Gen. Hassan Pakravan (chief of foreign intelligence) discussed the Kurdish situation. They believed that the approximately 3.6 million Kurds, spread out through Turkey, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, could either be valuable assets or substantial adversaries in terms of Iranian national security. They also believed that the 900,000 Kurds in Iran, split up into forty tribes and confederations, were a potential threat to Iran's security because they would eventually militate for autonomy. To preclude this eventuality, and to win the Kurds to the Iranian government's side, the two officers approached SAVAK chief Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar was already concerned about the Kurds, having heard that they were naming their children 'Gamal' and 'Nasser', so he wanted to do something. Pashai convinced him that people could not be arrested because of the names of their children. Pakravan and Pashai said it would be better to be concerned

with the Kurds' social and intellectual welfare and stated that Iran must take advantage of its natural ties with the Kurds to win them over to the Iranian government's side. To this end, they said, SAVAK should promote the Kurdish language and culture.[4]

Bakhtiar was amenable, and he ordered that a Kurdistan branch be established in Department II. The individual chosen to head this office was Maj. Isa Pejman, an enthusiastic Army officer who had been advocating some sort of Kurdish operations for several years. Pejman's hard work and Bakhtiar's statements indicating Iranian support for the Kurds paid off when, within one year of the start of the Kurdish branch, the Kurdish followers of Mulla Mustafa Barzani were at war with the Iraqi government. At one point, in fact, 80 % of the Iraqi military was deployed against the Kurds. The Kurds were also used to collect intelligence on the Iraqi regime. (The Barzani Kurds' conflict with Iraq at that time can also be traced to Qassem's refusal to grant them administrative self-rule). Although the Kurds still did not think of themselves as Iranians, SAVAK saw it as a victory that they did not think of themselves as Arabs.[5]

Promotion of Kurdish culture was a timely idea, since Kurdish intellectuals had been imprisoned by the Turkish government, which referred to the Kurds as 'mountain Turks'. (The Turkish government suppressed Kurdish cultural and political activities for the next two decades, causing some softening of SAVAK policies, since Iran did not want to interfere with its ally's interests). Among the activities designed to win over the Kurds was the creation of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*. *Kurdistan* was first printed in Spring 1959, and it featured news, poetry, history, and pro-Shah articles in three Kurdish dialects. The Kurds' language had been prohibited, and their printing facilities eliminated, after the suppression of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946, and some Iranian military officers

---

4. 'Political Potential of the Tribes of Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 890, 788.00/2JUN59, pp. 5-6; interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); interview with I. Pejman, (4MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

5. Interviews with M. Pashai (10DEC92 and 24JUN93, Denmark); the reminiscences of Col. Isa Pejman, (MAY83, Paris), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS; E. Ghareeb, *The Kurdish Question in Iraq*, (Syracuse, NY, 1981), p. 39; National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,' (AUG79), in *Asnad*, v. 31, p. 15. On Bakhtiar's views, see J. Walz, 'Iran Voices Faith in Kurds' Loyalty,' *New York Times*, (26OCT58), p. 58.

objected to the availability of *Kurdistan* in Iran, citing their service against the Kurds during that conflict. For this reason, it was only distributed in Europe, although it still got to Iraq and eventually Iran. *Kurdistan* only lasted until 1963, and SAVAK arrested many of its writers in 1964.[6]

SAVAK staged international conferences on the Kurds in cooperation with Pierre Rondot, a French expert on the Kurds, and all of these were staged in Eastern Europe. The first took place in Berlin, and was assisted by Gen. Ehsan Nuri Pasha. Professor Kordioff was always the big academic name associated with these conferences, but he never personally came. It was finally realised that Kordioff did not really exist, and he was a Soviet fabrication.[7]

SAVAK also established Kurdish-language radio broadcasts. One transmitter was near Mashad, while another was set up in Kermanshah. These were intended to counter the Soviet Union's Kurdish-language broadcasts, and to encourage allegiance with Iran, rather than with Communist organizations or with Iraq. Pejman brought some Kurdish leaders back to his house in Tehran, where they met with Pakravan, Bakhtiar, and his deputy, Gen. Hassan Alavi-Kia. The SAVAK officers told the Kurds that they should identify with Iran, because it would always support them.[8]

Some of Pashai and Pejman's efforts did not meet with such success. Although Pejman was the main intermediary between SAVAK and Barzani, he and Pashai actually thought that Jalal Talebani and his followers were preferable. They questioned Barzani's loyalty to Iran or anyone else, and they also believed that Barzani might be a Communist, witness Barzani's role in the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and his long stay in the Soviet Union after its collapse. They believed Talebani was more honourable and more reliable, but Pashai and Pejman's efforts to persuade SAVAK's leadership to support Talebani failed. Pashai and Pejman also advocated free elections in Iran's Kurdish areas. They believed

---

6. Interviews with M. Pashai (10DEC92 and 24JUN93, Denmark); US Army weekly update, 788.00 (W)/29MAY59, RG-59, Box 3814.

7. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

8. Interview with I. Pejman, (4MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; the reminiscences of Col. Isa Pejman, (MAY83, Paris), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS; Ghareeb, *The Kurdish Question in Iraq*, p. 43.

that if a Communist was elected and did a good job, the Iranian government looked good for allowing free elections. If the freely elected Communist failed, the Communists would look bad. Such a radical (by SAVAK standards) scheme was not approved, so the Kurds had very little confidence in the political system because they knew that SAVAK installed its own people in positions of power.[9]

Throughout the years, there was a failure within SAVAK to communicate over goals, objectives, and means of operations in Kurdish areas. There was a lot of bureaucratic in-fighting taking place, and officers who got too involved in their areas of specialization often failed to understand what was going on in Tehran. As a result of inter-agency competition, personal rivalries, and attempts to get information to the Shah first, intelligence-gathering operations and political actions were not as efficient as they might have been. An example of this took place as early as 1958, when Pashai originally recommended a Kurdish newspaper with Dr Karim Sanjabi, a Kurd, as its editor. Both Bakhtiar and the Shah were opposed to this idea, citing an anti-Royalist document signed by Sanjabi, Sardar Rafat Palizee, Dr Esmail Ardalan, Mohammad Amin Lahouni, Abdol Karim Qassem, Abdol Rahman Qassemlu, Sheikh Latif, and some minor notables. Although it was discovered that this document was a bad forgery, with bad hand-writing and almost identical signatures, the Shah and Bakhtiar did not back down on Sanjabi, a National Front member and early supporter of Musaddiq.[10]

SAVAK's Israeli friends expressed an interest in getting involved in Kurdish operations, but the Iranians were hesitant initially. They even objected to the Israelis opening a station in Qasr-e Shirin. The Kurds were not very open to strangers, and even Iranians rarely managed to melt them down, so it was believed that the Israelis would do even worse. The Israelis were not to be put off, however, and initially they operated without

---

9. CIA Cable, (17AUG79), in *Asnad*, v. 32, p. 8; interview with I. Pejman, (4MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

10. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark). On Sanjabi, see 'Further Arrests of Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 328, 788.00/30SEP57, (FOIA); 'Further Developments in Recent Arrests of Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 402, 788.00/24OCT57, (FOIA); and CIA Office of Central Reference biography, (8DEC78), in *Asnad*, v. 26.2, pp. 43-45.

Iranian cooperation. They were also involved with a Kurdish-oriented publication, a magazine organized by Jon Kimche called *Horizon* which was published in Paris by Kamran Ali Bedir-Khan and featured articles by Israeli government officials.[11]

Serious Israeli-Kurdish ties began in about 1963-1964. This was because of increased Israeli (and Iranian) concern about Iraq. It was hoped that by arming the Kurds and encouraging an insurrection, the Iraqi armed forces would be kept busy in the north. This would alleviate pressure on Israel in the south and Iran in the east. At this time, Shimon Peres met with Bedir-Khan. In May 1965, SAVAK arranged a meeting between Barzani, Israeli Chief of Staff Zvi Zur, and two others from the Israeli Defense Ministry. The Israelis were flown from Tehran to Rezaieh, then driven to Piranshahr. They then put on local costumes and walked into Iraq, where they met with Barzani. It was decided to train the Kurds in regular, rather than guerrilla, tactics. After a day and a half of talks, the Israelis left.[12]

From that time onward, arms, ammunition, and Israeli advisers began to arrive *via* Iran, channelled by SAVAK. A three month officers' training course (codenamed 'Marvad' [Carpet]) began in August 1965. The Israelis contributed and manned a field hospital for Kurdish use. When Iranian funding for the Kurds began to taper off, the Israelis filled the gap, supplying captured arms and $50,000 per month. A Kurdish defector to the Iraqi government claimed that a four-man Israeli radio-relay team broadcast directly to Tel Aviv, and that these four also tried to secure intelligence.[13] Mossad and SAVAK worked together to train and form a Kurdish intelligence organization called the *Parastin* for the purpose of collecting information on the Iraqi military, since that could be a valuable insight into Soviet military doctrine and tactics.[14] In the summer of 1966 Israeli cabinet member Aryeh 'Lyova' Eliav ('a legendary agent for special assignments') met with

---

11. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

12. J. Morris, 'Begin airs secret Israeli aid to Kurds as reminder for Iraqis,' *Christian Science Monitor*, (6OCT80), p. 11; *New York Times*, (30SEP80), p. A11; I. Black and B. Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, (London, 1991), p. 184; D. Kimche, *The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat, and Saddam Hussein , The Quest for Peace in the Middle East*, (London, 1991), p. 189.

13. D.A. Schmidt, 'Iranian Aid Vital to Kurds,' *Christian Science Monitor*, (12DEC74), p. 4.

14. Interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93); Ghareeb, *The Kurdish Question in Iraq*, p. 133.

Barzani, and in September 1967 and September 1973 Barzani visited Israel.[15] The combined Iranian-Israeli Kurdish policy was highly successful, since a Kurdish offensive precluded the dispatch of large numbers of Iraqi troops to aid Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, and in January 1975 the Arab League allegedly asked the Shah to reduce military pressure on Iraq so Iraqi armour which was in Kurdistan could take up positions on the Syrian-Israeli border.[16]

In May 1969, thousands of Iranians working in Iraq were deported unceremoniously as a result of the disagreement between their two governments over the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) waterway. This led to Iranian Army troops entering Iraq with the Kurds and combating Iraqi troops. As Iran's border dispute with Iraq grew more heated, the northern Kurds were employed by the Iranian government to take actions against Iraq, such as the destruction of Iraqi oil pipelines. By early-1970, the Shah grew concerned at the possible establishment of ties between Barzani and the Iraqi government.[17] In mid-1972 the Iranian government was working with the US and UK governments to formulate an anti-Iraqi plan which would involve the Iraqi opposition-in-exile and the Kurds.[18] The US government made a financial contribution, but its main achievement was to persuade Barzani to trust the Iranian government.[19] In 1973 the Israelis proposed having the Kurds within Iraq initiate an offensive, but the Shah (and the US ambassador) thought that such an attack

---

15. Y. Melman and D. Raviv, *The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence*, (London, 1989), p. 88; Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, p. 184; S. Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988*, (New York, 1989), p. 47.

16. T. Mostyn, *Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and Arabian Peninsula, 1945-1990*, (Oxford, 1991), p. 139.

17. A. Alam, (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), p. 129.

18. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 230. The US government had gotten involved in Iran's Kurdish operations as early as 1963-64. This was marked by training and advice provided by the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Iranian troops in the field in an attempt to put down a Kurdish insurrection. US Air Force personnel assisted the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) in conducting psychological operations and in supporting ground operations. By spring 1964, the Iranian government had managed to get these Kurds to withdraw to Iraq. Barzani had cooperated with the Shah's government by preventing the insurrectionist Kurds from being in contact with Iranian Kurdistan. See R. Secord with J. Wurts, *Honoured and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, (New York, 1992), pp. 46-51.

19. *The Village Voice*, (16FEB76), pp. 85-86. It has been claimed that the US was actually involved in Kurdish affairs continuously, having financed the Israeli involvement; see Secord, *Honoured and Betrayed*, p. 123.

would fail. The idea was not applied, allegedly because the Kurds were not adequately equipped for the proposed operation, and because the Shah did not want "'the Kurds branded as mere henchmen of Israel and the USA.'"[20] In fact, the Kurds' success was never intended, and they were merely to maintain the fight at a level which would sap Iraq's resources.[21] In a July 1974 interview, Barzani denied receiving any help from the West, and when he was asked if he would help the Kurds in Iran and Turkey seek autonomy, he said that his people's argument was only with Iraq. The interpreter at this interview was an assistant to SAVAK director Nassiri, who had sent his own man because he believed that Barzani had a tendency to say what was on his mind.[22] By October 1974, however, the Shah had supplied the Kurds with long-range artillery and anti-tank missiles (more precisely, Iranian artillery manned by Iranian troops was used against the Iraqis).[23]

In March 1975, as part of the Algiers Accord, Saddam Hussein and the Shah (without informing anybody in SAVAK, the Prime Minister's office, or the US or Israeli governments until after the fact) reached an agreement on the Shatt al-Arab Waterway and agreed 'to a final end to all subversive infiltration from either side.' The Kurdish operation had already cost thousands of lives and millions of dollars. While this agreement may have been good news for the Iranian and Iraqi governments, it had adverse results for the Kurds, who suffered badly as a result of the withdrawal of Iranian aid and the subsequent Iraqi onslaught. The CIA Chief of Station and Barzani communicated directly with the US executive branch in an effort to secure, at least, humanitarian aid for the many Kurdish refugees. Initially, SAVAK organized a safe-haven for the 90,000-250,000 Kurdish refugees in Iran, but about 40,000 took advantage of an Iraqi amnesty to return later.[24] At this point, Kurdish operations were transferred to Department VIII. The relationship between

---

20. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 327.
21. *The Village Voice*, (16FEB76), pp. 85-87.
22. B. Came, 'Interview with Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani,' *Newsweek*, (22JUL74), p. 50; interview with Nassiri's assistant (4MAY92).
23. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 391. 399.
24. NFAC, 'The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,' (AUG79), in *Asnad*, v. 31, p. 15; *The Village Voice*, (16FEB76), pp. 87-88; J. Kimche, 'Selling Out the Kurds,' *The New Republic*, (19APR75), pp. 19-21.

would fail. The idea was not applied, allegedly because the Kurds were not adequately equipped for the proposed operation, and because the Shah did not want "'the Kurds branded as mere henchmen of Israel and the USA.'"[20] In fact, the Kurds' success was never intended, and they were merely to maintain the fight at a level which would sap Iraq's resources.[21] In a July 1974 interview, Barzani denied receiving any help from the West, and when he was asked if he would help the Kurds in Iran and Turkey seek autonomy, he said that his people's argument was only with Iraq. The interpreter at this interview was an assistant to SAVAK director Nassiri, who had sent his own man because he believed that Barzani had a tendency to say what was on his mind.[22] By October 1974, however, the Shah had supplied the Kurds with long-range artillery and anti-tank missiles (more precisely, Iranian artillery manned by Iranian troops was used against the Iraqis).[23]

In March 1975, as part of the Algiers Accord, Saddam Hussein and the Shah (without informing anybody in SAVAK, the Prime Minister's office, or the US or Israeli governments until after the fact) reached an agreement on the Shatt al-Arab Waterway and agreed 'to a final end to all subversive infiltration from either side.' The Kurdish operation had already cost thousands of lives and millions of dollars. While this agreement may have been good news for the Iranian and Iraqi governments, it had adverse results for the Kurds, who suffered badly as a result of the withdrawal of Iranian aid and the subsequent Iraqi onslaught. The CIA Chief of Station and Barzani communicated directly with the US executive branch in an effort to secure, at least, humanitarian aid for the many Kurdish refugees. Initially, SAVAK organized a safe-haven for the 90,000-250,000 Kurdish refugees in Iran, but about 40,000 took advantage of an Iraqi amnesty to return later.[24] At this point, Kurdish operations were transferred to Department VIII. The relationship between

---

20. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 327.
21. *The Village Voice*, (16FEB76), pp. 85-87.
22. B. Came, 'Interview with Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani,' *Newsweek*, (22JUL74), p. 50; interview with Nassiri's assistant (4MAY92).
23. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 391. 399.
24. NFAC, 'The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,' (AUG79), in *Asnad*, v. 31, p. 15; *The Village Voice*, (16FEB76), pp. 87-88; J. Kimche, 'Selling Out the Kurds,' *The New Republic*, (19APR75), pp. 19-21.

SAVAK and the Kurds continued even after the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution, when the Kurds helped some of the SAVAK personnel escape the Islamic authorities.

3. Afghanistan and Pakistan

In 1958, SAVAK recognised that Soviet agents were infiltrating Iran through Afghanistan. Pashai and Col. Abdol Azim Valiyan, a Department II officer with expertise on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, devised the *Tarh-i Borun Marzi* (Extraterritorial Plan) to stop this. They placed agents in civilian posts (Customs agents, teachers, etc.) and gave them cameras to photograph suspected Soviet infiltrators. The agents would get to know the locals, so new faces would be recognised and reported to SAVAK, who could then catch the Soviets. SAVAK also intended to use this information to form a data-base which could be used to track the movements of Soviet agents and intelligence officers. The plan worked as intended, and Valiyan was rewarded by being put in charge of all border operations.[25]

SAVAK tried to get the CIA involved in its Afghanistan operations, but the Americans balked at joint operations with the Iranians. In one of the few joint operations which was attempted, SAVAK sent an agent into Herat, and he just disappeared. Other SAVAK-CIA joint operations also took place, such as the creation of Escape and Evasion (E&E) routes for Soviet defectors, 'reverse penetration routes' for intelligence collection in the Soviet Union, and reconnaissance operations. Such attempts were generally unsuccessful, which was why the CIA was reluctant to join in. The Iranians themselves admitted that penetration of the Afghan target was very difficult. The country was so backward, and the areas between Helmand and Herat so thinly populated, that any newcomer would immediately stand out and get the authorities' attention. An agent with enough education to operate communication equipment, for example, would be obvious, and an agent who was not so obvious could not run the communications gear.[26]

---

25. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

26. Confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (11APR92); M. Ledeen and W. Lewis, *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran*, (New York, 1980, 1981), p. 55; confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92).

In July 1973 a coup led by the pro-Soviet Sardar Davoud Khan took place in Afghanistan. At the same time, Afghans were being infiltrated into Pakistani Baluchistan. By mid-1975, the Afghan situation had deteriorated to such a level that SAVAK was warning of the possibility of a Soviet invasion. These factors caused a great deal of concern to the Shah, who believed the Soviets would use Afghanistan to gain access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. To counter these dangers, the Iranian government took several actions. The Shah arranged for the deposed Afghan monarch and his family to be given a monthly allowance and bought them houses in Italy. SAVAK also established and maintained contacts with a group of pro-Western Afghan military officers. Plans were also considered for the support of insurgents in western Afghanistan. Eventually, it was decided to limit financial support for the Afghan officers, because there seemed to be a constant stream of them and their demands for money.[27]

To counter the Iranian government's support for the Kurds, the Iraqi government provided support for Baluchi separatists in Pakistan, hoping that their conflict would spread into Iran. In January 1972, Pakistan and Iran's worries about Soviet and Iraqi support for the Baluchis were dismissed as unlikely by the CIA. In February 1973, however, the Pakistani government announced the discovery of Soviet weapons in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. Believing that these were intended for the Baluchis, Pakistan declared the Iraqi ambassador *persona non grata.* Iraq retaliated in kind, then opened an office for the Baluchistan Liberation Front in Baghdad. Soon thereafter, a Baluchi insurgency which lasted until November 1977 broke out. Iran committed AH-1 (Cobra) helicopters and aircrews, and SAVAK directed this operation.[28]

---

27. Alam, *The Shah and I*, pp. 305-307, 311, 326, 336, 359; confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92).

28. See CIA telegram, (31JAN72), in the Declassified Documents, 1985, (000832), LOC; CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Arab Threat to Iran,' Intelligence Memorandum, (21MAY66), in the Declassified Documents, 1988, (3107), LOC; *Arab Report and Record*, (1-14FEB73), pp. 54-55; S.S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan,' *Foreign Policy*, n. 32 (Fall 1978) pp. 138-139; confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92).

4. The Arabian Peninsula

SAVAK's involvement in affairs on the Arabian Peninsula stemmed from several factors. The first concern was the one which affected the entire Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s: Nasser. As there were over 20,000 Egyptians in the Arabian Peninsula, it was relatively easy for Nasser to infiltrate the Persian Gulf region with agents, many of whom posed as school teachers and doctors. The region was also subject to broadcasts by the Voice of the Iranian Nation and the Voice of the Arabs based in Cairo. The second concern was the belief that the regional instability caused by Nasserist ideology and agents could be exploited by the Communists. The third cause for concern was the threat that events in the Arabian Peninsula posed to the region's conservative monarchies. Other SAVAK operations had been mounted with these concerns in mind, and there had been several conferences of regional intelligence chiefs to discuss ways to counter these threats. There were two later overlapping reasons for an active Iranian role in the Arabian Peninsula. The first of these was the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, which was announced in 1968. The second was the Nixon Doctrine, which called for individual countries to take on a greater responsibility in their national security affairs, and under which Iran was viewed as the 'Gendarme of the Persian Gulf'.[29]

In September 1962, Imam Muhammad al-Badr of North Yemen was overthrown in a military coup, and the next month fighting between royalists and military forces broke out. In November, the United Arab Republic and the military junta signed a defence pact, and UAR aircraft bombed Saudi towns. This pattern continued into 1963 and 1964, and although the Kennedy Administration had promptly recognized the republican government, the royalists continued fighting. These events led to greater Iranian and Israeli cooperation, but they also helped in the establishment of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had to act for several reasons. Egyptian President Nasser hoped to establish his influence

---

29. Information on the Egyptian agents and on the conferences is from a telephone interview with H. Alavi-Kia, (17DEC92). Information on the radio broadcasts is from CIA, 'The Arab Threat to Iran,' and M. Copeland, *The Game of Nations*, (London, 1969), pp. 246-47. On the British withdrawal, see D. Holden, 'The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj,' *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49 (JUL71); and R.K. Ramazani, 'Iranian Foreign Policy,' *Orbis* (1975), p. 1051.

on the Arabian peninsula through a republican Yemen, so his air force undertook operations in the region and actually bombed some Saudi towns. The new Yemeni government expressed outright hostility to the Saudi government, while the Yemeni royal family made frequent requests for Saudi help, citing the 1956 Treaty of Jidda.

In 1965, Imam al-Badr visited Iran and requested help. Iran decided to help the royalist cause because of a desire to thwart Nasser and a desire to guarantee a stable and conservative Saudi Arabia. To this end, two SAVAK officials were sent to Saudi Arabia. One SAVAK official was sent to coordinate efforts with Kamal Adham, the Saudi intelligence chief, and another SAVAK official was sent to inform Imam al-Badr that supplies and trainers would arrive soon. The Israelis sent weapons they had captured from the Arab armies to Tehran, where they were repaired. Iranian C-130's would then fly the weapons and supplies to Taif, and they were then trucked to Yemen. At least twice the Israelis put Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) insignia on their aircraft and flew directly to Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia also provided arms which they had bought in Europe. Iran and Israel also trained the Imam's forces. The Israelis gave Yemeni forces arms training in Tehran. Iranian Special Forces were sent to Yemen to provide training, but they also participated in actual military operations. It was later reported by the Egyptians that the Iranians had inflicted a significant number of their 26,000 casualties. Jordanian troops also provided irregular warfare training for the royalists. A force of British mercenaries also played a part in the conflict, providing training and medical assistance, collecting intelligence (some of which was passed on to SAVAK), leading some combat operations, and carrying out some demolitions. The British were in close contact with all interested parties, and Col. David Stirling travelled to Tehran several times to brief Gen. Nassiri on events in Yemen.[30] Although the Egyptians used chemical weapons and enacted reprisals against the civilian population, they failed to subdue the royalists and were withdrawn from

---

30. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer who served in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt, (17APR92); Sobhani, *Pragmatic Entente*, p. 45. On the Jordanian contribution, see S.M. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970*, (Boulder, 1986), p. 105, 41. On the British role, see A. Hoe, *David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the S.A.S.*, (London, 1992), Ch. 20.

on the Arabian peninsula through a republican Yemen, so his air force undertook operations in the region and actually bombed some Saudi towns. The new Yemeni government expressed outright hostility to the Saudi government, while the Yemeni royal family made frequent requests for Saudi help, citing the 1956 Treaty of Jidda.

In 1965, Imam al-Badr visited Iran and requested help. Iran decided to help the royalist cause because of a desire to thwart Nasser and a desire to guarantee a stable and conservative Saudi Arabia. To this end, two SAVAK officials were sent to Saudi Arabia. One SAVAK official was sent to coordinate efforts with Kamal Adham, the Saudi intelligence chief, and another SAVAK official was sent to inform Imam al-Badr that supplies and trainers would arrive soon. The Israelis sent weapons they had captured from the Arab armies to Tehran, where they were repaired. Iranian C-130's would then fly the weapons and supplies to Taif, and they were then trucked to Yemen. At least twice the Israelis put Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) insignia on their aircraft and flew directly to Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia also provided arms which they had bought in Europe. Iran and Israel also trained the Imam's forces. The Israelis gave Yemeni forces arms training in Tehran. Iranian Special Forces were sent to Yemen to provide training, but they also participated in actual military operations. It was later reported by the Egyptians that the Iranians had inflicted a significant number of their 26,000 casualties. Jordanian troops also provided irregular warfare training for the royalists. A force of British mercenaries also played a part in the conflict, providing training and medical assistance, collecting intelligence (some of which was passed on to SAVAK), leading some combat operations, and carrying out some demolitions. The British were in close contact with all interested parties, and Col. David Stirling travelled to Tehran several times to brief Gen. Nassiri on events in Yemen.[30] Although the Egyptians used chemical weapons and enacted reprisals against the civilian population, they failed to subdue the royalists and were withdrawn from

---

30. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer who served in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt, (17APR92); Sobhani, *Pragmatic Entente*, p. 45. On the Jordanian contribution, see S.M. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970*, (Boulder, 1986), p. 105, 41. On the British role, see A. Hoe, *David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the S.A.S.*, (London, 1992), Ch. 20.

Yemen after the 1967 war with Israel. In September 1968, the Imam al-Badr returned to North Yemen to lead his forces against the republicans. In mid-1970, a peace agreement was signed which permitted royalists back into the government.

After the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Iran became involved in Oman. In addition to the anti-radical and pro-monarchic factors mentioned above, this may have been prompted by the Shah's interest in having a friendly state covering access between the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. British personnel had been fighting against guerrillas (People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, PFLOAG) in Dhofar since the mid-1960s. As is typical in many insurgencies, the guerrillas used safe-havens in a neighbouring state, in this case South Yemen. With this in mind, Stirling had tried to get the Shah to fund military operations in South Yemen.[31] The shah was willing, because members of the Iranian opposition were receiving training and material support from the leftist National Liberation Front government of South Yemen which had come to power in 1967. The Saudis funded anti-guerrilla operations in Oman. Iran provided weapons and helicopters and their crews in 1972, committed ground troops in 1973, and eventually stationed air defense systems and combat aircraft there. The Shah used Oman as a military training ground, implementing a four-month rotation policy to maximize the exposure of Iranian personnel.[32] Iranian involvement in Oman was initially directed by SAVAK, although as the military commitment increased, control shifted away from SAVAK slightly.

In 1969 Zvi Zamir, Mossad's chief, asked to be introduced to Adham, who was not-only King Faisal's brother-in-law, but also his foreign policy 'trouble-shooter'. Nassiri arranged a meeting between the two in Tehran. In November 1969, the Saudis contacted the Shah, informing him that South Yemen, with Soviet and Chinese technical assistance, now had the modern arms to threaten the Gizan airbase. The Shah reacted positively to the Saudi request for air-defense weapons, but he also tried to recruit US assistance for the

---

31. Hoe, *Stirling*, p. 384.

32. On the involvement of Iran and other countries in Oman, see F. Halliday, *Mercenaries: 'Counter insurgency' in the Gulf*, (Nottingham, 1977).

Saudis. The Saudis reciprocated by donating about $10 million to the Kurds, via Iran. The Saudi *Mukhabarat* was less generous with the intelligence reports it passed on to SAVAK. Saudi intelligence which was exchanged was almost useless, and the Iranians found it almost impossible to get information out of the closed family and tribe-based Saudi elite.[33]

In early 1973 the Shah and Nassiri met with Adham. Adham warned them of the impending Egyptian attack on Israel, but they did not inform Mossad. There are two possible reasons for this, speculates Dr Sohrab Sobhani. It is possible that the Shah informed US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, but Kissinger withheld the information, in an attempt to break the deadlock in the Middle East. Another possibility is that the Shah thought that Egypt could win back some of the land it had lost in 1967, making both it and Israel more willing to talk peace. These events are significant in showing how close the intelligence relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia became. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was excluded from this relationship, to the great irritation of the diplomats.[34]

5. Iraq

The main SAVAK activity directed against Iraq was the Kurdish operations mentioned above. There were several others, however, which are worthy of examination. The first to be discussed was a straight intelligence-gathering operation.[35] In the late-1960s or early-1970s, a SAVAK agent in the Iraqi air force informed his case officer that the Soviet Union was planning to send Sukhoi-7 (Fitter A) aircraft to Iraq. SAVAK immediately informed the Shah, who in turn informed one of his Western allies. A representative of the ally discounted the report, telling the Shah that the Soviets would never part with such sensitive weapons. As a result, the Shah berated the SAVAK officer who brought him this information and ordered him to drop the agent.

---

33. A. Alikhani, ed., in Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 385; Sobhani, *Pragmatic Entente*, p. 45; Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 104, 106, 112; confidential interviews with a SAVAK officer who served in Saudi Arabia (17APR92) and with a Department head (21FEB92).

34. Sobhani, *Pragmatic Entente*, p. 88; confidential interview with an Iranian diplomat (1MAR92).

35. Information on this operation is from a confidential interview with a Department head (3MAY92) and was confirmed by another Department head (21FEB92).

At this point control of the agent was transferred to Department II's Private Office, in direct contravention of the Shah's orders. When it was learned that the agent was going to be sent to the Soviet Union for technical training, SAVAK provided him with money for him and his family. Upon his return, SAVAK gave him a camera and asked that he photograph all available technical data relating to the Sukhoi-7's. This information was presented to the Shah, who was sufficiently pleased that he did not discipline the SAVAK personnel who had disobeyed his orders. Through this agent, an Iraqi pilot was persuaded to defect to Iran with one of these aircraft in exchange for money and his family's passage to the West. The aircraft was examined thoroughly by Iran's major allies and then returned to Iraq.

In May 1969, thousands of Iranians working in Iraq were unceremoniously repatriated by the Iraqi government as a result of the Shah's abrogation of a treaty over the boundaries of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Iranian government reacted in two ways. One way was to have SAVAK agents enter Iraq and agitate the Southern Shia against the central government. The second was seen in January 1970, when it slowly emerged that a plot against the regime had been supported by SAVAK. The plot was foiled by the Iraqi intelligence organization, which claimed that the Third Secretary of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, Davoud Taher, had established links with the conspirators. Forty-four of the conspirators were immediately executed, and the Iranian ambassador, Dr Ezzatollah Ameli, and four members of his staff were given twenty-four hours to leave Iraq. The staff of Iran's consulates in Baghdad, Basra, and Kerbala were also expelled. The Embassy's Second Secretary, Abdol Khaled Busherizadeh, claimed that he had been arrested and tortured before being questioned by Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar, who was then in exile in Baghdad.[36]

C. Miscellaneous

In addition to the operations listed above, Department II was also responsible for manning overseas SAVAK stations. All the SAVAK personnel at these stations, however, were not only from Department II. Department III and Department VIII personnel were also

---

36. Kimche, *The Last Option*, p. 195; Alam, *The Shah and I*, pp. 125-126; Mostyn, *Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and Arabian Peninsula*, p. 111.

posted at these stations. They were usually given diplomatic cover as Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel, such as political or cultural attachés, but some had cover as military attachés. In at least one case, the Ambassador was also the Chief of Station.

II. Department VII

A. Organization and Personnel

On Department VII's organization, see the chart below.


Director
Deputy
Branch 1: Military & Political Consultants
Branch 2: Communism
Branch 3: Translation
Branch 4: Open Publications
Branch 5: Exchange of Information
Sub-departments
Branch 6: Personnel Office
Areas: Middle East; South Asia; Africa; Europe & Western Hemisphere
Subjects: Kurds; Palestinians; Liberation Movements (Polisario, etc.)

B. Operations

Department VII had six major tasks:[37]

1. Department VII personnel would research and analyse information provided by Department II, the collection efforts of which were based on a list of requirements drawn up

---

37. The following information is from a confidential interview with a Department head (21FEB92). It is supplemented by L.K. Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 76-99.

by Department VII. To this end, priorities were set regarding the types of intelligence to be collected (i.e.: current, predictive, or basic intelligence).

2. Department VII would collate intelligence provided by friendly intelligence services.

3. Department VII would translate open source information and analyses into Persian and then disseminate them if appropriate. 80% of the information Department VII used came from open sources, while information from secret work supplemented this.

4. Department VII prepared daily, monthly, and quarterly bulletins on a variety of subjects and areas. These were then provided to consumers based on a standing distribution list. Current intelligence and estimates usually took priority over major research projects, which the analysts preferred.

5. Department VII was responsible for translating intelligence reports and bulletins into foreign languages so they could be shared at bilateral and multilateral intelligence conferences.

6. Department VII was responsible for staffing intelligence exchange meetings.

III. Liaison Sub-Department

Contact with other countries' intelligence services preceded SAVAK's creation. The early contacts with both the CIA and MI-6 have been discussed in previous chapters. There were also a few multilateral intelligence exchanges, such as the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), and after SAVAK's creation, Trident and the Safari Club. While the benefit of such exchanges of intelligence was recognized, it was also recognized that there was the potential for espionage and a fear of disinformation. For this reason, it was decided to create a channel for all shared information. This channel was Department VII's Exchange of Information Branch, which usually handled exchanges of intelligence, both on bilateral and multilateral bases.[38]

---

38. Confidential interviews with a member of the Liaison Sub-Department (4MAY92) and with a Department head (21FEB92).

Usually, operational matters were dealt with on a bilateral basis. On the SAVAK side, these matters were dealt with by the chief of service. The chief of SAVAK also handled one multilateral intelligence exchange, the CENTO Counter-Subversion Desk. This started out as a one-man branch, referred to as the 'CENTO Branch', and assigned to the SAVAK chief's staff in Department I. This branch slowly expanded to four people, including a typist and a chauffeur. Its nature and function had changed drastically by 1973-1974, by which time it had adopted a more operational role, handling funds for special operations, funds for allied intelligence services, and even some purchasing. After Gen. Nassiri left SAVAK, this office was removed from Department I and re-christened the Liaison Sub-Department, permitting its members to retain some of their privileges, such as a car and driver.[39]

The Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, was among the first with which SAVAK dealt. The intelligence relationship between Iran and Israel even preceded the creation of SAVAK.

A. Israel

During World War II the Jewish Agency had established contacts in Iran through the Persian Jewish community, and after the war Mossad, which at the time was concerned with the immigration of Jews to Israel, sent personnel to reinforce this group. This was, furthermore, backed up with meetings between official Iranian and Israeli representatives in Jerusalem.[40] By 1948, Iran was needed as a passage to Israel for Iraqi Jews who were facing increasing persecution. Iranian cooperation fluctuated in proportion to the pressure it faced from Iraq, but it finally gave in to Israeli demands for cooperation.

Shortly after Iran had joined the Baghdad Pact, Egypt's Nasser signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. Syria and the Soviet Union entered into an arms agreement in 1956. These Soviet advances alarmed the Shah, but the Israeli victory in Sinai in October 1956 served as a positive encouragement for the Shah to enter into strategic relations with

---

39. *Ibid.*

40. U. Bialer, 'The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy — 1948-1951,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 39, n. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 294.

Usually, operational matters were dealt with on a bilateral basis. On the SAVAK side, these matters were dealt with by the chief of service. The chief of SAVAK also handled one multilateral intelligence exchange, the CENTO Counter-Subversion Desk. This started out as a one-man branch, referred to as the 'CENTO Branch', and assigned to the SAVAK chief's staff in Department I. This branch slowly expanded to four people, including a typist and a chauffeur. Its nature and function had changed drastically by 1973-1974, by which time it had adopted a more operational role, handling funds for special operations, funds for allied intelligence services, and even some purchasing. After Gen. Nassiri left SAVAK, this office was removed from Department I and re-christened the Liaison Sub-Department, permitting its members to retain some of their privileges, such as a car and driver.[39]

The Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, was among the first with which SAVAK dealt. The intelligence relationship between Iran and Israel even preceded the creation of SAVAK.

A. Israel

During World War II the Jewish Agency had established contacts in Iran through the Persian Jewish community, and after the war Mossad, which at the time was concerned with the immigration of Jews to Israel, sent personnel to reinforce this group. This was, furthermore, backed up with meetings between official Iranian and Israeli representatives in Jerusalem.[40] By 1948, Iran was needed as a passage to Israel for Iraqi Jews who were facing increasing persecution. Iranian cooperation fluctuated in proportion to the pressure it faced from Iraq, but it finally gave in to Israeli demands for cooperation.

Shortly after Iran had joined the Baghdad Pact, Egypt's Nasser signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. Syria and the Soviet Union entered into an arms agreement in 1956. These Soviet advances alarmed the Shah, but the Israeli victory in Sinai in October 1956 served as a positive encouragement for the Shah to enter into strategic relations with

---

39. *Ibid.*

40. U. Bialer, 'The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy — 1948-1951,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 39, n. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 294.

Israel. Western leaders were also alarmed by Nasser, so they sought to surround Egypt with pro-Western states. It was recognised, however, that other regional actors would not enter into an open alliance with Israel. The Israelis saw that there were non-Arab states surrounding their immediate Arab neighbours, and even the immediate Arab neighbours had non-Arab minorities. All these groups suffered from Arab radicalism and nationalism, and the Israelis saw anyone who suffered at Arab hands as a potential ally.

These beliefs and the need for accurate intelligence led to a strategy known as the 'peripheral alliance', and the Israeli intelligence community was put in charge of it. Said alliance called for relations between Israel, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Iran, all of which were opposed to the Soviet Union and were fearful of Nasser's radicalism. '"My aim," as [Mossad chief Isser] Harel put it later, "was to build a dam against the Nasserist flood."'[41] This relationship began in the summer of 1957, only months after the formation of SAVAK.

In September 1957, Gen. Bakhtiar met with Israel's ambassador to France, Yaacov Zur, in the home of Yaacov Caroz, the Israeli embassy's political counsellor. Bakhtiar expressed concern about Nasser and suggested cooperation between Israel and Iran and an 'exchange of views on various developments in the Middle East.' Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was, undoubtedly, pleased with the chance to expand relations with another Middle Eastern state. In October a second meeting took place, this time in Rome. Bakhtiar represented Iran, while Isser Harel, Mossad's chief, represented Israel. They again discussed the subject of Nasser as a regional security threat, and again reached full agreement on that and on the Soviet threat.[42]

Then, in December 1957, Caroz was sent to Tehran to enter into practical talks on establishing a strategic relationship between Iran and Israel.[43] From that time onward, Israel and Iran exchanged intelligence on Egyptian activities in the Arab world and participated in some joint operations.[44] It is not surprising that Caroz was chosen as the Israeli represen-

---

41. I. Harel, *Bitachon VeDemocratia*, p. 409; in Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, p. 182.

42. Interview with Caroz, in S. Segev, *The Iranian Triangle*, (New York, 1988), pp. 31-32.

43. Interviews with Caroz and Harel; in *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

44. CIA, *Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services*; in *Asnad* , v. 11, p. 24.

tative in Iran. He was a Mossad officer who eventually served as Mossad's deputy chief, and the Political Action and Liaison Directorate of Mossad was, furthermore, in charge of maintaining contacts with countries, such as Iran, with which Israel did not have normal diplomatic relations.[45]

Trident

In 1957 and 1958, a number of the Middle East's conservative and pro-Western governments were sufficiently concerned by the threat posed by Pres. Nasser to have meetings to discuss intelligence and security issues. Representatives from the intelligence services of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon participated in this intelligence exchange.[46] After the Iraqi coup in 1958 and the new union between Egypt and Syria (Union of Arab Republics, UAR), the Shah and the Israelis became more concerned for regional stability. Yet another cause for alarm was the failure of Lebanese Pres. Chamoun's attempt to get re-elected and his subsequent replacement by the apparently pro-Nasser Gen. Fuad Shihab. Bakhtiar hand-carried a letter from Ben-Gurion to the Shah, in which Ben-Gurion called for an increase in cooperation between their two countries.[47] In late-1958, a formal relationship between Mossad and SAVAK was established.[48] Since it included a third organisation, Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS), it was named 'Trident'. Trident called for a continuing intelligence exchange plus semi-annual meetings at the chief-of-service level. Mossad and SAVAK first engaged in joint operations in the late-1950s. In addition to helping SAVAK with operations involving Yemeni royalists, Lebanese President Chamoun, and the Iraqi Kurds, the Israelis also provided information on Iraqi, Egyptian, and Communist activities affecting Iran.[49]

B. CENTO Counter-Subversion Desk

The Baghdad Pact was created not just as a military alliance, but also as a way of exchanging information on the threats faced by its members (Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, England,

---

45. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
46. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego).
47. Segev, *The Iranian Triangle*, p. 32.
48. CIA, *Israel;* in *Asnad*, v. 11, p. 24.
49. Confidential report, 'Minority Groups,' (MAY72); in *Asnad*, v. 8, p. 38. CIA, *Israel;* in *Asnad*, v. 11, p. 24.

Turkey). The organization's importance seemed greater after the July 1958 coup in Iraq. Iraq left the Pact, which was subsequently renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The vehicle for the exchange of intelligence at CENTO was the Counter-Subversion Desk. Although its primary concern was Communism, another major concern was Egypt's Pres. Nasser. This continued to be the case until the oil boom of the 1970s, when terrorism went from being almost non-existent to being a tremendous concern. The Counter-Subversion Desk was also responsible for some operational activities, such as the financing of demonstrations and support of Tibetan dissidents.[50]

C. France and the Safari Club

SAVAK's relations with France's SDECE (*Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage*) could be traced to Col. Maudry, who was stationed in Iran in the early-1960s. There were several issues of common interest, and the relationship developed. Among the issues of concern to moderate, pro-Western states after the oil boom of the 1970s was terrorism. Count Alexandre de Marenches, director general of the French intelligence service, was sufficiently concerned by the disruptive potential of the terrorist threat that he met with representatives of several friendly Middle Eastern and North African countries to discuss the issue. The outcome of these meetings was another multilateral intelligence group called the Safari Club, which was referred to as the Pentagonal Group (because it had five members: Iran, France, Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) by the Iranians. [51]

De Marenches' first meetings were with the Shah, Pres. Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and the kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco. At all of these meetings, de Marenches would later claim, he was not acting on behalf of the French Republic, although the president was aware of his actions, but as a private individual.[52] Although this may have been the case

---

50. Confidential interviews with an individual assigned to the Counter-Subversion Desk in the early-1960s (4MAY92), and with a military officer assigned to CENTO for three years in the late-1960s (15APR92). On CIA support to and training of the Tibetans, see D. Wise, *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power*, (New York, 1973, pp. 163-77; *Washington Post*, (14NOV71), p. B3.

51. Count A. de Marenches and D.A. Andelman, *The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism*, (New York, 1992), p. 158.

52. De Marenches & Andelman, *The Fourth World War*, p. 159.

officially, the Club's members still believed that the French were full participants. When de Marenches met with the Middle Eastern chiefs of state, he successfully encouraged fears of Communist subversion in Africa, while he also played on the terrorist threat.

> Recent events in Angola and other parts of Africa have demonstrated the continent's role as a theatre for revolutionary wars prompted and conducted by the Soviet Union, which utilizes individuals or organizations sympathetic to, or controlled by, Marxist ideology.[53]

The monarchies, in particular, took the bait, signing the founding agreement on 1 September 1976. As a result of de Marenches' salesmanship, Iran and Saudi Arabia paid most of the money for this pact, while the French only provided some secure communications equipment.[54]

It was originally proposed that the Safari Club's meetings take place at its operational centre in Cairo, but this was changed and meetings took place in the capitals of member countries on a rotating basis. Each country was represented by the chief of its intelligence service or its national security adviser. Those attending included, therefore, Gen. Nassiri from SAVAK, Prince Turki Bin Abdol Aziz of Saudi intelligence, and Ahmed Dlimi of Morocco's General Directorate and Documentation. The Club prepared intelligence reports on and forecasts of African affairs. There were to be 14 stations in African countries which would serve as bases for covert operations.[55]

Among these operations was the successful persuasion, in 1977, of Somalia's Siad Barré to expel the Soviets. The Shah had offered the Somali leader substantial financial aid to replace that which had been provided by the Soviets. The Shah also prepared the Iranian military to airlift arms to Somalia if the Soviets caused problems for Siad Barré or if Ethiopia gained the upper-hand against Somalia. The Egyptians offered to provide spare parts from their stocks of Soviet equipment, while the Saudis offered to pay for them. In Autumn 1977, as a result of the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, the Soviets termi-

---

53. A SAVAK document, as quoted in M.H. Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollahs: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini*, (London, 1981), p. 113. While this book is generally unreliable, several interviewees confirmed its accuracy regarding the Safari Club.

54. Confidential interviews with a member of the Liaison Sub-Department (4MAY92) and with a Department head (21FEB92).

55. Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, p. 89; Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollahs*, p. 114.

nated support of Somalia. At the same time, the Soviets airlifted arms to Ethiopia, while 17,000 Cuban troops were sent to participate in operations in the Ogaden. The Iranian offer to provide emergency military aid to Somalia fell through, however, after the US government refused to replace any equipment given to Somalia by Iran.[56]

The Club also played a part in the suppression of the Katanga uprising in Zaire in 1977. The *Front de Liberation Nationale Congolaise* (FNLC), which had been trained by Cubans in Angola, staged a revolt in Katanga. In what seems like a masterpiece of cooperation, the Saudis paid for 1,500 Moroccan soldiers to be transported by France to help bolster the ineffectual Zairean military. A year later another uprising took place, necessitating the dispatch of paratroopers from both France and Belgium.[57]

Anwar Sadat's November 1977 visit to Jerusalem was also the result of a Safari Club operation. Ahmed Dlimi delivered Israeli Premier Yitzak Rabin's letter proposing a meeting to Sadat. It was in Morocco, furthermore, that Moshe Dayan met with Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister. The chief of Saudi intelligence, allegedly, was dismissed from his job because he did not inform the country's rulers about these events, and they did not appreciate the surprise. The Safari Club supported Morocco in its struggle against the Polisario Front, which was operating with Libyan and Algerian assistance, and the Club also tried to counter other operations backed by Khaddafi. Libya was the target of psychological warfare and guerrilla operations based in Egypt.[58]

Interestingly, the actions of de Marenches led to complaints by his subordinates. In 1979, several SDECE analysts stated that in the Middle East and North Africa their organization was only in contact with conservative governments. As a result of such relations, they claimed, the SDECE was open to manipulation by these countries.[59] At the same time, however, it should be noted that Commander Alain de Beaupuy, a French intelligence officer with cover as Assistant Military Attaché, was the only member of the Diplomatic

---

56. Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, p. 93.

57. P. Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, 5th ed., (London, 1989), pp. 388-389.

58. R. Faligot and P. Krop, *La Piscine: The French Secret Service Since 1944*, (Oxford, 1989), p. 257; Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollahs*, p. 116.

59. J. Isnard, 'Des Agents du SDECE contestent l'orientation donnée à leurs activités en Afrique,' *Le Monde*, (26OCT79).

Corps in Iran to correctly predict the course of the revolution and that the Shah would not survive through the Spring of 1979.[60]

60. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, (15SEP78); in *Asnad*, v. 63, pp. 10-11.

CH. 7. DOMESTIC SAVAK

During Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar's 1956 visit to the US, he was advised on the creation of an intelligence organization. Among the advice he received was the suggestion that there be a clear distinction between the domestic security and the foreign intelligence apparatus, so there would be two different agencies, akin to the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This advice was relayed to the Shah, but he opted to have his organization perform both functions. Precisely why he did this is not clear. Perhaps he believed that all domestic problems were linked to foreign provocateurs. Perhaps the Shah regarded the nationalists as Communists, and he associated Communists, in turn, with the Soviet Union. Perhaps he wanted to avoid the creation of too many agencies, since the reason for the creation of SAVAK was the desire to create a centralized organization, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic battles for scarce resources.

The domestic security apparatus came to define nearly all the activities of SAVAK, both in the public eye and in reality. Its activities, furthermore, earned the organization a reputation for brutality and repression and associated Iran with gross violations of human rights. SAVAK's domestic security apparatus encompassed Department III, the provincial SAVAK offices, and Department VIII (Counter-espionage / Counter-intelligence).

I. Department III

Securing information on Department III was very difficult for a number of reasons. What open source information that does exist was either of the variety that blamed everything on SAVAK in a scatter-gun fashion, or it was relatively cursory. Very few of these works differentiated between SAVAK and other Iranian security organizations, let alone between Department III and other Departments. In this aspect, furthermore, interviews were not very productive. Department III employees are, for the most part, in fear for their lives, and they want to avoid the limelight as much as possible. The author's efforts to contact Department III employees were not very successful. The Oral History collections were not very fruitful, either; what information they contained was usually from the victims of SAVAK activities. Reliance on such sources can give a one-sided picture. In order to

avoid this trap, the section on Department III is much shorter than the sections on the other operational Departments.

A. Organization, Budget, and Personnel

The organizational structure of Department III underwent several changes over the years. When SAVAK was created, there was only a domestic security branch, the main concern of which was apprehending the opposition to the Shah. Until 1963, Counter-espionage / Counter-intelligence duties were part of this Department's responsibilities. As the organization grew and assumed new responsibilities, Department III became more complex.

By the early-1970s, Department III had four sections. Section 1 (operations and investigations) covered the Tudeh, the National Front, students and other Iranians abroad, the Arab and tribal minorities, and the *ulama*. Section 2 had similar responsibilities, but they were assigned differently: it dealt with the press, the tribes, workers and farmers, the official political parties, universities and schools, the Majlis and the different ministries, and had a branch charged with 'eliminating the peoples' discontent.' Section 3 handled archives and records. Section 4 handled enforcement; censorship (a job it later shared with the Ministry of Information); indoctrination and training; and special operations and judicial matters, including interrogation. Department III had branches for translation, finance, and military matters, and an independent judicial branch. Many Iranian prisons were under Department III, with the exception of Evin prison, which was under Department VIII. Provincial SAVAK offices were also part of Department III.[1]

As was indicated in previous chapters, the SAVAK budget was virtually unlimited. This led to problems of corruption in Department III. It became relatively easy for personnel to send in false reports and create fake networks, thus collecting their money. In fact, Asghar Zamani (head of the Tudeh section), was reported by his deputy, Ehsanollah Shahbazi, for this. Nor was this the only form of corruption. Department III personnel would get involved in shady business deals, using people's fear of SAVAK to force people to

---

1. National Front of Iran, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation (SAVAK),' (unpublished manuscript, MAY71), pp. 6-10.

do things they were reluctant to do. They also used the power to approve or disapprove applications for employment by selling the approval to the applicant.

People who complained about these practices or who refused to cooperate (by spying on others, for example) were brought in for questioning and threatened in numerous ways. One threat was the use of a dossier of falsified personal information, called *parvandeh sazi*. Such corruption did not seem to concern the Iranians very much, so Department III's foreign advisers decided that corruption should not be judged by Western standards and ignored the problem.[2] When public office becomes a means to wealth, however, the main object of the job becomes the promotion of private interests rather than public interests.[3] A joke making the rounds during the revolutionary period summarised the problem:

> During the revolution, a former director of SAVAK met with the current director:
> 'General,' he asked, 'what is going on in the country?'
> 'General,' SAVAK's director replied, 'I do not know.'
> 'But General, how could that be the case? What have you and the other generals been doing during all these years?'
> 'General,' the director replied, 'we have been doing real estate.'[4]

Such corruption led to a low level of political institutionalization, since the political organs that should have been the most independent were actually the most susceptible to outside influences.[5] 'Corruption naturally tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy.'[6]

Less than 10% of SAVAK's employees were in Department III. Based on the figure of 3,000-3,500 employees for all of SAVAK, this would indicate that approximately 300-350 individuals worked in Department III.[7] (For other estimates of personnel figures, see Ch. 3). It was also estimated that SAVAK had 3 million informers.[8] Such a figure seems highly exaggerated, especially in comparison to the figure of less than 1000 (in Iran) and

---

2. Confidential interviews with two retired CIA officers (11APR92 and 11SEP92).
3. S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London, 1968), p. 67.
4. M. Zonis, *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah*, (Chicago, 1991), p. 90.
5. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 67.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
7. E.R. Oney, '"The Eyes and Ears of the Shah",' *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 1, n. 4. These figures are corroborated in National Front, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation (SAVAK),' p. 6.
8. *Newsweek* (14OCT74), pp. 27-31.

about 1,500-1,700 (in Europe) given by a former SAVAK officer.[9] Such exaggerations are indicative of people's concerns about SAVAK. People were afraid to voice dissent, thinking that a listener might be a SAVAK agent whose job it was to provoke others into being critical. The constant fear of *agents provacateur* and the 'ubiquitous terror' made people so paranoid that they could not believe anybody was 'honest, pure, or courageous'.[10] When the National Front's Ahmad Razavi publicly demanded the end of monarchy in Iran, it was suspected that he was either crazy or controlled by SAVAK.[11]

B. Operations

1. Communists

The first priority of SAVAK's domestic security apparatus was to stop any Communist advances in Iran. Anti-communism came to take on an ideological nature for Department III. While this single-minded pursuit of Communists succeeded in effectively eliminating the Tudeh, it also had the effect of blinding security personnel to the other problems of the country. This may have been done as a frightened reaction to the extent of the Tudeh military network, but it could also have been due to the training given to SAVAK by the US and UK, since this training was anti-Soviet and anti-Communist in nature.

The Iranian government pursued an aggressive campaign against the Tudeh during the 1950s, managing to infiltrate what remained of it with SAVAK agents. Both the CIA and MI-6 also had agents at the highest levels of the Tudeh.[12] Soviet support of the Tudeh fluctuated as the Shah became friendlier with the Soviet government in the latter-half of the 1950s, but it became apparent that he had only done this to pressure the US into greater support for Iran. After the signing of the March 1959 US-Iran Bilateral Agreement, Soviet

---

9. Interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83; Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

10. R. Kapuscinski, *Shah of Shahs*, (London, 1982, 1985), p. 45.

11. 'The Strange Case of Ahmad RAZAVI,' State Department Airgram A-280, 788.00/7MAY62, (FOIA), p. 2.

12. The Reminiscences of Col. Gratian Yatsevich, (5NOV88, Camden, ME & 12JAN89, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

use of hostile propaganda and support of the Tudeh was renewed. There were even rumours of Soviet threats to occupy Azerbaijan.[13]

What remained of the Tudeh leadership fled to Iraq or Eastern Europe. SAVAK ensured that the press knew that Iranian Tudeh members attended Communist Party congresses in the Soviet Union, underlining the foreign connection in order to dissuade Iranians from joining. When demonstrations occurred, the Tudeh was accused of inciting them, and Communists were linked with an attempt on the Shah. SAVAK's aggressive pursuit of the Tudeh, its use of propaganda, and splits within the party succeeded in reducing the Tudeh to almost a standstill.[14]

2. Nationalists

Although the Communists were effectively out of the political scene by 1960, the Nationalists continued as a threat to the Shah's rule. The concern that the Nationalists would turn to the Soviets for help was kept alive by SAVAK publicity that linked the Nationalists with the Tudeh.[15] The possibility of such an occurrence seemed increasingly likely, as the more radical Nationalists gained influence over the moderates, in reaction to SAVAK penetration of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). SAVAK's use of torture

---

13. 'Text of Approved Bilateral Bill in Parliament,' Foreign Service Despatch 651, 788.5/11MAR59, RG-59, Box 3819; and State Department telegram 1763, 788.5/11MAR59, *ibid*. Memo for the President, 'Soviet Threats to Iran,' 23FEB59, in the Declassified Documents, 1979 (310A), LOC; State Department telegram 1621, 24FEB59, in *ibid.* (310B); and State Department telegram 1624, in *ibid.* (310C).

14. 'The 22nd CPSU Congress and the Tudeh Party of Iran,' Foreign Service Despatch 270, 788.00/30NOV61, (FOIA). 'Memorandum of Conversation with General Hassan PAKRAVAN,' Foreign Service Despatch 454, 788.00/23FEB61, (FOIA). 'Semi-Annual Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Airgram A-105, 17AUG65, (FOIA), p. 4. 'Report on the Nationalist Opposition,' Foreign Service Despatch 283, 788.00/11DEC61, (FOIA), p. 8-9. 'Changes in the Tudeh Party Propaganda Line, State Department Airgram A-177, 14SEP65, (FOIA). 'The Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party in 1966,' State Department Airgram A-357, 31DEC66, (FOIA). 'Tudeh Party: Continued Harassment of the Tudeh party and Efforts to Link Other Opposition Elements with the Communists,' State Department Airgram A-636, 24MAY67, (FOIA). State Department Director of Intelligence and Research, 'Chinese and Soviet Factions in Iran's Communist Party,' Research Memorandum, 8NOV67, (FOIA). 'The Disintegrated State of the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) Opposition in 1969,' State Department Airgram A-180, 17APR69, (FOIA).

15. The Reminiscences of Col. Gratian Yatsevich, (5NOV88, Camden, ME & 12JAN89, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS; 'Developments in Connection with the Arrest of Pro-Mosadeq Elements,' Foreign Service Despatch 540, 788.00/23DEC57, (FOIA).

on those it apprehended was another factor which favoured the radicals, as moderates either quit or decided to take a more aggressive route.[16]

In July 1960, the second National Front was announced with Allahyar Saleh filling the existing Nationalist leadership vacuum.[17] There continued to be, however, splits over preferred policies. The Nationalists boycotted the summer 1960 elections, and when the rigging was more blatant than was acceptable, the Shah cancelled them. After that, *chaqu keshan* employed by SAVAK broke up several of the Nationalists' meetings.[18] Nationalist leaders were associated with disturbances which occurred before and after Majlis elections in February 1961; they had spoken at several large rallies, and fiery speakers, such as Mozaffar Baqai of the Guardians of Freedom, managed to get the crowds agitated. Participation in these disturbances also was ascribed to rising economic expectations, student naivete, and Tudeh rabble-rousing.[19] Despite these factors, Saleh was elected as Kashan's representative.

In May 1961 the National Front held a meeting which attracted 80,000 people. It then scheduled a meeting for 21 July 1961 in order to celebrate Musaddiq's 1952 return to power (*30 Tir*). The meeting went ahead despite promises to Gen. Hassan Pakravan, and riots occurred.[20] A year later, students led by the National Front's Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr participated in street battles with police and paratroopers.[21] After the events of 5 June 1963 (see below), the Nationalists factionalised further. Some, such as the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), went abroad to prepare for armed struggle (see chapters 8 and 9).

---

16. 'Arrests of Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 314, 788.00/24SEP57, (FOIA); 'Further Arrests of Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 328, 788.00/30SEP57, (FOIA); 'Further Developments in Recent Arrests of Nationalists,' Foreign Service Despatch 402, 788.00/24OCT57, (FOIA).

17. H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini*, (London, 1990), p. 144.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

19. 'Opposition Activities and Resulting Disturbances in Tehran,' Foreign Service Despatch 433, 788.00/22FEB61, (FOIA). 'Memorandum of Conversation with General Hassan PAKRAVAN,' Foreign Service Despatch 454, 788.00/23FEB61, (FOIA).

20. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 164. 'General Pakravan's Attitude Toward the Amini Government,' Foreign Service Despatch 68, 788.00/31JUL61, (FOIA).

21. 'Political Disturbances in Tehran January 21-January 25,' Foreign Service Despatch 358, 788.00/3FEB62, (FOIA).

3. Students and Academic Institutions

Iranian students were considered a danger to the regime, since they represented the largest unified dissatisfied groups. Both university and college students had been involved in the disturbances of January-February 1961, January 1962, June 1963, and March 1968. While some students were arrested, the government also dealt with them by closing the universities. There could be several SAVAK informers in each university class. SAVAK could approve or disapprove specific textbooks and courses. The credentials of university lecturers had to be approved by SAVAK, and their contracts forbade the discussion of politics in the classes. These tactics eventually led to a degree of self-censorship by university administrators.[22] Some administrators, such as the Chancellor of Pahlavi University and then Tehran University, Hushang Nahavandi, did not just cooperate with SAVAK, but they actually came to rely on it to maintain order on the campus.[23] To facilitate SAVAK's role in campus life, there was usually an individual there who acted as the official link, outside of the alleged network of agents.[24] Even students in Iranian high schools were viewed as a potential danger, particularly after the demonstrations of January 1960.[25] In addition to the above tactics, the government started a Youth Guidance Office, run by Department III agent Nasser Khodayar, and built youth centres which were staffed by SAVAK.[26]

An increasing number of Iranian students were going abroad for university education. SAVAK concern that the students might get recruited by the Tudeh members who had fled to Europe after the collapse of the party in Iran resulted in the assignment of SAVAK per-

---

22. 'Resume of Student Disorders January 24,' State Department Airgram A-5, 788.00/26JAN62, (FOIA). 'Political Disturbances in Tehran January 21-January 25,' Foreign Service Despatch 358, 788.00/3FEB62, (FOIA). 'The Public Attack on Former Prime Minister Ali Amini,' State Department Airgram A-465, 2MAR68, (FOIA), p. 3. On SAVAK tactics, see R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (London, 1978, 1979), p. 147.

23. 'The Reputation of Dr. Hushang NAHAVANDI, Chancellor of Tehran University, among Shirazis,' CIA Memorandum, 10JAN72; in *Asnad*, v. 68, p. 105.

24. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 3AUG79; in *Asnad*, v. 68, p. 111.

25. 'The Student Demonstration of January 11, 1960,' Foreign Service Despatch 578, 12MAR60, (FOIA).

26. 'The Iranian Intellectual Community: Structure, Patterns, Problems, and Recommendations for US Actions,' State Department Airgram, (21DEC63); in *Asnad*, v. 20, pp. 2-26; J.A. Bill, 'The Politics of Student Alienation: The Case of Iran,' *Iranian Studies*, v. 2 (1969), p. 17.

sonnel to West Germany (actually, a Military Attaché who was already there was informed that he just had been made the SAVAK Chief of Station) and then other countries.[27] Originally, Department II had this responsibility, but as student opposition increased this responsibility was turned over to Department III. One way Department III dealt with students was to hold the passports of troublesome ones, such as those who had joined the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS) or the Islamic Student Association, denying them the ability to travel. All this tactic really accomplished was further irritation of the students. Reports to Tehran which stated that it is normal and safe for young people to question authority and explore were routinely ignored. Students groups were infiltrated by SAVAK agents. Department III also tried to coerce Nationalist figures into persuading the students abroad to terminate contacts with Arabs and Communists. The next step was an attempt to persuade them to 'make public confessions of guilt and express contrition,' then tell about their past activities and associates.[28]

Department III also exerted control in academic employment. Reza Baraheni, who had gotten his doctorate in 1960, did not get a job until 1964. Even then he felt constant job insecurity, due to the use of positive and negative reinforcement with jobs and benefits, as well as imprisonment and torture. Meanwhile, he had been made a full professor in the US and had had many visiting professorships. SAVAK then tried to discredit him by claiming he was an agent. Similar incidents occurred with Jalal al-e Ahmad.[29] Ali Shariati had also

---

27. Information on the COS-Germany is from an interview with H. Alavi-Kia (2MAY92, San Diego). The danger of Tudeh ideology to Iranian students in Europe is discussed in 'An Assessment of the Internal Political Situation,' Foreign Service Despatch 698, 788.00/3MAY60, p. 7, (FOIA). Opposition tactics in recruiting students were described in an interview with J. Moinzadeh, (6FEB92, London), who was COS-England. On an unsuccessful SAVAK attempt to recruit an agent with access to information on the CIS, see *The Sunday Times*, (12MAY74), p. 17.

28. On the holding of passports, see interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83; Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP. On agents and persuasion, see G.F. Rose, 'The Shah's Secret Police Are Here,' *New York*, (18SEP78). Department III chief Nasser Moghaddam tried to persuade the Nationalist M.A. Keshavarz-Sadr in July 1964; see *Asnad*, v. 22, pp. 17-18. On the public confessions, see P. Radji, *In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah's Last Ambassador to London*, (London, 1983), p. 18. Many students did not think that opposition activities would harm their career prospects when they returned to Iran; see G.B. Baldwin, 'The Foreign-Educated Iranian: A Profile,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 17, n. 2 (Summer 1963), p. 265.

29. Interview with R. Baraheni, (10MAR92, Cambridge).

secured a doctorate in France, but on his return to Iran in 1964 he was arrested, due to his extensive writing for opposition publications. After his release, he could only secure jobs teaching at high schools and at the College of Agriculture.[30]

4. Tribes and Minorities

As was seen in Chapter 1, by 1959-1960 most of the tribes were no longer a political threat. There were occasional tribal uprisings, such as the one in Fars in Spring 1963. Their interaction with government officials was usually confined to tax collectors and gendarmes. They interacted with SAVAK personnel during the elections, which the tribesmen knew to be rigged when they were informed who the winners would be beforehand. Through such tactics, whatever confidence the tribes may have had in the political system was lost.[31] Other SAVAK tactics had similar effects: SAVAK personnel often made unannounced visits on tribal elders and demanded hospitality and bribes, and their attempts to recruit agents bred an atmosphere of mistrust.[32]

Arabs in Khuzestan were also a concern, particularly during the era of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabist claims on 'Arabistan', but even into the 1970s. Arab leaders were occasionally rounded up for questioning, and arms were routinely confiscated. In Baluchistan, the government used extensive surveillance, bought off the tribal chieftains by allowing them to make money through smuggling, and prevented use of the Baluchi language and dress in schools. SAVAK made use of Baluchi elements as deniable assets in cross-border operations.[33]

5. Clergy

The regime had reached a *modus vivendi* with the Islamic clergy (*ulama*) in the period after Musaddiq's ouster. As this involved cooptation of a number of influential clerics, nei-

---

30. G.A.Tavassoli, 'Introduction', in A. Shariati, *On The Sociology of Islam*, (Berkeley, 1979), p. 26.

31. 'Political Conversations Among the Bakhtiaris,' Foreign Service Despatch 218, 788.00/28OCT61, (FOIA).

32. L. Beck, *The Qashqai of Iran*, (London, 1986), pp. 257-259.

33. S.S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan,' *Foreign Policy*, n. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 155-156. A. Alam, (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), p. 310, 316.

ther SAVAK nor the CIA thought of them as a possible source of trouble.[34] After the death of the *Marja al-Taqlid*, Aya. Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi, in March 1961, the *ulama* policy of tacit cooperation faded. It was recognized that certain religious leaders and other conservatives were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Shah, but they had been discounted, not only because 'their power (was) in rural areas, religious cities such as Qum, and among the more ignorant elements in the provincial urban centers [*sic*],' but also because they lacked good leadership and feared the Nationalists.[35]

Their main cause of dissatisfaction was the Land Reform program, which threatened a major source of the clergy's social power and, to a lesser degree, income. (For more detail on Land Reform, see Chapter 1). Land Reform was a fairly popular program, but the Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Arsanjani, was moving too fast and was using its success as a base for his own ambitions. To slow down and supervise Arsanjani when he went too fast or too far, and also to make sure that the program did not meet with unacceptable opposition, SAVAK's Abdol Azim Valiyan was assigned to the ministry's inspectorate. Gen. Esmail Riahi became Minister of Agriculture in March 1963, Arsanjani became Ambassador to Italy, and Valiyan was put in charge of the Land Reform Organization.

There was also concern over the Shah's indications of support for Aya. Mohsen al-Hakim to replace Aya. Borujerdi, which would have caused Shia leadership to leave Iran for Iraq. Other complaints were about women's enfranchisement, the apparent increase in toleration of the Bahais by the government, and the January 1963 White Revolution, which codified women's suffrage, a Literacy Corps, aspects of Land Reform, and workers' rights. The Shah added fuel to the fire by going to Qum and Mashad and referring to the clerics as parasites who were not as qualified as he was to interpret Islam. The ulama reacted by distributing leaflets attacking the Shah, the regime, and the reform program, and

---

34. Confidential interviews with two retired CIA officers (16APR92 and 11SEP92).

35. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 'Internal Political Situation in Iran,' 11FEB61, (FOIA), p. 2.

by preaching anti-government sermons. The National Front echoed these statements. Troops were sent to Qum in a show of force.[36]

Concern and dissatisfaction with government policies erupted into violence during Muharram and after *ashura* ceremonies on 5 June 1963 (*15 Khordad*).[37] After Aya. Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini had preached a fiery sermon attacking the Shah, the police were forced to arrest him and several other clergymen.[38] Already in an emotional state, the public reacted with riots which were suppressed with great loss of life. The use of force came about after Prime Minister Assadollah Alam persuaded the Shah that there was no other option, and the commanders in the field were Generals Gholam Ali Oveissi (Tehran's Military Governor) and Nematollah Nassiri (Chief of Police). The chief of Department III, Gen. Mostafa Amjadi, was fired for his failure to foresee the events. SAVAK's chief tried to blame the landlords, Gen. Bakhtiar, and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Aya.'s Khomeini, Qumi, and Mahallati were placed on house arrest in August, possibly after reaching an understanding with the government.[39]

After the elections of September, SAVAK got information that the *Fada'iyan Islam* were being revived and re-armed, although little came of this. (See Chapter 1 for more on the Fada'iyan). Khomeini was released in April 1964. He then preached against the un-

---

36. Information in this paragraph is from: 'Some Comments on Recent Religious Agitation in Iran,' Department of State Airgram A-404, 788.00/29DEC62, (FOIA); 'Year-End Report on the Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Airgram A-361, 31DEC63, (FOIA), pp. 3-6; confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer (11APR92). On the White Revolution, see R.K. Ramazani, 'Iran's "White Revolution": A Study in Political Development,' *IJMES* 5 (1974).

37. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic calendar, and the first ten days of the month are dedicated to the memory of Imam Hussein. For the Shia, Ashura is the anniversary of the martyrdom of Hussein at the hands of the Caliph Yazid on the plains of Kerbala. During the days before Ashura, passion plays depicting the incident take place, and on the day itself, some Shia express their guilt at having abandoned the Imams when they were in need by inflicting wounds on themselves.

38. For the text of this speech, see Aya. R.M. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* , (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 177-180.

39. On the riots and the clerics, see 'Politico-Economic Assessment: Iran: March-September, 1963,' State Department Airgram A-231, 8OCT63, (FOIA), p. 1; and 'Year-End Report on the Political Situation in Iran,' Department of State Airgram A-361, 31DEC63, p. 7, (FOIA). On the suggestion that Nasser was behind the unrest, see *New York Times*, (6JUN63), p. 1, and *The Times*, (6JUN63), p. 12. In private meetings, Pakravan was not so sanguine about the foreign connections, although Cairo did issue statements supporting the rioters; confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer (11APR92).

popular Status of Forces Agreement which gave US forces immunity from Iranian law. In November, Khomeini was arrested and exiled to Turkey on the Shah's orders, although Pakravan recommended internal exile and Police chief Nematollah Nassiri recommended executive action. A year later, Khomeini went to Najaf. At this point, the SAVAK Chief of Station (COS) in Baghdad was warned twice by representatives of the Najaf clergy that Khomeini should be kept in Iran or he would cause trouble. The COS reported this information to Department III, which told him to, basically, mind his own business! Khomeini continued his criticism of the Shah, at times with Iraq's active support, until the day he left the country.[40]

Most of Iran's Shia clergy stayed quiet until the 1970s, when government policies intended to curb their power went too far. Religiously-linked unrest, however, did occur during this period. In January 1965 Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur was assassinated by Mohammad Bokharii, a member of a religious group called *Maktab*.[41] Four members of Maktab were executed for this crime in June. Maktab was traced to the Islamic Nation's Party (*Hizb-i Millal-i Islami*). In the autumn, the government arrested fifty-five members of the Party. In March 1966 all fifty-five were found guilty of 'plotting an armed uprising against the state.'[42] (On the ulama during the 1970s, see Ch. 9).

6. The Press, Censorship, and Black Propaganda

SAVAK prevented Tehran newspapers from printing opposition statements, or if they did, it only permitted modified statements to appear. Domestic news which discussed economic, political, or social problems was censored. Eventually, the major newspapers, *Ettela'at* and *Keyhan*, concentrated on foreign news, since they had little room to comment

---

40. Information on the Fada'iyan is from a confidential interview with a now-retired CIA officer (11APR92). On Khomeini's exile, see interview with Col. I. Pejman, (4MAR83 Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

41. *New York Times*, (24JAN65), p. 3.

42. *The Times*, (21JAN66), p. 11; (7FEB66), p. 8; (7MAR66), p. 10. Several members of the Islamic Nation's Party rose to later prominence. Among them are Abbas Zamani (Abu Sharif), commander of the Revolutionary Guards and then Ambassador to Pakistan, and Abbas Duzduzani, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards for a brief period; see K. Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard*, (Oxford, 1993), p. 31.

on domestic affairs.[43] SAVAK funded a number of publications as vehicles for pro-Shah propaganda. It was believed that *Elm va Zendegi*, published by Khalil Maleki of the *Niru-yi Sevvom* (Third Force), was one such magazine; true or false, this belief discredited him completely.[44] It became a common tactic to allow the occasional publication of critical works, or modified versions thereof, making it seem that the authors had actually cooperated with the regime.[45] SAVAK also critiqued movies, so the security forces were usually portrayed as good people opposing evil, righting wrongs, and bringing justice.[46]

7. Majlis and Ministries

Department III, in conjunction with Departments IV and IX, had the power to approve or disapprove potential employees for governmental or non-governmental jobs. It could approve or disapprove exit visa applications for government employees (or anybody else) who had to travel on official business. Department III had a voice in labour policy, via the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior. It practiced censorship through the Ministry of Information and Culture. The personnel who operated the telex machinery for the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications also received approval from SAVAK. Because of Department III's role, civil servants were usually unwilling to risk taking individual initiatives. Such tactics extended to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both in Iran and in the embassies, whose personnel cooperated for 3 reasons: (1) money, (2) the belief that cooperation would advance their careers, and (3) fear of SAVAK. Department III's interference, therefore, slowed down the administrative, bureaucratic, and diplomatic processes.[47]

---

43. 'The Strange Case of Ahmad RAZAVI,' p. 2. G.H. Razi, 'The Press and Political Institutions of Iran: A Content Analysis of *Ettela'at* and *Keyhan*,' *Middle East Journal* v. 22, n. 4 (Autumn 1968), p. 464, 474. P.W. Avery, 'Printing, The Press, and Modern Literature in Modern Iran,' *The Cambridge History of Iran*, v. 7, (Cambridge, 1991), p. 860.

44. 'Aspects of the Shah's Reform Program,' Foreign Service Despatch 302, 788.00/28OCT58, (FOIA). 'Iranian Government Critics and Opposition Leaders and the Status of the Latter,' Foreign Service Despatch 486, 788.00/8FEB60, (FOIA), p. 10.

45. Some of the works of dissident poet and playwright R. Baraheni, such as *God's Shadow*, (Bloomington, 1976), and *The Crowned Cannibals* (New York, 1977), are among those whose appearance was connected with attempts to discredit him.

46. H. Naficy, 'Cinema as a Political Instrument,' in M.E. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds., *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*, (Albany, 1981), p. 351.

47. Confidential interview with an MFA diplomat (1MAR93); Graham, *Iran*, p. 147.

8. Official Political Parties

Department III played a part in the few political parties that were allowed to exist. Its support for and use of Mohsen Pezeshkpour's branch of the Pan-Iranist Party is discussed in Chapter 2. The Progressive Centre (*Kanun Moterreqi*), which eventually became the New Iran Party, hoped to escape association with SAVAK, but in fact SAVAK screened prospective members and helped in recruitment.[48] Quite a few people with Tudeh and National Front affiliations were able to join the New Iran Party because of the close relationship between Department III chief Parviz Sabeti and Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida.[49] Department III had performed similar functions for the Mardom and Melliyun parties, and eventually the Rastakhiz Party.

9. 'Eliminating the peoples' discontent'

Department III had to learn if and why people were dissatisfied, and it had to foresee which government policies would cause problems. Also, it had to find out if certain government officials were causing problems. The Prime Minister was to be informed so he could take corrective measures. Also, if a person joined, for example, the Tudeh, Department III personnel were to learn why he or she had done so, and why he or she was not happy with the *status quo*. SAVAK learned that, at least in the lower classes, if a person had a comfortable life, with a family, a home, and a good income, that individual would not want to get mixed up in politics.[50]

A major cause of discontent was economic problems. Among these problems were poor crops caused by drought, uncertainty over land reform, and inflation. Another cause of discontent was poor wages and work conditions, but when an NIOC executive reported this to SAVAK, he was told not to worry. Labour unions which might have protected workers' rights were discouraged, and those which were permitted were banned from strikes or po-

---

48. 'The New Iran Party's First Year,' State Department Airgram A-346, 31DEC64, (FOIA), p. 5.

49. 'The Recent Evolution of Power in Iran,' State Department A-71, 11APR75; in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 196.

50. Interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP. See also, 'Opinion in Tehran's Lower Depths: What the Taxi Drivers Think,' State Department Airgram A-323, 21DEC64, (FOIA), pp. 5-6.

litical activities. The workers believed that these unions were full of SAVAK agents or officials; union representatives who did speak up were often detained, necessitating underground organization.[51]

11. Judicial Matters

Those arrested for political activities were tried before military tribunals. (See the Appendix for the appropriate legislation). Their appeals were also heard by military tribunals. These hearings were usually held *in camera*. Individuals appearing before military tribunals did not have the right to a civilian lawyer, and their defenders were chosen for them. These defenders were always military personnel, but not necessarily trained lawyers.[52] In at least one case the lawyers themselves were tried for defending their clients too vigorously.[53]

12. Interrogation

Those being brought to trial before military tribunals were routinely held for lengthy periods. There were probably two reasons for this: (1) the defendant had to be interrogated, and (2) the defendant had to recover from the interrogation sufficiently to be brought to court. Torture was routine during the Military-Governorship of Tehran, and its use allegedly continued when Bakhtiar was SAVAK's chief. Although its use was minimal during the Pakravan era, LMI defendants at a January 1964 trial stated that they had been tortured. After Pakravan's departure from SAVAK the use of torture apparently increased, and it was seen that defendants at the trials in connection with the 1965 assassination attempt on the Shah (also known as the Marble Palace Plot), the Islamic Nations Party, and other incidents had suffered badly. These allegations of torture increased in frequency and

---

51. Information on labour at the NIOC is from a confidential interview, (6MAR92). On unions, see A. Bayat, 'Capital Accumulation, Political Control and Labour Organization in Iran, 1965-75,' *Middle East Studies*, 25 (1989). See also, W.H. Bartsch, 'The Industrial Labour Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 25, n. 1 (Winter 1971).

52. W.J. Butler Esq., and Prof. G. Levasseur, 'Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran,' *A Report for the International Commission of Jurists*, (Geneva, MAR76), pp. 18-19, 47-48.

53. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 183.

severity through the 1970s. It has been alleged that the interrogation experts used pseudonyms and adopted the title 'Doctor'.[54]

C. Prisons

Some of Iran's prisons were under Department III. These included Baq-i Mehran, Qezel Qaleh, Qezel Dokhtar, Vakilabad, and the notorious Komiteh. Political prisoners kept at these facilities were often tortured. SAVAK apparently held over 200,000 people in a 're-education camp' between Qum and the Kavir-e-Namak. There were also a number of other facilities, such as juvenile institutions and open prisons, which were probably not a SAVAK concern.[55]

D. Provincial SAVAK Offices

Originally there were SAVAK offices only in Khuzestan, Fars, and Khorramshahr, but this was later expanded to all the provinces. Each province, furthermore, had smaller offices in different towns. Fars-SAVAK, for example, had offices in Shiraz, Bushehr, Lengeh, and Bandar Abbas. There were between eight and twenty people *per* station, but this depended on the duties there, which varied from province to province. They provided hospitality to Gulf sheikhs who came to Iran for the hunting. They were responsible for cross-border infiltrations, tribes, and smuggling, but the biggest thing was anti-Communism. To this end, they collected information on public activities and moods and reported it to headquarters in Tehran.[56]

There was very little budget other than their military salaries, and that pay was pretty low. Although officers stationed in the provinces were to be transferred every three years, this only really happened about three times, until Gen. Nasser Moghaddam took

---

54. Butler, and Levasseur, 'Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran,' pp. 8-13. P. Jacobson, 'Torture in Iran,' *The Sunday Times*, (19JAN75), p. 9; *idem.*, 'Pregnant Woman Tortured,' *The Sunday Times*, (16FEB75), p. 9; *idem.*, 'Prisoners "Coldly Executed",' *The Sunday Times*, (1JUN75), p. 6.

55. National Front, 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation (SAVAK),' p. 10. On the re-education camp, see State Department Memorandum of Conversation, (31AUG77), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 227. On other institutions, see Butler, and Levasseur, 'Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran,' pp. 67-70. For a description of prison life, see R. Savin, *Vakil Abad, Iran: a survivor's story*, (Edinburgh, 1979).

56. Interview with H. Alavi-Kia, (2MAY92, San Diego); interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London).

over at SAVAK. Initially, there was a lack of qualified personnel, but most people preferred to be in Tehran. Personnel were sometimes assigned to the provinces as punishment or for political reasons, resulting in a lack of enthusiasm. As a result of these budgetary and personnel problems, a great deal of corruption took place in the provinces.[57]

II. Department VIII

SAVAK's Department VIII was responsible for counter-espionage/counter-intelligence, which is defined below:

> (CECI) is a special form of intelligence activity, separate and distinct from other disciplines. Its purpose is to discover hostile foreign intelligence operations and destroy their effectiveness. This objective involves the protection of the (Iranian) Government against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as control and manipulation of adversary intelligence operations. An effort is made to both discern and deceive the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence services.[58]

A. Establishment and Training

CECI was originally under the mantle of Department III. This was because there was no real cadre of CECI officers, although there were some military people with CECI responsibilities. Despite the discovery of the Tudeh Military Network, the need for CECI was not taken seriously, because the Iranians considered the incident to be an isolated case which could not be repeated. SAVAK's American trainers changed this situation by making the Iranians cognizant of the dangers of Soviet espionage and encouraging them to regard the threat with more gravity.[59]

Shortly after SAVAK's establishment in 1957, ten SAVAK personnel were sent to the Iranian Army's counter-intelligence course. This intensive course took six months, about ten hours a day. These individuals were then assigned to Department III's CECI-section (Section 2). In 1958, two officers from the Soviet desk were sent to London for a two-month CECI class. Several officers also attended a four-month CECI course taught by the US in Iran. Others attended an Israeli-taught course in Iran. West Germany even gave a course

---

57. *Ibid.*

58. G. Kalaris & L. McCoy, 'Counter-intelligence for the 1990's,' *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence*, v. 2, n. 2, (Summer 1988), p. 182.

59. Interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

about Communism and the Soviets which featured lectures by Germans who had escaped from East Germany. Training by allied intelligence services continued even after the formation of SAVAK's Training Department.[60]

In those early days, SAVAK's CECI section had about twenty-thirty officers and three-four US advisers. When Department VIII was created in 1963, about thirty-forty individuals made the transfer, as well as several US advisers. Among these advisers was a husband-and-wife team which provided advice on organization and on determining the validity of sources. They would often check reports and were viewed as very helpful.[61]

Brig. Gen. Manucher Hashemi, former chief of a provincial SAVAK office and one of the first CECI trainees, was put in charge of Department VIII. One of his first steps was to have the Americans leave; how can the CECI Department have foreign spies in it? He also thought it was bad for morale to have the foreigners around, because the newer people would not feel self-sufficient and independent.[62]

Also, Hashemi was offended by the behaviour of some of the Americans, who would just barge in unannounced. Hashemi had his secretary inform them that in the future they should call ahead to make an appointment. The same American whose behaviour caused the issuance of these orders arrived unannounced two more times, and on the third time he was not allowed to enter the building, and security was informed that no foreigners were allowed back in the building without an appointment. News of this incident got back to the Shah, and Hashemi was told to report to Gen. Pakravan. Pakravan stated that the Shah was not displeased and had ordered that the Americans' access to other Departments should also be curtailed.[63]

At the same time, however, it was recognized that some of the advisers were good at their jobs and were considered to be helpful. Perhaps even more important than the advice and training was the information the US shared with Department VIII. The US govern-

---

60. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).

61. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington); interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93, London).

62. Interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

63. *Ibid.*

ment had extensive archival information on individuals which SAVAK did not have. So, when a Soviet diplomat came to Iran, with US help SAVAK would know immediately whether he or she was KGB, GRU, or straight. After the US advisers were kicked out, it was made SAVAK doctrine to have separate weekly meetings with the CIA, Mossad, and MI-6 at which information on the Soviet Union and Communists was exchanged. The Shah did this for three reasons: (1) he hoped that keeping the US, UK, and Israel updated would keep them from probing too deeply into Iranian affairs by recruiting their own agents and installing their own spies (who would be unknown to SAVAK), (2) the Shah was genuinely afraid of the Soviet Union, and (3) SAVAK still needed US help. Department VIII also shared information with other interested allies. West Germany, for example, wanted access to all information on East Germany, and Israel wanted all information on the Arab states, while all allies wanted access to any captured espionage equipment.[64]

B. Organization, Budget, and Personnel

As with other Departments in SAVAK, CECI expanded and gained more responsibilities over time. When SAVAK's CECI effort was part of Department III, it had only twenty-thirty officers. By 1963, Department VIII had thirty-forty individuals assigned to it. By the time Hashemi retired in 1978, there were approximately five hundred people in Department VIII. Hashemi was succeeded by his deputy, Ali Assefi.[65]

Department VIII's budget was variable and was adjusted according to needs. Abuse of the system through the creation of false accounts (claiming money to pay an agent when no agent really existed) was made very difficult. This was through an extensive filing system, oversight of operations, and review of case officers and their agents. For example, a case officer would have to identify his or her agents, state where they were placed, show what the information the agents provided was, and state how recent the agents' information was.[66]

---

64. Interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington); interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

65. *Asnad*, v. 55, p. 33.

66. Interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London).

Department VIII personnel were also stationed in provincial and overseas SAVAK stations. For example, there were Department VIII personnel stationed in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Khorasan. Those in the first two were charged with stopping Iraqi infiltration of Iran, and those in the latter region were to stop infiltration from the Soviet Union.[67]

Although Department VIII grew over the years, it still did not have enough personnel to, nor was it authorized to, actually act on the information it collected. For this reason, activities such as surveillance and wire-tapping were often carried out by personnel from Department V. When arrests had to be made, Department VIII turned to Department III or the *Shahrbani* (National Police). Funding for most operations came through Department VI. Department IV provided additional personnel when they were needed.

---

67. C. Delannoy, *SAVAK*, (France, 1990), p. 96.



C. Operations

Department VIII's main target was the Communist states and their personnel in Iran. This was followed in importance by the Arab states. Department VIII also observed the activities of Iran's allies, keeping a close watch on the US and UK embassies and even following their personnel. The hardest targets were personnel from MI-6 and the KGB, whose covers and tradecraft were very good.[68]

Soviet intelligence was a substantial adversary. By the early-1970s the CIA estimated that the number of KGB personnel involved in 'clandestine activity directed against foreign countries' was 10,000. GRU personnel dealt with signals intelligence (SIGINT) and, with guidance from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, trained ele-

---

68. Interview with M. Hashemi (13NOV92, London); 'Semi Annual Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Airgram A-577, 19FEB66, (FOIA).

ments of the Iranian opposition at camps in the Soviet Union. KGB personnel destined for Iran received extensive training in Persian, and the Soviets would often assign personnel with Persian physical characteristics to Iran. As of May 1974, the Department of State estimated, conservatively, that there were 67 intelligence officers out of the 5,000 Soviets in Iran.[69]

In February 1956, a Soviet military attaché was arrested for espionage activities.[70] In May 1959, two Iranian employees of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran were arrested for distributing Communist propaganda and were charged with espionage, and despite the Soviets' protests, their press attaché, Fyodor Saulchenkov, was expelled in June.[71] In February 1962, KGB officer Ivan Anisimovich Fadeikin mounted an unsuccessful operation which was intended to assassinate the Shah with a car bomb.[72] In January 1965, Col. Ghasem Hamidi, Maj. Mirza Agha Alimoghadam, and Sgt. Jahangir Hamzeh Tashvighi were executed as foreign spies.[73]

In April 1966 Fikrat Isfendiyar Ogly Efendiyev, a Soviet attaché in Tehran, was arrested at a meeting with an Iranian government employee. The Soviet was declared *persona non grata,* as were two other KGB officers, Viktor Nikolayevitch Spolnikov and Ismail Murtuza Ogly Aliyev. The Iranian was actually a double agent who was pretending to work for the Soviets while actually working for SAVAK.[74] Later that month, Lieut. Parviz Hekmatju, who had been operating out of East Germany to collect intelligence in Iran for the Soviets, and Ali Khavari, an employee of Peking Radio's Persian service, were

---

69. 94th Cong., 2nd session, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Final Report: Book I, 'Foreign and Military Intelligence,' Appendix III, p. 558-61. Department of State memorandum, 'The Soviet Intelligence Presence in Iran,' (2JUN74); in *Asnad,* v. 47, pp. 60-63. Soviet tradecraft is discussed in 'Soviet Intelligence Operations Against Americans and US Installations Abroad: An Analysis of Soviet Doctrine and Practice,' (JUL68); in *Asnad,* v. 51, pp. 4-57.

70. Embassy despatch 739, 788.21/29FEB56, RG-59, Box 3818.

71. *New York Times,* (18MAY59), p. 3; (29MAY59), p. 5; (24JUN59), p. 2. Saulchenkov was reassigned to Tehran in the 1970s.

72. V. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB,* (New York, 1990), pp. 210-13.

73. *New York Times,* (31JAN65), p. 3.

74. Intelligence Information Cable, (12APR66); in *Asnad,* v. 47, pp. 27-28.

sentenced to death after being captured while attempting an infiltration from the Soviet Union.[75]

In June 1974, Minister of Court Alam was warned by the local MI-6 representative that the palace housekeeper, an Englishwoman named Florence, was having an affair with the local KGB resident.[76] In May 1977, an Iranian Ministry of Education official named Rabbani, who had been a KGB agent since the 1940s and had occasionally travelled to the Soviet Union, was arrested when he attempted to meet his case officer, Evgeni Venditkov. Although Venditkov was not expelled from Iran, SAVAK did intimidate him in various ways, such as draining his car's brake fluid, until he left six months later. In June 1977, KGB officer Boris Checherin's attempt to recruit an Iranian he had been cultivating backfired when the Iranian and two SAVAK officers encouraged Checherin to become a double agent. Checherin refused, and although SAVAK did not make an issue of the incident, the KGB officer was expelled.[77]

In September 1977 Maj. Gen. Ahmad Mogharrebi, who had been a KGB agent since 1947, was arrested when he tried to meet with his case officer, Boris Kabanov. Mogharrebi, who had been providing the Soviets with high-quality intelligence on Western weapons systems used by the Iranian military, was executed in December 1977, while Kabanov and his driver were declared *persona non grata*. This case received a great deal of press coverage, bringing Department VIII to the public eye. Evidence had been gathered for two years before the arrest was made, leading allied intelligence agencies to comment on the thoroughness and honesty of Department VIII's leadership.[78]

In April 1978, Brig. Gen. Ali Akbar Derakhshani, a Soviet agent since 1947, had a heart attack after being caught. He had been spotted by a SAVAK surveillance team out-

---

75. *The Times*, (21APR66), p. 12.

76. Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 377.

77. Interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, p. 147, 148.

78. Confidential interviews with two retired CIA officers (11APR92 & 24MAY92); interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP; Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, pp. 192-95.

side the Soviet Embassy when he tried to contact the KGB with a demand for money, and SAVAK then pressured him into calling for a meeting with the KGB, whose officers were then arrested.[79]

Not all KGB and GRU personnel were assigned to Iran as diplomats at the Embassy in Tehran or the consulates in Rasht, Isfahan, Mashad, and Tabriz. Checherin had cover as a TASS correspondent. Others worked under cover at the Soviet Red Cross Hospital as doctors, nurses, and administrators. Cover under Soveksportfilm, a trading group, was regularly used by the GRU. Cover was also provided by the Aryamehr steel mill in Isfahan. The one place that was never used by the KGB was the Soviet Cultural Institute's Russian classes, because the Soviets realised that SAVAK personnel were regularly sent there to learn the language.[80]

Iran was also the regional headquarters for the KGB's 'illegal Residency' (where a group of illegals work together). Located in Beirut until the Civil War made it too difficult to work, it had been moved to Tehran. The Soviets also had local agents, such as Khomayun Akram, first secretary of the consular section of the Afghan Embassy. There was also at least one high-ranking official in the Iranian Prime Minister's office who was working as a Soviet agent, but Department VIII never managed to positively identify the correct individual.[81]

With such an active presence in Iran, Department VIII had to use a variety of methods to keep tabs on the KGB and other foreign spies. The Soviet Embassy was kept under constant surveillance from an apartment building across the street and from a kiosk nearby. Soviet personnel were kept under surveillance whenever they left the Embassy, and SAVAK would only let them secure housing near the Embassy. Through these methods, they could usually identify a Soviet official's organizational affiliation within a month.

---

79. *New York Times*, (7APR78), p. 6.

80. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, p. 148, 159, 298; R. Moss, 'Who's Meddling in Iran?', *The New Republic*, (2DEC78), p. 16. The hospital was bugged and its personnel were under surveillance by SAVAK; see USAF Agent Report, (30AUG77), in *Asnad*, v. 52, p. 78.

81. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, pp. 198-99, 145-46; interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

side the Soviet Embassy when he tried to contact the KGB with a demand for money, and SAVAK then pressured him into calling for a meeting with the KGB, whose officers were then arrested.[79]

Not all KGB and GRU personnel were assigned to Iran as diplomats at the Embassy in Tehran or the consulates in Rasht, Isfahan, Mashad, and Tabriz. Checherin had cover as a TASS correspondent. Others worked under cover at the Soviet Red Cross Hospital as doctors, nurses, and administrators. Cover under Soveksportfilm, a trading group, was regularly used by the GRU. Cover was also provided by the Aryamehr steel mill in Isfahan. The one place that was never used by the KGB was the Soviet Cultural Institute's Russian classes, because the Soviets realised that SAVAK personnel were regularly sent there to learn the language.[80]

Iran was also the regional headquarters for the KGB's 'illegal Residency' (where a group of illegals work together). Located in Beirut until the Civil War made it too difficult to work, it had been moved to Tehran. The Soviets also had local agents, such as Khomayun Akram, first secretary of the consular section of the Afghan Embassy. There was also at least one high-ranking official in the Iranian Prime Minister's office who was working as a Soviet agent, but Department VIII never managed to positively identify the correct individual.[81]

With such an active presence in Iran, Department VIII had to use a variety of methods to keep tabs on the KGB and other foreign spies. The Soviet Embassy was kept under constant surveillance from an apartment building across the street and from a kiosk nearby. Soviet personnel were kept under surveillance whenever they left the Embassy, and SAVAK would only let them secure housing near the Embassy. Through these methods, they could usually identify a Soviet official's organizational affiliation within a month.

---

79. *New York Times*, (7APR78), p. 6.

80. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, p. 148, 159, 298; R. Moss, 'Who's Meddling in Iran?', *The New Republic*, (2DEC78), p. 16. The hospital was bugged and its personnel were under surveillance by SAVAK; see USAF Agent Report, (30AUG77), in *Asnad*, v. 52, p. 78.

81. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, pp. 198-99, 145-46; interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

It usually took nine months to determine with certainty whether or not a Soviet was an intelligence officer, and SAVAK rarely erred in this. The surveillance often included physical intimidation, in an attempt to make the Soviet intelligence officer's job impossible to accomplish. SAVAK also used 'honey-traps' (sexual lures) to entrap KGB personnel. Although some of the early SAVAK employees worked for the Soviets, they did not infiltrate Department VIII because it had an agent in the KGB Residency.[82]

As was stated earlier, the Soviets were not Department VIII's only target, although they were the main adversary. In early-1975, the Iranian government signed a $500 million contract with Rockwell International to build a SIGINT facility in Iran. This facility, code-named IBEX, eventually had an estimated 100 retired NSA, CIA, and Air Force Security Service people assigned to it. Department VIII devised a plan to keep these people under observation, but its approval was held up by SAVAK chief Nassiri's office for about one or two months, despite the approval of Department VIII's leadership. Finally, Nassiri ordered that the plan be shelved, fearing that it would harm relations with the US.[83]

After the Communist coup in 1978, many Afghans fled to Iran, bringing to 500,000 the number of illegal Afghans residing in Iran. Recognizing that this was a potential source of trouble, Department VIII devised the *Tarh-i Kontrol-i Afqani* (Afghan Control Plan). Utilizing a system of identification cards for all the Afghans entering Iran, SAVAK would check their stories and also secure information on events in Afghanistan. It was also intended to use this system to recruit agents from among the Afghans. Overtaken by revolutionary events, the plan fell to the wayside, despite SAVAK chief Moghaddam's enthusiasm for it.[84]

---

82. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB*, p. 150, 154, 298; interview with Gen. M. Hashemi (17,18,20FEB85 & 2,3,6MAY85, London) by S. Meskoob and (17OCT85, London) by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

83. *The Times*, (10JUL75), supplement, p. ii; N. Gage, 'US-Iran Links Still Strong,' *New York Times*, (9JUL78), p. 1, 10; interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington). The existence of this plan could not be confirmed.

84. Moss 'Who's Meddling in Iran?', p. 16; interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).

D. Miscellaneous

Department VIII also dealt with international terrorism issues, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Red Brigades, and the PLO. While information on the training of Iranians in, for example, Syria and Lebanon by Palestinians was dealt with by Departments II and III, Department VIII depended on friendly states for intelligence on foreign terrorists. An example of the extent of international terrorist links and their importance to Iran was the arrest of Kristina Berster of the Baader-Meinhof Gang when she tried to enter the US with an Iranian passport which had been stolen from the Iranian Consulate in Geneva when it was occupied by student radicals in June 1976. Not only did Iran's allies share information, but they also taught courses on how to deal with terrorism, such as a course on hostage-rescue conducted by Israeli Special Forces.[85]

Department VIII dealt with one aspect of Kurdish affairs within Iran. Kurdish activities outside Iran (such as those that were directed against the Iraqi government), were handled by SAVAK's Department II. As a result of the 1975 Algiers Accord, Iranian government support of the Barzani Kurds was terminated. In the face of the subsequent Iraqi onslaught, many of the Kurds fled to Iran. SAVAK saw these new arrivals as, essentially, foreigners. Since observation of foreigners and prevention of espionage was the responsibility of Department VIII, the Barzani Kurds fell under its mantle. There was also concern that, perhaps out of a desire for revenge, Mulla Mustafa Barzani would agitate among other Kurds in Iran. For this reason, some Department III personnel with experience in Kurdish affairs were transferred to Department VIII. In addition to observing the Kurds closely, some other schemes to control them were used. The Kurds were not allowed to choose where they would settle, nor was their concentration in any one area permitted. They were resettled all around the country, in areas as far away from their mountain homes and as hostile as Baluchistan. The younger men were given jobs to keep them busy, and many of them entered the military.[86]

---

85. *New York Times*, (15SEP78), p. 90; interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington).

86. Interview with M. Hashemi (14DEC93, London).

Finally, Department VIII supervised Evin prison as an interrogation and holding centre. Other prisons, such as Bagh-e Mehran, Qezel Qaleh, and Qezel Dokhtar were operated by Department III.

CH. 8. SAYYID MUSA SADR, SAVAK, AND IRANIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS

Iranian-Lebanese relations during the reign of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi can be viewed in two fairly distinct phases. The first phase took place during the rule of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. During this phase, the Shah's activities were determined by his desire to thwart Nasserist expansionism in the Middle East. To this end, Iran aided and worked with the Middle East's other pro-Western governments. Iran, furthermore, initiated a number of political actions to influence governments which were not as anti-Nasser as it would have liked. The second phase, which overlaps with the first one slightly, took place from 1967 through 1978. During this phase, two connected events took place which underlined Lebanon's importance to Iran. The first event was the influx in Lebanon of the combatants from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and again after their expulsion from Jordan during the 'Black September' of 1970. The second event was the commencement of military training in Lebanon by members of the Iranian opposition.

Iran's major instrument for the conduct of sensitive foreign policy was SAVAK, and this organization staged a number of operations to influence political events in Lebanon. Until now, however, Iranian-Lebanese relations and SAVAK's role in Iranian foreign relations have received little attention. By following the career of Sayyid Musa Sadr, the man credited with giving Lebanon's Shia population a sense of community, one can study Iranian-Lebanese relations and SAVAK activities in Lebanon.[1] One can also see a reason why the

---

1. On Sadr, see F. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and The Shia of Lebanon*, (London, 1986); M. Halawi, *A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia Community*, (Oxford, 1992); B. Hoffman, 'Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism,' RAND National Defense Research Institute Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Santa Monica, CA: MAR90); T. Khalidi, review of *The Vanished Imam*, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v. XVI, n. 3 (Spring 1987); A.R. Norton, *Amal and The Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, (Austin, TX: 1987), and 'Musa Al-Sadr,' in *Political Leaders of the Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary*, B. Reich, ed., (New York, 1990); S. Shapira, 'The Imam Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shi'ite Resurgence in Lebanon,' *Jerusalem Quarterly*, (Fall, 1987); A. Taheri, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West*, (London, 1987); and P. Theroux, *The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr*, (London, 1987).

Iranian government did not have sufficient intelligence on the opposition forces which eventually overthrew it.

I. A Brief Biography

Born in Qum in 1928, Sayyid Musa Sadr was from a family that claimed direct descent from the Prophet Mohammad. His grandfather was the Lebanese-born Sayyid Ismail Sadr, who went on to become one of the great *Maraji al-Taqlid* in Iraq, and Sayyid Musa's father was Aya. Sadr al-Din Sadr. Initially, Musa Sadr attended the University of Tehran Faculty of Law and Political Economy. On his return to Qum he studied Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) at a Qum *madrasah*. In 1953, a year after his father's death, he moved to Najaf to study *fiqh* under *Marja al-Kabir* (Grand Marja) Aya. Mohsen al-Hakim (d. 1970).[2]

In December 1957, Sayyid Abdol Hussein Sharaf al-Din, the Shia leader of Tyre, died. South Lebanon's Shia community invited Sadr, who had been there in 1957, to replace the deceased marja. Sadr accepted the offer and moved to Tyre in 1960. The reason that Sadr often gave for his acceptance of this offer was that because his family originated in Lebanon, the move was a return to his roots, but he also claimed that Sayyid Abdol Hussein had referred to him as a worthy successor.[3]

There were more practical reasons for such a move, and there is little doubt that these carried more weight with the young cleric. By the late-1950s, the Iranian religious community had become very quiet. The *ulama* had inspired some short-lived violence against the Bahais, and a few years later voiced concern over women's enfranchisement. Most clerics, however, had allowed themselves to be bought off by the government, and some participated in pro-regime activities.[4] The *Marja al-Taqlid* in Qum, Aya. Mohammad Hussein Borujerdi, pursued an apolitical line. This quietism (some would say conservatism) and the size of Iran's Shia community guarantied that it would be a long time before Sadr made his

---

2. Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 39; Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 44. Also trained in Najaf was Sayyid Musa's younger cousin, Sayyid Muhammad Bagher al-Sadr; see H. Batatu, 'Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 35, n. 3 (Autumn 1981).

3. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 104; Halawi, *A Lebanon Defied*, p. 124.

4. 'Rally Against Anti-Iranian Radio Broadcasts,' Foreign Service Despatch 16, 788.00/29AUG59, Box 3812, RG-59; and 'Establishment of Mashad Branch of National Defense Society,' Foreign Service Despatch 11, 788.5/19SEP59, Box 3819, *ibid.*

mark. The Lebanese Shia community was much smaller than Iran's, but it was also less formal. Here, then, was where an ambitious young man could shine.

Upon his arrival, Sadr made a good first impression. He was tall (6'6"), flamboyant, clean, and elegant. It was even believed that he lined his eyes with kohl. These details may seem unimportant to some, but physical appearance is important to the Shia. Sadr was, furthermore, an excellent speaker, and although he never lost his Persian accent, he came to speak fluent and stylish Arabic.[5]

Sadr also increased his exposure by immediately providing practical assistance to the Lebanese people, whether or not they were Shia. He taught at a number of Christian and Moslem schools and universities. He also revitalized some charitable bodies and organized new ones. He began to give the Shia a sense of community, whether they were Beirut slum-dwellers, southern peasants, or Bekaa farmers, in the hope that they would think beyond personal issues. He attracted support from all areas of Shia society, from wealthy merchants to urban youth, and he called for people to struggle and not accept misfortune: 'whenever the poor involve themselves in a social revolution it is a confirmation that injustice is not predestined.'[6]

II. The Political Environment, 1957-1967

The late-1950s was a time of great political unrest in the Middle East, and Lebanon was no different than any of its neighbours. Sayyid Musa Sadr arrived in Lebanon at a time of great political activity, with the termination of a civil war and the installation of a new government.

The system had started to break down in 1957, when there was a great deal of public unrest in Lebanon. Demonstrators were objecting to two things. One was President Chamoun's pro-Western stance and adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was ill-timed in light of the popularity of Nasser's Pan-Arabism. Two, there was opposition to Chamoun's attempt to introduce a constitutional amendment which would allow him to stand for a second term as President. Behind these two factors was the increasing polarization of the

---

5. Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 40.
6. Quoted in *al-Sadr!?*, p. 27, in *ibid.*

Lebanese political elite, who were unhappy with Chamoun's corruption, the failure of his reform drives, and his attempts to rig the 1957 elections.

It was believed that demonstrations were being encouraged by Nasser, witness the arrest in Beirut of two Syrian intelligence agents and reports of the provision of arms and cash by Syria and Egypt.[7] These events were of great concern to the Shah of Iran, let alone the President of Lebanon, and when the two met in December 1957, they announced their intention to 'oppose any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of their countries'.[8]

The Lebanese situation did not improve, with riots in the second week of May 1958 being caused by allies of the United Arab Republic (UAR, the merger of Egypt and Syria from 4 February 1958 to 28 September 1961), which had been providing 'policy guidance, propaganda support, and weapons, supplies, and "volunteers".'[9] That May, Chamoun turned to Iran and Turkey for help.[10] That same month, Iran began aiding Chamoun, because the Shah saw the Lebanese crisis mainly in terms of the threat of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. Iranian aid consisted of the provision by SAVAK of small arms and ammunition to Chamoun and the Maronites. Arms from Israel were also flown into Lebanon via Iran. The Turks supplied rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition to the Gendarmerie, which in turn handed them over to Chamoun's entourage.[11] Meat from Turkey was also flown in, since that which had originally been supplied by Syria was no longer available. This operation was run by Ahmad Azima, a naval officer in SAVAK's foreign intelligence section. Farid Shihab, head of Lebanese Intelligence, served as Chamoun's intermediary, travelling frequently to Tehran for coordination purposes.[12] Chamoun also turned to the Arab League and

---

7. *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 1957-1958, p. 15696.

8. 'Summary of communique on the talks between President Sham'un and the Shah of Iran, Beirut, 23 December 1957,' in M.S. Agwani, ed., *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study*, (Bombay, 1965), p. 29.

9. Special National Intelligence Estimate 36.4-58, 5JUN58; in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, v. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 94.

10. State Department telegram, 4MAY58, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, v. XI, p. 29.

11. Beirut (Ambassador) to FO, 29MAY58, # 133 855/V1193 58, (PRO). I am grateful to N. Kalawoun for provision of the Public Records Office (PRO) documents cited in this chapter.

12. Information in this chapter which is not from diplomatic archives, oral histories, or open sources was secured in interviews with nine SAVAK officers with duties which touched directly on this issue, one Iranian Military Intelligence officer stationed in Iraq, and two retired CIA officers with duties in Iran and/or Lebanon. Many of these sources have requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of this subject. Unless otherwise noted, any information

the United Nations for help. The Arab League failed to resolve the crisis, and in July, the UN announced that its Observation Group (UNOG) had failed to find any evidence of massive UAR infiltration.

On 14 July the Iraqi coup took place, resulting in the brutal overthrow of a pro-Western government. This turn of events was too much for Chamoun, and he appealed to the US for something more substantial than its earlier promise of small arms, ammunition, and tear gas for riot suppression. Saudi Arabia's King Saud made similar demands on Chamoun's behalf.[13] US assistance took the form of the amphibious landing of US Marines, commencing on 15 July. The US commitment was made despite its recognition of the adverse publicity such an act might engender. This was because US officials realised that their Middle Eastern allies would lose confidence in the value of friendship with the US if no action was taken.

Chamoun's efforts to retain power failed, and on 31 July 1958 Army commander Fuad Shihab was elected to the Presidency. After taking office in September, Shihab set about bringing new faces into Lebanese politics because he recognized that the 1958 crisis had been started by Sunnis in West Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, and by Kamal Junblat's Druze faction, all of whom wanted a greater voice in national affairs.[14] Lebanese politics had been dominated by a predominantly-Maronite business oligarchy, and most of the top government jobs went to Christians. The rebels believed that they were qualified for public office, and they deserved a share of the state-condoned corruption that went with government posi-

---

secured in interviews has been corroborated by at least one other source. Information on the operation to provide aid to Chamoun is from an interview with SAVAK's then Deputy-Director for Plans and chief of Middle East operations, M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark) and a telephone interview with SAVAK director Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar's assistant for all expenditures and special operations, H. Alavi-Kia (17DEC92). Farid Shihab provided hospitality for Bakhtiar when the latter visited Beirut after he was dismissed by the Shah; see the interview with Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

13. Memorandum of Conference with President, White House, 14JUL58; in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, v. XI, p. 212. It has been alleged that King Saud and Prince Feisal were on the CIA payroll. While Saud was hostile to Nasser, Feisal was actually sympathetic to Nasser, and although he took the CIA's money, he kept Nasser current on the intentions of Saud and the CIA. See L. Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network*, (London, 1978), pp. 348-51.

14. On Junblat's attitudes toward Chamoun and then Shihab, see F. al-Khazen, 'Kamal Jumblatt, The Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 24 (1988).

tions.[15] Shihab hoped to help the Moslems by increasing their representation in the government, but to do so the Maronites would have to give up some of their power. Shihab hoped that such actions would make the Moslems more loyal to the state and less receptive to Nasserism. His expansion of the political playing field, plus his refusal to use the Army to suppress the rebels, earned Shihab the enmity of many Christians, especially Chamoun.

Lebanon's importance to Iran increased after the Iraqi coup when SAVAK's foreign intelligence chief, Col. Hassan Pakravan, initiated efforts to restore the Iraqi monarchy. To this end, Maj. Mujtaba Pashai, head of SAVAK's Middle East branch, occasionally accompanied by SAVAK chief Brig. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar and his assistant Col. Hassan Alavi-Kia, would travel once a month to Beirut, where they would meet with Iraqi exiles. Maj. Isa Pejman, who was in charge of SAVAK's Kurdish operations, would also travel to Lebanon to meet with Iraqi Kurds there.[16] Among the individuals the Iranians met were Abdol Hadi Chalabi, Abdol Karim Osri, Jodat Ayudi, Towfiq Sowedi, Ahmad Mokhtar Baban, Mahmud Mokhtar Baban, and Maj. Gen. Abdol Majid.[17]

The Iraqi revolution also alarmed Jordan's King Hussein, whose country had briefly federated with Iraq in early-1958. The first cause for alarm was the brutal killings of King Feisal II (King Hussein's cousin), Crown Prince Abdol Elah (Feisal's uncle), Premier Nuri Es-Said, the Royal household, and the CIA Chief of Station (COS). The second cause for alarm was broadcasts by Radio Baghdad criticizing King Hussein as a traitor and agent of imperialism and calling for the Jordanian people to overthrow their King. Third was the fact that the first state to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Iraqi Republic was the UAR.

By 17 July, King Hussein was sufficiently concerned that he requested 'effective military aid' from friendly countries to protect Jordan. The most obvious forms of aid were the arrival of 2000 English paratroopers, the provision of petroleum products via US aircraft,

---

15. K.S. Salibi, 'Lebanon Under Fuad Chehab, 1958-1964,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2 (APR66), p. 213.

16. Letter from Colonel I. Pejman, reprinted in M. Alamuti, *Iran dar Asr-i Pahlavi*, v. 11, *Jang-i Qodrat dar Iran*, (London, 1992), p. 521; interviews with Pejman (15OCT92, Paris) and Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

17. Telephone interview with Pashai (19DEC92).

and on 20 July, a gift of $7.5 million from the US.[18] A less obvious form of assistance was the journey by Bakhtiar, Pashai, and Pejman to Jordan to meet with King Hussein and discuss plans to restore the Iraqi monarchy.[19] At this time, King Hussein asked that SAVAK assign an officer to Amman, and the Iranians agreed, believing that this would be a good way to solidify the two countries' relations. The officer chosen for this assignment was Col. Ali Motazed, who was eventually despatched to Amman.[20]

Following in the footsteps of these events, the Shah had sent an order to Bakhtiar to come up with a way of containing Nasserism. Pashai conceived a 'Green Plan' (*Tarh-i Sabz*) to contain and then roll back the danger of Nasserism. Bakhtiar, Alavi-Kia, Pakravan, Azima, and Pashai met to discuss the plan, and Pashai stated that 'we should combat and arrest the danger (of Nasserism) on the beaches of the Mediterranean so we do not have to shed blood on Iranian soil.' He also saw Lebanon as the only democratic Arab state, where all religions had a political identity, and there was intellectual freedom as exemplified by the universities. Lebanon was also important because of its banks, its ports, and its role as an aerial transit point

Pashai indicated the need to have the Lebanese populace identify more closely with Iran, thus distancing itself from such a pro-Arab stance. He favoured building on the existing Moslem ties, particularly those with the Shia. Pashai suggested that the Shia community was undergoing changes and the Iranian government could take advantage of these changes. Shia politics had been dominated by clans, but in the late-1950s parties, such as the Communists, the Baath, the Movement of Arab Nationalists, the Progressive Socialists, and the *Parti Populaire Syrien* (PPS), began to attract the younger Shia males. At the same time, the younger Shia began heading for Beirut, leading to a diminution in

---

18. As a result of the coup, Jordan lost access to its Iraqi fuel supplies and was forced to rely on fuel from Lebanon transported by aircraft overflying Israel; see H.M. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, (London, 1962), p. 168. British airborne personnel also overflew Israel to get to Jordan; see Editorial Note in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, v. XI, p. 317.

19. Interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); telephone interview with Pejman (17DEC92, Paris).

20. US Army Weekly Update, 788.00 (W)/26JUN59, Box 3814, RG-59.

the importance of land-based wealth and the traditional *beys*.[21] Shihab recognized these Shia-specific issues, and a public-works program was devised for the Shia regions. The government's educational system also had an urbanizing effect, leading to migration by Lebanese of all religions and the growth of suburbs in all the major cities.

Pashai believed that the Iranian government was too close to the Lebanese Christians, and he suggested that the only reason there were already such close relations with them was the friendship of the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, Ahmad Atabaki, with Chamoun. It was then decided to assign Air Force officer Hamid Nasseri as SAVAK COS to Beirut. In fact, Nasseri was the first SAVAK COS anywhere. Also, at this time the Iranian government began making contributions of approximately $33,000 a year to the Lebanese Shia community. Implementation of SAVAK's Green Plan altered the relationship between the Shah, the Iranian Shia establishment, and the Lebanese Shia community. Until then, the Shah, via the Pahlavi Foundation (*Bonyad-i Pahlavi*), had given money to Aya. Borujerdi who had directed it to Lebanon.[22]

The Green Plan was not just Lebanon-specific. SAVAK officers, with non-diplomatic cover as teachers, were sent to Syria to conduct classes on the Persian language and Iranian culture and history. Connections were made with other Shia communities, such as the one in Iraq. Sizable contributions were sent to Najaf (about $520,000 a year in 1959 and 1960). The Shah also tried to influence the selection of a successor to Aya. Borujerdi, who died in 1961. There was a growing consensus in favour of Aya. al-Hakim, and it was believed that the Shah was encouraging the departure to Najaf of the supreme Shia leadership.[23] This was because the Shah wanted to keep out-spoken religious leaders out of Iran, where they could wield what he saw as undue influence.

---

21. On the land-owners' political system, see A. Hottinger, 'Zu'ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 15, n. 2 (Spring 1961). On the social changes, see F.I. Khuri, 'The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 23, n. 1 (Winter 1969).

22. Information on the Green Plan is from: Pejman letter, in Alamuti, v. 11, pp. 521-23; interviews with Pejman (150CT92, Paris) and Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (21DEC92); and a letter from Pashai to the author (26APR93).

23. 'Some Comments on Recent Religious Agitation in Iran,' Department of State Airgram A-404, 788.00/29DEC62, (FOIA).

The Shah had, furthermore, prepared for contingencies such as the unrest in Lebanon by strengthening his ties with Israel, one of the few non-Arab states in the region. Bakhtiar was sent to Paris and Rome in September and October 1957 to meet with Mossad chief Isser Harel and offer Iranian cooperation in the battle against Nasser's destabilizing activities. Then, in December 1957, Mossad's Yaacov Caroz was sent to Tehran to enter into practical talks on establishing a strategic relationship between Iran and Israel.[24] From that time onward, Israel and Iran exchanged intelligence on Egyptian activities in the Arab world, and participated in some joint operations.[25]

Lebanese parliamentary elections were scheduled for June and July of 1960, and SAVAK's leadership, concerned by Shihab's active support of Arab nationalism outside Lebanon, and possibly encouraged by Chamoun, decided that several anti-Nasserist representatives should be elected. Bakhtiar, Pakravan, and Alavi-Kia called on Pashai to devise a plan to meet this end. Pashai told his superiors that this could be very expensive, but Alavi-Kia said that it was a matter which affected the very existence of Iran, so expenses be damned. This being the case, approximately $330,000 was spent, although SAVAK was prepared to spend more.[26]

The Christian Lebanese believed that they and the Shia had a joint interest in resisting the Sunni Moslems, and that the two groups together could resist an alliance between the Nasserist Sunnis and the Palestinians in the refugee camps.[27] The mostly-Christian Phalange (Kataeb) party, interested in preserving the political status quo of the Lebanese state, had been supportive of Chamounist elements during the 1958 crisis and had staged a revolt in East Beirut after Shihab came to power, so the party was chosen as the main recipient of Iranian aid.[28] SAVAK COS Nasseri offered financial aid to Phalange leader

---

24. Interviews with Caroz and former Mossad chief Isser Harel; in S. Segev, *The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair*, (New York, 1988), pp. 31-32.

25. CIA Survey, *Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services*, MAR79; in *Asnad*, v. 11, p. 24.

26. Pejman letter, in Alamuti, v. 11, p. 524; interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

27. K.S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*, (London, 1976), p. 10.

28. Information on aid to the Phalange is from Pejman letter, in Alamuti, v. 11, p. 524; and is confirmed by Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark). On the Phalange, see F. Stoakes, 'The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the

Pierre Gemayel, who said that $100,000 was needed for publicity. While the money was being prepared, however, Gemayel had a change of heart and said the money was no longer required. From that time onward, the Phalange maintained close relations with Iran, with Gemayel often attending Iranian Embassy social functions, and the Phalange usually fulfilling whatever requests the Iranian government had.[29]

Bakhtiar hand-delivered $50,000 to Camille Chamoun himself. This was done despite the objections of Bakhtiar's subordinates, who knew that Chamoun had sold many of the arms donated by Iran and Israel and kept the proceeds. The friendship of the Dashnak (a right-wing Armenian party) candidates was won by promising them that flights from Yerevan to Lebanon would have the right to pass over Iran, they would have easier transit between Iran and Lebanon, and two priests from Lebanon were allowed to come to Iran to establish churches. Permission was also given for the conduct of courses in Armenian on a variety of subjects, not just religion. SAVAK also helped in the printing and distribution of their election publicity. Raymond Eddé's *Bloc National* party was also the target of SAVAK money. Eddé himself was never offered any money, because he and Gemayel were running for the same seat, but many of the party's candidates took the money they were offered, and SAVAK helped fund some of their publicity.[30]

Aid to the PPS was also advised, because it was viewed as a tough, combatant group, and it was believed that it would be receptive to the Iranians' approach because it had received Iraqi aid before the 1958 coup and sided with the Chamounists during the 1958 crisis. The Shah refused to permit dealings with the PPS, objecting to their concept of a

---

State,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 11 (JAN75), p. 224; and J.P. Entelis, 'Structural Change and Organizational Development in the Lebanese Kata'ib Party,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 27, n. 1 (Winter 1973), p. 28.

29. Pejman letter, in Alamuti, v. 11, p. 524; interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); Stoakes, 'The Supervigilantes,' p. 233.

30. Telephone interviews with Pashai (19DEC92) and Alavi-Kia (17DEC92). In 1976, Congress was informed by Director of Central Intelligence William Colby that the CIA had armed and funded the Phalange and the Dashnak in the 1950s; see J. Randal, *The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers*, (London, 1983), p. 160. The 'special relationship' between the CIA and Bashir Gemayel may have its origins in this period; see D. Kennedy and L. Brunetta, 'Lebanon and the Intelligence Community,' *Kennedy School of Government Case Program*, Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy, with support from the CIA, (1988), p. 14.

Greater Syria at a time when Syria was a member of the UAR.[31] Ironically, Chamounist candidates did relatively poorly in the elections, while the Phalangists did quite well. Gemayel, in fact, became the Minister of Finance. Four Dashnak candidates were elected. The Communists, Baathists, and PPS all failed to win any seats.[32]

The SAVAK station in Beirut also maintained contact with Lebanese newspapers and magazines. Fariborz Farzaneh, a SAVAK officer with diplomatic cover as the Press Attaché, was deemed to be highly effective at his job, although the Arabic-language newspapers which were approached by SAVAK personnel made direct requests for money. The one exception to this was the strongly anti-Nasser Kamal Morovah, who ran *Al-Hayat* and *The Daily Star*. Morovah did not receive any direct payments to print anti-Nasser articles, but SAVAK did buy his newspapers and distribute them in the Gulf region. In 1960, Morovah's offices were bombed after he printed an article criticizing Nasser for his break in relations with Iran over the Shah's announcement of *de facto* recognition of Israel. At this point, SAVAK gave Morovah about $15,625 as compensation for the risk and the damage. The SAVAK Station had particularly good relations with two French-language publications, *L'Orient* and another run by Tikran Tospot, an Armenian, and these were willing to print articles provided by SAVAK. These articles emphasised Nasser's expansionism and quest for hegemony, saying that these were a result of Egypt's internal economic problems. Such articles also sought to cause disunity between the more radical Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. No person-to-person money transfers took place, but SAVAK would buy advertising or buy up several thousand copies and distribute them in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf.[33]

---

31. Interview with Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark). In December 1961 a group of military and civilian PPS supporters attempted a coup. They were stopped by loyal troops, and the next day the government had the party dissolved. There were rumours of an Iranian hand behind the PPS revolt, but the Iranians proclaimed their innocence and suspected the Jordanians. Interview with Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark). The PPS may have been linked to the CIA, also; see D. Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 44, n. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 64.

32. *Keesings*, 1959-1960, p. 17556, 17571.

33. Interview with Pashai (24JUN93, Denmark).

The available evidence does not suggest that these SAVAK activities were inspired by England or the US. The Shah was deeply concerned by the clear and present danger posed by Nasser and did not need anybody to goad him into action on that issue Interviewees have stated that the Western intelligence officials were aware, to a degree, of SAVAK's efforts in Lebanon. The extent of this knowledge is not clear. It is also possible that, although aware of SAVAK activities, the CIA and MI-6 wanted to act unilaterally and maintain strict compartmentalization. Archival records make it seem that the Shah, unconvinced of US commitment to Iran or the region, was encouraging the US to make a move, since he urged President Dwight D. Eisenhower to act when they met in July 1958 and congratulated Eisenhower after the Marine landings.[34] What the Shah knew of covert US and UK activities is also unknown.[35]

It was at about this time (late-summer 1960), that Sayyid Musa Sadr arrived in Lebanon. There have been allegations that Sadr took over for the deceased Sayyid Abdol Hussein Sharaf al-Din due to the encouragement Sadr supposedly received from Teimour Bakhtiar. Allegedly, when Bakhtiar heard of the Lebanese Shias' search for a new marja, he summoned Sayyid Nasser al-Din, the son of the deceased marja, who had been studying in Qum. Bakhtiar wanted to send Sayyid Nasser back as his father's replacement, so he could help strengthen the Shia community and promote ties with Iran. Word of this got to a relative of Sadr, who went to Bakhtiar and promoted Sayyid Musa. Bakhtiar met Sayyid Musa and was favourably impressed, as was Sayyid Musa with the idea of going to Lebanon. This is not to imply that Sadr had been recruited as a SAVAK agent. It was tra-

---

34. White House Memorandum of Conversation, 1JUL58; in the Declassified Documents 1985, #626, LOC; State Department telegram, 16JUL58, in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, v. XI, pp. 306-308. The Shah's doubts are seen again in, 'Internal Political Situation in Iran,' State Department Memorandum, 788.00/11FEB61, (FOIA); CIA, 'Intelligence Memorandum: The Arab Threat to Iran,' 21MAY66; in the Declassified Documents 1988, (3107), LOC.

35. *Covert* US involvement in Lebanon dated from at least 1957, when the CIA, as part of an operation intended to counter Egyptian and Syrian efforts, had provided aid to Chamoun's allies for the 1957 parliamentary elections so they would be in a position to determine the victor of the 1958 presidential election; see W.C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, (London, 1980), p. 252, and M. Copeland, *The Game Player*, (London, 1989), p. 216. The British role in Lebanon, as far as has been possible to determine, consisted of the delivery of aircraft and rockets to the Chamounists in May 1958; see 'Vampires for the Lebanon,' 28MAY58, # 133 855/V1193 57G, (PRO).

ditional, at the time, for high-ranking Iranian officials to maintain ties with members of the religious community. In this case, furthermore, there was a coincidence of interests: Iran sought greater influence in Lebanon, and Sadr needed a position with the potential for advancement.[36]

After his arrival, Sadr set out to provide practical assistance to the local community. Sayyid Musa gave classes on Iran and the Persian language at the *Amelieh* school, where he achieved great popularity due to his good rapport with young people. He then taught at a Sunni school called *Al Maqassed*. He revitalized *Jamiyat al-Bir wa al-Ehsan*, a religious and charitable foundation founded by Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, and raised money for *al-Mu'assasa al-Ijtima'iyya* (The Social Institute), a Tyre orphanage. In 1963, Sadr established *Bayt al-Fatat* (The Girls' Home), a sewing school and nursery, started *Ma'had al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya* (The Institute of Islamic Studies), and taught Islamic philosophy at St Joseph University.[37]

Sadr also stayed in contact with SAVAK. Although he never met with SAVAK COS Nasseri, since their time in Beirut only overlapped by a few months, Sadr did meet with Nasseri's successor, Pashai, frequently. Pashai was stationed in Beirut from 20 November 1960 to 20 December 1963, and during that time they met about once a week. During this period, Pashai served as Sadr's entree to the Lebanese political elite, a portion of society to which a Shia cleric would normally not have access. Although he accepted such help from Pashai, Sadr never asked the Iranian government for any money. In fact, in 1962 Sadr was offered some money to use in whatever way he saw fit. Sadr declined the offer of a direct payment and warned against giving money to any individuals. Sadr recommended a contin-

---

36. This allegation was related in confidential interviews with two individuals who had heard it from a member of Sadr's family (16OCT92 & 30DEC92). Two other sources claim that after meeting with Bakhtiar, Sadr underwent a four-eight week training course and was given 1,500-2,500 Lebanese lira (about $470-780); see the reminiscences of M. Qadar, (30APR & 4MAY86, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS, and 'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?'*Elm va Jameh*, Sixth year, n. 40, (JUL-AUG85), p. 42. A later article dismissed such claims, saying that Sadr was extremely popular and was given many gifts by his followers, so he had absolutely no need for such payments; Moq, 'Zindigi va Napadid Shudan-i Musa Sadr,' *Elm va Jameh*, Seventh Year, n. 42, (FEB-MAR86, p. 45. All of my interviewees were adamant that the subject of payments to Musa Sadr never arose.

37. Interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); Halawi, *A Lebanon Defied*, pp. 135-136.

uation of the cultural approach, such as sending teachers, helping schools, and building hospitals.[38]

The Iranian government continued to attempt to wield influence in Lebanese governmental affairs. The April-May 1964 elections, however, were not very favourable to the Iranians' favourite candidates. Chamoun failed to get re-elected to the parliament. Shihab's term had ended, and in the balloting for the Presidency, Pierre Gemayel only got five votes, while Charles Helou got ninety-two. It has been asserted that Gemayel had become President Shihab's principal Maronite ally, and Shihab had favoured Gemayel for presidential office.[39] Since there was not enough support for Gemayel, Helou was elected, and he followed policies similar to Shihab's. As it was, however, Gemayel, with backing from the Dashnak, as well as the Phalange, managed to retain his seat as East Beirut's representative.

Also in 1964, Sadr established the Burj al-Shimali Technical Institute with funding from Shia benefactors, bank loans, and the Lebanese Ministry of Education. He had approached the Iranian Embassy for financial assistance, but the Shah was not feeling very charitable towards the religious elements, it being so soon after the riots of June 1963. Both the Shah and SAVAK chief Gen. Pakravan blamed President Nasser for these riots, but a number of clerics were arrested for playing a leading role in them.[40] Sadr, furthermore, had been one of several clerical signatories to a letter to the Shah which listed objections to Iranian governmental policies (such as women's enfranchisement, ties with Israel, and land reform). When confronted with this, Sadr assured the Embassy that he was only going

---

38. Interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); letter from Pashai to the author (26APR93).

39. Interview with Munah Solh; in W.R. Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976*, (London, 1985), p. 75.

40. On the role played by the religious community in the 1963 riots, see 'Politico-Economic Assessment: Iran: March-September, 1963,' Department of State Airgram A-231, 8OCT63, (FOIA); and on the arrests of clerics, see 'Year-End Report on the Political Situation in Iran,' Department of State Airgram A-361, 31DEC63, p. 7, (FOIA). On the suggestion that Nasser was behind the unrest, see *New York Times*, (6JUN63), p. 1, and *The Times* (of London), (6JUN63), p. 12.

through the motions, in an attempt to strengthen his credibility with the Shia clergy. Sadr reassured the Embassy of his continued friendliness and loyalty.[41]

Although Sadr worked through the established political system in order to show his fidelity to Lebanese institutions, he followed a path which differed from that which was considered acceptable for a cleric. In what has been termed the Shias' 'quietist interpretation', the belief that man must bear the burden of being the oppressed minority until the return of the Twelfth Imam, it was traditional for a cleric not to get involved in politics, thus absolving him of responsibility. According to this viewpoint, one must accept what one gets, even if it includes death, just as Hussein did at Karbala. To bring about social reform would require greater commitment, but clerics were not expected to be active, they were supposed to be interested in religious scholarship.

This was not the route that Sadr chose, because he wanted Islam to be more than ritual. In his writings, too, Sadr endorsed the activist role for a cleric, embodying the Shia expectation that a religious leader also had political obligations. He tried to attract civil servants and lawyers to a movement under his leadership, although such people normally resisted the clerics. He took advantage of this by condemning religious figures who kowtowed to people in power. This was not a way to earn friends, and old-style politicians tried to portray Sadr as a client of the Lebanese intelligence service, while the old-style clerics wanted him to conform to their restrictive system.

Sadr's criticism of the land-owners came at a bad time for them. They were already suffering a loss of influence because many of their clients were going to the cities. This urban migration was encouraged when Southerners fled their homes as a result of military activities. These events coincided with Sadr's increase in public exposure. The beys' loss, therefore, was the Sayyid's gain, as the newly urbanised Shia heeded his rallying call. One of Sadr's targets was Kamil al-Assad (Kamil Bey), who in 1964 had been made Speaker of Parliament, the highest position to which a Shia could rise. They competed for power in the Supreme Shia Council (*Al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-A'la*), where Sadr was elected

41. Interview with Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark).

chairman. Another target was Kazem al-Khalil (Kazem Bey), who had been a government minister in 1958. The beys retaliated with claims of Sadr's sexual improprieties.[42]

Throughout the 1960s, Sadr's leadership position among the Shia continued to improve, and some even ascribed certain charismatic qualities to him, referring to him as 'imam'. In Shia tradition, a mujtahid was not supposed to claim the traits of an imam, which were *baraka*, divine charisma, and *ma'sum*, moral infallibility. The followers of certain charismatic mujtahids, however, sometimes attributed such divine powers to their preferred clerics. This, of course, distinguished the mujtahid from the common man, who was seen as weak, sinful, and given to temptation.[43] In Arabic, furthermore, the term 'imam' is used to signify the leader of any organized group activities, particularly prayers.

During the 1960s, however, relations between Sunnis and Shias continued to deteriorate. Sunnis were city-dwellers, while Shia peasants, even after coming to the cities, stood out. Even the wealthier Shia never fit in. The few Shia, such as civil servants or physicians, who succeeded were resented and envied by other Shia. Yet the Shia took pride in being in the minority, seeing Sunni Moslems as an illegitimate group which did not have a proper understanding of Islam as it had been passed down through the Imams.

III. The Palestinians' Influence

When the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created by the Arab League in 1964, the Lebanese government insisted that no Palestinian troops should be stationed in Lebanon. This concern was natural, but it was unrealistic, and eventually hypocritical, to hope that the PLO would avoid Lebanon. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Palestinian refugee camps had existed in Lebanon since the creation of the state of Israel. Secondly, the Sunni Moslem populace of Lebanon sympathised with the Palestinian cause. Thirdly, the Lebanese Army, emboldened by the outbreak of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, had briefly trained dozens of Palestinians at Army facilities in the South.[44] Finally,

---

42. H. Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, (London, 1985), p. 172.

43. M. Zonis & D. Brumberg, 'Khomeini, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab World,' *Harvard Middle East Papers*, Modern Series: n. 5, (Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp. 5-6.

44. Y. Sayigh, 'Turning Defeat Into Opportunity: The Palestinian Guerrillas after the June 1967 War,' *Middle East Journal*, v. 46, n. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 260.

the first chief of the PLO, Ahmad Shukeiri, lived in Lebanon until 1968, and it was believed that the grounds of his summer residence were used for the training of PLO guerrillas.[45]

In January 1965, *Fatah* (a PLO faction) began raids on Israel, mainly from Jordan, but also from Lebanon and Syria, resulting in Israeli retaliatory raids. The retaliatory principle eventually expanded, and Israel launched raids on Lebanon in return for PLO attacks on targets outside Israel, such as the attack on an Israeli aircraft in Athens airport or the killings of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Israel used all of its military resources for these attacks, from airstrikes to raids by commandos from Unit 269 (*Sayaret Matkal*, the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit). The Israelis selected targets like high-ranking PLO officials and the headquarters of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), but they also attacked seven guerrilla training centres in the Nahr el Bared and Badawi refugee camps, where Palestinians, Chinese, Japanese, Turks, Cypriots, and Iranians had been trained.[46]

Palestinian operations and Israeli counter-operations forced the Lebanese government to act. In April 1969, the Lebanese government declared a state of emergency, and in May, the Lebanese Army initiated operations against the Syrian-backed *Al-Saiqa*, which had established itself in South Lebanon. In October 1969, fighting resumed after the guerrillas violated an agreement not to move near inhabited areas and expose civilians to Israeli reprisals. An agreement between the Lebanese government and the PLO was reached in late-1969, but soon thereafter (January 1970), a number of Palestinian units based in Amman accused the Lebanese government of trying to restrict guerrilla activities. Clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerrillas, after a brief hiatus, took an upward surge in 1972-1973.[47]

To gain acceptance in the Arab world, Sadr had to be pro-Palestinian, but relations between the PLO and Sadr were never harmonious. When the PLO moved into southern

---

45. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 26.

46. *Keesing's*, 1965-1966, pp. 21515-21516; 1969-1970, p. 23216; 1971-1972, pp. 25501, 25644; 1973, pp. 25757, 25868.

47. *Keesing's*, 1969-1970, pp. 23520, 23704, 23843; 1971-1972, p. 25644; and 1973, p. 25932.

Lebanon, Sadr's warnings that this would be counter-productive were ignored. When the PLO and the Lebanese Army clashed in 1972-1973, Sadr criticized the Sunnis for supporting the guerrilla forces, criticized the government for not defending the south from Israel, and criticized the PLO for shelling, and thus provoking, Israel. Sadr said the PLO was a factor in the south's anarchy, and he also accused the PLO of being a military organization that terrorised the Arab world, using extortion to gain money and sympathy. The PLO saw Sadr as a creation of the Lebanese *Deuxième Bureau* or an agent of the United States.[48]

When the PLO was pushed into Lebanon, the Maronite elites lost interest in Sadr, who had been courting them because of their shared anti-Sunni interests. Sadr was prepared for this contingency, because he had been cultivating Syrian President Hafez Assad. In a late-1969 meeting of the Supreme Shia Council, Sadr had stated that the Alawi sect, of which Assad was a member, was a part of Shia Islam, and in 1973, Sadr issued a *fatwa* that Alawis were a Shia community. Syria's Sunni majority had traditionally ruled the country, and they had questioned whether Alawis were really Moslems, so the passage of this fatwa was very helpful to Assad.[49] The Alawis needed quick religious legitimacy, and the Lebanese Shia needed a powerful patron, so both sides gained.

Such pragmatism led Sadr to change political partners frequently. While this may have been done with the sole purpose of advancing the Shia cause, it lost Sadr needed support, because people could not tell where he stood, and they questioned his sincerity and his agenda. There was also some debate about whether he identified more with Arabs or with Iranians, because Sadr would talk about the 'Arabian Gulf', but there were a number of Iranians in his entourage, and he would often meet with SAVAK officers.[50]

In January 1975, both the Phalange and Chamoun's *Parti National Liberal* (PNL) made statements attacking the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon, and they then called for a

---

48. Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 43; Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 175.

49. P. Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, (London, 1988, 1990), p. 173.

50. Sadr's references to an 'Arabian Gulf' were taken out of context and used against him in Iran; see A.R. Nourizadeh, 'Imam Musa Sadr, In Imam Qaib-i Hazir,'*Rouzegar-e No*, v. 7, (fifth year), July-August 1986, p. 45; and Moq, 'Zindigi va Napadid Shudan-i Musa Sadr,' p. 46. Both Pashai and a SAVAK interviewee who requested anonymity met with Sadr often, and Maj. Gen. Mansour Qadar also claims to have met with Sadr often; see the reminiscences of Qadar in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS.

referendum on the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. In February, demonstrations by fishermen in Sidon resulted in fighting between civilians and the army. Chamoun, Gemayel, and other right-wingers supported the Lebanese Army and accused the PLO of inciting the violence. Then, on 10 March, Moslem leaders called for a change in the political balance of power so it would account for the increase in the size of the Moslem population. The Christians, naturally, opposed this suggestion.

By May 1975 the fighting between various armed factions had reached such a level that the president was forced to appoint a government of military officers after the previous cabinet resigned. One of these armed factions, the *Fityan Ali* (the Knights of Ali), claimed an association with Sadr's *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (Movement of the Deprived), but this group was so brutal that Sadr disassociated his movement from it.[51] The Military Cabinet resigned only a few days later. On 27 June, Sadr began a fast in a Beirut mosque to protest the violence in Lebanon. Lebanese of all factions (Christian and Moslem) came to see him, as did his followers. On 1 July he was visited by Yasir Arafat and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdol Halim Khaddam. As a result of their meeting a national unity cabinet was formed, and the newly designated prime minister, Rashid Karami, appealed to Sadr to break his fast, which he did after having fasted for a total of five days.

Because he was seen as having clean hands and a peaceful alternative to the bloodshed, Sadr's appeal for peace achieved temporary success. Only five days later (on 5 July), however, he admitted to the formation of a Shia militia, Amal (*Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya* [Lebanese Resistance Detachments]). This revelation only came about after thirty - forty Shia from the Bekaa and from Beirut and their Fatah instructors were killed by a training accident in a camp in the Bekaa Valley. Yet even this was somehow turned to Sadr's advantage, when the funeral turned into a rally with chants for the 'Imam of the Disinherited' and the 'Imam of the Mojahedin'.[52] Amal's creation was an understandable indication of the Shias' need for fighters, since the Palestinians and Maronites already had militias, and the Druze had a long martial tradition.

---

51. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 104.
52. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 169.

IV. The Iranian Opposition

During the 1960s, the Iranian opposition to the Shah found that its domestic operational environment was not conducive to success. After the government's suppression of the June 1963 demonstrations, opposition units decided to make their activities more clandestine by moving some of their operations abroad. Many of these opposition groups, inspired by the armed struggles taking place in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, decided to pursue violent means to achieve their goals.

The *Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran* (Liberation Movement of Iran, LMI[abroad]) leadership decided that armed struggle was necessary if the Shah's regime was to be defeated, so a search for a foreign sponsor was initiated. Meetings in Algeria did not bear fruit, but Egyptian President Nasser was willing to aid the LMI(a). Ebrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, and Mustafa Chamran went to Egypt and Chamran ran their organization's guerrilla training program. In 1966, they left Egypt, because, for the Iranian nationalists, Nasser's Pan-Arab and anti-Iranian behaviour was no longer tolerable.[53]

In 1970, Chamran moved to Lebanon. Lebanon came to serve as the base for LMI(a) Middle East operations, and it was also a place from which the LMI(a) could maintain contact with the People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI). Chamran settled outside of Tyre as director of Burj al-Shimali Technical Institute, which by now provided ideological as well as technical training.[54] The school happened to be near a PLO camp, and since some LMI(a) members had been trained in Egypt by Fatah, their relations improved after 1970. The Iranian Mojahedin also got training at PLO camps.[55] Mojahedin and LMI(a) relations,

---

53. H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini*, (London, 1990), pp. 198-199. Yazdi would later state that he had filled the years between 1963 and 1967 by lecturing at the American University of Beirut; see 'Biographic Information on Deputy Prime Minister Ebrahim Yazdi,' State Department Cable, 26MAR79; in *Asnad*, v. 18, p. 127.

54. Chamran (b. 1933) was well-qualified for his cover, since he had earned a BA, with honours, in electrical engineering at Tehran University, an MS at Texas A&M, and a Ph.D. in civil engineering at the University of California - Berkeley. He had also worked for Bell Laboratories in New Jersey. After going to California for graduate studies in 1961, Chamran founded the Muslim Students Association. He served as Islamic Iran's Defense Minister.

55. In exchange for training at Burj al-Shimali, the Iranians helped Fatah secure false documents, make travel arrangements, and acquire weapons; see Defense Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism: A Compendium, Volume II - Middle East (U)*; in *Asnad* v. 43, p. 19, 27.

however, soon deteriorated. After Amal and PLO relations deteriorated, LMI(a)-PLO relations also deteriorated. The LMI(a) was also in contact with Sayyid Musa Sadr, who introduced Ghotbzadeh, Yazdi, and Chamran to Syrian President Assad, and Ghotbzadeh had a Syrian passport and travelled with cover as a reporter for a Syrian newspaper.[56] Chamran helped found the Shia *Harakat al-Mahrumin* and had dealings with Amal, the Shia militia. Members of Iran's Islamic opposition got military training at Amal facilities.[57]

The PMOI was founded in 1965 by younger LMI members who had been radicalized by the events of June 1963. In mid-1968, the PMOI made contact with the PLO in Dubai and Qatar and arrangements were made to train PMOI volunteers at the Palestinians' camps. In July 1970, the first group of volunteers went to PLO camps in Jordan and Lebanon. From 1970 to 1979, a total of thirty PMOI personnel were trained at PLO camps.[58]

A number of Mojahedin activists were arrested and executed by the Iranian authorities in 1971-1972. At the same time, a split between the Mojahedin and the LMI appeared, since the LMI objected to the more radical of the Mojahedin philosophies. From 1972-onward, the Mojahedin worked to strengthen ties with revolutionary movements in other countries, meeting with representatives of the PLO, Libya, and South Yemen. The Mojahedin also stayed in contact with the Confederation of Iranian Students and the Islamic Student Association. A publication (*Bakhtar-e Emruz* [Today's West]) printed in Beirut by young National Front members who were sympathetic to Marxism gave the Mojahedin some publicity. Through its contacts with other opposition groups, the Mojahedin message got to many foreign-based Iranian students.[59]

---

56. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 195; Seale, p. 352. Ghotbzadeh (Islamic Iran's Foreign Minister) also linked up with a Paris-based terrorist-support service called *Solidarité;* see C. Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, (London, 1981), p. 55, and confirmed by a retired CIA officer in a confidential interview (11APR92). On Curiel, see also CIA, *International Terrorism in 1978*, (MAR79), p. 3.

57. Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 57.

58. E. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin*, (London, 1989), pp. 85-89, 98, 126-27; S. Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran,' *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1980, pp. 15-18.

59. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 137-39; DIA, *International Terrorism*, in *Asnad*, v. 43, p. 27. On the training of Iranians in South Yemen and their receipt of aid from the host government, see F. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987*, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 170.

Iran's militant Islamic opposition was headed by Aya. Khomeini from his exile in Najaf. Little is known about the underground network that Aya. Khomeini had established in the mid-1960s, although it is believed that it started with small cells organized by Aya. Muhammad Hussein Beheshti and Aya. Morteza Mottahari. It is known that it was a close circle including Mustafa and Ahmad Khomeini, and several frequent visitors, such as Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr (future President of the Islamic Republic), Chamran, Yazdi, and Aya. Mahmud Taleqani. Over time, this network grew, but its members did not participate in anti-regime violence until 1978. Instead, they concentrated on propaganda, recruitment, and organization. The Khomeini camp maintained contact with the LMI(a) and may have provided money for the PMOI.[60]

Members of these cells also received guerrilla training in Lebanon. There was some participation in activities at Amal facilities. There were more extensive contacts with the PLO, however, particularly after the break by Sayyid Musa over Palestinian activities in the South. After Yasir Arafat met with Aya. Khomeini in Najaf, more formal ties were made between their two organizations, and trainees were sent to Lebanon. In an interview with Tehran Radio on 20 February 1979, the PLO's Hani el-Hassan made what seems like a highly exaggerated claim, saying that the PLO had trained 10,000 anti-Shah guerrillas.[61]

In March 1971, the *Sazeman-i Cherikha-yi Fedai Khalq-i Iran* (the Marxist Fedai) was formally established by two groups of Tehran University students who had decided to join up for anti-regime activities in 1970. One such group was led by students from Mashad. The other group included individuals who had gone to Lebanon and spent time at Fatah training facilities. The Fedai later received training in Lebanon from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), according to Bassam Abu Sharif, a PFLP spokesman. It

---

60. E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton, 1982), pp. 473-79; C. Mallat, 'Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon,' *Papers on Lebanon*, no. 7, (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, APR88), p. 12; S. Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*, (New York, 1984, 1986), pp. 38-40.

61. A. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution*, (London, 1985), pp. 166-67, 224, 254, 271; Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 63, 110, 244.

is the Marxist Fedai which is credited with starting Iran's guerrilla movement, when, on 8 February 1971, the gendarmerie post in the Caspian town of Siahkal was assaulted.[62]

V. Sadr's Break with the Shah's Government

The Iranian government's need to collect intelligence in Lebanon was obvious. Lebanon was the base for opposition organizations' martial operations. Lebanon was also, at the time, a centre of Middle Eastern intrigues, comparable to Lisbon during World War II or Vienna in Cold War Europe. In such an environment, however, Iranian access to important intelligence was severely limited for two reasons. Firstly, Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh had dismantled the Lebanese intelligence organization in 1970, because it had grown too powerful, having formed a virtual parallel administration.[63] Secondly, diplomatic ties between Tehran and Beirut had been broken on 2 April 1969.

The reason for the break in diplomatic relations was the presence in Lebanon of Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar had arrived in Lebanon on 2 May 1968 and was arrested and jailed for gun-running. The Iranian government sought his extradition to face 1967 charges of making an illegal fortune while heading SAVAK. In September 1969 he was tried *in absentia* and sentenced to death for treason. The Lebanese were reluctant to extradite Bakhtiar. The Turkish ambassador recommended that the Iranians bribe the Lebanese generously, but this failed to overcome the Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon's intervention, and Bakhtiar was allowed to leave Lebanon on 4 April 1969.[64]

Relations were not resumed until 16 July 1971, shortly after Camille Chamoun had met with the Shah in Tehran. The first Iranian ambassador to Beirut after the resumption of relations was Rokneddin Ashtiani, a diplomat from Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

---

62. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 483-89; on PFLP training for the Fedai, see 'Palestinian Activity in Iran,' 1979, in *Asnad*, v. 42, p. 92; and for Abu Sharif's statement, see Sterling, *The Terror Network*, p. 322 fn 24. See also Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran,' pp. 11-15.

63. Stoakes, 'The Supervigilantes,' p. 220.

64. *Keesing's*, 1969-1970, p. 23297, 23580; A. Alam (A. Alikhani, ed.), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), p. 38, 62. Another account has it that relations were broken when three employees of Lebanon's General Security Directorate were suspected of giving information to SAVAK; see Y. Caroz, *The Arab Secret Services* (London, 1975), p. 355. It is possible that Sadr spoke out in Bakhtiar's favour, because a close associate of Bakhtiar's, Sayyid Ahmad Tabatabai-Qomi, was related to Sadr, whose maternal grandfather was Aya. Qumi; letter from Pashai to the author (26APR93).

(MFA). Ashtiani was from a religiously-connected family, did very well with the local clerics, and was very popular with the Embassy employees. Ashtiani's deputy, Lavasani, was also an MFA diplomat with religious connections.

At this point, another character, Maj. Gen. Mansour Qadar, enters the story.[65] Born in 1923, Qadar attended the Military Academy and then served in Army Intelligence. He was transferred to SAVAK in 1958 and assigned to Department II (Foreign Intelligence Collection). He was given diplomatic cover as First Secretary and was assigned to the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, and when that was closed he was assigned to Beirut as a commercial attaché. In 1961, he was made the chief of the Middle East branch in Department II. About one year later he was made chief of Department II and stayed in this slot until late-1963. From 1964-1967, Qadar was stationed in Beirut as COS. From June 1967 to 1971-1972, Qadar served as SAVAK COS in Jordan with diplomatic cover as Iran's ambassador. He was then assigned to Lebanon as COS with cover as Ambassador, and served in this post until November 1978.

Qadar's career track differed from that of most military personnel, because of his duties and his political skills. He became a Brigadier General, then a Major General, through a series of 'exceptional promotions', thus moving up the ladder much faster than was normal. These promotions were considered unusual because normally one could not advance to General rank without receiving military higher education at the General Staff College, which Qadar did not. Furthermore, if a military officer transferred to and stayed in a civilian job over three years, he forfeited his right to return to the military for promotion purposes. Throughout this time Qadar earned a reputation as a man ambitious for the rank and the perks high office offered. Qadar could not tolerate anyone who did not agree with him completely, and he would set out to destroy those individuals who disagreed

---

65. Qadar declined three requests for an interview, once in MAY92 and twice in OCT92. Biographical information and information on his SAVAK career was secured in confidential interviews with four Department chiefs, two SAVAK COS's, two other SAVAK officers, two retired CIA officers, one MFA official, and from the reminiscences of Qadar in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS. An abbreviated version of Qadar's biography is presented in *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, v. II, *Jostarha-i as Tarikh-i Moaser-i Iran*, (Tehran, 1990), p. 479.

with him. He usually accomplished this through the Iranian bureaucratic art of *parvandeh sazi*, which calls for building a dossier of real and falsified personal information which can be used against one's enemies.

The COS Qadar replaced was Col. Abbas Shaghaghi, who had been transferred back to Tehran. This was because Shaghaghi had enemies in high places. Qadar had been lobbying to replace Shaghaghi and had built up a dossier against him, and Gen. Nematollah Nassiri, SAVAK's director, had disliked Shaghaghi since they had served together in the Imperial Guard in 1953.[66] Qadar also moved to replace Ambassador Ashtiani, accusing him of disloyalty based on Ashtiani's having served under Musaddiq's Foreign Minister, Hussein Fatemi.[67] When Qadar became the ambassador, he set about establishing his authority in the Embassy, reducing his MFA deputy, Kiafar, to translating documents. Several of the station's SAVAK officers requested transfers, and the MFA personnel staged a work slow-down.[68]

In late-1971 or early-1972, Sadr had travelled to Iran to ask the Shah for a contribution of $30 million to build a hospital and university complex. The Shah and Assadollah Alam, the Minister of Court, decided the money should come from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Red Lion and Sun Society (the Iranian Red Cross). When Qadar got word of this financial set-up, he was very unhappy. Qadar had Prime Minister Hoveida attempt to postpone the dispensation of the money. Qadar urged that the money come from the MFA, which would put it under his control. This would allow him to dispense the money to Sadr at his leisure, and it would also allow Qadar to take a cut. When the Shah heard of Qadar's interference, he angrily ordered that the hospital and univer-

---

66. The dossier on Shaghaghi contained claims that he had played a part in blocking Teimour Bakhtiar's extradition from Lebanon to Iran.

67. Musaddiq had been born into the Ashtiani 'clan', and Mohammad Hussein Ashtiani had allegedly phoned a warning to Musaddiq that Nassiri was on his way with the dismissal papers; see Dr M. Musaddiq, (H. Katouzian, ed.), *Musaddiq's Memoirs*, (London, 1988), p. 69.

68. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer serving in Beirut at the time.

sity project get underway immediately. When Qadar's plan was not utilized his animosity towards Sadr increased.[69]

Qadar also became hostile towards Maj. Janus, the SAVAK officer who had been given control of the Sadr account by Department III (Domestic Security) chief Gen. Nasser Moghaddam. This was because Janus, whose area of responsibility was the LMI(a) and the Lebanese Shia, was a member of SAVAK's Department III, which ran operations that by-passed the COS. (Overseas SAVAK stations were under the control of Department II, but events and personalities which affected the opposition to the Shah were dealt with by Department III). Janus was sympathetic when a delegation of the local Shia convinced him that Iran should support the Palestinians, and he also believed that such support could discourage the PLO from cooperating with the Iranian opposition. Janus travelled to Tehran and reported his new-found convictions to Parviz Sabeti, the new chief of Department III. Sabeti listened politely, then showed Janus a file which documented SAVAK's payments to the PLO leadership.[70]

Disillusioned and chagrined, Janus returned to his post. Qadar did not have any such illusions, and he decided that more agents were needed if good intelligence on the opposition was to be secured. Not content to expend his efforts on a little fish, Qadar decided he would recruit Lebanon's most high-profile Shia, Sayyid Musa Sadr. Qadar and Sadr had met in the early-1960s, during Qadar's first tour in Beirut as COS. At the time, however, Sadr was not enough of a political entity for Qadar to give him much notice. The original reason that Qadar's predecessor, Pashai, had paid attention to Sadr was because of the

---

69. On the proposed hospital and the Shah's reaction to Qadar's interference, see Alam, p. 301. Information on the proposed break-down of funding sources is from confidential interviews (16OCT92 & 29OCT92).

70. Confidential interview. On money from the Shah to the Palestinians, see Alam, p. 215. The existence of these payments was confirmed in confidential interviews, two with SAVAK Department chiefs and one with a SAVAK official who met with Arafat in Jordan. The Shah was funding Arafat because the PLO was a threat to King Hussein's rule, and Iran preferred a Hashemite Jordan to a Palestinian one. The Shah believed that the payments would help King Hussein preserve his throne. A Palestinian Jordan would be, furthermore, a direct threat to Iran's major regional ally, Israel. By May 1972, however, the Shah was sufficiently irritated by PLO training of Iranian terrorists that he considered termination of the funding.

perceived need to encourage the cleric's unwitting efforts on behalf of the Green Plan. With time, a friendship had developed between Sadr and Pashai.[71]

The desire to collect intelligence on the opposition was Qadar's purported reason for trying to recruit Sadr. It seems much more likely that Qadar's principal motivation was the desire to get his hands on the hospital money. Even a 5% cut would have earned him $1.5 million! Qadar put a great deal of pressure on Sadr to enter a case officer-agent relationship with him, but Sadr demurred,[72] protesting that he was a man of God. In a more precise and practical vein, he went on to say that it had taken him years to build up a good position in Lebanese politics. If people thought he was working for SAVAK, he would be completely discredited, as would all his work. After all, he would be very obvious, in his turban and *abba*, as he walked into the Embassy every day. Sadr had many enemies, from the beys to the PLO, who would be more than happy to denounce him as a SAVAK agent who got his daily orders from the Iranian Embassy. He told Qadar that he was a patriotic Iranian and loyal to the Shah, but he was not willing to let Qadar destroy all his efforts.

The Shah, receiving mixed reports on the situation from Sadr, Qadar, and Gen. Hossein Fardust, a close friend of both the Shah and of Qadar,[73] decided to turn the situation over to a disinterested party, Ambassador Bahrami in Egypt. During this time, Sadr was travelling extensively throughout the Middle East (usually accompanied by Chamran). A stop in Cairo, then, did not raise any suspicions. While in Cairo, Sadr met with the local SAVAK COS and Bahrami. Sadr told them that he was a sincere patriot, but his position as a religious leader made Qadar's proposal impractical. Bahrami had Sadr write out his comments, purportedly as an *aide-memoire* to Bahrami. Bahrami then forwarded this

---

71. Allegedly, the friendship between Pashai and Sadr involved them in plots against the Shah, when, in 1963, Teimour Bakhtiar visited Lebanon and met with Pashai, Khomeini representative Bahr al-Olum, Iranian embassy representative Parviz Atabaki, and Sadr at the Coral Beach Hotel in Beirut. At this meeting it was decided to send a $1 million contribution by Nasser to Iran to sponsor anti-Shah demonstrations. See 'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?', p. 44. Both Pashai and Atabaki were recalled and confronted with this story by SAVAK, and they both denied (and still deny) this story emphatically. Atabaki described the questioning he underwent in a letter in the author's possession.

72. See Nourizadeh, 'Imam Musa Sadr, In Imam Qaib-i Hazir,' p. 47.

73. Fardust's 'autobiography' states that Qadar, far from trying to recruit Sadr, actually furnished him with intelligence; see *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust*, (Tehran, 1980), pp. 468-71.

'letter', in which Sadr again declared his patriotism and loyalty to the Shah, as his report to Iran. When the Cairo COS's report matched Bahrami's, Qadar contacted the COS and accused him of calling Qadar a liar. The Cairo COS stuck to his position that Qadar was in the wrong, and Sadr was a loyal Iranian who would be of the greatest help to Iran if he was allowed to operate unhindered.[74]

A firm conclusion was not reached, so a commission, consisting of Manucher Zelli (former Ambassador to Lebanon), Abbas Ali Khalatbari (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Nassiri, and Sabeti, met to discuss the issue. Nassiri stated that the issue concerned Iran's security, it was out of the diplomats' domain, and Sabeti should decide what to do. The MFA officials deferred to the SAVAK officers out of their fear of SAVAK and their recognition of the fact that the Shah paid greater heed to Nassiri. The result of these meetings, then, was not what Sadr had hoped for. It was decided that Sadr should enter a case officer-agent relationship with Qadar, and he again demurred. The reward for his stubbornness was withdrawal of his Iranian citizenship.[75]

Janus was never consulted, and he was unwilling to report his own views. This reluctance stemmed from several factors. The first was the man's relative youth (he was thirty-three years old) and newness to the job, which resulted in self-doubt. His superiors, furthermore, would discount his views because of his youthfulness. The second was the way that Qadar ran the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. He was authoritarian and would brook no second-guessing from his staff. Both he and Janus were military officers, so Janus instinctively deferred to his superior and obeyed orders. Finally, Janus had no way of appealing or going over Qadar's head. To do so would have been anathema to a military officer. Qadar was, furthermore, very close to Fardust, who not only had the Shah's ear for reasons

---

74. Information on Sadr's trip to Cairo is from interviews with the Cairo COS, Janus, and two SAVAK Department chiefs. Information on the actual meeting was confirmed by the COS. The two Department chiefs personally saw the letter, as did the COS.

75. From the sources in the previous footnote. The withdrawal of citizenship or suspension of passports was a common SAVAK method for dealing with expatriate Iranians who were believed to be opposed to the Pahlavi government. Said trouble-makers would be kept out of Iran so their revolutionary ideas would not infect the general population. The only thing this tactic really accomplished was further irritation of the person whose passport was being held. For a discussion of this tactic, see the interview with Gen. H. Alavi-Kia, (1MAR83, Paris), by H. Ladjevardi for the IOHP.

of personal friendship, but was also a very high-ranking intelligence officer, being chief of the Special Intelligence Bureau (*Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at*) and the Imperial Inspectorate Organization (*Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi*), both of which functioned as oversight organizations.

By 1974, the Shah was considering termination of support for the Lebanese Shia and Sadr. Sadr's behaviour had not been living up to the Shah's expectations, and the Shah believed that Sayyid Musa was getting paid off by Iraq and Libya. The Shah decided to give Sadr one last chance to terminate his contacts with countries hostile to Iran. To this end, Qadar was ordered to relay the Shah's sentiments to the cleric.[76] In light of the fact that Sadr did not conform with the Shah's suggestion, and in light of Qadar's record of animosity towards Sadr, it is questionable whether Qadar actually relayed the Shah's comments. In fact, Qadar tried to have Sadr replaced as head of the Supreme Shia Council by Sayyid Hussein Shirazi, an Iraqi-born mullah who had been expelled from Najaf by the Baathist government, but he did not succeed.[77]

Expectation of Sadr's cooperation was justified, since his activities had benefited from the Shah's largesse. It is not clear what Sadr thought he was getting paid for. Sadr could not have realistically thought that the payments were made out of any religious conviction or real desire to help the Shia of Lebanon. When Qadar demanded Sadr's cooperation, however, the Sayyid balked. Qadar was justified in persisting if his desire to recruit Sadr as an agent was real. Sadr had been friendly with the Iranian government and its representatives, and there is no doubt that a gift of $30 million would have ensured that he stayed friendly. Qadar's strong-arm tactics and the final decision by Qadar to revoke Sadr's passport put an end to that.

Sadr's political standing improved from 1974-1976. As a show of Sadr's success in getting Lebanon's Moslems to show unity, in May 1974 Lebanon's Supreme Official Islamic Council declared its support for the Shia, and in September the Executive Committee of the

---

76. Alam, p. 366. The belief that Sadr had improved his relations with Iraq, and that he may have received Iraqi money in early-1974, is repeated in Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 41.

77. Confidential interviews (16OCT92 & 30DEC92); confirmed by Ambassador. Jafar Raed (27APR93, London). On Shirazi, see Shapira, 'The Imam Musa al-Sadr,' p. 139.

Islamic Associations presented the government with a list of Moslem demands which included the demands of the Supreme Shia Council.[78] To show his national-, rather than Shia-only spirit, Sadr participated in the Greek Catholic metropolitan's movement, *al-Harakat al-Ijtima'iyya*, and his sister, Sayyida Rabab, encouraged Lebanese Shia females towards greater political activity. By September 1975, Lebanon was in a state of civil war, with clashes between the Phalange, the PLO, conservative Christians, left-wing Moslems, the Druze, and the Shia. As the civil war worsened, Sadr's criticism of Druze leader Kamal Junblat and of the PLO increased. Sadr's criticisms were not well received, and several attempts were made on his life in Summer 1976.[79]

Sadr also became openly hostile towards the Iranian government, accusing the Shah of suppressing religion in Iran, criticizing the Shah's pro-Israel stance, and calling him an 'imperialist stooge'. When Ali Shariati, an opposition figure, died in 1977, Sayyid Musa officiated at his burial at Zeinabiyeh, the tomb of Imam Hussein's sister. (On Shariati, see Ch. 9). Finally, in Spring 1978, when Iran sent troops to Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a number of its members were SAVAK personnel charged with identifying Sayyid Musa's Iranian followers.[80]

VI. Conclusion

By following Sayyid Musa Sadr through his career in Lebanon, one sees how the Shah of Iran tried to influence Lebanese affairs via SAVAK, his secret policy instrument. The Green Plan, as it was first conceived, was supposed to discourage the Lebanese Shia from supporting Nasser by winning their loyalty through the provision of money, teachers, schools, and perhaps even a mullah.[81] Sadr gained the support of the Lebanese Shia, and

---

78. Halawi, *A Lebanon Defied*, p. 190.

79. Theroux, *Strange Disappearance*, p. 41; R. Calis, 'The Shiite Pimpernel,' *The Middle East*, (NOV78), p. 52.

80. Norton, *Amal and The Shia*, p. 41; Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 209-10; Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 220; J.K. Cooley, 'Shah promotes security in Lebanon,' *Christian Science Monitor*, (19APR78), p. 7.

81. Opposition member and former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar's frequent assertions that Sadr had been sent to Lebanon by the Shah have been referred to as 'unsubstantiated' by G.E. Fuller; see C. Bakhtiar, *Ma Fidelité*, (Paris, 1982), p. 217; Bakhtiar interview with Theroux, *Strange Disappearance*, p. 15; G.E. Fuller, *The "Center of the Universe", The Geopolitics of Iran*, (Boulder, CO: 1991), p. 121. It is not inconceivable that Shahpour Bakhtiar talked about Sadr with his cousin, Teimour Bakhtiar, particularly after

he taught them to think as a community. The Green Plan, geared as it was towards the Shia community, the fastest growing and changing part of the Lebanese populace, was bound to succeed. The success of the other operations was not so clear. From the 1958 provision of military aid to Chamoun onward, they were geared mainly towards helping conservative Christian politicians win office, but from 1958-onward, other Lebanese minorities were demanding and gaining a greater voice in national affairs. This expansion was initiated by President Shihab, and continued by Presidents Helou and Frangieh.

By the 1970s, the Shah needed intelligence on the Iranian opposition which was being trained in Lebanon. Sayyid Musa would have been very useful as a source of intelligence and an agent-of-influence in dealing with the opposition. Through Qadar's interference, Sadr's potential was lost to the Iranian government. This was one of the major reasons why SAVAK failed to counter the armed opposition that participated in the eventual overthrow of the Shah of Iran.

---

the General became openly opposed to the Shah. Shahpour Bakhtiar, furthermore, had a number of former SAVAK personnel in his entourage after leaving revolutionary Iran, and he could have learned about Sadr's possible involvement with the Iranian government through the former SAVAK officers.

CH. 9. SAVAK ,THE OPPOSITION, AND THE REVOLUTION: 1970-1979

I. The Opposition

During the 1960s, the Iranian opposition to the Shah found that its domestic operational environment was not conducive to success. After the government's suppression of the June 1963 demonstrations, many opposition units decided to make their activities more clandestine. Successors to the National Front, such as the *Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran* (Liberation Movement of Iran, LMI), and the People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI) moved some of their operations abroad. They extended their contacts with organizations like the Confederation of Iranian Students and the Islamic Students Association, which were composed of Iranians studying in Europe and North America. Many of the opposition groups, inspired by the armed struggles taking place in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and by the Shia concept of martyrdom, decided to pursue violent means to achieve their goals. In their own words:

> The Uprising of 5 June (15 Khordad) is one of the most important events in all Iranian history and the most bloody event in contemporary Iranian history. It has forced us to draw the following three conclusions: first, that the clerical leaders have a crucial role to play in the struggle against the Shah and against imperialism; second, that the progressive secular forces must work together with the religious ones against the tyrannical regime; and third, that the unarmed struggle – however popular and widespread – cannot possibly succeed against such a bloodthirsty regime. The only way to bring down this detestable regime is through a concerted armed struggle.[1]

To achieve this end they sought the support of the Shah's foreign enemies.

A. Liberation Movement of Iran (abroad)

The LMI(a) was one of the groups which had decided to pursue an armed struggle to defeat the Shah's regime, so its leadership initiated a search for a foreign sponsor. A Paris-based LMI member was sent to Algiers to arrange for training by the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) in military skills. The Algerian connection did not work out, and final arrangements were made with Egypt. In December 1963, Ebrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, and Mustafa Chamran went to Egypt, and in July 1964, these three established *Sazeman-i Makhsus-i Ittihad va Amal* (SAMA, Special Organization for Unity and Action).

---

1. 'The Lessons of 15 Khordad,' *Iran-e Azad* 62 (JUN-JUL69); in E. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin*, (London, 1989), p. 85.

Chamran (the future Defense Minister in the Islamic Republic) ran SAMA's guerrilla training program. After 1964, translated copies of the Communist-inspired guerrilla tracts which Chamran and Yazdi had been collecting were sent to Iran for young LMI members. The relationship with Egypt was not as fruitful as the LMI(a) had hoped, because, for the Iranian nationalists, Nasser's Pan-Arab and anti-Iranian behaviour was no longer tolerable. For example, Nasser wanted the LMI(a) to broadcast anti-Shah statements on Radio Cairo, while the LMI(a) preferred to continue preparations for armed struggle. So in 1966, SAMA left Egypt and effectively disbanded.[2]

In 1970, Chamran moved to Lebanon. Lebanon came to serve as the base for LMI(a) Middle East operations, and it was also a place from which the LMI(a) could maintain contact with the PMOI. Chamran settled outside of Tyre as director of the Burj al-Shimali Technical Institute, which had been established by Sayyid Musa Sadr, Lebanon's most prominent Shia figure. (On Chamran's qualifications for this job, see Ch. 8). Originally established as a vocational school, by 1970 the Burj al-Shimali Technical Institute also provided ideological training. The school happened to be near a PLO camp, and since some LMI(a) members had been trained in Egypt by Fatah, their relations improved after 1970. The Iranian Mojahedin also got training at PLO camps.[3] Mojahedin and LMI(a) relations, however, soon deteriorated over ideological issues. After Amal and PLO relations deteriorated in 1973-1974, LMI(a)-PLO relations also deteriorated.

The LMI(a) relationship with Sayyid Musa Sadr was also helpful in their pursuit of outside sponsors. It was probably Sadr who introduced Ghotbzadeh, Yazdi, and Chamran to Syrian President Hafez Assad, and Ghotbzadeh was issued a Syrian passport and trav-

---

2. H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini,* (London, 1990), pp. 198-199. On Yazdi, see 'Biographic Information on Deputy Prime Minister Ebrahim Yazdi,' State Department Cable, 26MAR79; in *Asnad,* v. 18, p. 127.

3. The US Government believed that in exchange for training at Burj al-Shimali, the Iranians helped Fatah secure false documents, make travel arrangements, and acquire weapons; see Defense Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism: A Compendium, Volume II - Middle East (U);* in *Asnad* v. 43, p. 19, 27.

elled with cover as a reporter for the Syrian newspaper *al-Thawra*.[4] Ghotbzadeh (who eventually became Islamic Iran's Foreign Minister) also linked up with Egyptian-born Henri Curiel, who ran a Paris-based terrorist-support service called *Solidarité*.[5] Ghotbzadeh maintained contacts with the KGB's Paris resident (Chief of Station) and with French and Italian Communist Party members, too.[6] Chamran helped Sadr found the Lebanese Shia *Harakat al-Mahrumin* in March 1974, and as a 'military expert', Chamran had dealings with Amal, the Shia militia.

B. People's Mojahedin of Iran

The PMOI was founded in 1965 by younger LMI members who had been radicalized by the events of June 1963. This group spent the next three years studying, reading, and discussing books on religious, political, and historical issues. They also read some of the revolutionary classics, such as Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*. The PMOI's ideology combined Marxist social theories and Islamic religious thought, and it advocated armed struggle and the Shia concept of martyrdom.[7]

In mid-1968, the PMOI made contact with the PLO. A PMOI member (Hossein Ruhani) was sent to Paris to ask Fatah to train PMOI volunteers at the Palestinians' camps. This quest was not successful, but contacts were made in Dubai and Qatar. In July 1970, the first

---

4. F. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon*, (London, 1986), p. 195; P. Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, (London, 1988, 1990), p. 352.

5. See C. Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, (London, 1981), p. 55, and confirmed by a retired CIA officer in a confidential interview (11APR92). Curiel was jailed in France until 1962 for his connections with the Algerian FLN, and he was allegedly close to the PLO. It is believed that Solidarité provided assistance to Fatah, the Provisional IRA, the Red Brigade, and under a different guise, to the Red Army Faction. See G. Rosie, *The Directory of International Terrorism: The Definitive Reference Work on Terrorism*, (New York, 1986), p. 92, 268; Central Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism in 1978*, (MAR79), p. 3; J.-M. Bouguereau, 'Henri Curiel, Revolutionnaire de Tous Les Soupçons,' *Liberation*, (24APR84). It is not clear when Ghotbzadeh met Curiel, whether it was through the FLN, through Paris-based contacts, or through their Arab friends. In 1976, SAVAK hired Jules Khan Pira to assassinate Ghotbzadeh, but Pira tried, unsuccessfully, to extort money from his target instead; see J.-C. Guillepaud, 'Les tribulations d'un "tueur" de la Savak,' *Le Monde*, (8APR77), p. 2.

6. E.R. Oney, review of Rafizadeh, *Witness*, in *Intelligence Quarterly*, v. 3, n. 4, p. 4.

7. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 85-89, 98; S. Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran,' *Problems of Communism*, (JUL-AUG80), pp. 15-18.

group of seven volunteers (Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, Mohammad Bazargani, Ali Bakeri, Torab Haqshenas, Abdol Rasul Meshkinfam, Masud Rajavi, and Reza Rezai) went to PLO camps in Jordan and Lebanon. The training at these camps would last several months, and when one group finished, another group of six would be sent to the camps. From 1970 to 1979, a total of thirty PMOI personnel were trained at PLO camps.[8]

A number of Mojahedin activists were arrested and executed by the Iranian authorities in 1971-1972. At the same time, a split between the Mojahedin and the LMI appeared, since the LMI objected to the more radical of the Mojahedin philosophies. From 1972-onward, the Mojahedin worked to strengthen ties with revolutionary movements in other countries. Mojahedin representatives met with representatives of the PLO, Libya, and South Yemen. The Mojahedin also stayed in contact with the Confederation of Iranian Students and the Islamic Student Association. A publication (*Bakhtar-e Emruz* [Today's West]) printed in Beirut by young National Front members who were sympathetic to Marxism gave the Mojahedin some publicity, while PLO presses in Beirut published Tudeh (Communist) Party propaganda.[9] Through its contacts with other opposition groups, and with the help of a clandestine Baghdad-based radio station, the Mojahedin message got to many foreign-based Iranian students.[10]

C. Marxist Fedai

In March 1971, the *Sazeman-i Cherikha-yi Fedai Khalq-i Iran* (the Marxist Fedai) was formally established by two groups of Tehran University students who had decided to join up for anti-regime activities in 1970.[11] One such group was led by students from Mashad. The other group included individuals who had gone to Lebanon and spent time at Fatah training facilities. The Fedai later received training in Lebanon from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), according to Bassam Abu Sharif, a PFLP

---

8. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 126-27.
9. DIA, *International Terrorism* ; in *Asnad*, v. 43, p. 27.
10. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 137-39. On the training of Iranians in South Yemen and their receipt of aid from the host government, see F. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987*, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 170.
11. On the formation of the Fedai, see E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton, 1982), pp. 483-89.

spokesman.[12] It is the Marxist Fedai which is credited with starting Iran's guerrilla movement, when, on 8 February 1971, the gendarmerie post in the Caspian town of Siahkal was assaulted.

D. Islamic Opposition

For the purposes of this study, the group which is the most relevant is the Islamic opposition. Iran's militant clerical opposition was headed by Aya. Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini from his exile in Najaf. His political principles were defined in his work *Velayat-e Faqih: Hukumate-e Eslami,* but the main principles which he advocated were that the Shia clergy should have an active role in political life and that all believers in Islam should work to overthrow the non-Islamic state.[13]

Little is known about the underground network that Khomeini had established after his exile, although it is believed that it started with small cells organized by Aya. Muhammad Hussein Beheshti and Aya. Morteza Mottahari. It is known that it was a close circle including Mustafa and Ahmad Khomeini, and several frequent visitors, such as Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr (future President of the Islamic Republic), Chamran, and Aya. Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani.[14] Yazdi also visited Khomeini often, and in 1972, he was appointed as Khomeini's US representative. Over time, this network grew, but its members did not participate in anti-regime violence until 1978. Instead, they concentrated on propaganda, recruitment, and organization. In 1970, the Khomeini camp established contacts with overseas Iranian student associations, and during the decade, made contacts in the foreign media, among European parliamentarians, and with human rights organizations. The

---

12. On PFLP training for the Fedai, see 'Palestinian Activity in Iran,' 1979; in *Asnad,* v. 42, p. 92; and for Abu Sharif's statement, see Sterling, *The Terror Network,* p. 322 fn 24. See also Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran,' pp. 11-15. The Marxist Fedai's connection with George Habash's PFLP makes sense in light of his own Marxist tendencies and the PFLP's penchant, in the early-1970s, for very public, very violent, actions.

13. On *Velayat-e Faqih,* see Aya. R.M. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 27-150.

14. Taleqani had spent a great deal of time in the Shah's prisons, where he had won over some of the imprisoned Marxists with his own socialist-oriented and readily accessible interpretation of Islam; see R. Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran,* (New York, 1985), pp. 324-26. For some of his theories, see Aya. Sayyid M. Taleqani, *Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations,* (Berkeley, 1982).

Khomeini camp maintained contact with the LMI(a) and may have provided money for the PMOI.[15]

Members of these cells also received guerrilla training in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. There was some participation in activities at Amal facilities, with Ahmad Khomeini, Sadiq Tabatabai, Abbas Qafuri-Rad, and Muhammad Biravi undergoing training there.[16] There were more extensive contacts with the PLO, however, particularly after the break by Sayyid Musa Sadr over Palestinian activities in the South. Ahmad Khomeini trained at Fatah camps near Beirut, and he allegedly took part in Fatah operations in Lebanon. It is believed that Yasir Arafat met with Aya. Khomeini in Najaf, at which point more formal ties were made between their two organizations, and Khomeini issued fatwas that made it obligatory for Moslems to support the Palestinians. The first group of twelve trainees went to Lebanon in 1972 and finished its training in 1974. Among the Khomeini-followers trained in Lebanon by Fatah were Ho. Mohammad Montazeri, Aya. Montazeri's son; Mohammad Qarazi, the future Oil Minister;[17] Jalaleddin Farsi, Khomeini's special representative to the PLO; Aya. Ali Janati; Mohammad Mussavi-Khoeniha, mentor of the militants who occupied the US Embassy in Tehran; and Abbas Zamani (Abu Sharif), commander of the Revolutionary Guards and then Ambassador to Pakistan.[18]

In an interview with Tehran Radio on 20 February 1979, the PLO's Hani el-Hassan made what seems like a highly exaggerated claim, saying that the PLO had trained 10,000 anti-Shah guerrillas. A former prisoner of one of the revolutionary Komitehs claims

---

15. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 473-79; C. Mallat, 'Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon,' *Papers on Lebanon* 7, (Oxford, APR88), p. 12.

16. A.R. Norton, *Amal and The Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, (Austin, TX, 1987), p. 57. Ahmad Khomeini was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's son and was married to Sayyid Musa Sadr's niece. He served as his father's chief of staff after the Iranian revolution. Sadiq Tabatabai, the son of Ayatollah Tabatabai, was married to a sister of Sadr and was Ahmad Khomeini's brother in law. Tabatabai served as one of Ayatollah Khomeini's aides. Qafuri-Rad and Biravi later served as the Islamic Republic of Iran's minister of energy and Ambassador to Nicaragua, respectively.

17. In 1972, Qarazi was sentenced to a year in prison for his 'tenuous' links to the PMOI; see Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 130.

18. Information in this paragraph, unless otherwise noted, is from A. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution.*, (London, 1985), pp. 166-67, 224, 254, 271; and S. Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*, (New York, 1984, 1986), p. 63, 110, 244.

that his captors told him that they had all been trained by Palestinians. In a 1984 interview, Yasir Arafat claimed that Fatah had trained many members of the armed opposition, and there were also reports that Fatah had sent over 300 armed Palestinians to Iran from November 1978-onward. Although the exact nature and extent of the PLO relationship with the Iranian opposition is still unknown, Arafat has been quoted as saying 'that Khomeini could not have come to power without us, and that he could not have existed on his own without our support. He would still be living in exile today.'[19]

II. The War on Terrorism

A. Events

The Iranian terrorist campaign commenced when the Gendarmerie post in Siahkal was assaulted on 8 February 1971. The Siahkal group was rounded up after an extensive manhunt in the Caspian mountains, and thirteen of its members, including several students from Aryamehr University, were executed in March.[20] In April, the terrorists retaliated against the head of the military tribunal, Gen. Zia Farsiou, by shooting him and his teenage son. In May, three of those responsible for Farsiou's death were killed in a ten-hour gun-battle with security elements in Tehran.[21]

The celebration of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy was scheduled for October 1971. Top officials from sixty-nine countries had been invited to the multi-million dollar extravaganza, ensuring the presence of the world media. Recognizing that this would be an excellent opportunity for the armed opposition to score a major blow, the authorities rounded up thousands of potential trouble-makers. The PMOI's plan to disrupt the celebrations by destroying Tehran's main power plant went awry when the former Communist they approached for explosives betrayed them to SAVAK. The PMOI tried (unsuccessfully) to kidnap the Shah's nephew, Prince Shahram, so he could be traded for some of those who were imprisoned. They also staged a number of bank robberies, attacks on police posts, and bomb-

---

19. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah*, pp. 254; interview with M. Moussavi (25MAY93, Washington, DC); interview with Arafat in *Keyhan*, (5JUL84), as quoted in 'A Hand for Khomeini,' *The New Republic*, (24DEC84), p. 8.

20. See 'Student Disturbances at Universities in Tehran,' State Department Airgram A-136, 10MAY71, (FOIA).

21. *New York Times*, (8APR71), p. 4; (12APR71), p. 34. *The Times*, (26MAY71), p. 6.

ings.[22] In November 1971 there was an attempt to kidnap US Ambassador Douglas Macarthur II. (Seven leftist guerrillas were tried for this, and six were sentenced to life imprisonment in July 1973).[23]

In Spring 1972, sixty-nine of those arrested the previous year were tried before military tribunals. That January, Ahmad Rezai, Reza Rezai's brother, killed himself when his capture seemed imminent.[24] In February, five guerrillas were sentenced to death, while eight others got lengthy prison sentences.[25] In March, fifteen individuals were executed for terrorist crimes.[26] The government spread rumours that those who were not executed were granted clemency because they had cooperated with SAVAK. In early May, an American was killed in a bombing, and a Baghdad-based radio station took credit for several other bombings.[27] In May, a Tehran police station was attacked and a journal's offices blown up.

Later that month, President Richard Nixon visited Iran, providing the terrorists with a very high-profile target. Several bombs were set off during the visit, one damaging the US Information Service building in Tehran, another at the Iran-America Society, another at the Hotel International, others at the offices of General Motors, Marine Oil Company, and Pepsi-Cola, and yet another going off near the tomb of Reza Shah only hours before Nixon's scheduled visit. A third one injured Brig. Gen. Harold Price, a US military adviser, and killed his driver and a bystander. The Marxist Fedai launched eight other bombings. Security forces launched an intensive campaign against the perpetrators of these assaults, and on 30 July four terrorists were killed in a raid on a house in southern Tehran.[28]

In August 1972, the Jordanian Embassy was bombed during a state visit by King Hussein as revenge for the Black September of 1970. Later that month, Gen. Said Taheri, former head of prisons and a Police chief, was assassinated. In September, the Imperial Country Club, the Civil Defense Organization Centre, the Municipal Department Store, a Police

---

22. *The Times*, (1OCT71), p. 9. On the PMOI, see Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 128.
23. *The Times*, (18JAN72), p. 6; (2JUL73), p. 5.
24. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 129.
25. *The Times*, (2FEB72), p. 6.
26. *The Times*, (2MAR72), p. 8; (14MAR72), p. 6.
27. *The Times*, (18MAY72), p. 8.
28. *New York Times*, (1JUN72), p.1; (31JUL72), p. 21. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 140.

armoury, and a military exhibition hall were bombed. Also in September, the authorities fought a lengthy street-battle with a group of terrorists. In November, the authorities engaged a number of terrorists in a firefight, killing one and capturing four more.[29] Later that month, the authorities closed the Hosseiniyeh Ershad, a lecture hall and meeting place used by Islamic nationalists.[30]

In the first half of 1973, thirteen foreign-trained Iranians, including two convicted of involvement in Taheri's murder, were executed after being found guilty of sabotage and terrorism. The PMOI fought two street battles with the security forces and staged ten bombings. In June, Lieut. Col. Lewis Hawkins, a US finance adviser, was killed outside his house. Later that month, Reza Rezai of the PMOI, accused of killing Taheri and an American, was killed by the Police when he would not surrender.[31]

In January 1974, the trial of twelve individuals arrested the previous October for planning to kidnap the Shah and members of the Royal Family commenced. Two members of this group were sentenced to death, while the rest got prison sentences of varying lengths.[32] Also in January, a guerrilla was killed in a gunfight with the authorities.[33] In February, an Isfahan Police station was attacked. In April, the Bank of Oman, the British Embassy's gates, the Pan-American Oil Company, and a reception hall were bombed to protest a state visit by the Sultan of Oman. In mid-April, there was an attempt to blow up a security facility at Tehran University. In late-May, three buildings were bombed. In June, a Gendarmerie post and five factories were bombed, and when Henry Kissinger visited Iran, two more companies were bombed. In November and December, a number of student demonstrations took place.[34]

---

29. *The Times*, (30NOV72), p. 9. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 140-41.

30. On the founding of the Hosseiniyeh, see Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 202-204.

31. *New York Times*, (5JAN73), p.8; (29MAY73), p. 27; (3JUN73), p. 1; (17JUN73), p. 7. *The Times*, (12JAN73), p. 6; (29MAY73), p. 1. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 141.

32. *New York Times*, (3OCT73), p. 11; (7JAN74), p. 14; (3FEB74), p. 18. *The Times*, (3OCT73), p. 1; (7JAN74), p. 4; (10JAN74), p. 6; (24JAN74), p. 6; (18FEB74), p. 6.

33. *The Times*, (23JAN74), p. 6.

34. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 142.

In February 1975, the Gendarmerie post in Lahijan was attacked. In March, the warden of the Komiteh Prison was assassinated. In late-April, the death of nine prisoners was announced; Amnesty International suggested they had been tortured to death, but it later emerged that they had been executed.[35] In May, Col. Paul R. Shaffer, Jr., and Lieut. Col. John H. Turner of the US Air Force were assassinated, allegedly in retaliation for the deaths of the prisoners. In June riots took place in Qum, and in July, Hassan Hossnan, an Iranian employee of the US Embassy, was assassinated. Later in July, two individuals were arrested for the assassinations of Shaffer and Turner, and in August four more people were arrested in connection with the assassinations. (In January 1976, ten people were executed for the assassinations and one was sentenced to fifteen years in prison). In August, a police station was attacked.[36] Violence in the provinces also escalated, with a robbery and four assassinations in Hamedan, a bombing in Tabriz, harassing operations in Zanjan, and bombings in Mashad.[37]

In April 1976, three terrorists were killed in a gun-battle with the security forces. In May, Col. Gholam Reza Fardad, two other security officers, and eleven terrorists were killed in a gun-battle. Another terrorist died of his wounds while in the hospital. Later that month, ten terrorists and four pedestrians were killed in three separate shoot-outs in northwestern Tehran, and a bomb was detonated at an Israeli facility. In June, ten terrorists were killed in a street-battle near Mehrabad airport. In August, three American civilians were assassinated, and a week later three terrorists were killed and three were captured. At least five more members of the armed opposition were killed in October. In November, Bahram Aram and Mohammad Shafiiha were killed in battles with the authorities, Aram allegedly by his own grenade. In December, a member of the Marxist Fedai was executed after being charged with bombing an Isfahan hotel and killing its doorman. In December, two Tehran gun-battles saw the death of eight terrorists, the capture of eleven,

---

35. *The Times*, (23APR75), p. 9; *New York Times*, (18JUN79), p. 5.

36. *New York Times*, (22MAY75), p. 1; (11JUN75), p. 10; (4JUL75), p. 20; (30JUL75), p. 10; (12AUG75), p. 8; (1JAN76), p. 3; (24JAN76), p. 8. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 142, 166.

37. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 165.

and the seizure of guns, ammunition, explosives, documents, and two safe-houses.[38] In one of the December raids, according to a member of the Israeli Mission, many bystanders were killed, as were three counter-terrorism troops.[39]

B. Non-violent tactics

Lethal force, arrest, and torture were not the only weapons used against the terrorists. SAVAK also used disinformation and propaganda. It would be announced that some convicted terrorists were granted clemency because they had provided information about their comrades. Others would be killed and evidence would be planted that made it appear that other terrorist organizations were responsible for the deaths, thus encouraging rivalry. SAVAK's censorship powers ensured that government successes against the terrorists would be highly publicized, while successful acts of terrorism would not. The only publicity that the media did give the terrorists sought to emphasize the civilian casualties. Dead women and children made a strong impression on readers and viewers. The government made sure that funerals of security personnel killed by the opposition would be televised.

The writings of opposition ideologues, such as Ali Shariati, would be reprinted in newspapers, and articles praising them would be printed, making it appear as if they had cooperated with the government.[40] Some would be released if they recanted publicly. Parviz Nikkah, who had been imprisoned in connection with the 1965 attempt on the Shah's life (the Marble Palace Plot), recanted, and he went on to have a high position in the Ministry of Information.[41] In the case of Khosrow Golesorkhi this plan backfired, when he described publicly the Shah's government as corrupt, repressive, and illegitimate.[42] Students who had been involved in opposition organizations abroad would go on

---

38. *New York Times*, (28APR76), p. 19; (17MAY76), p. 7; (20MAY76), p. 42; (29AUG76), p. 1; (6SEP76), p. 5; (18OCT76), p. 18; (17NOV76), p. 8; (6DEC76), p. 14; (24DEC76), p. A7. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 166.

39. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, (6MAR77); in *Asnad*, v. 11, p. 55.

40. H. Algar, Introduction to A. Shariati, *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique*, (Berkeley, 1980), p. 13.

41. 'Recantation of Two Tudeh Party Members,' State Department Airgram A-185, 13JUN70, (FOIA).

42. J. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, (New Haven, 1988), p. 191.

television to announce how they had been deceived; in fact, they would say, Iran had progressed much more than they had been led to believe.

International organizations, alerted by the Iranian opposition and concerned individuals, began to investigate the methods used by the Iranian security forces against the terrorists. In September 1972, a United Nations (UN) panel reported that the Iranian government had been systematically denying people's human rights, using arbitrary arrests, secret trials, and executions. In March 1974, the UN was criticized for paying insufficient attention to human rights violations in Iran. In November 1976, Amnesty International published a report stating that there were 25,000-100,000 political prisoners in Iran and they were subject to torture. In January 1977, the US State Department countered with a classified report which said that there were only 100-150 people imprisoned in Iran for their political beliefs, while there were 2,800-3000 imprisoned for terrorism.[43]

The Shah responded to his critics by stating that those who were referred to as 'political prisoners' were in fact 'terrorists'. He later stated that there were '1,500 extreme leftists or Communists ... in jail for being caught red-handed conspiring against the state.' The Shah went on to denounce as Communist propaganda charges that there were 40,000 political prisoners in prison. By August 1976, the number of imprisoned terrorists, according to the Shah, was up to 3,500.[44]

In interviews, the Shah blamed the rise of terrorism on an 'unholy alliance between the extreme right and the extreme left, including some Iranian students abroad,' and Prime Minister Hoveida accused the Soviet Union, using Iraq as a proxy, of aiding the urban guerrillas.[45] To emphasize these charges, propaganda regarding the incompatibility of Marxism and Islam was disseminated. Government attempts to connect the rise of terrorism with foreign elements led to announcements regarding the capture of documents which connected the armed opposition with Libya and the PFLP, as well as statements by the Shah

---

43. *New York Times*, (21SEP72), p.18; (10MAR74), p. 1; (29NOV76), p. 5; (2JAN77), p. 1.

44. *New York Times*, (30SEP74), p. 6; (22MAR75), p. 31; (19MAY75), p. 2; (7AUG76), p. 32.

45. *New York Times*, (17JAN72), p. 3; C.L. Sulzberger, 'It's Everyone for Himself,' *New York Times*, (9FEB72), p. 39.

in which he criticized the PLO, which he had sponsored until being made aware of its connection with Iranian terrorists.[46]

C. Theory vs. Reality

The rise of Iran's terrorist problem in the early 1970s showed that no single security organization was capable of addressing the issue. The Police did not have sufficient information about the terrorists, and SAVAK did not have sufficient physical assets to tackle the problem. In recognition of these facts, the Joint Committee of the National Police and SAVAK was formed to deal with Iran's terrorism problems.

On one hand, the Joint Committee dealt with the terrorist problem with relative efficiency. This was achieved through the application of dogged detective work, and when the terrorists were identified and located, through the application of large amounts of firepower by special counter-terrorist groups, such as SAVAK's *Keyhan* units.[47] Yet the tactics used by the government (force, disinformation, and propaganda) could only achieve a short-term solution, and were more reflective of a military mind-set than an intelligence one.

A more long-term solution would have been the authorities' application of four of the principles to which a government should adhere to counter an insurgency.[48]

1. 'The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically stable and viable.'
2. 'The government must function in accordance with the law.'
3. 'The government must have an overall plan.'
4. 'The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.'

Examined individually, one can see that the Iranian authorities did not pay much heed to the above principles, particularly numbers three and four. Although there is no

---

46. *New York Times*, (23MAY76), p. 9; (22OCT76), p. A3, A27.
47. E.R. Oney, 'The SAVAK Émigré,' *Intelligence Quarterly* v. 4, n. 1 (NOV88), p. 10.
48. R. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, (London, 1966), pp. 50-57. An example of a book which gives 'the recipe for successful insurgency' is R. Taber, *The War of the Flea*, (London, 1965, 1969, 1970), p. 135. A useful analysis and critique of such theories is the review of D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton, NJ, 1988), in J. Wirtz, 'Counterinsurgency Paradigms,' *International Security* v. 14, n. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 184-194. There is no universally applicable theory for counter-insurgency, but in this author's opinion, terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla war must be viewed as political problems first and foremost.

'magic formula' for dealing with terrorism, it has been recognized that an overall strategy, rather than the adjustment of tactics, is necessary for a permanent solution to the problem.[49] As was shown above, the Joint Committee aimed more at treating the symptoms (violence) of the terrorist campaign, than at curing the disease (political dissatisfaction) itself. When, in 1977, terrorism resurfaced, SAVAK chief Nassiri was criticized for failing to keep up with Iranian political developments. Just as importantly, SAVAK was criticized for having failed to develop a counter-insurgency campaign and for being poor at public relations.[50]

The Iranian authorities pursued a short-term policy aimed at eliminating the terrorists. There was no attempt at determining what the terrorists' objections were.

> However unpleasant the political illness may be, to diagnose it accurately must be the first step in reducing the symptoms and ultimately controlling, if not curing, the disease.[51]

To have done so would have helped determine the legitimacy of the terrorists' complaints. Should their complaints have been legitimate, the government could have addressed them, thus eliminating the opposition's grounds for complaint. There was apparently no attempt to do so, although there was a branch in Department III charged with 'eliminating the peoples' discontent'. The SIB should have been able to, theoretically, determine the causes of public disgruntlement. Domestic information reviewed by the SIB came from the Police and SAVAK, however, so in theory the SIB would not have had anything which differed from what those organizations had. SIB did not have sufficient personnel, furthermore, to go out and collect raw information on public attitudes.

It was SAVAK's job to collect information, analyze it, and deliver the intelligence to the policymakers. Information was extracted from captured terrorists, often, if not usually, through torture. Such information was tactical, rather than strategic, in nature. An exam-

---

49. 'International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis,' *CIA Research Study*, (APR76), p. 33.

50. J.D. Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution*, (Bloomington, 1981), p. 25. Criticism of Nassiri was repeated in a telephone interview with former-Director of Central Intelligence and Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms (18MAY93).

51. S. Segaller, *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990's*, (San Diego, 1987, 1986), p. 24.

ple of this is the case in which the torture of one terrorist may produce the information which allows the saving of many lives.[52] In such cases, the information was time-sensitive, and this was the reason SAVAK personnel usually gave for using torture.[53]

Issues of morality aside, SAVAK's tactics were counter-productive for a number of reasons. (1) Information secured under duress is generally unreliable. (2) Terrorists would rather die than undergo SAVAK torture. There can be little doubt that opposition cadre exaggerated SAVAK's already bad reputation in an effort at strengthening the terrorists' determination to avoid capture. The terrorists would, therefore, fight to the death or just kill themselves, and government statements promising harsh measures against the terrorists only underlined their determination. (3) Opposition cadre knew that captured members would be tortured for whatever information they had, and that, sooner or later, they probably would divulge that information. For this reason, little information about upcoming operations would be disseminated, and the cadre would keep on the move, thus making their capture very difficult. (4) Government forces seemed to have little interest in actually capturing their opponents. For example, numerous terrorists were killed when 'grenades went off in their hands,' while others were 'shot while trying to escape.' The avoidance of paperwork was another reason given for the killing of terrorists, rather than their capture.[54] It has been suggested, furthermore, that counter-terrorist units, and elite military units generally, have been so hardened by their brutal training that they think little of inflicting pain on others.[55]

---

52. In terms of proportionality (the torture of one person to save, perhaps, hundreds), torture may have a 'plausible military utility', according to W.V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War*, (New York, 1981), p. 190.

53. Arguments which attempt to justify torture are discussed in R.S. Gerstein, 'Do Terrorists Have Rights?' in D.C. Rapaport and Y. Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, (New York, 1982), pp. 296-98.

54. Confidential interview (25JUN92); J. Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*, (New York, 1986), p. 438.

55. R. Beaumont, 'Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, v. 1, n. 1 (APR90), p. 69. This tendency was seen also during the campaign against the Italian Red Brigades in the 1980s; see B. Quarrie, *The World's Secret Police*, (London, 1986), p. 61.

SAVAK should have been trying to collect information of a strategic nature. It would seem that this should have been the primary objective of an intelligence organization.[56] Yet it did not seem that SAVAK was pursuing such information seriously. This information would have let the authorities know the organization's ideology, membership, plans for future operations, safe-houses, where its members trained and who trained them, and its foreign connections. Most importantly, it would have let the authorities know why the terrorists were pursuing such means to achieve their ends.

A counter-terrorism program which did emphasise the importance of intelligence was the Phoenix Program run by the Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS) in Vietnam.[57] Phoenix was designed to combat the Viet Cong (VC) Secret Police, which was the VC element responsible for assassinations and terrorism, by identifying VC members, welcoming defectors, capturing members, and killing members. Phoenix also intended to prevent VC supporters from aiding the VC fighters. Just as Phoenix suffered a reputation as an instrument of torture and assassination, based partly on the record of its predecessor, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, so did the Joint Committee, based partly on SAVAK's record and partly on the tactics used by personnel assigned to the Joint Committee and associated units. By this time, furthermore, SAVAK did not have any CIA advisers who could have passed on the lessons learned through Phoenix. Nor did the Iranian security elements cooperate with or provide information to the Americans with whom they were in contact.[58]

SAVAK could have tried to persuade captured terrorists to go back and act as agents-in-place. SAVAK methodology essentially precluded this option. Firstly, the prisoner had undoubtedly been kept in poor conditions and roughed up, so he or she had no sympathy for

---

56. The importance of intelligence in counter-terrorism was emphasised in a telephone interview with former-Director of Central Intelligence William Colby (19MAY93). S. Gazit and M. Handel, 'Intelligence Warfare against Terrorist Organizations,' *Maarachot*, n. 278 (JAN-FEB81), discuss the primary importance of human intelligence in this context.

57. Information on the Phoenix Program is from Ranelagh, *The Agency*, pp. 437-40; and a telephone interview with Colby (19MAY93).

58. *New York Times*, (21SEP75), p. 2. FOCUS Iran, 'An Intelligence Community Review of Reporting by Human Resources from the United States Mission in Iran,' (DEC76-JAN77); in *Asnad*, v. 8, p. 146.

his or her captors. Secondly, SAVAK or the Police had probably gone to the prisoner's family and harassed them. Thirdly, due to the prisoner's absence, there is little doubt that his or her colleagues would no longer trust him or her. In cases in which using agents-in-place is impractical, it has been suggested that the 'legal cadre' (those who have normal, legal day-to-day lives, but who are secret members of opposition or terrorist groups) be used as double-agents, and because they are free to travel and have access to both sides, would be less likely to be suspected.[59]

Through interrogation of captured terrorists, SAVAK could have identified the causes of dissatisfaction, and in this way, the authorities could have identified those who were most likely to enter the opposition's recruitment pool. SAVAK agents could have entered this recruiting pool and, one hopes, joined the terrorist organizations and eventually provided useful information. Such an approach usually takes time, and it is not easy, but it can produce incredibly useful information which quite possibly can lead to the arrest of the whole organization or the prevention of its operations.

It is not, admittedly, easy to secure information on any terrorist organization, for a number of reasons. As a result of the repression they face, terrorist groups are highly secretive in nature and are very slow to take new members into their midst, and if they are considering a person for membership, that person usually has to commit an act of violence to show sincerity and commitment. Once an individual has joined such a group, that person will find it very difficult to leave the group, due to the combination of the individual's sense of complicity in the group's violent acts, and the leader's general reputation for ruthlessness and threats to use violence against anyone who leaves the group.[60] In cases in which the former terrorist goes so far as to give testimony against his or her former colleagues, the terrorists have used persuasion or intimidation to get the converts to withdraw their testi-

---

59. O. De Forrest & D. Chanoff, *Slow Burn*, (New York, 1990), p. 63. The benefits of treating captured terrorists well are discussed in A. Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952-60: A study of military operations against Mau-Mau*, (Nairobi, 1976), p. 34, 47.

60. Segaller, *Invisible Armies*, p. 88.

mony, and they have also kidnapped and threatened to kill the relatives of those who rally to the government side.[61]

The Joint Committee's methods were not classics in terms of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency, nor were they textbook examples of the application of intelligence to such problems. They did succeed in putting a temporary halt to the Iranian terrorist campaign. That this was only a hiatus was the result of a two-fold problem. In the first place, there was not an adequate effort to penetrate the militant opposition. In the second place, it seems unlikely that determination of the causes of the peoples' dissatisfaction would have led to changes in government policies anyway, especially in light of such statements by the Shah: 'In our the country the young generation has no reason to be dissatisfied.'[62] The Shah's government had been operating in such a way that it was not able to open up the political system without major disruptions. For years, officials had been discouraged from making real decisions, and they shied from taking responsibility. The public did not see Iran's political parties (party after March 1975) as outlets for political expression. Finally, and most importantly, the Shah never believed that the Iranian public was ready for democracy.

D. 1977-1978 – *Ad Hoc* Groups

For a number of reasons, the Shah decided to open up the political system slightly. As a result of this breathing space, the opposition resumed its activism. The Joint Committee was still in operation. Several new groups were started at this time to act in support of the government. The existence of one such group came to light when Rahmatollah Moghaddam-Maraghei, a member of the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights (ICDFHR) and the founder of a party called the *Nehzat-e Radikal* (Radical Movement), complained that a group of young toughs with government cars was hanging around his house. He was told by a retired SAVAK official that these people were not from SAVAK, but were from a 'sub-group'.[63] These sub-groups did more than look

---

61. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

62. *Ettela'at*, (6JUL71); in Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, pp. 143.

63. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 230-32; State Department Memorandum of Conversation, (27APR78), in *Asnad*, v. 25, pp. 19-22.

tough: apparently, they placed small bombs in the homes and offices of Moghaddam-Maraghei and other ICDFHR members to warn them off such activism.[64] These sub-groups may have been from the Underground Committee of Revenge.[65]

Meetings of opposition members were often disrupted by the arrival of 'patriotic workers'.[66] Such patriotic and popular groups were institutionalized, in Isfahan, at least, with the establishment of Civil Defense Organization (CDO) 'Action Squads' (also known as Resistance Corps Units). The Action Squads, which consisted of armed military personnel in insignia-free uniforms, beat up members of the opposition, then turned them over to the police, permitting the Iranian government the ability to deny any connection.[67]

After Gen. Nasser Moghaddam replaced Nassiri as chief of SAVAK, several new counter-insurgency instruments were brought into play. A five-man committee, headed by Gen. Hossein Fardust and including Martial Law Administrator Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi, Gen. Parviz Khosrovani, businessman Jalal Ahanchian, and the Royal Court Master of Ceremonies, was charged with organizing pro-Shah demonstrations.[68] Another five-man committee dealt with the press and propaganda.[69] There was also the Mihan Committee, which had been formed to coordinate 'operations designed to confuse and divide the Islamic Movement by producing and distributing false leaflets.'[70] The Mihan Committee coordinated its activities with the Joint Committee. There were also *agents provacateur* actions led by SAVAK. Clashes in Kerman, Rezaieh, Gorgan, and many other cities may have been a result of these actions. It was alleged, furthermore, that Parviz Sabeti, who had been in charge of the Joint Committee until his retirement, had claimed credit for these in-

---

64. 'Dissident Statements About Iran,' State Department Airgram A-94, 22JUN78, (FOIA).

65. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 508.

66. *New York Times*, (24NOV77), p. 15.

67. Information on the CDO Action Squads is from, 'Disturbances in Isfahan,' State Department Airgram, (6MAY78), in *Asnad*, v. 61, p. 106-111.

68. 'Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-measures,' State Department Telegram, (5NOV78); in *Asnad*, v. 63, p. 12. See also, J. Ahanchian, *The Plot of a King's Fall: The Memoirs of Jalal Ahanchian*, (Mill Valley, CA, 1982).

69. 'Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-measures'.

70. T. Plate & A. Darvi, *Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror*, (London, 1981), p. 237.

cidents, and when he travelled to Kurdistan, pro-Shah demonstrations and clashes did take place there.[71]

The creation of these new bodies in the face of the groundswell in opposition to the Shah signified several things. First and foremost, it showed that SAVAK was caught unawares when the opposition resumed its activism, having been lulled into a sense of false confidence. Use of the intelligence methods discussed in the previous section would have brought about a more rapid end to the violence. It also would have helped secure intelligence that would have foreseen what happened when the Shah opened up the system. The provision of information by agents in the opposition organizations could have been turned into predictive intelligence. Since the agents were not, apparently, in place, the Joint Committee of the National Police and SAVAK could not predict what was going to happen. Nor would such well-placed agents have been particularly necessary. A sampling of public attitudes in South Tehran or in the provincial cities probably would have revealed some of the underlying hostility to the regime.

The security forces were not properly equipped to deal with the opposition they were facing. The Iranian government's attempts to acquire non-lethal riot control equipment had been held up by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian, until bureaucratic dealings won approval for the sale.[72] This necessitated the creation of stop-gap measures to buy time, and it caused some disquiet among Iranian security elements, many of whom still believe that the US was hoping for the Shah's overthrow. The use of the violent sub-groups and the CDO 'Action Squads' can be ascribed to several factors. Firstly, the desire to lash out and get some sort of revenge. Secondly, Department III's reliance on its standard bullying tactics, refusing to use logic and persuasion, and turning to brute force instead. Thirdly, an apparent failure to take the demonstrators seriously, leading to a belief that they would not sacrifice their lives for their cause.

---

71. 'Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-measures'.

72. G. Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran*, (1985, 1986), p. 41. Lucy W. Benson, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, received similar criticism; G.C. Wilson, 'US Intelligence Experts Misread Extent of Iran Riots, Officials Say,' *Washington Post*, (20NOV78), p. A21.

Finally, the CDO's chief, Gen. Mohsen Mobasser, was a firm believer in strong measures to curb any sort of unrest.

The alleged use of *agents provacateur* elements is indicative of several things. Firstly, it was hoped that if the disorder and violence got bad enough, the military would be allowed to take action and restore order. Secondly, it also indicated a lack of confidence in government policies in dealing with the opposition. Thirdly, it indicated a lack of confidence in existing security institutions. The creation of the committees dealing with demonstrations, propaganda, the press, and disinformation are a sign that the Shah's government and his advisers were not interested in dealing with the real political, economic, and social problems affecting the country. They seemed to have trouble looking beyond such window-dressing. Of course, by then it was probably too late to put the genie of political expression back in the bottle of cynical acceptance.

III. The Final Years, 1977-1979

A number of events in 1977 led to a resurgence of opposition activities. Chief among these was the Shah's reaction to the Carter Administration's emphasis, both real and perceived, on Human Rights. By this time, furthermore, the Shah was aware that he had cancer, so it is possible that he was preparing the way for his son's accession to the throne of a freer country. The Shah had spoken often of his hopes for a democratic Iran; perhaps restraint of the oppressive apparatus was his way of bringing this about. Whatever the reasons behind the restrictions imposed on the official security apparatus during this period, the opposition recognized that the time for action had arrived.

Opposition groups, both armed and unarmed, favoured a variety of ideologies and had different goals. What they all recognized, however, was that if they were to succeed in achieving lasting political change, they would have to unify their efforts and rally under one banner. There was a need for them to look for some sort of leadership to serve as, at least, a figurehead which could attract the attention of the masses and make the outside world take the opposition seriously. For this reason, the religious community was allowed to take the lead.

A. The Islamic resurgence and activities to diminish religious power

It was not by default that the religious community was chosen for this role. A country's religious community has a traditional role to play in legitimizing non-priestly rulers.[73] There is, furthermore, a degree of competition between the ruling political community and the religious community.[74] These factors are particularly important in the case of Shia Islam, in which only the *imams* are infallible.[75] Iran's Shia community believed that any attempts to separate religion and politics were improper, witness Aya. Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani's statement that 'Government belongs to God.'[76]

In twentieth-century Iran, the ulama participated openly in secular affairs. As a result of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, Shia Islam had been defined as the state religion, and elements of the clergy were active in daily politics, some even serving in Parliament. During his ascent to the throne (1921-1925), Reza Khan (Pahlavi) sought ulama support. During his reign (1925-1941), however, Reza Shah acted to curb the clergy's power, with Parliament enacting legislation which limited ulama influence in legal affairs and education, and exerting control over religious endowments.

Clerical activism and power took an upward swing after Reza Shah's abdication. Aya. Abul Qassem Kashani served as Speaker of the Majlis and played major roles in the Oil Nationalization issue and the ouster of Musaddiq (1951-1953). From 1953-1962 (for more on this period, see Ch. 1), most of the ulama followed Aya. Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi's example of quietism and withdrawal from politics (some would say this amounted to conservatism and support for the regime). At the same time, the size of the religious community expanded.

---

73. M. Weber, (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.), *Economy and Society*, v. II, (Berkeley and London, 1968, 1978), p. 1159.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 1163.

75. The *Ithna Ashariyah* sect, which is predominant in Iran, believes that there are twelve Imams, with the twelfth in occultation. Until his earthly return as Mahdi to establish justice, the ulama will make religious pronouncements and judge the propriety of secular acts, thus assuming the role of the Imams' deputies. The Shia see the Imams as the guides needed by society. C. Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, (New York, 1989), p. 202.

76. From a sermon titled 'Jihad va Shahadat,' ('Jihad and Martyrdom') given at the Hedayat Mosque in mid-1963, in Taleqani, *Society and Economics in Islam*, p. 97.

The leadership role of the Islamic clergy became obvious after the riots of June 1963. A mullah's words, and his subsequent arrest, had sparked the violence. It was at this time that elements of the leftist opposition indicated an awareness of the shared interests between themselves and Islamic leaders in the struggle against the Shah. To this end, Yazdi and Ghotbzadeh visited Khomeini in Najaf soon after he arrived there from his Turkish exile. In the years after that, members of the religious community produced a steady stream of anti-government propaganda, via Iraqi radio, leaflets, cassette tapes, and word of mouth. These last three made their way into Iran by way of the Iranians pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, by way of religious students who studied in Najaf, and by way of clerics who effected clandestine border-crossings to meet with their sources of guidance.

The Iranian government recognized that the clerical establishment was an alternative centre of authority for some Iranians. The Shah's attempts to weaken the clerical establishment relied on a number of actions, both repressive and non-repressive. Such actions dated from, at least, the early 1960s. A number of actions in the 1970s were also designed to reduce the power of the clerical establishment.

1. Repressive measures

Some clerics, such as Aya. Morteza Mottahari, Aya. Mohammad Hossein Beheshti, Ho. Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, and Ho. Mohammad Mofateh found a way to cooperate with the Iranian government, even while maintaining contact with Khomeini.[77] Other members of the clerical establishment, like Aya. Montazeri, Aya. Ali Hoseini-Khamenei, Aya. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Aya. Abdol-Karim Musavi-Ardabili, Mohammad-Mehdi Rabbani, and Ho. Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani had been in touch with Khomeini since the 1960s and had not cooperated with the Iranian government in any

77. Beheshti had headed the Shia mosque in Hamburg, allegedly due to his connections with Gen. Mehdi-Qoli Alavi-Moghaddam, chief of the National Police. Bahonar, who had worked with the Ministry of Education on Islamic textbooks, and Mofateh had spent brief periods in prison for their activism. Interview with M. Pashai (10DEC92, Denmark); Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, p. 27; and Bakhash, *Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 43.

way, as a result of which many of them spent time in prison and/or were exiled to towns away from the population centres.[78]

Internal exile (not to be confused with house arrest) was a bad idea, indicating belief in the theory of 'out of sight, out of mind'. It backfired for a number of reasons. As has been indicated in previous chapters, SAVAK personnel in the provinces were often more interested in enriching themselves than in collecting intelligence or performing security functions, so they did not keep a very close eye on the exiles. During the 1970s, furthermore, there was a great deal of urban migration, as villagers left the land to seek employment in the cities. Having been indoctrinated by their preachers, and then finding that city life did not live up to its earlier promise, they were easily encouraged to voice their dissatisfaction. Finding themselves in an unfamiliar and unfriendly urban environment, they turned to their traditional values and their traditional leaders, the ulama. While imprisonment may have been a better idea, it backfired in 1977. During this time the Shah was releasing, in order to appease his critics, a large number of 'political' prisoners, many of whom were, in fact, common criminals. Either they were already members of the Islamic opposition, or they had been indoctrinated while in prison, but many of these individuals were active in the revolution and then the Islamic government.

The government used other harsh measures to silence its clerical opponents. The authorities infiltrated student religious organizations and mosque meetings, and they arrested and imprisoned many of those attending. When Aya. Mohammad Reza Saidi, a student of Khomeini, criticised government policies as treasonous he was imprisoned, and in June 1970 he was allegedly tortured to death.[79] The following Spring, security forces blocked access to a memorial ceremony for him. When Khomeini criticised the 1971 events

---

78. Hashemi-Rafsanjani had met with members of the Islamic opposition in Lebanon in 1975. On his return to Iran he was arrested, because PMOI member Vahid Afrakhteh had revealed his contacts with Hashemi-Rafsanjani to SAVAK. Bakhash, *Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 42-44.

79. S. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*, (Albany, 1980), p. 161.

at Persepolis, the Shah replied that Iranians did not take Khomeini seriously because he was a foreigner (Indian-born), an agent of Iraq and England, and a traitor to Iran.[80]

In April 1972, about fifty relatives of those arrested for political crimes took *bast* in Aya. Shariatmadari's home in Qum. Troops entered the house and forced out the refuge-seekers. Theology students demonstrated, and the troops' violation of bast offended Shariatmadari. He then made a speech at the Fayzieh School in which he said that he had not supported Khomeini in 1963, because he was opposed to demonstrations and disorders and he believed that the government's reforms were genuine. He now saw, however, that he was wrong and asked for forgiveness.[81]

2. Non-repressive measures

a. Endowments Organization (*Sazeman-i Awqaf*)

There were less harsh, but potentially more effective, moves to rein in religious influence. Chief among these was the creation of an Endowments Department in the Ministry of Culture. Eventually this became a cabinet-level Endowments Organization (*Sazeman-i Awqaf*). The Organization's importance is indicated by the individual appointed as its director in the 1970s: Manucher Azmun, a SAVAK Sovietologist with a long career in government. Azmun had been stationed in West Germany and put in charge of 'Iran News'. When he returned to Iran he served in the Ministry of Information, while simultaneously writing editorials for 'Problems of Iran' magazine under the name 'Dr Manucher Ghaneh'. He had also served in the Ministry of Labour, the Majlis, and as Governor of Shiraz.

Probably as bribes and rewards for services to the regime, Azmun made grants of some of the land under his control to individuals, such as the singers Giti and Hayedeh, Hojabr Yazdani, the Empress, Gen. Fardust, and organizations, such as the Imperial Court.[82] The individual charged with handling *awqaf* in Qum, a certain Abd al-Wahhab Iqbal, along with two other people, allegedly pocketed about 10% of the Qum shrine's income. These individuals also sold portions of the religious properties to their relatives. To guarantee

---

80. 'Persepolis: vielle Perse et jeune Iran,' *Le Monde*, (16OCT71), p. 3.
81. Confidential interview (11APR92).
82. 'Hayadah va Giti as Mushtariyan-e Awqaf,' *Iran Times*, (11APR79).

their cooperation, local SAVAK officials were given chunks of property which they would then sell or develop.[83]

In January 1971, the Shah expressed a desire to keep religion and politics separate. To this end, he proposed the formation of a Religious Corps (*Sepah-i Din*) which would draft students from the Universities of Mashad and Tehran's theology faculties into the military and assign them as village mullahs. The Corps was to be run by the Endowments Organization.[84] Allegedly, Aya. Shariatmadari worked with SAVAK to form the Corps.[85] Another development was the creation of a Department for Religious Propaganda in the Endowments Organization.[86] The functions of the Religious Propagandists overlapped with those which were traditionally assumed by clerics, indicating another government attempt to reduce the clergy's influence.

In February 1972, a SAVAK official in Qum informed Aya. Golpaygani that the government would exert greater control over the Endowments Organization. Golpaygani rejected this proposal and a few days later there were riots in Qum. The Iranian Shia started to decrease their religious donations. Religious contributions that bypassed the Endowments Organization made their way to Khomeini's brother in Qum, Aya. Haj Sayyid Morteza Pasandideh, who in turn directed a portion of this money to Najaf and used the rest to support mosques, students, clerics, and opposition movements.[87]

In July 1972, a memorandum from The Methods and Policy Committee of the Endowments Organization to the Prime Minister's office discussed ways to discredit Aya. Khomeini by the use of rumours, bribes, and force. The individuals who took responsibility for this plan were Azmun, the Governor of Tehran (where Qum is located), and the Governor of Khorasan, former Gendarmerie chief Gen. Sayyid Sadegh Amirazizi. To this end, SAVAK, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Information were to fab-

---

83. 'SAVAK Mamur-i Ijad-i Ikhtilaf-i Miyan-i Mardum va Ruhaniyat Bud,' *Keyhan*, (2APR79).

84. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, p. 23, 138.

85. *Asnad*, v. 55, p. 26.

86. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, pp. 140-41.

87. Pasandideh was arrested on 12 May 1978 and sent to internal exile in Anarak; see Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran, 'The Iranian Bulletins,' *Index on Censorship*, (London, SEP79), p. 38.

ricate and disseminate documents connecting Khomeini with Iraq's rulers. Iran's Shia establishment was to be convinced that not only was Khomeini connected to foreign interests, but he was also an embarrassment to the ulama. The government was prepared to use harsh treatment against members of the religious community who refused to cooperate in this campaign, by arresting them and isolating them from their supporters.[88]

The Endowments Organization also tried to appear as a defender of Islam. Pursuant to the July 1972 memorandum, the Endowments Organization committed itself to repairing two Tehran religious schools a year (traditionally, such repairs had been in the hands of the religious community, and the assumption of such a role by the Endowments Organization increased its influence at the expense of the original controlling body).

b. The Hosseiniyeh Ershad Institute

Founded in 1964 with funds from Mohammad Homayoun, a wealthy bazaar merchant, and other contributors, the Hosseiniyeh Ershad was meant to serve as a meeting place and lecture hall for Islamic-oriented nationalists. It was located in a northern suburb of Tehran, in an effort to distinguish it from the more traditional Islamic institutions located in southern Tehran. Speakers at the Institute included Aya. Mottahari, Aya. Beheshti, Ho. Bahonar, Ho. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ho. Sadreddin Sadr-Balaghi.[89] It has been speculated that the Institute was allowed to function in the hope that a wedge could be driven between the more forward-thinking clerics and nationalists and the traditional clergy and the leftists.[90]

The individual who became the most popular speaker there was Ali Shariati. Non-traditional and usually attacking the conservative clergy, Shariati himself became the subject of ulama criticism. As he grew more popular, individuals like Beheshti and Hashemi-Rafsanjani left the Institute. Religious conservatives and bazaar merchants began to criticise the Institute's management. Accusations that Shariati was a SAVAK agent

---

88. Information on this memorandum is from 'Awqaf alayh-i Mazhab Tajhiz Shudeh Bud,' *Keyhan*, (19MAR79).

89. For an example of their work, see Aya. Dr. M.H. Beheshti and Ho. Dr. M.-J. Bahonar, *Philosophy of Islam*, (Salt Lake City, UT, n.d.).

90. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 202-204.

also surfaced. Meanwhile, SAVAK was pressuring him to tone down his lectures and lessen his concentration on Shia ideology. Despite these problems, Shariati's lectures continued to attract large crowds. In October and November 1972, however, things seem to have gone too far, with Shariati giving a lecture advocating Shia Islam as a political way of life and the Institute giving a play about a Shia social movement that had gained power in Khorasan. The authorities closed the Hosseiniyeh and forced the imprisoned Homayoun to transfer the title to the Endowments Organization. Shariati hid until his father was arrested and offered for exchange.[91]

Shariati was held until March 1976. When he was released he discovered that one of his works had been reprinted in a Tehran daily newspaper (*Keyhan*), making it seem that he had collaborated with the regime. Finding that his options in Iran had disappeared, Shariati moved to England, where he died of a heart attack in June 1977. His supporters said a SAVAK hit squad had done the deed. Then, either to gain from his popularity or to cause further splits within the opposition, *Keyhan* published an article honouring Shariati.[92]

c. Others

The Shah was viewed as a leader of the Shia community,[93] so the government had to take actions to support this role. That such government initiatives would also undermine the power of the clergy was viewed as an additional benefit. In the Spring of 1971, SAVAK revealed an Iraqi plot to assassinate Khomeini. The chief of SAVAK in Qum contacted Khomeini's son to warn him of the plot against his father, saying that the Iraqis wanted to make it look like an Iranian plot.[94] At around the same time, *Marja al-Kabir* (Grand

---

91. Details in this paragraph are from Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 205-208. For biographical details on Shariati, see Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, pp. 144-45, and Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 187-189. On the content of Shariati's lectures and the programs he advocated, see Shariati, *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies; idem., On The Sociology of Islam*, (Berkeley, 1979); and *idem., Man and Islam*, (Mashad, 1982).

92. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, pp. 209-210.

93. A. Alam, (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (London, 1991), p. 321.

94. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, p. 163. The opposition took this to mean that the Iraqis had captured an Iranian hit squad, and SAVAK was just laying a smokescreen; *ibid.*, p. 235fn12.

Marja) Aya. Mohsen al-Hakim died in Najaf, and the Shah sent condolences to Ayatollahs Khoi, Khonsari, and Shariatmadari. Only Shariatmadari responded, thus turning many younger clerics against him.

The regime also allowed the existence of Sheikh Mahmud Halabi's *Hojjatieh* Society, which had started out as an anti-Bahai group. Members of the Society admit to having received support from SAVAK. The Society's existence was probably due to two factors. One reason may have been an effort to show the Shah as a defender of Islam against the Bahai faith. The second reason was probably an attempt to cause further divisions within the religious community. In fact, the Society condemned armed struggle, and at the same time it excommunicated Shariati and the managers of the Hosseiniyeh Ershad. The group itself underwent some splintering in 1974.[95]

In 1974, SAVAK officer Abdol Azim Valiyan, (for more on Valiyan, see Ch.'s 6 and 7) was made governor of Khorasan and guardian of the tomb of Imam Reza in Mashad.[96] Whether or not this assignment was an indication of active SAVAK involvement there is not clear. What is important is that people believed it to be so. At least one other ex-SAVAK officer worked for Valiyan at the Office of the Holy Shrine, which was normally a very lucrative job.[97] The Mashadis were unhappy with Valiyan, who, despite his education, was rather rough and straight-talking. He was not a religious person either, so he had no sympathy for, nor any understanding of, Mashadis. Probably as a result of this atti-

---

95. Information on the Hojjatieh group is from 'The Hojjatieh Society — Its History, Advocates, and Opponents,' *Iran Press Digest*, (28SEP82), pp. 19-21, and *ibid.*, (5OCT82), pp. 15-18. See also E. Abrahamian, 'Interview with Ahmad Ashraf: Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution,' *MERIP Reports*, v. 13, (MAR-APR83), p. 18.

96. Although Valiyan's name has appeared in several parts of this work, he was not an exceptional individual. Quite a few people who started out in SAVAK went on to have successful careers in other fields. These individuals served as cabinet ministers, university chancellors, Provincial governors, members of the Majlis and the Royal Court, and as ambassadors. It is not clear how important the SAVAK connection was in their later careers. What was important, however, was Iranians' perception that SAVAK ran the country and had installed its people in the highest echelons of power. H. Katouzian's allegation that Valiyan was a member of the Progressive Centre indicates the depth of such feelings, although the allegation has been denied by one of the Centre's early members; Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*, (London, 1981), p. 234, and interview with F. Mehr, (2NOV92, Boston).

97. *Asnad*, v. 32, p. 17.

tude, Valiyan was unsympathetic to public objections when he proceeded to level many of the buildings surrounding the Shrine in preparation for a development project.

In 1977, Prime Minister Jamshid Amouzegar decided to cut religious funding used for the maintenance of mosques and religious schools.[98] During the 1970s, the government also closed publishers which produced religious literature, and it searched mosque libraries for potentially dangerous literature. The Soviets were happy to fill this gap by distributing copies of Persian classics and Korans that had been printed in the Soviet Union.[99] The government also glorified Iran's imperial, pre-Islamic, past, and it tried to purify Iranians' spoken language by stopping the use of Arabic words, Arabic being the language of the Koran. A new calendar, based on the years of Persian monarchy, was imposed to replace the more traditional Islamic calendar. Nor were these efforts based solely in Iran. After the March 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Shah sent food and other emergency supplies to the mostly Shia refugees from southern Lebanon.[100]

3. Summary

All of these measures, both repressive and non-repressive, drove those who favoured political change underground. The lack of any viable political options, and the government's lack of sympathy or even interest in their motivations and goals radicalized the religious establishment. They stayed active by recruiting, preaching, and propagandizing, while they waited for a window of opportunity. That window presented itself in 1977, with the coincidence of a number of factors. Iran's economy was suffering, with oil income down, and inflation up and being driven higher by speculators.[101] Add to this the Shah's liberalisation of the political system, and the results were almost inevitable.

B. Rise of secular groups

Perhaps because the government moves against the religious community had made them more restrained in their willingness to act, or perhaps because their cloistered exis-

---

98. F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, (New York, 1980), pp. 84-85.

99. E.R. Oney, *CIA Research Study: Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran*, (FEB76), in *Asnad*, v. 7, p. 55.

100. J.K. Cooley, 'Shah promotes security in Lebanon,' *Christian Science Monitor*, (19APR78), p. 7.

101. R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (London, 1978, 1979), pp. 77-127.

tence made it more difficult for them to sense the political changes around them, it was the more secular nationalist groups who became active at this time. In March 1977, the writer Ali-Asghar Haj-Sayyid-Javadi sent a more-than-200-page letter to the Shah in which he analysed Iran's problems. In May, a number of lawyers wrote to the Imperial Court, calling for an independent judiciary. In June, Karim Sanjabi, Dariush Foruhar, and Shahpour Bakhtiar of the National Front wrote to the Shah to request implementation of the Constitution, release of political prisoners, and freedom of the press. Two groups of intellectuals and writers wrote to Prime Minister Hoveida to demand the termination of censorship. In November, there were readings of politically-oriented poetry at the Goethe Institute and Arya Mehr University, and when the government responded violently, there were student protests. Significantly, all of these communications criticised SAVAK and its role in Iran, and some even demanded its dissolution.[102] Also in 1977, political parties, such as Moghaddam-Maraghei's *Nehzat-e Radikal*, began to emerge. They had great difficulty coordinating their activities, however, because of lingering ideological and personality clashes.[103]

C. SAVAK vs. the Revolution

In 1977, bulldozers destroyed shanty-towns in Tehran to make room for new highways, and the shanty-dwellers responded with strikes and riots. The shanty-dwellers were mainly newly-urbanised peasants, uprooted from villages which had been levelled to make way for agro-industry projects. It was, therefore, natural that they would turn to individuals, such as clerics, who were often leadership figures in the villages.[104] In July 1977, Aya. Taleqani was arrested again and sentenced to ten years in prison, sparking anger among his supporters. In November, a huge crowd formed in the Tehran bazaar for a memorial service commemorating the death of Ho. Mostafa Khomeini, Aya. Khomeini's son, who allegedly died at the hands of SAVAK. During this time, more secular groups were

---

102. 'Straws in the Wind,' State Department Airgram A-124, 25JUL77, (FOIA).

103. On their organizational efforts and the difficulties they encountered, see Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, Ch. 6.

104. The potential for unrest in these areas and the possibility of the religious community's assumption of a leadership role was recognised as early as 1970; see 'South Tehran: The Urban Mass,' State Department Airgram A-101, 23MAR70, (FOIA).

also voicing their discontent, and in November, security forces broke up a meeting of about 1,000 National Front supporters.[105] By the end of the year, gun-battles between security forces and the government's opponents were taking place. The foreign press said that 'innocent college students,' who happened to be very well-armed, engaged the police (although the opposition and the press said SAVAK) in hour-long shoot-outs, leading foreign diplomats in Iran to wonder who was really sponsoring the opposition's propaganda effort.[106]

Throughout this period there was a trend among the populace to return to more traditional behaviour. Use of the *chador* (a garment which covers the body from head to toe) increased, and women who did not use them were increasingly subject to verbal abuse. Reactionary students tried to force others to abandon classes during prayer-time. There were even calls for the codification of religiously-oriented demands, such as prayer-breaks and mandatory veiling, in addition to separate male and female eating facilities and the suspension of faculty who were insufficiently Islamic.[107] There was also resistance to existing women's rights legislation.[108]

On 7 January 1978, *Ettela'at* published an article about Aya. Khomeini.[109] The article was less than flattering, describing Khomeini as an agent of 'red and black imperialists'. Rumours about the article had it that Khomeini was referred to as a Bahai with unpleasant personal habits. Seminarists in Qum reacted to these perceived insults by demonstrating in the streets, and the ensuing clashes with the authorities resulted in several deaths. Khomeini encouraged the protests from his Iraqi exile. Closer to home, Shariatmadari condemned the government and called for further protests. Shia traditionally mourn their

---

105. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 229.

106. Official informal letter from J.D. Stempel to Department of State Near East/Iran Desk (C.W. Naas and M.L. Greene), 12JAN78; in *Asnad*, v. 18, p. 97. It seems very likely that conservative bazaar elements, whose influence had suffered as a result of many government policies, and who resented the modernising trends being imposed from above, were the major financial supporters of the opposition. On bazaari attitudes, see G. Thaiss, 'The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change,' in E. Yar-Shater, ed., *Iran Faces the Seventies*, (New York, 1971).

107. 'Disturbances in Isfahan'.

108. 'Straws in the Wind'.

109. 'Qum Dissidence: What Started It All?' State Department Airgram A-27, 12FEB78, (FOIA).

dead forty days after the fact. In February, crowds in Tabriz (and other cities) gathered to mourn those who had died in Qum. Riots erupted in Tabriz, troops were called in, and many people were killed in the largest protests since June 1963.[110] Forty days later, there was a large number of deaths in Yazd when protesters marched on the police station. Thus the cycle of deaths and mourning became continuous. Also in March, a number of SAVAK personnel, sent to Lebanon as part of a UN peace-keeping mission, were tasked with identifying and isolating anti-Shah followers of Sayyid Musa Sadr.[111]

The mourning ceremonies in May also grew violent, and two people were killed in Shariatmadari's house, once again a violation of bast. On 13 May all the security and police chiefs met in Tehran. SAVAK's Nassiri favoured closing the bazaar and using lethal force. SIB's Fardust opposed this, fearing that if a religious leader like Shariatmadari led the crowd and was killed the conscripts might change sides. Fardust's recommendation that a dialogue with the opposition be opened was adopted and submitted to the Shah, who ordered its implementation.[112] Meanwhile, the *ad hoc* groups discussed above were in action, using violent tactics which could not, in theory, be traced to the regime. In June, Nassiri was replaced by Moghaddam, probably to appease the public. Soon thereafter, Moghaddam transferred many of the personnel stationed in the provinces. These tactics, the Shah's pilgrimage to Mashad, Amouzegar's anti-inflationary measures, and other gestures seemed to calm the situation, and no riots occurred for two months.

The government's imposition of economic belt-tightening had resulted in hardships for the lower-classes. In late-June, July, and September, workers all over the country staged strikes. There were also a number of demonstrations which ended violently, as did the subsequent memorial services. Following the demonstrations, the Shah met with Fardust and Moghaddam. After heavily criticizing Moghaddam, the Shah directed that force be used and allowed the military to fire on the demonstrators.[113] In August the Rex Cinema in

---

110. 'Rioting and Civil Insurrection in Tabriz: An Initial Analysis,' State Department Airgram A-04, 23FEB78; in *Asnad*, v. 61, pp. 95-99.

111. Cooley, 'Shah promotes security in Lebanon'.

112. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 15MAY78; in *Asnad*, v. 25, pp. 23-25.

113. State Department Airgram, 1AUG78; in *Asnad*, v. 25, pp. 50-53.

Abadan burned down, killing over four hundred people. Although it was later discovered that this was done by Islamic extremists, at the time it was believed that it was the work of SAVAK. The Shah initiated more concessions, promising greater participation in the political system, removing security guards from the universities, and replacing Amouzegar with Jafar Sharif-Emami, who had ties with the religious elements.[114]

Shortly before Amouzegar's replacement, SAVAK acted to discourage Khomeini's activities. For this reason, Moghaddam contacted the head of Iraqi intelligence, Saddoun Shaker. On 25 August 1978, Moghaddam requested that Iraq, in accordance with the 1975 Algiers Accords, pressure Khomeini to be quiet. Shaker met with Khomeini at his residence in Najaf, giving him a choice of ceasing his activities or being silenced, stating that there was no third option. Khomeini responded that he would not cease his activities, and if the Iraqis interfered with him, he would leave Iraq.[115] SAVAK advised the Iraqis to keep Khomeini isolated, because a continuation of Khomeini's activities endangered both Iran and Iraq. It was believed therefore, that keeping Khomeini in Iraq would be mutually advantageous. Shaker's response was that Khomeini was being very hard-headed and would not listen to reason.[116]

A SAVAK official then travelled to Iraq and met with Shaker. Shaker stated that all religious figures in Iraq were kept under occasional observation, and when Khomeini became more outspoken, he was advised to cease and desist from engaging in political activities. Khomeini had responded that he was a religious figure, but religion and politics could not be separated, and if the Iraqis bothered him, he would leave the country. (Khomeini's statement matched one he had made to Gen. Hassan Pakravan in 1963. Pakravan had told Khomeini that 'Politics is all dirt, lying, and viciousness; why don't you leave it to us?' Khomeini had replied that Islam and politics were inseparable).[117] Shaker told the

---

114. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 314.

115. 'Silabat Imam, Shoknadi-yi Doshmanan-i Islam,' *Ettela'at*, (3JUN90), p. 12. This article shows copies of several SAVAK documents, but a former SAVAK official has stated that the authors of the article were highly selective in their choices.

116. *Ibid.*

117. For Khomeini's conversation with Pakravan, see Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 139.

SAVAK official that the Iraqi government had arrested Khomeini's Iraqi aides, but could not touch Khomeini because he was not an Iraqi citizen. For this reason, the Iraqi government tried to quarantine Khomeini. Khomeini then requested an exit visa, which was granted, because Iraq could not legally stop Khomeini from leaving the country, nor did it really want to.[118] What Shaker did not say, but which must have been prominent in his mind, was the fact that a majority of the Iraqi populace was Shia, so interference with a cleric as prominent as Khomeini could have resulted in serious unrest.[119]

The situation in Tehran was worsening, and on 7 September martial law was declared in a number of the bigger cities. The Military-Governor of Tehran was Gen. Oveissi, who had distinguished himself in the same position in 1963. That same day, a number of the previously mentioned Nationalists, such as Sanjabi and Moghaddam-Maraghei, were arrested. The next day, on what became known as 'Black Friday', a veritable blood-bath occurred in Jaleh Square and in the southern slums, when tanks and helicopter gunships fired on the demonstrators. The next few days were filled with news of strikes throughout the oil industry. On 18 September, employees of the *Bank Markazi* (Central Bank) published a list of individuals who had supposedly transferred large sums of money out of the country: included were Amouzegar, Sharif Emami, Oveissi, and Moghaddam.[120]

On 4 October, Shaker informed SAVAK that Khomeini would be travelling to Kuwait by car. On receipt of this information, Moghaddam arranged to have a SAVAK official go to Kuwait to persuade the government to keep Khomeini out. Before the SAVAK official even left Tehran, however, the Kuwaitis, on their own initiative, informed Khomeini that he would not be welcome. The Khomeini camp then tried Syria and Libya, but they also declined to accept Khomeini.[121] On Ebrahim Yazdi's advice, the Khomeini camp then contacted France, asking if Khomeini would be welcome there. The French, in turn, consulted with the Shah. The Shah, thinking that because of the distance from France to Iran, and

---

118. 'Silabat Imam, Shoknadi-yi Doshmanan-i Islam'.

119. 'The Opposition in Iran,' State Department Briefing Memorandum, 15SEP78, (FOIA).

120. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 314.

121. 'Silabat Imam, Shoknadi-yi Doshmanan-i Islam'; confidential interview (28APR93).

because of the existence of a friendly intelligence service, Khomeini would be kept isolated and out of touch with his followers. A high-ranking SAVAK officer met with de Marenches in Paris to discuss Khomeini's arrangements.[122]

The outcome of Khomeini's October move to France was the opposite of what the Shah had expected, since the cleric now had greater access to the international media and the resulting greater visibility. He also had access to better communications facilities, and a direct telephone link to Tehran was established. At this point, furthermore, his more pragmatic followers persuaded Khomeini to moderate his public statements regarding the clergy's role in politics. Khomeini was convinced to stress democratic processes, women's rights, and minority rights.[123] For this reason, Western observers came to believe that after coming to Iran Khomeini would retire to Qum and would leave government matters to the more Westernised and nationalist-oriented opposition figures.[124]

Back in Iran, the situation was worsening, with more strikes and riots. Among the demonstrators' demands were the abolition of SAVAK. The Shah put more cities under martial law, gave control of the newspapers to the military, replaced Sharif-Emami with Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari, and put military personnel in charge of a number of other ministries. At the same time he tried to placate the opposition. Over a thousand prisoners were released, military control of the newspapers was terminated, and the Rastakhiz Party was dissolved. In October, over thirty domestic SAVAK officials were fired,[125] and in November, the Shah had some of his longest serving officials arrested, including Nassiri (who had actually returned from Pakistan to be arrested at the airport), Valiyan, and Hoveida. These events did nothing but harm the morale of SAVAK personnel, who saw

---

122. Confidential interview (28APR93).

123. C. Benard and Z. Khalilzad, *The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic*, (New York, 1984), p. 39.

124. Confidential interview with a private individual who met with Khomeini at Neuphle-le-Chateau (16APR92).

125. There were three groups of officials. The first group consisted of voluntary retirements. The second group consisted of armed forces personnel seconded to SAVAK whose temporary duty time had expired, so they were returning to their military branches. The third group consisted of officials who were of dubious competence, and who would have been fired or retired anyway. Despite these facts, these were announced as dismissals to appease critics of SAVAK. Confidential interview (28APR93).

that they were being used as scapegoats. Nor was the opposition placated: Khomeini suggested that the Shah abdicate and face an Islamic trial.

In December the violence continued, with heavy civilian casualties occurring when the curfew was defied. To deter further violence, many imprisoned opposition members were released. Many of those who were released were members of the armed opposition. In the following months they resumed their violent tactics against the regime's forces. At the same time, military conscripts were disobeying orders to fire on civilians, and mass desertions were taking place. At the end of December, Shahpour Bakhtiar was appointed as Prime Minister. The National Front and Khomeini both disowned Bakhtiar, seeing him as illegitimate because of this connection with the monarchy.

Among Bakhtiar's first steps was the proposal of legislation dismantling SAVAK. This was insufficient for the public, which took to nailing threatening notes to the houses of SAVAK officials and agents, and lists of SAVAK personnel who were scheduled for popular justice also appeared.[126] Crowds then attacked SAVAK offices, destroying their files and stealing weapons. The SAVAK personnel were forced to seek shelter in military and Gendarmerie facilities. Mass demonstrations took place until the Shah's departure from Iran on 16 January 1979.

On 10 February the last meeting of the National Security Council took place. Bakhtiar called for stricter enforcement of martial law, and he also revealed SAVAK's secret plan for mass arrests and banishment of opposition leaders.[127] He asked Moghaddam to enforce the plan with Army cooperation. By 11 February, the security forces were in almost complete disarray. Moghaddam declared that he could not implement the plan, because SAVAK no longer existed, and there were no armed personnel assigned to it anyway. He went on to say that his people needed protection if classified documents and weapons were not to fall into the opposition's clutches.

---

126. S. Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, (London, 1988), p. 34; 'Cloudy for Iran,' State Department Airgram, 6JAN79; in *Asnad*, v. 63, p. 33.

127. Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, p. 71.

D. SAVAK after the return of Khomeini

Khomeini returned on 1 February 1979. The executions of SAVAK personnel and the purges of the armed forces commenced soon thereafter. Generals Pakravan, Nassiri, and Moghaddam were executed after brief trials. Of the 404 announced executions that took place between February and late-September, it is estimated that 38% were of SAVAK personnel.[128] It has been difficult to secure accurate tallies, however, because of the relationship between the military and SAVAK. Not only have the scholars who have perused the lists had difficulty determining the precise organizational affiliation of the dead, but even SAVAK personnel were not always sure who else was in the organization.

The precise numbers were much higher. Revolutionary sources stated that there would be a few well-publicized executions of provincial SAVAK personnel; then they would shoot 'up to dozens of others' quietly.[129] There can be little doubt that many of those executed were not from SAVAK at all, but were being killed to settle private scores. Some were imprisoned but not killed. Others were given internal exile. Faced with this onslaught, some surviving SAVAK personnel went underground and stayed on the run until they could flee the country.

Essentially, SAVAK was eliminated. Among the groups most eager to see its disappearance were the PMOI and Fedai, who were also clamouring for the armed forces' dismantlement. The dangers that the new regime faced, however, had not disappeared. Some of the *komitehs* that sprang up all over the country were tasked with eliminating their sponsors' political competitors. To this end, SAVAK personnel who had worked in anti-communism and against foreign enemies were encouraged to continue their work. SAVAK personnel did an admirable job of self-promotion in this context, stressing their potential to

---

128. *Ibid.*, p. 119. See also G.F. Rose, 'The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment,' *Iranian Studies* XVII, n. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1984); W.F. Hickman, 'Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982,' Brookings Institution Staff Paper, (Washington, DC, 1982), pp. 8-18; N.B. Schahgaldian, 'The Iranian Military Under The Islamic Republic,' RAND National Defense Research Institute Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, (Santa Monica, CA: MAR87), pp. 17-27.

129. State Department Cable, (8MAR79), in *Asnad*, v. 28, p. 9.

their captors.[130] The first reason for this was that they were trying to save their lives and those of their colleagues. The second reason was that many were convinced that they were acting in Iran's best interest. A former Department VIII officer related that although he had been released the Komiteh made him come in everyday to identify Communists and to advise. He arranged the release of other Department VIII personnel, saying they were necessary for anti-Soviet and anti-Communist work. Other SAVAK officers were in contact with Mustafa Chamran, and they were still spying on the Soviets, the Mojahedin, and the Tudeh. Their success in these efforts was met with hostile propaganda.[131]

The Iranians were not content with reliance on former SAVAK personnel. In May they approached the US Embassy with a request for information on Iraqi activities in Khuzestan. They even wanted information on their revolutionary allies, the PLO and Libya.[132] By September, they were hoping for completion of the IBEX project and an intelligence exchange with the US.[133] The US, hoping to establish an intelligence dialogue between the two countries, furnished the Iranians with information on Afghanistan.[134] The US Government arranged to have Middle East expert Robert Clayton Ames brief the Iranians in Stockholm.[135] By October, Iranian representatives, sufficiently impressed to credit the US with knowing 'everything on developments in the region,' were asking for intelligence on sabotage in Kurdistan and in Khuzestan, where George Habash of the PFLP had been seen.[136]

Whether or not this request was met is doubtful. What is known is that a new intelligence organization was established. It has been referred to as SAVAMA (*Sazeman-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i Melli-e Iran*) and as VEVAK (*Vizarat-i Ettela'at va Amniyat-i*

---

130. See, for example, G.-R. Sabri Tabrizi, *Iran: A Child's Story, A Man's Experience,* (Edinburgh, 1989), p. 273.

131. Interview with M. Moussavi, (25MAY93, Washington, DC). For a discussion of some of these operations, see V. Kuzichkin, *Inside The KGB,* (New York, 1990), pp. 261-266.

132. *Asnad,* v. 9 & 10, (this volume does not have page numbers).

133. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 12SEP79; in *Asnad,* v. 16, pp. 80-81.

134. *Asnad,* v. 30, p. 162.

135. *Asnad,* v. 9 & 10, (this volume does not have page numbers). Ames was killed in April 1983 when the US Embassy in Beirut was bombed.

136. *Asnad,* v. 34, p. 199.

Kishvar), but to reduce confusion it is referred to here as MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security). Despite the name-change, the organization is apparently very similar to SAVAK. This is because among its first employees were about 75% of Department VIII's staff. Then came about 25% of Department III, followed by personnel from Department's II and VII. It is estimated that, altogether, 45-55% of SAVAK's personnel went to the new organization.[137] Apparently, the MOIS took over all of SAVAK's assets, including its files.[138]

---

137. Interview with Gen. Manucher Hashemi (20FEB85, London) by S. Meskoob for the IOHP; interview with J. Moinzadeh, (7JUL92, London).

138. Confidential interview (28APR93); 'Iran: A Year After,' *The Economist*, (23FEB80), p. 29.

CONCLUSION

Muhammad Musaddiq's time as Prime Minister brought home the realities of Iranian statecraft to the Shah. Unwilling to repeat his ignominious flight from Iran to Baghdad and Rome, the Shah acted to strengthen and consolidate his hold on power. To this end, he moved to eliminate or neutralise potential competitors. Through the use of both repression and cooptation, SAVAK being the main practitioner of the former and a vehicle of the latter, the Shah succeeded in giving his hold on power the appearance of stability. In the end, reliance on the repressive apparatus and on the coöptive system led to, not a flight to Baghdad and Rome, but a meandering journey which took in Cairo, Marrakesh, New York, Mexico, the Bahamas, and Panama.

I. Domestic issues

Reviewed point by point, one can see how policies towards the groups in Chapter 1 backfired.

A. Secular groups

Members of the National Front and the Tudeh were radicalised, firstly by the repression they faced in the 1950s, and secondly, by the regime's obvious willingness to use force against them when they became too outspoken, as happened in the early-1960s, so many of them left the country to prepare for armed struggle. They emerged as the LMI, the PMOI, and the Marxist Fedai. The *Fada'iyan-i Islam* were eliminated, but similar groups, such as the Islamic Nations Party, continued to emerge. The Thousand Families, while still a powerful class, were politically emasculated, and they did not have much sympathy for the Shah due the harm his policies had done to many of their interests.

B. Religious opposition

Most of the *ulama*, following Aya. Borujerdi's example, was quiet, but it was the ulama which led the revolution and now runs the country. It would seem that there were three reasons for the clergy's success. Some clerics were recipients, either directly or indirectly, of money from the regime. Acceptance of the money, however, was not indicative of acquiescence in the Shah's rule. They were possibly practicing *taqiyyah* (dissimulation in order to protect oneself from harm). A Westerner may not have been aware of this practice, but

SAVAK's domestic security personnel had no such excuse. Secondly, many of the more educated and westernized Iranians regarded Moslem clerics as primitive reactionaries. With such thinking, Iranian intelligence personnel discounted the mullahs, dismissing their views as nothing but a desire for the days when they had access to land and money and when they wielded power in all aspects of life. They recognised that an Iran ruled by the clerics would not have progressed as far as it had under the modernizing Shah, and such thinking apparently entered their analyses. Thirdly, the individuals who should have been collecting intelligence on the clergy were, to a great extent, busy pursuing their private (financial) interests instead.

C. Shah's management style

The Shah, through his Machiavellian personnel policies, guarantied that he would have no competitors within the armed forces. These practices also ensured that military officers would be incapable of making major decisions on their own. The oversight and coordination bodies that were created, such as the SIB and the NSC, failed to function as was intended. While their existence precluded plots against the Shah, it also precluded independent thinking.

The Shah sought independent information and analyses from SAVAK and other organizations. When that information did not conform with his preconceived notions, he would ignore it and berate the individual who had brought it to him. Eventually the Shah was surrounded by 'yes men', with the occasional exception of individuals like Court Minister Alam and the Queen. These 'yes men' learned that they could enrich themselves to their hearts' content, as long as they were not too obvious, as long as they did not upset the Shah, and as long as they did not upset the business interests of SAVAK personnel.

D. Corruption

'He who corrupts a system's police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the system's police stations.'[1] Those individuals were willing to pay lip service to the regime and to flatter the Shah, thus enabling themselves to cash in on the

---

1. S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London, 1968),p. 64.

system. When the time of crisis came, however, they and their money had left the country, abandoning the Shah. SAVAK should have informed the Shah of the dangers of corruption, but it did not. This was particularly true when its top-ranking personnel were among the country's most corrupt. The IIO had similar functions, but it accomplished little. The anti-corruption drives were regarded as shams. The only individuals who were really affected were some token military officers and a few middle-level bazaar merchants, and this only served to increase the bazaaris antagonism towards the system.

II. International issues

International events have a direct bearing on states undergoing revolutions, although there seems to be a tendency to focus on the state in isolation. It is usually state rulers who transmit the international effects into their countries' domestic politics, since they must act within the international arena.[2] Since Iran's international stature was so important to the Shah, furthermore, the international context bears examination.

A. Economic issues

The Shah's arms build-up in the 1970s was spurred by his desire to be a major actor on the world stage. He was also encouraged in this context by regional events (Nasser, the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, etc.) and by other statesmen (Nixon, Kissinger, de Marenches). The rise in Iran's oil revenues permitted a spending spree on sophisticated arms and adoption of new agricultural and business practices which in turn caused major economic problems in Iran. Corrective measures enacted by 1977 only deepened the dissatisfaction felt by the majority of the population. SAVAK's Department III was supposed to identify and eliminate 'the peoples' discontent.' The effects of economic measures and social practices fall within those parameters, but apparently the Shah was not informed what those effects might be, or in the unlikely chance that he was, he ignored the advice.

B. Intelligence reporting and analysis

It is also the case that the Shah's greater interest in international affairs than in domestic affairs filtered down to SAVAK. Intelligence gatherers, security personnel, and an-

---

2. T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, (Cambridge, 1979), p. 24.

alysts focussed more on Iranian Communists and Nationalists than on the religious classes. When domestic problems occurred, they were inevitably blamed on externally-aided subversion (Nasser, Arabs, and/or Communists). The possible causes of the problems, which lay much closer to home, were ignored.

C. Human Rights

Chapter 9 has shown that there were a number of possible reasons behind the Shah's opening of the political system in the late-1970s. When viewed in the international context, the US government's emphasis on Human Rights was probably the most significant factor.[3] Although torture has long been part of Iranian history, its significance increased as Iran came to play a greater part in world events. When the Shah decided to reduce the use of torture, SAVAK was the most affected because one of its major means of controlling dissent had been through the threat to use torture and the actual use of torture. SAVAK's reliance on torture meant that its domestic security apparatus was not thinking in terms of identifying and eliminating problems. Instead, it was forcing individuals into acquiescence with the *status quo.*

III. Summary

A true social revolution, rather than a coup, requires the coincidence of a number of factors. These factors include domestic and international political, social, and economic events. It is difficult to predict when all these factors will coincide to bring about the downfall of a regime. An intelligence and security organization (the intelligence producer) should be able to foresee and predict the effects of government policies called for by the head of state (the intelligence consumer). Based on these analyses, the head of state can avoid policies which might have an adverse effect.

At the same time, an intelligence and security agency has a great deal of leeway in the way it implements policies called for by the head of state. SAVAK's use of repression precluded most forms of political expression. The corruption of some of its employees prevented its collecting the information which would have enabled it to advise the Shah. The

---

3. See M. Zonis, 'Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran,' in T.J. Farer, ed., *Toward A Humanitarian Diplomacy: A Primer for Policy,* (New York, 1980).

Shah's ruling style discouraged honest reporting. Whether or not the Shah would have actually acted on such reporting is doubtful.

Appendix: *The Establishment of Security Organization Act, Approved in 1336 (1957)*[*]

ARTICLE 1. For the purposes of security of the country and prevention of any kind of conspiracy detrimental to the public interests, an organization under the name and style of 'the National Information and Security Organization,' affiliated to the Premier's Office, shall be established. The Chief of the Organization shall hold the rank of assistant to the Prime Minister and shall be appointed by a Decree of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah.

ARTICLE 2. The functions of the National Information and Security Organization are as follows:

a) Obtaining and collecting items of information required for the maintenance of national security.

b) Pursuing the activities which constitute a portion of espionage and the acts of such elements conducted against the independence or integrity of the country or those who act in favour of an alien.

c) Repressing the activities of those groups whose establishment or management has been or will be declared as illegal; likewise preventing the formation of the groups whose aim or policy is against the Constitution.

d) Foiling conspiracies and plots against the national security.

e) Inspecting, discovering, and investigating the following crimes:

1. The crimes which are provided for in the Treason Act, approved on 22nd Khordad 1310 (1931).
2. Misdemeanours and/or felonies provided for in Chapter One, Part Two of the Penal Code approved on 23rd Dey 1304 (1925).
3. The crimes mentioned in Articles 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, and 317 of the Court-Martial Act 1318 (1939).

ARTICLE 3. The functionaries of the National Information and Security Organization shall, from the standpoint of prosecuting the crimes mentioned in this Act as well as discharging their functions, be considered as the military magistrates and in this respect shall enjoy all the authorities extended to the military magistrates and assume the responsibilities of such office. As from the date of approval of this Act, the permanent courts-martial shall deal with all the crimes hereinabove mentioned.

Note 1. Discharging the functions of the National Information and Security Organization, to the extent that their functionaries are considered as military magistrates, shall by no means affect the functions assigned to the military magistrates by virtue of the Court-Martial Act. Similarly, the provisions of this Act do not preclude execution of the laws, orders, administrative regulations, and stipulations concerning the functions of the military, Gendarmerie, and Police functionaries in regard to assignments.

Note 2. Taking cognizance of the crimes which in accordance with this Act fall under the jurisdiction of the permanent Court-Martial, and those accused to have committed the said crimes which have been prosecuted by the competent authorities before the approval of this Act, where a bill of indictment has not been issued against the accused, the file so prepared shall be sent to the Military Prosecutor for taking cognizance and prosecution. In regard to those files wherefor a bill of indictment has been issued, cognizance shall be taken by the relevant courts.

ARTICLE 4. Where the employees of the National Information and Security Organization are accused of having committed an offence which concerns their functions or has a relationship to their duties or services, they shall be considered as the military personnel and military employees, and they shall be governed by the permanent court-martial, with due observance of the provisions of the Court-Martial Act of 1318 (1939).

ARTICLE 5. Articles of Memorandum of the Organization and internal employment and finance regulations relevant to this act are enforceable with the approval of the Government.

---

[*] The text of this law is copied, *verbatim*, from Butler, 'Report on Human Rights in Iran,' *Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran*, pp. 32-33.

GLOSSARY

abba	a cloak-like garment
Ayatollah	'Sign of God'; a distinguished Shia cleric with a following
baraka	divine charisma
bast	sanctuary
bey	a title given to some political leaders in Lebanon
chaqu keshan	knife-wielding thugs
dowreh	lit: circle; a social gathering of people with similar interests
fada'iyan	those who sacrifice themselves for a cause
fatwa	'A published opinion or decision regarding religious doctrine or law made by a recognised authority.'*
fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence
firman	a royal decree
Hojjat ol-eslam	'Proof of Islam'; a mujtahid with a following who ranks below an Ayatollah.
Imam Jomeh	government appointed Friday prayer leader
khan	a tribal leader
madrasah	a traditional Islamic school
maktab	a traditional elementary school
marja	an authoritative religious scholar
Marja al-Kabir	Grand Marja
Marja al-Taqlid	'source of emulation'; the highest-ranking Shia cleric
ma'sum	moral infallibility
Mukhabarat	Arabic term for an intelligence organization
mujtahid	cleric who can interpret Islamic law
mullah	generic term for a Moslem cleric
Sardar	an honorific title meaning 'commander'
Sayyid	a male descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
Sayyida	a female descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
Tarh-i Borun Marzi	Extraterritorial Plan
Tarh-i Kontrol-i Afqani	Afghan Control Plan
Tarh-i Sabz	Green Plan
ulama	The superior mullahs, whose leading members are Hojjat ol-eslam or Ayatollahs

* C. Glassé, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, (New York, 1989).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Abrahamian, E., *Iran Between Two Revolutions.* Princeton, 1982.

———, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin.* London, 1989.

Aburish, S., *Beirut Spy: The St George Hotel Bar.* London, 1989.

Agwani, M.S., ed., *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study.* Bombay, 1965.

Ahanchian, J., *The Plot of a King's Fall: The Memoirs of Jalal Ahanchian.* Mill Valley, CA, 1982.

Ajami, F., *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon.* London, 1986.

Akhavi, S., *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period.* Albany, 1980.

Alam, A., (ed. A. Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977.* London, 1991.

Alamuti, M., *Iran Dar Asr-i Pahlavi,* v. 10, *Aryamehr Daraj-i Iqtidar.* London, 1991.

———, *Iran dar Asr-i Pahlavi,* v. 11, *Jang-i Qodrat dar Iran.* London, 1992.

Alexander, Y., and Nanes, A., eds., *US and Iran: A Documentary History.* Fredrick, MD, 1980.

Arasteh, A.R., *Man and Society in Iran.* Leiden, 1964.

Arfa, Gen. H., *Under Five Shahs.* New York, 1965.

Arjomand, S.A., ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam.* Albany, 1984.

Avery, P.W., *Modern Iran.* London, 1965.

———, 'Printing, The Press, and Modern Literature in Modern Iran,' *The Cambridge History of Iran,* v. 7. Cambridge, 1991.

Badeeb, S.M., *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970.* Boulder, 1986.

Bakhash, S., *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution.* New York, 1984, 1986.

Bakhtiar, C., *Ma Fidelité.* Paris, 1982.

Bashiri, S., *Qisih-yi SAVAK.* Paris, 1987.

Bayne, E.A., *Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversations with a Monarch Whose Office is Traditional and Whose Goal is Modernization.* New York, 1968.

Baraheni, R., *God's Shadow.* Bloomington, 1976.

———, *The Crowned Cannibals.* New York, 1977.

Beck, L., 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy,' in Richard Tapper, ed., *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan.* London, 1983.

———, *The Qashqai of Iran.* London, 1986.

Beheshti, Aya. Dr. M.H., and Bahonar, Ho. Dr. M.-J., *Philosophy of Islam.* Salt Lake City, UT, n.d.

Benard, C., and Khalilzad, Z., *The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic.* New York, 1984.

Bill, J.A., *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization.* Columbus, 1972.

———, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations.* New Haven, 1988.

Bill, J.A., and Louis, W.M., eds., *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil.* London, 1988.

Binder, L., *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society.* Berkeley, 1962.

Black, I., and Morris, B., *Israel's Secret Wars.* London, 1991.

Bonine, M.E., and Keddie, N., eds., *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change.* Albany, 1981.

Butler, W.J., Esq., and Levasseur, Prof. G., 'Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran,' *A Report for the International Commission of Jurists.* Geneva, MAR76.

Calvocoressi, P., *World Politics since 1945.* 5th ed. London, 1989.

Caroz, Y., *The Arab Secret Services.* London, 1978.

Chehabi, H.E., *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini.* London, 1990.

Clayton, A., *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952-60: A study of military operations against Mau-Mau.* Nairobi, 1976.

Cobban, H., *The Making of Modern Lebanon.* London, 1985.

Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran, 'The Iranian Bulletins,' *Index on Censorship.* London, SEP79.

Cooper, R., *Death Plus Ten Years.* London, 1993.

Copeland, M., *The Game of Nations.* London, 1969.

———, *The Game Player.* London, 1989.

Cottam, R.W., *Nationalism in Iran.* Pittsburgh, 1964, 1979.

———, *Iran and the United States: A Cold-War Case Study.* Pittsburgh, 1988.

Deacon, R., *'C': A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield.* London, 1985.

DeForrest, O., and Chanoff, D., *Slow Burn.* New York, 1990.

Delannoy, C., *Savak.* France, 1990.

Eisenberg, D., Dan, U., and Landau, E., *The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service.* London, 1978.

Elwell-Sutton, L.P., *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics.* London, 1955.

Eveland, W.C., *Ropes of Sand.* New York, 1980.

Faligot, R., and Krop, P., *La Piscine: The French Secret Service Since 1944.* Oxford, 1989.

Fardust, Gen. H., *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi: Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hossein Fardust.* Tehran, 1989-1990.

Felix, C., *The Spy and His Masters: A Short Course in the Secret War.* London, 1963.

Fesharaki, F., *Development of the Iranian Oil Industry: International and Domestic Aspects.* New York, 1976.

Fuller, G.E., *The 'Center of the Universe': The Geopolitics of Iran.* Boulder, CO, 1991.

Gasiorowski, M.J., *US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran.* London, 1991.

Gerstein, R.S., 'Do Terrorist Have Rights?' in D.C. Rapaport and Y. Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications.* New York, 1982.

Ghareeb, E., *The Kurdish Question in Iraq.* Syracuse, NY, 1981.

Glassé, C., *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam.* New York, 1989.

Goria, W.R., *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943-1976.* London, 1985.

Graham, R., *Iran: The Illusion of Power.* London, 1978, 1979.

Halawi, M., *A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia Community.* Oxford, 1992.

Halliday, F., *Mercenaries: 'Counter insurgency' in the Gulf.* Nottingham, 1977.

———, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development.* London, 1979.

———, *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987.* Cambridge, 1990.

Heikal, M.H., *The Return of the Ayatollahs: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini.* London, 1981.

Hickman, W.F., 'Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982,' Brookings Institution Staff Paper. Washington, DC, 1982.

Hoe, A., *David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the S.A.S.* London, 1992.

Hoffman, B., 'Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism,' RAND National Defense Research Institute Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Santa Monica, CA, MAR90.

Hoveyda, F., *The Fall of the Shah.* New York, 1980.

Huntington, S., *Political Order in Changing Societies.* New Haven and London, 1968.

H.M. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head.* London, 1962.

Huyser, Gen. R.E., *Mission to Tehran.* London, 1986.

Irnberger, H., *SAVAK oder Der Folterfreund des Westens: Aud den Akten des iranischen Geheimdienstes.* Hamburg, 1977.

Johnson, L.K., *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society.* Oxford, 1989.

Kapuscinski, R., (trans. by W.R. Brand and K. Mroczkowska-Brand), *Shah of Shahs.* London, 1982, 1985.

Katouzian, H., *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979.* London, 1981.

——, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran.* London, 1990.

Katzman, K., *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard.* Oxford, 1993.

Keddie, N.R., ed., *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution.* New Haven, 1983.

Keddie, N.R., and Gasiorowski, M.J., eds., *Neither East Nor West: Iran, The Soviet Union, and the United States.* New Haven and London, 1990.

Khomeini, Aya. R.M., (trans. by H. Algar), *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* Berkeley, 1981.

Kimche, D.,*The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat, and Saddam Hussein, The Quest for Peace in the Middle East.* London, 1991.

Kuzichkin, V., *Inside the KGB: Myth and Reality.* London, 1990.

Ledeen, M., and Lewis, W., *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran.* New York, 1980, 1981.

Lytle, M.H., *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance: 1941-1953.* New York, 1987.

Maclean, F., *Eastern Approaches.* London, 1949, 1974.

Mallat, C., 'Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon,' *Papers on Lebanon* 7. Oxford, APR88.

Mangold, T., *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, The CIA's Master Spy Hunter.* New York, 1991.

de Marenches, Count A., and Andelman, D.A., *The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism.* New York, 1992.

Melman, Y., and Raviv, D., *The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence.* London, 1989.

Misl-i Barf Ab Khahim Shod: Mozakerat-i 'Shora-yi Farmandahan-i Artesh,' (Dey-Bahman 1357). Tehran, 1986.

Mosley, L., *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network.* London, 1978.

Mostyn, T., *Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945-1990.* Oxford, 1991.

Mottahedeh, R., *The Mantle of The Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran.* New York, 1985.

Musaddiq, M., (H. Katouzian, ed.), *Musaddiq's Memoirs.* London, 1988.

Naraghi, E., *Des Palais Du Chah Aux Prisons De La Revolution.* Paris, 1991.

National Front of Iran (operating abroad), 'A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organization (SAVAK).' Unpublished manuscript, MAY71.

Norton, A.R., *Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon.* Austin, TX, 1987.

———, 'Musa Al-Sadr,' in *Political Leaders of the Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary,* B. Reich, ed.. New York, 1990.

O'Brien, W.V., *The Conduct of Just and Limited War.* New York, 1981.

Pahlavi, A., *Faces in A Mirror: Memoirs from Exile.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980.

Pahlavi, H.I.M. M.R. Shah, *Mission for My Country.* London, 1961.

Pejman, Col. I., *Arteshbod Hossein Fardust, Rais-i Sabeq-i Daftar-i Vizhe-yi Ettela'at va Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi, "Khidmat ya Khianat?"* Paris, 1991.

———, *Asrar Qatl Va Zindegani-yi Shigiftangiz-e Sepahbod Teimour Bakhtiar.* Paris, 1991.

Plate, T., and Darvi, A., *Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror.* London, 1981.

Quarrie, B., *The World's Secret Police.* London, 1986.

Radji, P.C., *In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah's Last Ambassador to London.* London, 1983.

Rafizadeh, M., *Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal, An Insider's Account of US Involvement in Iran.* New York, 1987.

Rai'in, E., *Huquq Begiran-i Ingilis dar Iran.* N.p., 1969.

———, *Faramush-Khaneh va Feremasoneri,* v. III. Great Britain, 1978.

Ramazani, R.K., *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations.* Charlottesville, 1975.

Randal, J., *The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers.* London, 1983.

Ranelagh, J., *The Agency : The Rise and Decline of the CIA.* New York, 1986.

Reeves, M., *Behind the Peacock Throne.* London, 1986.

Roosevelt, A., *For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer.* Boston, 1988.

Roosevelt, K., *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran.* New York, 1979.

Rosie, G., *The Directory of International Terrorism: The Definitive Reference Work on Terrorism.* New York, 1986.

Rourke, F.E., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy.* 3rd ed. Boston, 1984.

Rubin, B., *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran.* Oxford, 1980.

Sabri Tabrizi, G.-R., *Iran: A Child's Story, A Man's Experience.* Edinburgh, 1989.

Saleh, G.R.M., *Khatirat-i Siyasi-i Ahmad Aramesh.* Isfahan, 1990.

Salibi, K.S., *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976.* London, 1976.

Sampson, A., *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made.* London, 1975.

Savin, R., *Vakil Abad, Iran: a survivor's story.* Edinburgh, 1979.

Schahgaldian, N.B., 'The Iranian Military Under The Islamic Republic,' RAND National Defense Research Institute Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Santa Monica, CA, MAR87.

Seale, P., *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East.* London, 1988, 1990.

Secord, R., with Wurts, J., *Honoured and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos.* New York, 1992.

Segaller, S., *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990's.* San Diego, 1987, 1986.

Segev, S., *The Iranian Triangle.* New York, 1988.

Shariati, A., (trans. by H. Algar), *On The Sociology of Islam.* Berkeley, 1979.

——, (trans. by R. Campbell), *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique.* Berkeley, 1980.

——, (trans. by G.M. Fayez), *Man and Islam.* Mashad, 1982.

Sick, G., *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran.* New York, 1985, 1986, 1987.

Skocpol, T., *States and Social Revolutions.* Cambridge, 1979.

Sobhani, S., *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988.* New York, 1989.

Stempel, J.D., *Inside The Iranian Revolution.* Bloomington, 1981.

Sterling, C., *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism.* London, 1981.

Sullivan, W.H., *Mission to Iran.* New York, 1981.

Taber, R., *The War of the Flea.* London, 1965, 1969, 1970.

Taheri, A., *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution.* London, 1985.

——, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West.* London, 1987.

Taleqani, Aya. Sayyid M., *Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations.* Berkeley, 1982.

Thaiss, G., 'The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change,' in Yar-Shater, E., ed., *Iran Faces the Seventies.* New York, 1971.

Theroux, P., *The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr.* London, 1987.

Thompson, R., *Defeating Communist Insurgency.* London, 1966.

de Villiers, G., *SAS Contre CIA.* Paris, 1965.

Weber, M., (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.), *Economy and Society,* v. II. Berkeley and London, 1968, 1978.

Wilber, D.N., *Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions.* Princeton, 1986.

Winks, R., *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961.* New York, 1987.

Wise, D., *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power.* New York, 1973.

Woodhouse, C.M., *Something Ventured.* London, 1982.

Yergin, D., *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.* London, 1991, 1992.

Zabih, S., *The Communist Movement in Iran.* Berkeley, 1966.

——, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War.* London, 1988.

Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi, v. II, *Jostarha-i as Tarikh-i Moaser-i Iran.* Tehran, 1990.

Zonis, M., *The Political Elite of Iran.* Princeton, 1971.

——, 'Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran,' in Farer, T.J., ed., *Toward A Humanitarian Diplomacy: A Primer for Policy.* New York, 1980.

——, *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah.* Chicago, 1991.

Zonis, M., and Brumberg, D., 'Khomeini, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab World,' *Harvard Middle East Papers,* Modern Series: n. 5. Cambridge, MA, 1987.

Articles

'A Hand for Khomeini' *The New Republic,* (24DEC84).

Abrahamian, E., 'Interview with Ahmad Ashraf: Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution,' *MERIP Reports,* v. 13, (MAR-APR83).

Algar, H., 'An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran,' *Middle East Studies,* v. 6, n. 1 (OCT70).

Arab Report and Record, (1-14FEB73).

Arjani, C., review of Bill and Louis, *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil,* in *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin,* v. 16, n. 2 (1989).

'Awqaf alayh-i Mazhab Tajhiz Shudeh Bud,' *Keyhan,* (19MAR79).

Baldwin, G.H., 'The Foreign-Educated Iranian: A Profile,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 17, n. 2 (Summer 1963).

'Banisadr on Fardoost [*sic*],' *Iran Press Digest,* (17SEP86).

Bartsch, W.H., 'The Industrial Labour Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 25, n. 1 (Winter 1971).

Batatu, H., 'Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 35, n. 3 (Autumn 1981).

Bayat, A., 'Capital Accumulation, Political Control and Labour Organization in Iran, 1965-75,' *Middle East Studies,* v. 25 (1989).

Beaumont, R., 'Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* v. 1, n. 1 (APR90).

Bialer, U., 'The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy – 1948-1951,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 39, n. 2 (Spring 1985).

Bill, J.A., 'The Politics of Student Alienation: The Case of Iran,' *Iranian Studies,* v. 2 (1969).

Binder, L., 'The Cabinet of Iran: A Case Study in Institutional Adaptation,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 16, n. 1 (Winter 1962).

Bouguereau, J.-M., 'Henri Curiel, Revolutionnaire de Tous Les Soupçons,' *Liberation,* (24APR84).

Bozeman, A.B., 'Iran: US Foreign Policy and the Tradition of Persian Statecraft,' *Orbis,* v. 23, n. 2 (Summer 1979).

Brewer, S.P., 'Unrest Is Viewed As Threat in Iran,' *New York Times,* (2JAN58).

Calis, R., 'The Shiite Pimpernel,' *The Middle East,* (NOV78).

Carr, H., 'The Foundation of the Grand Lodge of Iran,' *Ars Quatuor Coronatorum,* v. 81 (1968).

Chubin, S., 'Leftist Forces in Iran,' *Problems of Communism,* (JUL-AUG80).

Cooley, J.K., 'Shah promotes security in Lebanon,' *Christian Science Monitor,* (19APR78).

Croziat, V.J., 'Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie,' *Marine Corps Gazette,* (OCT75).

Entelis, J.P., 'Structural Change and Organizational Development in the Lebanese Kata'ib Party,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 27, n. 1 (Winter 1973).

Farazian, A.A., review of Rafizadeh, *Witness,* in 'Aya Jameh-yi Irani In Hameh Ahanat-ha va Narava Goftan-ha Ra Bayad Bipasokh Bigzarad?,' *Rah-e-Zendegi,* (n.d.).

'Fardoost [*sic*] Appears on TV,' *Iran Press Digest,* (7APR87).

'Fardoost [*sic*] Dies,' *Iran Press Digest,* (26MAY87).

Fatemi, K., 'Leadership By Distrust: The Shah's *Modus Operandi,' Middle East Journal,* v. 36, n. 1 (Winter 1982).

Gage, N., 'US-Iran Links Still Strong,' *New York Times,* (9JUL78).

Gasiorowski, M.J., 'The 1953 *Coup D'Etat* in Iran,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (1987).

———, 'The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25 (1993).

Gazit, S., and Handel, M., 'Intelligence Warfare against Terrorist Organizations,' *Maarachot,* n. 278 (JAN-FEB81).

Guillepaud, J.-C., 'Les tribulations d'un "tueur" de la Savak,' *Le Monde,* (8APR77).

Handel, M.I., 'The Study of Intelligence,' *Orbis,* v. 26, n. 4 (Winter 1983).

Harrison, S.S., 'Nightmare in Baluchistan,' *Foreign Policy,* (1978).

'Hayadah va Giti as Mushtariyan-e Awqaf,' *Iran Times,* (11APR79).

Hersh, S., 'Ex-Analyst Says CIA Rejected Warnings on Shah,' *Washington Post,* (7JAN79).

'The Hojjatieh Society — Its History, Advocates, and Opponents,' *Iran Press Digest,* (28SEP82 and 5OCT82).

Hottinger, A., 'Zu'ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 15, n. 2 (Spring 1961).

Ignatius, D., 'In From the Cold,' *Wall Street Journal,* (19OCT79).

'Iran: A Year After,' *The Economist,* (23FEB80).

Isnard, J., 'Des Agents du SDECE contestent l'orientation donnée à leurs activités en Afrique,' *Le Monde,* (26OCT79).

'Israel's Iran Connection,' *Israel & Palestine,* (JAN87).

Jam, F., 'Asharaty bih Adaha-yi Arteshbod-i Sabeq-i Artesh-i Iran Hossein Fardust va Merury bar Kitab-i Khatirat-i U zir 'nvan "Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi",' *Rahavard,* v. VIII, n. 29 (Spring 1992).

Kalaris, G., & McCoy, L., 'Counter-intelligence for the 1990's,' *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence,* v. 2, n. 2, (Summer 1988).

Kaplan, C., and Halliday, F., 'The SAVAK-CIA Connection,' *The Nation,* (4MAR80).

Keddie, N. R., 'The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change, 1800-1969: An Overview,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971).

Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1956-1980.

Kennedy, D., and Brunetta, L., 'Lebanon and the Intelligence Community,' *Kennedy School of Government Case Program,* Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy, with support from the CIA, (1988).

Khalidi, T., review of Ajami, *The Vanished Imam,* in *Journal of Palestine Studies,* v. XVI, n. 3 (Spring 1987).

al-Khazen, F., 'Kamal Jumblatt, The Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left,' *Middle Eastern Studies,* v. 24 (1988).

Khuri, F.I., 'The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 23, n. 1 (Winter 1969).

Kimche, J., 'Selling Out the Kurds,' *The New Republic,* (19APR75).

Ladjevardi, H., 'The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15 (1983).

Lillienthal, D.E., 'Enterprise in Iran: An Experiment in Economic Development,' *Foreign Affairs,* v. 38, n. 1 (OCT59).

Little, D., 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 44, n. 1 (Winter 1990).

Mahdavy, H., 'The Crisis in Iran,' *Foreign Affairs,* v. 44, n. 1 (OCT65).

Miller, W.G., 'Political Organization in Iran: From Dowreh to Political Party,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 23, n. 2 & 3 (Spring and Summer 1969).

Miyata, O., 'The Tudeh Military Network during the Oil Nationalization Period,' *Middle East Studies,* v. 23, n. 3 (JUL87).

'Mohakimih-yi Arteshbod Hossein Fardust dar Zendan-i Evin Payan Yaft,' *Keyhan,* (2JAN86).

Moq, 'Zindigi va Napadid Shudan-i Musa Sadr,' *Elm va Jameh,* Seventh Year, n. 42 (February-March 1986).

Morris, J., 'Begin airs secret Israeli aid to Kurds as reminder for Iraqis,' *Christian Science Monitor,* (6OCT80).

Moss, R. 'Who's Meddling in Iran?', *The New Republic,* (2DEC78).

Nourizadeh, A.R., 'Imam Musa Sadr, In Imam Qaib-i Hazir,' *Rouzegar-e No,* v. 7, (fifth year), (July-August 1986).

Oney, E.R., '"The Eyes and Ears of the Shah",' *Intelligence Quarterly,* v. 1, n. 4.

——, 'Drang Nach Islam Revisited,' *Intelligence Quarterly,* v. 3, n. 2.

——, review of Rafizadeh, *Witness,* in *Intelligence Quarterly,* v. 3, n. 4.

——, 'The SAVAK Émigré,' *Intelligence Quarterly,* v. 4, n. 1 (NOV88).

Organization of Democratic Youth and Students of Iran, eds., *Aus Dem SAVAK-Dossier: Die Westdeutsche Beziehung,* v. 2, n. 3 (JUL78).

'Persepolis: vielle Perse et jeune Iran,' *Le Monde,* (16OCT71).

Ramazani, R.K., 'Iran's "White Revolution": A Study in Political Development,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974).

——, 'Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy,' *Orbis,* v. 28, n. 4 (Winter 1975).

——, 'Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 32, n. 4 (Autumn 1978).

Randal, J.C., 'SAVAK Jails Stark Reminder of Shah's Rule,' *Washington Post,* (13DEC79).

Razi, G.H., 'The Press and Political Institutions of Iran: A Content Analysis of *Ettela'at* and *Keyhan,*' *Middle East Journal* v. 22, n. 4 (Autumn 1968).

Revolutionary Prosecutor-General, 'The Role of SAVAK,' *Iran Times,* (31AUG79).

Ricks, T.M., 'US Military Missions to Iran, 1943-1978: The Political Economy of Military Assistance,' *Iranian Studies,* v. XIII, n. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1979).

Roosevelt, A., 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 1 (JUL47).

Rose, G.F., 'The Shah's Secret Police Are Here,' *New York,* (18SEP78).

——, 'The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment,' *Iranian Studies* XVII, n. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1984).

Ruehsen, M. de M., 'Operation "Ajax" Revisited: Iran, 1953,' *Middle Eastern Studies,* v. 29, n. 3 (JUL93).

Sablier, E., 'L'extravagant en pyjama,' *Le Monde,* (18SEP53).

Salibi, K.S., 'Lebanon Under Fuad Chehab, 1958-1964,' *Middle Eastern Studies,* v. 2 (APR66).

'SAVAK Mamur-i Ijad-i Ikhtilaf-i Miyan-i Mardum va Ruhaniyat Bud,' *Keyhan,* (2APR79).

Sayigh, Y., 'Turning Defeat Into Opportunity: The Palestinian Guerrillas after the June 1967 War,' *Middle East Journal,* v. 46, n. 2 (Spring 1992).

'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?' *Elm va Jameh,* Sixth year, n. 40 (JUL-AUG85).

Schmidt, D.A., 'Iranian Aid Vital to Kurds,' *Christian Science Monitor,* (12DEC74).

'Silabat Imam, Shoknadi-yi Doshmanan-i Islam,' *Ettela'at,* (3JUN90).

Shapira, S., 'The Imam Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shi'ite Resurgence in Lebanon,' *Jerusalem Quarterly,* (Fall 1987).

Stoakes, F., 'The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State,' *Middle Eastern Studies,* v. 11 (JAN75).

Sulzberger, C.L., 'It's Everyone for Himself,' *New York Times,* (9FEB72).

'Trial of Fardoost [*sic*] Concluded,' *Iran Press Digest,* (7JAN86).

The Village Voice, (16FEB76).

Walz, J., 'Iran Voices Faith in Kurds' Loyalty,' *New York Times,* (26OCT58).

Weinbaum, M.G., 'Iran and Israel: The Discreet Entente,' *Orbis,* v. 28, n. 4 (Winter 1975).

Westermann, W.L., 'Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion,' *Foreign Affairs,* v. 24 (JUL46).

'Who's Really Who in Iran,' *Newsweek,* (14OCT74).

Wilson, G.C., 'US Intelligence Experts Misread Extent of Iran Riots, Officials Say,' *Washington Post,* (20NOV78).

Wirtz, J.J., review of D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy,* (Princeton, NJ, 1988), in 'Counterinsurgency Paradigms,' *International Security,* v. 14, n. 1 (Summer 1989).

Yazdi, M., 'Patterns of Clerical Behaviour in Postwar Iran, 1941-1953,' *Middle Eastern Studies* v. 26, n. 3 (JUL90).

Zonis, M., 'Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran,' *Comparative Political Studies,* v. 1, n. 3 (OCT68).

Government Documents

Asnad-i Laneh-yi Jasusi (these are the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency documents stolen from the US embassy in Tehran in 1979), volumes 7, 8, 9 & 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26.2, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 47, 51, 52, 55, 56, 61, 63, 68.

CIA, *International Terrorism in 1978,* (MAR79).

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, v. VIII, The Near East and Africa. Washington, DC, 1969.

——, 1958-1960, v. XI, Lebanon and Jordan. Washington, DC, 1992.

'International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis,' *CIA Research Study,* (APR76).

Military Governor of Tehran, *Kitab-i Siyah Dar Bareh-yi Sazeman-i Afsaran-i Tudeh.* Tehran, 1955.

US Congress, *CIA: The Pike Report.* Nottingham, 1977.

94th Cong., 2nd session, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Final Report: Book I, 'Foreign and Military Intelligence,' Appendix III.

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY CAMBRIDGE